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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the description of individial 
experiences of (architectural) space in a social milieu. 
Architecture, while considered to be primarily concerned with 
space as its medium, has a very impoverished (or occasionally, 
very contorted) verbal language in which to discuss space. 
The author, as a beginner teacher, noted this in attempts to 
explore spatial experience witli students of architecture, and 
resolved with their help to generate an appropriate verbal vehicle. 
The main body of the thesis relates this attempt and accounts for 
its failure. 
The Thesis, thus, follows three intertwined streams. 
1) A scientific investigation into means for the description of 
human experience of (architectural) space, using methods 
developed from Kelly's Personal Construct Theory Repertory 
Grids. 
2) A partially developed spatial analytic language, my 
personalresponse to 1) above, which is to be seen as the start of 
a new research programme that may last many years (the future 
of which is outlined). 
3) An account of a personal learning experience both from, 
around and through each of these. 
These streams are organised into three parts. 
Part 1: Background Studies - into work in associated areas and 
fields, with an assessment of their relevance to the undertaking 
presented here. 
Part 2: The Experiments - attempting (and failing) to create a 
language, and the transition from verbal to visual, with critical 
arguments and observations. 
Part 3: A New Beginning - learning from the failure of Part 2, and 
the argument for and commencement of a new research 
programme. 
This thesis is dedicated to Sam 
Stevens. 
"The end is in the beginning. and yet you go on. " 
Samuel Beckett, "Endgame" (1958). 
Now will you help me with the final chapter? 
LIST OF CONTENTS 
Volume 1 
Title 
Abstract 
Dedication 
List of Contents 
List of Figures ( appearing as 
List of Appendices (appearing 
Acknowledgements 
Prologue 
Foreword 
Introduction 
Part 1 
Volume 2) 
as Volume 3) 
Chapter 1: Architecture and Space 
Chapter 2: Environmental Psychology 
Chapter 3: Design Research 
Part 2 
11 
111 
V 
Vii 
viii 
ix 
X11 
xiv 
2 
27 
43 
65 
Chapter 4: My Problem 89 
Chapter 5: First Experiment - Inventing a Shared Lang uage 
93 
Chapter 6: Second Experiment - The Blindfold Survey 110 
Chapter 7: Third Experiment - Controlled Viewing 126 
Chapter 8: Three Spin-offs 139 
Chapter 9: The End is in the Beginning (and yet you go on) 
153 
Part 3 
Chapter 10: Architecture and Space for Thought 
Chapter 11: Learning: a Short History of the Future 
Bibliography 
160 
209 
222 
Volume 2 
Title 
Introductory Note 
List of Illustrations 
Illustrations A 
Illustrations B 
Illustrations C 
Illustrations D 
Illustrations E 
Illustrations F 
Illustrations G 
Illustrations H 
Illustrations I 
Sources of Illustrations 
Volume 3 
Title 
List of A ppendices 
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
Appendix C 
Appendix D 
Appendix E 
Appendix F 
Appendix G 
Appendix H 
Appendix I 
Appendix J 
Appendix K 
Appendix L 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (to be found in Volume 21) 
Section Title 
A Architectural Photographs 
B Blindfold Surveys 
C Constructs 
D Design Research. 
E Environmental Psychology 
F Terms and Statistics 
G Controlled Viewing and MOTIF 8 
H Architectural Drawings 
I Architectural Diagrams 
1 Illustration sources, where not the author, are listed by source in Volume 
2, in a special section. 
LIST OF APPENDICES (to be found in Volume 31) 
Appendix Title 
A Amazing Space! for the Architectural Stimulus- 
response Rat? 
B Is Architecture just a Hollow Space? Or is it the Empty 
Set? 
C Mapping Realities. 
D Impossible Worlds and Other Mythical Beasts. 
E Construct Games. 
F Why Design Research? 
G The Architecture of the Computable. 
H Construct Heterarchies. 
I The One Armed Bandit. 
J Motivation. 
K MOTIF 8 
L MOTIF 8X 
1 Some of the Appendices are fully referenced in the Bibliography (Volume 
1), but others are not. However, in the case of each of the Appendices a full 
reference will be found on their title pages. 
vi" 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Every time I read a list of acknowledgements, it seems to me to be 
a hedged list of potential omissions and excuses for making them. 
This is no exception, and I apologise for the inadequacy of this list 
in both its form and content. I don't know how I could mention 
everyone to whom I owe a debt in this work, even if I could 
remember them (you) all. So I start with the disclaimer that we all 
start with: if I have omitted you, I am truly sorry. Omission 
merely reflects my inadequacy, and all those who recognise their 
work, influence and ideas here are asked to accept that their own 
recognition is, in a sense, the best acknowledgement: for, in my 
opinion at least, the finest thing a teacher does is to make himself 
un-needed and unrecognised (and therefore largely forgotten) in 
the person he has taught. 
But for my own benefit, as a way of, as it were, wiping the slate 
clean of this particular debt, I should nevertheless like to thank 
the many people named. 
Firstly, all those who have been my teachers, who come in so 
many forms, from my mother and father Cecil and George, and 
step-father Rodie, to my son Severi! But, then, almost everyone is 
a teacher, and there are four who I would like to mention as 
formally occupying this role, by name. Firstly, there is my 
supervisor, Dr Laurie Thomas, who has put up with an irregular 
student whose irregular enquiries have often looked foolish but 
which, I trust, have finally borne fruit and are worthy of his 
attentions. Secondly, my former supervisor and now long-time 
colleague, Prof Dr Gordon Pask, who got me interested in the first 
place (and has since continuously nurtured that interest) in the 
academic way. Thirdly, there is my "Dutch Uncle", Prof Dr Gerard 
de Zeeuw, who has a remarkable knack of making the abstract 
appear real and reasonable, a skill I have lacked and yet often 
needed. And finally, there is Prof Thomas (Sam) Stevens, my 
dedicatee, about whom I can say little that is worthy of his magic. 
But that can't stop me, so I shall tell one anecdote: Sam it was who 
I overheard when I began as a student of architecture, giving 
what is still the only accpetable description of the critic's role that 
I have heard. He said that the critic does two things: he assesses 
the argument put forward on the grounds on which it is put 
forward (logic), and he questions those grounds when he feels 
offended by them (aesthetics). That opinion has served me ever 
since, and is just one example of how Sam can capture something 
complex and sophisticated in the clearest and briefest manner. 
ix 
And then I should like to thank all those teachers who have been 
colleagues. I have been very lucky with those I have worked with. 
Not only have they been courteous and understanding, they have 
also been highly talented, and I have been lucky to be able to 
teach with and learn from them. They include, at the Architectural 
Association School in London Dr Grahame Shane, Leon van Schaik, 
Dr Dick Bunt, Prof Sam Stevens and Stephen Gage, and Dr Annetta 
Pedretti: and the staff of the School of Architecture at Portsmouth 
Polytechnic, many of whom doubled for me while I had leave of 
absence to write this thesis. And there are my colleagues on the 
newly founded "1.2 Project" ("Support, Survival and Culture") at 
the Subfaculty of Andragology of the University of Amsterdam, 
and my friend Janos Gerle. -I am priviledged to have had the 
chance to work with such distinguished and generous colleagues. 
Then there are generations of students who have tolerated my 
sometimes unusual approach to teaching and project setting, and 
who have supported me in my research by being willing 
participants and sensitive critics. Over the years there have been 
so many (and in so many countries where I have been invited to 
teach) that it would be impossible to list them. Without them there 
would be no experimental results, and there would- have been no 
chance of proposing, testing and developing or rejecting ideas. 
Similarly, there are the staff and members of the Centre for the 
Study of Human Learning, especially Dr Thomas and Dr Sheila 
Harri-Augstein, who have allowed my work to progress and whose 
own flow of creativity and imagination has remained an 
inspiration over many years. There are few places of which 
anyone can say that they have always enjoyed their visits, and 
always benefitted from the discussions there: the CSHL is one such, 
in my experience. _ 
There are also those who kindly granted me access to sites in 
which my experiments could take place: for instance, the trustees 
of the Art Space Gallery, London, the committee of the Covent 
Garden Community Association, the vicar of St Paul's, Covent 
Garden, and the Bedford Estate, as well as those who provided 
sites for "demonstration runs" in, eg, Belfast. And there are those 
of my colleagues at Portsmouth - Dr Jonathan Sime, Dr Michi 
Kimura and Dr Chris Creed - who, as "proper" environmental 
psychologists have, as it were, allowed me access to that site, too, 
providing also encouragement, criticism and correction. 
Finally, I wish to thank those who have given me substantive 
X 
support. The Architectural Association School, under its Chairman 
Prof Alvin Boyarsky, has allowed me the chance to run "wild" 
projects in which I had the chance to fulfil myself and that were 
not, I hope, merely self-indulgent: most of the experimental work 
described here was initially undertaken at and with the support of 
the AA. Portsmouth Polytechnic School of Architecture, under Prof 
Geoffrey Broadbent, has challenged me and given me the travel 
and experiential opportunities to develop the ideas I now have 
about space (probably quite unwittingly), and, through the offices 
of Prof James Powell (associate head of the School of Architecture), 
David Parham and Jay Potts (course leaders in the School of 
Architecture), Dean of the Faculty of Environmental Faculties, Dr 
Michael Bateman and Dr Harry Law, President of the Polytechnic, 
has given me the month off I needed to perform the major part of 
writing my material up in this form. And the Subfaculty of 
Andragology of the University of Amsterdam, under Prof Gerard 
de Zeeuw, has lent (= given) me the Macintosh computer and M/S 
WORD wordprocessor on which I wrotel, as well as much other 
support, both general and specific. 
And thank you Diana, Jo and Kiko, for things only you know about. 
I am sorry to those who have been omitted but should not have 
been: all selection is arbitrary, but all omissions in the 
acknowledgements are mine and mine alone. 
And so are all omissions and errors in the text. Mea culpa, and I 
am not ashamed of it! 
Ranulph Glanville 
Portsmouth 
25.3.88 
1 In preparing this document I have used a number of versions of this 
wordprocessor, including some test versions. This has lead to some strange 
page ejects that I have not been able to correct. Even consultation with the 
manufacturere has not lead to a resolution of this problem. 
xi 
Author's note: this quote appears as an introduction in John Lilly's 
"Centre of the Cyclone" (Lilly (1972)), where it is stated that it is 
taken from George Spencer Brown's "The Laws of Form" (Spencer 
Brown (1968)). It is to be found towards the end of Appendix 1 
("Proofs of Sheffer's Postulates") of Spencer Brown's book. 
Discoveries of any great moment in mathematics and other 
disciplines, once they are discovered, are seen to be extremely 
simple and obvious, and make everybody, including their 
discoverer, appear foolish for not having discovered them' before. 
It is all too often forgotten that the ancient symbol for 
prenascence of the world* is a fool, and that foolishness, being a 
divine state, is not a condition to be either proud or ashamed of. 
Unfortunately we find systems of education today that have 
departed so far from the plain truth that they now teach us to be 
proud of what we know and ashamed of ignorance. This is doubly 
corrupt not only because pride is in itself a mortal sin, but also 
because to teach pride in knowledge is to put an effective barrier 
against any advance upo n what is already know, since it makes 
one ashamed to look beyond the bounds imposed by one's 
ignorance. 
To any person prepared to enter with respect into the realm of 
this great and universal ignorance, the secrets of being will 
eventually unfold, and they will do so in a measure according to 
his freedom from natural and indoctrinated shame in his respect 
of their revelation. 
In the face of the strong, and indeed violent, social pressures 
against it, few people have been prepared to take this simple and 
satisfying course towards sanity. And in a society where a 
prominent psychiatrist can advertise that, given the chance, he 
would have treated Newton to electric shock therapy, who can 
blame any person for being afraid to do so? 
* wer = man, ald = age, old. The world may be taken to be the manifest 
properties of the all, its identity with the age of man being evident through 
the fact that man is a primary animal with a hand ('manifest' coming from 
manus = hand, festus =struck). Thus the world is considerably less that the 
all, which includes the unmanifest, but considerably greater that 'the' 
universe (more correctly, than any universe), which is merely the formal 
appearance of one of the possible manifestations which make up the 
world. 
X11 
To arrive at the simplest truth, as Newton knew and practised, 
requires years of contemplation. Not activity. Not reasoning. Not 
calculating. Not busy behaviour of any kind. Not reading. Not 
talking. Not making any effort. Not thinking. Simply bearing in 
mind what it is one needs to know. And yet those with the 
courage to tread this path to real discovery are not only offered 
practically no guidance on how to do so, they are actively 
discouraged and have to set about it in secret, pretending 
meanwhile to be diligently engaged in the frantic diversions and 
to conform with the deadening personal opinions that are being 
continually thrust upon them. 
In these circumstances, the discoveries that any person is able to 
undertake represent the places where, in the face of induced 
psychosis, he has, by his own faltering and unaided efforts, 
returned to sanity. Painfully, and even dangerously, maybe. But 
nonetheless returned, however furtively. 
G. Spencer Brown 
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FOREWORD 
The work presented in this thesis has been in progress, at various 
paces and places, over the course of the last 15 years, and may be 
divided, loosely, into 4 periods. Three of these 4 periods are 
explicitly referred to here in the structuring of the main text into 
its 3 main parts (plus extensive appendices). 
The first of these is familiarisation: with the area of constructivist 
psychologies and cybernetics, and of design research, and with the 
realisation that I had a problem in not being able to discuss clearly 
the main material of concern to architects as a medium - 
architectural space - which I was meant to be teaching to 
architecture students. This story is told in part 1. 
The second was a period that, although it overlapped the first, 
may be thought of as distinct, for the purposes of this document. 
In it, the 3 experiments that are recounted here in specific detail 
were carried out, under various circumstances and on several 
occasions. This story is told in part 2. (Further experiments, as well 
as the 3 that are mainly recounted, are referred to in the 
appendices, but are considered secondary to the main argument as 
presented here. ) 
The third period is invisible. It is a longish period in which I was 
(actively) doing other things, of chewing the cud, and of seemingly 
idle dreaming (how often is a daydream productive! ). There is 
nothing to report of this time: it is as if I was completely absent 
from this area of research, doing other things. But, during this 
period, ideas formed and formented, firmed up and fermented in 
the way in which they do, and the fourth period thus became 
possible, even necessary. This story is not told here. 
The fourth period is the one I am still in. In it, I have found ( and 
have needed to find) a different way in which to try to tackle my 
problem, one that is much more inward-looking and reflective. 
This period is represented by the story in the single chapter of the 
third part, which chapter should be taken as a start rather than an 
end. It may be considered as the beginning of a new and highly 
personals research project that follows on from the failures 
1 Especially in the sense that I am using myself as my own greatest 
resource, in the most introspective manner, relying almost exclusively 
upon my understanding of how I have come to understand.... 
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recounted in the previous parts, and from what I learnt from 
them. Whereas what I recount in the first 2 parts might be largely 
familiar (although never previously co-ordinated in this manner) 
this part has not appeared in written form before, even if some of 
the ideas in it have been developed and presented in lectures, 
seminars and teaching projects2. 
These 3 parts, which constitute the first volume of the work are 
followed by two further volumes - the illustrative material, and 
the collection of appendices. The separate volume in which the 
illustrations appear is unusually organised. The reasons are two: I 
find it especially aggravating to have to turn backwards and 
forwards within one volume, looking for an illustration that cannot 
fit on the same page as the related text; and in the hope that 
illustrations of like material may be grouped together so that a 
better overview is presented. As for the appendices, mostly, these 
are publications prepared during the earlier periods, detailing 
larger ranges of experiments and giving examples, although there 
are a couple that have only just been written and are currently 
being submitted to the publication procedure. 
The text is written, unusually for a doctoral dissertation, in a style 
that is informal, personal and chatty. I make no apology for the 
style in which I have chosen to write, but I should, perhaps, 
comment on it. The papers were, as I have indicated, largely 
extant before this text was commenced. Its role was, in essence, 
therefore, not so much to present new material (until part 3), but 
to compose old material into a coherent whole that was both 
attractive and sensible. It was my choice to do this in a very 
personal way, writing what I almost think of as a psychological 
detective story. I believe this is more interesting, informative and 
attractive to read than the story told in other modes of 
presentation would be, and I also believe that it is a far more 
honest account of what went on: for I cannot accept the traditional 
(and in my opinion, quite untruthfully misleading) position 
ascribed to the scientific observer as being external to his 
experiment. Especially in a study in a field in which the human is 
the concern, such as psychology, there is as much to be learnt from 
what and how this human (and every other experimenter) learnt, 
2 There is a generation of students at Portsmouth Polytechnic School of 
Architecture who still argue the toss over the notions of "+ ve, 0 and - ve 
space" (see chapter 10), which I introduced to them in the first year courses 
beginning 1980 and 1981, and which are central to the understandings 
developed in the third part of this document. See the later discussion, 
especially in chapter 11. 
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and how I can account for that, as there is to be learnt from the 
more formal results of the experiments themselves. The 
importance of this learning becomes apparent, even if it is not 
explicitly emphasised, in the last chapter, for the change in 
approach, and the difference in results (as well as the extra- 
ordinary fortuitousness and genuine good luck behind some of the 
sources) could not, I believe, have occurred had this whole process 
not been a profound and self-organised learning experience and 
adventure for me, and, equally, would be less comprehensible and, 
hopefully, valuable to the reader were I not to tell that (part of) 
the story. 
Ranulph Glanville 
Portsmouth 
26.3.88 
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2 
INTRODUCTION 
"Once we lose faith in the blanket formula of education, in the 
magic fashion in which education, using the passive capacities of 
children, is to create something out of nothing, we can turn our 
attention to the vital matter of developing individuals, who as 
adults gradually mould our old patterns into new and richer 
forms. " ("Growing up in New Guinea", Margaret Mead (1942)) 
POSITION STATEMENT 
There are many tasks that may be accomplished in an 
Introduction. For instance, in an Introduction an author can 
explain what he is concerned with and why, the approach he 
chooses to take and his method of working, and the general 
relationship of his work to other work in the field, the field in_ 
general and even other fields. He should outline the form that his 
presentation of his work takes, and can even be a little 
autobiographical! An introduction both sets the context of the 
work described and provides some sort of overview and guide. 
In this introduction, I essay all of these, although not quite in the 
clearcut manner indicated abovel. - 
What I introduce is 3 areas and approaches that form the subject 
matter of this piece of work. They are: 
I IN GENERAL, I DO NOT LIKE, JUST FOR THE REASONS VICKERS (1983) INDICATES, 
FOOTNOTES, ESPECIALLY IN AN INTRODUCTION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE 
VARIETY OF BACKGROUNDS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS WORK, AND ALSO 
BECAUSE, ONLY IN THIS INTRODUCTION IS THE WORK OF SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO 
WERE ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH IT WAS CONCEIVED AND 
DEVELOPED MENTIONED, I HAVE DECIDED TO USE FOOTNOTES EXTENSIVELY: IN THIS 
CHAPTER TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS CONTEXT, ELSEWHERE, TO ALLOW AN (OPTIONAL) 
ENRICHMENT OF THE TEXT BY THE REPORTING OF THIS CONTEXT. 
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1) A scientific investigation into means for the description of 
human experience of (architectural) space, using methods 
developed from Kelly's Personal Construct Theory Repertory 
Grids. 
2) A partially developed spatial analytic language, my own 
response to 1) above, which is to be seen as the start of a new 
research programme that may last many years, for which a 
future is outlined. 
3) An account of a personal learning experience, by myself and 
others, both from, around and through each of these. 
TENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY 
There are many different approaches to psychology, although 
perhaps not quite as many as there are psychologists! Most 
psychological discourse can rapidly be recognised as belonging to 
and espousing one of several distinct main approaches, usually 
referred to as schools. This text presents work that might be 
considered, perhaps, as another- psychology from another 
psychologist, which, if it fits in anywhere in the general cannon, 
relates to the reflexive psychology of George Kelly and his 
followers plus R. D. Laing (1966), married to the constructivist 
approach pioneered by Piaget (1967,1973), betrothed (almost) 
to the analysist-ic Adlerian approach to reliance on the self, and 
re-inforced and given backbone by the recent cybernetic 
approach to cognition and epistemology espoused by Pask, Beer, 
Maturana, Spencer Brown, von Foerster (to whose work Piaget 
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became much attached in his last years) and myself2. In turn, 
this derives both from classical cybernetics of Wiener (1948) and 
Ashby (1956) and from Wittgenstein (1971) (though not as 
appreciated by the Logical Positivists), and strongly moulded by 
the interactive, self-organisational inspirations of Thomas and 
Harri-Augstein ( Harri-Augstein, Thomas et at (1977), Harri- 
Augstein, Smith and Thomas (1982), and, especially, Thomas and 
2 This cybernetic work is characterised by its concern for the circularity of 
causality, and by the insistence on the unbridgeable distinction between 
the self and the other, especially as indicated in "self-reference". Thus, 
Gordon Pask ((1976a), but especially, and more movingly in "The Limits of 
Togetherness" (1980)), whose main original interest was the building of 
machines that could learn and therefore might be able to teach, has 
demonstrated that the means of our interaction is not the unidirectional 
causal chain, but the circular conversation, itself as much a part of the 
interchange as the "ideas" we are supporting, and that all those things that 
can be known (Pask, Scott and Kallikourdis (1975)), including ourselves, 
must be thought of as circularly formed - organisationally closed, but informationally open is the popular phrase; Humberto Maturana, of "What 
the Frog's Eye tells the Frog's Brain" (Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and 
Pitts (1959)) fame, working firstly with von Foerster, then with Francisco 
Varela and Ricardo Uribe, developed an account of the self-generation of 
living systems, where components (which can only be understood as such 
after the event) form into wholes which re-produce from within their 
environment both the components of which the whole is manufactured and 
the means of manufacturing - the procedure or organisation - referred to 
as "Autopoiesis" (cf "Allopoiesis") (see Varela, Maturana and Uribe (1974)), 
which, in turn, has spawned the more abstract musings of Varela (cg 
(1975)) in the area of self-referential and re-entrant logics, and the more 
socially based work of, eg, Luhmann (1986) and Beer - who worked with Maturana, Varela and Uribe in Chile in Salvatore Allende's tragic 
government - work in Management (Beer (1975)); and von Foerster's work 
on the Construction of Realities (1973), based strongly in Spencer Brown's 
(1968) logic of indications, and, most particularly on how self-regenerative 
systems (as beautifully described in the circular paper "Notes on an 
Epistemology for Living Things" (1976a)) can appear, externally, to have a 
stable and / or stabilising behaviour, and Eigen behaviour (1976b). It was 
he who invented the notion of the "Cybernetics of Cybernetics" (1974), of 
observing as well as of observed systems. My own research work lies 
largely in this field, and continues. Of works cited elsewhere in this text, 
the references (Glanville (1975) (1982) and (1987 a, b and c)) are, perhaps, 
of most immediate concern. My particular interest is in showing that, in 
order for any "normal" observation to be made, there must first be the 
observation of the self, and this is the form which gives identity (self- 
control), and is thus fundamental. A book of selected papers on this topic 
will shortly be appearing, in German. 
S 
Harri-Augstein (1985)). le, it may fall, possibly extremely 
unhappily, between several stools! 
In many respects it ems a story of failure: failure of method, failure 
of experimental result, even failure of the whole project (as it 
came to be seen). But, in this failure, there was much learnt, by 
me-the-experimenter, by experimental subjects and colleagues, 
and about the limitations of certain types of question and 
approach in the examination of human cognition. Most of all, I 
learnt that, if you keep your eyes open, you can learn a lot, 
frequently quite unexpectedly, from an experiment that does not 
do what you wanted: and that if you allow experiments (and 
experimental subjects) a certain life of their own, and watch 
what happens, you stand to gain. For, he who will know must 
take risks, and there is no learning without the risk of failure 
which, when it happens, may, nevertheless, be turned into a 
source of learning. Thus it is that this text records a history of (a 
selection from my) experiments, their failures and the successes 
that were (more often than not) accidental side-results: and it, 
therefore, naturally, records the development of -y 
understanding - that is, the understanding of this experimenter. 
I have explained, in the foreword, that I make no apology for 
this personal approach - for the involvement of my self as a 
participant in the experiment and learning processes - and I 
shall often write in the first person. Psychology is the study of 
(some varieties of) mental activity and mental activity is done by 
and large by people like you and me (I discount, on both 
experiential and theoretical grounds, the current claims for an 
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Artificial Intelligence: the structure of present-day machines, 
and their environments / sensory facilities, together with the 
instructional as opposed to self-motivational learning make a 
nonsense of this notion of intelligence as being anywhere but in 
the eye of the programming beholder. But this is another 
discussion. (See Glanivlle (1980) for an outline of my views. ) Any 
proper study in psychology must include the observer in the 
experiment, for humans are, even under the most extreme of 
circumstances, not without interaction (Glanville (1987a), and to 
pretend otherwise is to take not only a very naive, but also a 
very unrealistic position. Equally, a scientist who does not learn 
is not a scientist. Asserting this, is not, of course, taking away in 
- the least from the extra-ordinary achievements of scientists in 
the presentation of their concerns "qua Scientia". But, as Kelly 
(1955a) was so very fond of asserting (although in a slightly 
different context), we are all "personal scientists", and it is we 
who learn the truths of science and how to appreciate and 
manipulate them - including those entities of our social delight, 
persons. 
In fact, it has been one of the substantial and profound 
contributions of cybernetics over the course of the last 15 years 
or so to make the position of the learning observer clear and 
respectable, arguing its necessity to the most rigorous of logical 
criteria, so that, now, it seems astonishing that any other position 
could have held sway: although, I suspect, it never did in the 
minds of creative scientists, who understood that the conventions 
of presentation used in science (as introduced in experimental 
write-ups at school, and required by the journals) are just that: 
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conventions (even prescriptions) of presentation (and not, as so 
many textbooks and popular philosophers of the scientific myth 
would have us believe, the actual content3). This means, in my 
terms, that we should appreciate Popper's (1963) position, for 
instance, as an assertion of what science should, or at least could, 
aspire towards (rather than what it actually is or how it actually 
is done, the social activity): we have Kuhn (1970) to thank for 
suggesting we look at what scientists do, not what they say they 
do, Lakatos (1970) for explaining the social reluctance of 
scientists to change (until a Thomian catastrophe makes it 
unavoidable, as I predict will shortly occur in, for instance, post- 
Chomskyian linguistics), and Feyerabend (1975) for making us 
question the special value and veracity we are prepared to give 
(above all others) to the scientific description of the world. All of 
which goes to support the argument I have been making for 
some time, that knowledge is designed (learning is a form of 
designing-in of new discoveries, for without designing them into 
what we already know, we merely have an unco-ordinated list of 
discoveries which is without coherence and, thus, characteristics 
such as constancy, prediction for action, etc): science is, therefore, 
properly considered as a branch of design (and not, as has been 
foolishly posited even by many whose work is referred to later, 
vice versa). This is usually seen, initially, as a rather surprising 
statement, but reflection gives it credence even when no further 
argument is presented. 
3 For an elaboration of my position in this matter. see "Why Design 
Research" (Glanville (1981)). 
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Thus, it is probably reasonable to say that my approach and 
interests have been much closer to those of the anthropologist of 
the "suck-it-and-see" school (as, for instance, depicted in the 
Introduction to Margaret Mead's (1942) "Growing up in New 
Guinea", where she claims she went into her study without a pre- 
ordained thesis to test, but rather to develop a thesis that might 
work) than of the conventional academic psychologist of recent 
times. So my "experiments" tend to be less concerned with 
testing hypotheses, as most scientific experiments are supposed 
to be, than with developing them so that learning can arise via 
them, for by and from myself. (Thus, I am at least in part my 
own subject, and, like - although not as rigorously as - John 
Lilly's medical professor, I carry out the experiment on myself 
(Lilly (1972)). ) As a polarised over-simplification, I would claim 
that I prefer to do experiments in order to find out and generate 
ideas, more than to check ideas I've already had4. 
However, neither this introduction nor the work it introduces are 
intended as a philosophical discussion, even if philosophical 
assumptions can never be hidden far beneath the surface, and 
4 This has been the cause of some (continuing) confusion and frustration 
between myself and my supervisor, who has often said to me that he is 
never sure what the purpose of one of my experiments is. This comment 
has caused me to think carefully and explicitly about what I have been 
doing, and the intentions behind it, and to formalise and assert this 
"anthropologist's" position (which I have checked to be accurate). In a 
sense, the view I champion here is somewhat old-fashioned, for it places 
enormous value on exacting, detailed and rather "cool" observation. 
However, it is still in use as a prime material source, in, for instance, 
studies of animal behaviour. The difference regarding my position, is that 
I use it to allow me to generate understandings, in myself, of myself and 
by myself, that I may test and then correct, and then account for as an 
experience: ie, in my explicit and expounded internalisations. But the 
essential "ambiguousness" and "openness" of my aims does, indeed, 
remain, and is one feature of this work that I consider to be important and 
a source of both learning and interest. 
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should never be forgotten or lightly dismissed (failure to 
appreciate and continue to take cognisance of them may make 
this appear a very strange document! ) Rather, this is the record 
of a voyage of discovery and of the learning that resulted, 
summarising work that I have carried out over the last 15 or so 
years, since I first explicitly studied cybernetics and discovered I 
was also doing, without cognisantly or intentionally either 
realising or intending it, quite a lot of psychology. 
THE VOYAGE AND THE VOYAGER 
The sea (and, to me it was a very stormy ocean in which I felt 
myself becoming a progressively smaller boat) through which 
this voyage took place was architecture. I should explain why, 
for it was architecture, and my relationship to it, that caused the 
initial problems that were to generate the work described here 
to surface; provided the environment and the experimental 
subjects; taught me about design (and led to me studying 
cybernetics); and has remained mysterious and enchanting 
enough still to keep me entranced with what I would generally 
claim is its existence-beyond-the-utterable. Without architecture 
I doubt that I would have acquired the particular interest in 
psychology that I developed, or that I would have approached it 
as I did (and still do): nor would I have discovered the discipline 
that I was taught to apply to the imagination, and the value of 
this application, during my (continuing) studies of cybernetics, or 
have been able to see design, as I have indicated above, as an 
activity of great and general value in its own right. 
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When I studied architecture (which I did for my first 7 years of 
post school study), the "world" seemed a very different 
environment to the rather grim and conformist one we currently 
inhabit. Architecture students were led, for instance, by the 
Utopian dreamings of Buckminster Fuller, the cartoon fun 
architecture of Archigram, the scandalously off-hand and 
"respectless" approach of Cedric Price, and the belief that 
technology could master everything (a view largely encouraged 
by NASA's moon shots and the simplicity and apparent 
universality of the (quark) model in Physics, which seemed to 
finally solve the "problem" of matter). And they survived in the 
aura of hippy happenings where anyone and everyone could do 
everything and anything, felt an optimistic megalomania - in the 
benign interpretation that architecture was, and could achieve, 
everything - that now seems truly astonishing, but which 
allowed me to pass through architecture school doing the very 
minimum necessary - and always late - in the way of what 
would now be recognised as "architecture" itself. 
Instead, I composed music, and performed with my own (one of 
the earliest live-electronic and mixed media) and other bands. 
Indeed, the current Chairman of the School I attended (the 
Architectural Association School in London) still chooses to 
introduce me as the student who got a diploma in architecture 
for writing electronic music, largely by frightening the 
examination committee out of the room before they could pass or 
fail him, because of the volume and audiousness of the 
concatenated noises presented at the examination. Thus, I got 
through and left architecture school with little more 
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understanding of the main concern of architecture, the generous 
creation of space, to provide "Commodotie, firmnesse and 
delighte" (as $$Sir Henry Wootton put it in his English translation 
of Vitruvius), than the average layman. I had scraped through 
with the minimal possible contribution, in an era when the 
maximum was often minimal, usually achieved through use of 
the most mechanistic devices of organisation, in the manner 
publicised and supposedly (though not actually) used by 
Maldonado and the Ulm School, to be realised in the Braun 
collection of commestibles that grace our yuppie designerly (and 
to be photographed) homes to this day. 
Given this unlikely start, it was hardly surprising that I did not 
wish to face the tedium (as I then imagined it) of working in the 
conventional architect's office. I was too much a "free-thinker", 
and, in my own arrogant yet naive mind, "important" - or, worse 
still, "significant" - ask my employers from my student days. 
Instead, and rather to my surprise, I discovered I was studying 
for a doctorate in cybernetics. (Architecture, to this day, provides - 
a very good general education, and a remarkable number of 
people, trained as architects, have turned out to be-very good at 
something else, including the novelist and poet Thomas Hardy, 
and the mathematician-composer Yannis Xenakis). But much 
more surprising, even, than this, was that I was invited to teach 
architecture. 
In teaching a field, it seems to me you must, necessarily, also be 
a student of the field and of your own students, at least if the 
field is one of those creative fields which cannot effectively be 
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taught by lecturing instruction and blind example. (I believe, 
ardently, that nothing should be taught in this manner. ) And so, 
through no active effort or intent of my own, I found myself with 
a second chance to study architecture (at a rather better rate of 
pay than I had had through my student grant). 
I soon found that there was this mysterious substance, 
previously unknown to me, that architects, in the dusk and 
confusions of the '60's, were beginning to talk about again, and 
about which I understood in an architectural sense virtually 
nothing at all. Yet I was expected to teach in the company of 
those who at least claimed they did understand this substance, 
which was SPACE. My first response was to find methods of 
controlling arguments, and ways of hiding ignorance, so that I 
could pick up on what was being said without loss of face, 
claiming all the time that it was my own (which technique I still 
find useful and exploit to this day, most recently with a builder 
about a conversion job): my second, to try to find a means of 
discussing space -a vocabulary - so I could make this material I 
neither understood nor appreciated tangible. Of course, I failed: 
and it took me a long time to -discover why and to try to do 
something about it. But it was also the beginning of the voyage 
that I recount in this text, a voyage which, like almost everything 
else recounted above, began by accident and led to unlikely 
places and discoveries. Serendipity has served me well and with 
great generosity, and its kindness to me may help explain the 
slightly open, laissez faire attitude which I have tried to explain, 
and which I clearly have to experiments, experimental subjects, 
and the growth of knowledge, at least in comparison to some. 
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I stated that I in no sense apologise for the autobiographical non- 
exclusion of myself from this account. I have introduced my 
belief that experiments and science are enlightened by the 
presentation of the circumstances in which they happen. Without 
taking these positions, and in the light of the above, I believe it 
would be very hard to understand the why of the investigation, 
and its methods, from which so much else of my work comes, 
and related to which so much else of my work is. 
PSYCHOLOGIES 
Nor am I embarrassed by the way in which I have approached 
the field of psychology, with more than a little something of the 
naive innocent: for psychology was never a subject I studied, or 
even considered studying, at undergraduate level, but is rather 
something I happened upon when I found myself doing it. As I 
have already indicated, I believe there is a lot to be learnt from 
the "anthropological" method, when used in psychology, of just 
watching, allowing mistakes to happen so that they may be 
learnt from. However, this is not the full story. There are 
carefully considered reasons both for the way in which I have 
proceeded, and my attitude in discarding or ignoring various 
approaches to psychology that I shall argue I find are neither 
concerned with nor methodologically appropriate to the 
examination of areas of creativity - the making of the new (and 
unpredictable), and of novel behaviour. (I do not argue that 
there is nothing in the manipulation of architectural space that is 
controlled by habit, or the irrelevance of the trusty solution to 
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the standard problem: that is, rather, a convention of description 
with which I do not find myself particularly concerned. ) The 
work described here is, however, particularly concerned with the 
elicitation of means of communication of individual mental 
models of a substance, architectural space, (which I believe to be 
sharp and precise, as I believe all thoughts to be exact: their 
inexactness comes from their presentation for communication in 
a social and public domain) that, while it is accepted as existing, 
has not to the best of my knowledge, been explored, in a 
psychological sense, experientially and as a material to be 
formed in the design process, but, rather, has been dealt with - 
either in a private jargon that reflects the academic 
preoccupation of the author concerned (usually closely related to 
another area of study), or in terms not of its own qualities, but, 
instead of its enclosure. This latter is rather like talking about 
wine in terms of the bottle it was in instead of how it tastes5. 
Thus, the concern is with the novel: both in terms of creativity, 
and in terms of approach to that, and that it is the (individual) 
experience of this is to be described. Which, naturally, renders 
certain approaches unsympathetic, counter-productive and / or 
irrelevant. 
5 The analogy I present of the relationship between wine and its bottles is, 
I believe, reasonably good: for there is also interaction, and we know a lot 
about either from the other. Vide Claret and Burgundy! Clearly, the form 
of an architectural container or focus has much to do with the experience 
of the space. My point is that it is not just the container that matters, and, 
even, that a case should be made for "positive discrimination" in favour of 
space. 
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In particular, for example, my work is singularly devoid of 
statistical analysis, for the simple reason that statistics concerns 
itself with blurring the precision of (ie fudging) the individual 
and particular, to create an overriding general social account (it 
is mega as opposed to micro), whereas I am interested in each 
individual and particular in all its precision and in its own right. 
The types of "truths" unearthed in statistics (and also in the use 
of fuzzy procedures), no matter how useful in certain 
circumstances, are exactly not what I have been or am today 
searching for. 
Nor is the type of model presented by Behaviourism and other 
mechanistic psychological approaches6 which treat external sign 
as being either devoid of or isomorphic with internal process, of 
any help, for, although I am interested in behaviour (eg the 
design of spaces), it is not the major concern of this work, which 
is better referred to as the cognitive models used by individuals 
in exploring and perceiving (architectural) space ( in this context, 
design may be seen as the process by which an exploration and 
perception of a space that has not been experienced by anyone 
else before can be admitted: the first experience any of us has of- 
any space is substantially the same as the experience the 
designer has in discovering, through creating, his space, as an 
experience, which is not quite the argument about 
representation, or the difference between synthesis and 
6I have no problem with mechanistic approaches, even in psychology. The problem, here, is to do with the relationship between the cause and its 
expression, to use another way of putting it. The assumption that they are identical or that one doesn't exist seems to me to indicate a very weak 
understanding of the whole tenet of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" (1971). 
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simulation that Frank George (1971) presents. See, for 
exemplification, the assertion of von Foerster concerning the 
inappropriateness of the term "representation", when 
"presentation" would do better). Such a concern has, clearly, little 
to do with the input / output paradigm of Behaviourism, even 
though such a mechanistic model (ie, the Black Box) has, as I 
have shown (Glanville (1982) , considerable power in accounting 
for and justifying several activities including design, amongst 
other things. 
Neither are such models as the highly symbolic (and causal) ones 
generally used in Psychoanalysis of much help to me7, for they 
are concerned with the interpretation of whatever cognitive 
model we may be presumed to have in terms of a (universal) 
other by means of the (assumed) universal symbolism, and the 
development of (failures in) such a personal model that may be 
accounted for within these terms: whereas I am concerned 
neither with symbolic interpretations of whatever models there 
are, nor their growth, development, or pathologies. Should there 
be any (symbolic) interpretation, I would rather it came, 
reflexively, from the experimental subjects themselves, and of 
their own volition, than the experimenter: my concern is, as 
would be expected from a cybernetician, with the form rather 
7 Although Carl Gustav Jung used his general theory to develop more than 
a mere written formulation of "Man and his Symbols" (1964) in the 
building of his own, and highly (personally) symbolic house, and Gaston 
Bachelard took his notions of "The Poetics of Space" (1969) to a 
considerable symbolic level in his image of the house as a type of allegory 
for the (human) body and the first room experienced as the key to all 
further experience of rooms and spaces which many architects have 
found attractive and even seductive. 
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than the content. (Cyberneticians are currently very concerned 
with systems that are informationally open, but 
ORGANISATIONALLY CLOSED. What they look at is the form and 
the consequences of this closure: the information, being open, is 
of less concern, for it can be more or less anything. ) And I don't 
imagine any reader will seriously consider that either a physical 
/ physiological approach, or one based on taxonomies of given 
classes will recommend itself for the tasks reported here, when 
opposed to the attempt to generalise classes from individual 
cognitive models, without loss of initial individual distinction and 
precision). - 
Thus do I justify the position I presented myself as taking at the 
beginning of this introduction, falling as it may between too 
many stools, as reflexive, constructive, conversational, formal, 
individual: as an approach that takes on board error, failure and 
mistake because of a concern with learning, no matter how it 
comes about or where and of what it happens. In many ways, I 
see this as being an approach that has more in common, as I 
have indicated, with that of an anthropologist, even in his guise 
as an urban geographer, than that of a psychologist, although I 
notice a change that I take to be a growing maturity in 
psychology, making it more like anthropology than, perhaps, it 
once appeared. In the introduction to John Lilly's "The Centre of 
the Cyclone" (1972), George Spencer Brown makes this point with 
great precision and elegance. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
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I have not, so far, mentioned the burgeoning field of what used 
to be called Architectural and is now called Environmental 
Psychology, which, one might imagine, should be of direct 
relevance to this study. I do not wish to go into extended detail 
here (an old, but nevertheless still relevant paper on the topic of 
the limits of Environmental Psychology can be found in Appendix 
B, and my current impressions of the topic, together with a full 
explanation of why I find it to have short-comings for what I am 
attempting, is summarised in Chapter 2), but I must at least 
outline in this introduction why it seems essentially to have little 
to offer to my undertaking. This becomes more significant since 
it relates forcefully to the positive choice I can be seen to have 
made in avoiding that variety of the scientific investigation 
which is appropriate when variables have been isolated and 
confirmed, in which experiments are arranged so that only one 
variable is changed at a time, but which is irrelevant in the 
actual isolating of such variables (should there be any) except 
when and insofar as the psychologist's sole concern, as the 
artist's in analysing works of his predecessors can only be, is 
with finding out how he sees things, himself. 
To start with, there is a problem of substitution: of report for 
experience; of 2 dimensions for 3; of one medium for another. 
This is due, at least insofar as it is a limitation in the work 
described here (and therefore also in the work of others, 
specially in Environmental Psychology), to the need in the 
scientific as well as the practical scheme, for the repeated 
availability of identical material (this is not the place for a 
discussion of this tenet: see von Foerster's " On Constructing a 
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Reality" (1972) for a terse account of the weaknesses of this 
approach). For example, I used a primary experimental research 
resource in the first experiment I recount, slides of a building. 
But slides are clearly a report (by the photographer) of an 
experience, which is a substitute for the experimental subject 
having that experience, just as slides give a2 dimensional 
presentation of what should be a3 dimensional object (I assume 
time is present in both cases, and so does not enter the 
equation! ) and use aa medium (colour film, white wall, dark 
room, bright projector, no tangibility, etc) that is quite different 
to the medium of experiencing the subject of this record and 
presentation, itself. (In the case of my work, a building as space 
and object. ) 
Then there is the problem of what to examine - what can be 
considered as the variables. When Environmental Psychology 
discusses perception and perception in architecture, it does not 
begin to confront the medium of architecture - space - but deals 
with easily isolatable and identifiable objects positioned in space 
(such as coffee table position, pitch of roof). To introduce the 
metaphor I shall use throughout this work, the discussion is of 
the bottle, not the winel 
I accept that not to talk about the bottle but rather the wine is, 
currently, difficult: even architects, speaking amongst 
themselves, do not manage it well. But Environmental 
Psychologists naturally bring with them their own tools, and 
conceptual framework, and these are not necessarily helpful to 
architects. One way in which they are not really helpful is that 
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the findings of Environmental Psychology are descriptive, but to 
make them useful they have to be treated as prescriptive. Yet 
the whole basis of making architecture is the generation of the 
new (and 'hence, before its generation, the unknowable), whereas 
Environmental Psychology (and any other descriptive field) 
requires the ready existence of the object, sos that when it is 
used prescriptively it presumes precisely what is, as yet, not 
known (the old difference between analysis and synthesis, and 
Mill's (1843) problem of induction in scientific method)! And this 
is not the only way in which the aims and assumptions made in 
Environmental Psychology, no matter how valid in their own 
terms, are not necessarily in sympathy with those of architects 
or architecture. For instance, as I shall describe the central 
activity of designing -a conversation with the self over the topic 
of the developing building project via a pencil and a piece of 
paper - is not an approach accommodated in Environmental 
Psychology, which has, until very recently, been concerned with 
gross and mass measurements, and not with the reflexive, 
inward, subjective approach that is essential if talking about 
design as I have been doing (although, fortunately, there are 
reflexive psychologies, even if they have never considered 
architecture and architectural space). 
Finally, the approach of Environmental Psychology to the 
construction of its field of knowledge and expertise is essentially 
the partition of wholes into atomic parts that can be assembled 
to reconstitute the whole. This approach has been used with 
outstanding success for centuries in science, but all attempts to 
treat design (including architecture) as a science has proved to 
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be a failure. One of the discoveries presented here indicates that 
our perception of space is of a whole, into which we invest detail 
(was that crack in the room that we have just noticed there 
before, unnoticed, or has it just appeared: and how can we decide 
this). I believe that this approach, of wholes being enriched, is 
not only a matter of our perception of architecture and 
architectural spaces, but is also how we design through our 
conversation with ourselves via pencil and paper. Here is a case 
of the old adage of systems theory, that the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts, being, if anything, too weak: the whole is 
distinct from the sum of its parts, and a part is a whole in a role. 
THE FORM OF THE PRESENTATION - 
Finally, it remains for me to outline logic behind the form and 
content of this essay. But, before I do that, I should explain the 
existence of 3 separate volumes. 
These volumes are this text, the illustrations referred to in the 
text, and the collection of appendices. I have kept these as 
separate volumes as a response to- both the sensible division of 
material, and also my experience, gained over the years, of the 
intense frustration I often find in having to turn pages to look up 
appendices and illustrations that have already appeared 
elsewhere in the text, and trying to read the text when the 
relevant illustration is nowhere near it. In providing the material 
in 3 volumes, I hope to make the difficulties of correlating 
different elements easier, rather than to provide a main volume 
and 2 annexes. And I have also attempted, in the volume of 
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illustrations, to so organise them that, where there are diagrams 
of arguments in the main text, the diagrams may, by themselves, 
make a sense of their own when looked at in their volume. 
Returning to the text (in this volume), the remaining text is 
divided, as already shown in the list of contents, into 3 main 
sections. The 3 chapters that immediately follow this 
introduction are concerned with setting the scene. In order, they 
provide and introduction to Space and Architecture, with a short 
history of architecture as it has been told, and an introductory 
discussion of spatial concepts present (which became apparent to 
me after doing most of the experimental work described), as well 
as discussing how the_ concept of space became articulated as the 
major concern of architects: an expanded version of the section 
above, in which the sort of things that Environmental 
Psychologists and others working in related fields have and have 
not done, and their values are discussed: and a summary of what 
my problem was, both as it appeared at the time, and as I see it 
in retrospect, with the--benefit of hindsight. 
The middle chunk consists of 4 chapters. The first 3 describe a 
selection from series of experiments I carried out, using as 
subjects (partially because of availability, partially because of 
their position between layman and architect, and partially 
because of their willingness and inclination to investigate and 
learn) architecture students. What the experiments were, why 
and how they were designed, how they succeeded (or, more 
often, failed) in their aims and what else was learnt, is 
summarised in a chapter on what went wrong and why it did, 
23 
including a statement of the origins of my current position. In 
some respects, the reader may be surprised that these are so 
relatively short. There are 3 reasons that I should like to give. 
The first is that they are presented as key experiments that 
summarise the results and findings of many more experiments, 
without needing over-lengthy explanation and elaboration. The 
second is that they are discussed (with many of the other 
experiments that were omitted from the main text) at greater 
length in several members of the collection of papers (of mine) 
reproduced and presented as appendices to the argument. The 
third is that these experiments, and the development of the 
thinking behind them, relate to several distinct fields (as 
discussed in the first main section) - and presenting and 
clarifying the relationship (ie relevance and helpfulness) of these 
several fields to the main area of interest, necessarily requires 
the introduction in greater detail of more material covering a 
wider base (and, thus, not being straightforwardly directable at 
the expert) than is, I believe, normally the case. This is, of course, 
a well recognised difficulty in inter (and intra) disciplinary 
studies, and represents the anti-productive difference 
understood as existing between the approach of he that is 
thought of as a "generalist", and his "opponent", the "specialist". 
This is followed by an "interval" chapter in which I recount some 
of the interesting and valuable spin-offs that have occurred as a 
result of the necessary development of techniques and ideas, and 
the exploitation of opportunism, as explained in the main text. 
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In the final two chapters, and the penultimate is rather longer 
than the others, I describe where I am now, and how I am 
attempting to describe architectural space as a phenomenon that 
I experience, instead of trying to access (verbal) mental models 
of others and forcing them into a social milieu, together with 
some analyses, and indications of the use of this approach in 
design projects that I have set my students, based on these 
understandings. And I discuss the future: what work may be 
carried out, what may be expected of it, and why it has the 
peculiar characteristics that I believe it has. 
There follow usual bibliographic references. And, as I have said, 
the illustrations referred to in square brackets -[I- in the text 
by reference numbers of the form A. 2. iii - where the A refers to 
the section, the 2 the group, and the iii the member of the group 
- appear in a separate volume, Volume 2, with the Appendices in 
Volume 3. 
Ranulph Glanville 
Portsmouth 
28.3.88 
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CHAPTER 1 
Space and Architecture 
"A satisfactory History of Architecture has not yet been written, 
because we are still not accustomed to thinking in terms of space, 
and because historians of architecture have failed to apply a 
coherent method of studying buildings from a spatial point of 
view. " (Bruno Zevi "The Language of Modern Architecture" 
(1983), quoted in Dahinden (1984). ) 
BACKGROUND 
A first-time visitor to a school of architecture may be a little 
surprised should he stumble upon a student presenting his 
design work for assessment by his teachers. This surprise will, 
initially, be caused by the means of assessment used (an open 
public criticism or review of the work, in character not unlike a 
doctoral viva), but it is likely that at least as much surprise will. 
be occasioned by the topic and language of the debate, itself. For, 
as well as questioning buildability and durability, practicality of 
planning and safety, legality and finance, social contribution, 
effect on the surroundings and whether the proposal will give 
generously to the client, user and community, he will most likely 
hear much mention of the term "space", often followed by 
gesticulations and expressions of which "Y'know what I mean? " 
(almost always an assertion, rhetorical question or command) 
might be considered a rather articulate exemplar. 
Architecture is not synonymous with building, for otherwise we 
would not need two words and we could not talk of, for instance, 
computer architecture: and while, for many, architecture has 
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always pre-supposed or at least entailed building, (the more 
especially in the rather entrenched and inward-looking 
atmosphere of today) for some architects building does not come 
into it. There are, as well as academics - teachers, historians and 
critics, many of whom do not practise - architects whose practice 
is almost entirely theoretical (who range from the Italian 
fantasist Piranesi to, more recently, the New York 5), and, 
alternatively, those who see architecture as an approach and 
discipline that can solve problems in a way that other disciplines 
cannot, often either without reference to building at all, or 
advising as to whether or not a building is a solution to some 
particular problem (eg Cedric Price). Thus, architecture and 
building should not be seen as synonyms, for the purposes of 
both my own involvement and, more importantly, in as far as the 
work described here is concerned. 
Given this position, it is clear that it is not my intention, here, to 
debate the value of various, assorted views of architecture, 
although it is important that it is understood, from the outset, 
that, in this context, architecture is NOT to be taken as being 
synonymous with building - indeed, there is no primary concern, 
here, for building per se at all. So that, apart from a craftsman- 
like approach to the act of designing and a professional status 
and its consequent obligations and responsibilities, that which 
sets the architect apart from the builder is seen, here, to be his 
major concern - space - which is, if you like, the medium and 
material of architecture. Not even the act of design, no matter 
how fascinating (and I have examined both the actuality of 
design and its theoretical basis in some detail) is central to 
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architecture in the manner in which space is, for designing is a 
general and universal activity, one of the great techniques for 
problem (re- / dis-) solving, which happens to be applicable in 
the field of architecture. 
It is this centrality of space in architecture (viewed, naturally, in 
architectural terms, as opposed, for instance, those of geometry 
or physics), and the happy interdependence of the two which are 
often 'agreed to be virtually mutually indistinguishable, that 
makes space the vital medium for architects, and therefore a 
good material to study. This is not to say that I disagree with the 
limitations of this amalgamation, or that I become worried by the 
interpretation that is given to architecture, in a different context, 
by such as Price, with whom I am usually in agreement. But, in 
my case, the need to (begin to) study the "spatial" view of 
architecture when I began teaching the subject which I 
recounted in the Introduction was all the more urgent, since I 
had failed to notice its potential, let alone its centrality, as a 
student being educated at a time when, in a progressive 
architecture school, anything went (and I made sure that meant 
ANYTHING). - 
THE DISCUSSION OF SPACE 
The understanding that space is central in architecture is not 
new, and yet there is neither a good nor an established and 
generally accepted language within which to discuss it. (Hence 
the "Y'know what I mean" statement quoted above. ) And, in 
some peculiar way, it is only just recently that the centrality of 
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space has become articulated as an explicit, studyable topic in 
critical works concerned with architecture. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that architecture, throughout the 
ages, has had as a primary concern the medium and material 
that is, and is subsumed / constituted under the term "space". 
The classical Greek temple, for instance, is so arranged that it is a 
central and generative point, creating a vast space from and 
around itself (you could participate in a service or celebration as 
long as you could see the temple), and great attention was paid 
to its exact location within the landscape or townscape for 
exactly this reason, although reading many of the classic critical 
and historical works you would have no inkling of this, for they 
confined themselves to a discussion of (historical developments 
of) proportion, order and, occasionally, plan and symbolism 
within each age or style in architecture [A. 2. i to iv, H. 2. i and ii]. 
(There is, in effect, no inside public space in the Greek temple for 
the ordinary population: the building's interior is accessible, 
through an entrance at the back, only to the very few initiates 
who form the priesthood-. In this respect it is profoundly 
different to the general notion that we have today of a religious 
building, be it temple, synagogue, church or mosque, in which the 
ceremony and worship are performed within the building. I 
elaborate and better demonstrate this point in Chapter 10. ) 
In fact, the change from a public architecture that was concerned 
with the building generating (or capturing, depending on the 
landscape) a spatial field around it was broken in what we refer 
to, over-simplistically, as the European tradition by the Romans, 
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for it was they who first covered over this public space, and 
brought it within the building. Thus the major public space in a 
Roman sports arena (such as the Colloseum) is contained within 
the building itself, and the walls project the space inwardly, from 
the walls to the centre. As a matter of interest it is worth noting 
that the Colloseum had a retractable roof, thus further 
emphasising the containment of the space [H. 3. i]. 
And yet, in spite of the general acceptance amongst architects 
that what they handle is space, and discussion in architecture 
schools both at reviews and in tutorials, which is full of reference 
to the term space, it was rare, I repeat, until recently, to find 
critical and. historical discussions of architecture in which space 
was given more than passing reference. Even Vitruvius (1914), 
commonly (though incorrectly) held to be the author of the first 
book, or rather, series of five books, on architecture ("De 
Architectura") does not discuss space. His requirement is that 
good architecture demonstrates, in the words of Sir Henry 
Wotton's late C17 translation (re-published in facsimile as 
Wotton (1969)), 
"Firmnesse, 
Comoditie 
and Delight" 
(ie, consistency and coherence, convenience and comfort, and 
pleasure). His books are concerned with proper proportions and 
the elements to achieve them, planning layout and drainage, etc., 
rather than space. (Compare this definition with 2 of Le 
32 
Corbusier. The first is concerned, as is Vitruvius', with 
everything except space 
A Modern Architecture should be characterised by: 
Piloti, 
Roof gardens, 
Free planning, 
Horizontal windows, 
and freely designed facades. 
(Le Corbusier (1927), in the classic "Towards a New Architecture: 
a curious translation of the French original, "Vers une 
Architecture". Most of these ideas were expressed in the ideal 
"Domino House" [ H. 15. i]. ) 
In contrast, the second reflects much better my concern in this 
work, (although it is still more concerned with the container than 
that which is contained) 
"Architecture is the masterly, correct, and magnificent play 
of forms brought together in light. " (quoted in Broadbent (1987)) 
AND THE NON-DISCUSSION OF SPACE 
This second definition of Le Corbusier's (although it pre-dates the 
first) is much more in keeping with the pure concern of 
architects, and with the recent attempts made by some critics to 
discuss architecture in terms of space. (Such discussions are 
usually either almost unreadable due to the use of opaque and, 
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arguably, unnecessarily obscuritan jargon, - eg Porphyrios 
((1982a), (1982b), (1985)) - or evasive in that space, its 
qualities, interpretation and meaning, are nevertheless dealt 
with in terms of some other substance, such as Jungian universal 
symbolisms, or sign theory alias semiology (see, for instance, the 
collection in Bunt, Broadbent and Jencks (1980). ) But it remains 
the case that there has been but small development in the the 
precise discussion of architectural space: most of the 
distinguished critical effort has concerned itself with other 
things. 
This can, perhaps, best be described by analogy to the world of 
wine tasting. Wine tasters and others concerned with identifying, 
blending and buying drinks have a fairly extensive private 
language - including actions - of some idiosyncracy (at a certain 
whisky blending plant, according to a Radio programme 
broadcast some years ago, one of their descriptions of a notable 
smell is "green bush", which refers precisely to the scent of a 
particular plant that is just outside the whisky blending and 
distilling building), in which they discuss their beverages, with 
such success that they can often communicate to others who 
speak their language just what to expect of a wine previously not 
tasted. In contrast, architectural criticism concerns itself not with 
the wine (space) at all, but with describing the attributes of the 
bottle (building fabric) that contains the wine. 
For instance, the noted and distinguished critic, scholar and 
cataloguer (almost county-by-county curator) of English 
architecture, Nikolaus Pevsner, from whom every schoolchild 
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studying in the architecture section of the old A level art 
examination first learnt architecture and architectural criticism, 
discusses an "Outline of European Architecture" (Pevsner (1963)) 
almost exclusively in terms of stylistic periods. Styles are made 
up of proportional and decorational - and sometimes planning - 
systems which retain a coherence and identity of appearance 
that allow the categorising together of various (grand and public) 
buildings which have occurred in various places over a definable 
period of time, and which, probably, show both some sort of 
development and local variations during that time. Pevsner (and 
most are like him) is. not interested in space, but in the sculpture 
and proportions of the walls, and the dramatic sweep of roofs 
surging, symbolically, upward toward the heavens (Gothic 
Cathedrals), and this pre-occupation allows him to entirely miss 
the point I made above about the difference between Greek and 
Roman architecture. Indeed, for Pevsner, Roman architecture is 
seen as an architecture practised by engineers (the Romans as 
builders of aqueducts) with poor and clumsy appreciation of the 
principles of the Greek style: ie, Roman architecture was a 
regression from the fine, delicate and elegant perfection of the 
Greek. Yet, in spatial terms, the Greek may be seen as the 
culmination of one period which would include, for instance, the 
Egyptian Temples (which have, if anything, an even more private 
interior than the Greek Temples, and which generate enormous 
spaces and spheres of influence out into their surrounding 
desert), while the Romans created a revolutionary new 
beginning, exploring a totally new type of spatial appreciation 
that occurred within the building fabric itself. 
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Nor is the approach by recourse to style that I have personified, 
above, by reference to the work of Pevsner the only medium 
that critics, theorists and historians invoke. Returning to the 
Gothic style / period as a centre of focus, we can find examples 
that epitomise two of the other main substituting media used in 
place of space: technological development, and reflection of socio 
/ cultural / philosophical ambience / mood. 
SOME OTHER NON-SPATIAL CRITIQUES. 
The technological approach is magnificently presented by Frank! 
(1946) (1960) in which he argues that the development of the 
forms of the buildings of the Gothic (Cathedrals) was determined 
by the inquisitive nature of the master builders as they began 
better to understand the structural performance of the forms 
possible in the materials available (largely stone, brick, glass and 
timber), and, later, to celebrate this in displays of structural 
virtuosity unparalleled previously in Western Architecture. Thus, 
the architecture is seen as consisting of an expression, in built 
form, of the understanding of structural principles of the master 
builder [H. 8. i]. (The most extra-ordinary examples of this 
expression of structural virtuosity are found in the late English 
Gothic referred to as Perpendicular!. As part of the work 
1 The Perpendicular is a style unique to the English Gothic, and is best 
exemplified in the Royal Chapels (Henry VII at Westminster Abbey, St 
George's at Windsor) and Royal Collegiate Chapels (Eton and King's College, 
Cambridge). Other examples exist in which it was used for the renewal of 
parts of older buildings - Gloucester Cathedral, for instance, contains a 
wonderful history of English architecture from about 1050 to about 1550, 
embodied in stone and glass. The style occurred between, roughly, 1450 and 
1550. It may be of interest to note that the commonly accepted cause of the 
origin of the Perpendicular (and the cause of its uniqueness to England), 
was the Black Death, which killed off all the master builders. A new 
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required recently in restoring the chapel of King's College, 
Cambridge, it is said that the engineers computed that there was 
absolutely NO way that the structure, as built, could stand up, 
given their models of the structural performance of materials. 
Such was the fineness of the understanding of its master 
builders, the latest of whom, Gaudi [H. 10. i], actually suspended 
strings and weights, to model his Sagrada Familia upside down. ) 
The other approach cited is epitomised in Erwin Panofsky's little 
book "Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism" (1957). It is of no 
importance, here, that contemporary scholars nowadays consider 
Panofsky's understanding of Scholasticism and of the content, 
intent and mechanism of the Scholastic Method to be entirely 
wrong: what matters is the pattern making that Panofsky 
attempted (and in which Norberg-Schulz (1974) has followed 
him). 
Panofsky's thesis was that the architecture of a particular period 
must reflect the general thinking (or thought schema) of that 
period. This is not a very surprising notion, for we do talk about 
art objects as being some of the consequences of, and reflecting, a 
particular cultural background at a particular time. However, as 
far as I know, Panofsky was the first to explore the relationship 
between the "philosophical context" and the buildings created 
within it. Panofsky's particular endeavour was to show how the 
generation was left without continuing oral and apprenticeship traditions, 
but with experience of building simple rectanguloid buildings, such as 
halls, and the examples of the preceding late decorated Gothic: so they built 
elaborate halls with lots of daring decoration when they built their 
churches. 
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great Gothic Cathedrals were embodiments in stone of the 
Scholastic system of "world construction", ie reflected the 
(theological / philosophical) views of the times and the manner 
in which philosophers (priests) considered the world to be 
organised, which was according to the so-called "Encyclopaedic 
System" (all-containing and reflecting God's Holy Order, and not 
as currently embodied in our alpha-numerically organised 
reference books). Thus, for Panofsky, buildings are literal 
expressions or embodiments of these ideas. So he analysed 
Cathedrals into Trinities (both vertically and horizontally - see 
the plan [H. 7. iii] of Amiens, which Panofsky used as an example, 
and try it), and demonstrated an encyclopaedic structure in the 
symbolism, positioning and organisation of the elements 
(including decorations) of some of the great French Gothic 
Cathedrals. In "Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism", 
architecture is seen as being philosophy in stone (although, as I 
have indicated, Panofsky's interpretation of Scholasticism is 
nowadays taken to be severely misdirected). 
In both of these cases, the essential medium and material of 
architecture, space, is scarcely mentioned at all. Just as-in the 
style approach of Pevsner, architecture is seen as being 
constituted in the qualities of its shell, and not of the space thus 
made: the discussion is still of the bottle and not of the wine. 
I believe that these discussions have a value of their own, and 
do, indeed, tell us much about the architecture described. But it 
is about, about (some of) the (minor) constituent parts of 
architecture, about parallels, and is not the architecture itself. 
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These critiques highlight important areas associated with 
architecture (and its production, embodiment and culture), but 
they miss, and possibly even intentionally avoid, the central 
substance. And it is with this substance, and how and whether it 
can be described and appreciated that I am concerned. 
VIEWS OF STYLE. 
Although only as an aside, views of style deserve a short 
discussion here. The view of style that I attributed above to 
Pevsner is only one view, as a moment's reflection, or a look at 
the dictionary will confirm. The word has as its root, according to 
the Oxford Reference Dictionary (Hawkins, (1986)) the Latin 
"stylus", which refers, as does its present day use in English, to a 
long pointed device for making marks on some surface, such as a 
pen nib. In architecture it usually takes on the historian critic's 
meaning, although the meaning intended in the phrase "in-house 
style" is almost as important. I often use the word to denote a 
meaning at once more personal and, paradoxically, more general: 
more personal in that it refers to each particular person as 
particular, more general in that it refers to a (possibly socially 
shared) private general problem solving strategy (or solution) 
that permits the concentration upon one part of a complex 
problem while maintaining the confident assumption that other 
parts will, nevertheless, be soluble, either through the use of 
ready-made solutions, or because room has been left, in the 
approach to the problems already solved, for further solutions to 
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different problems2. Naturally, this adumbrates the historian 
critic's meaning. The origins of this more personal and more 
general definition of style lie with a group of three of us, 
teaching Architecture at the Architectural Association School in 
the mid 1970's - specifically, Stephen Gage, Thomas Stevens and 
myself (Gage, S, Glanville, R and Stevens, T (1975)). 
ARCHITECTURAL SPACE AND VERBAL DESCRIPTION 
It is not my intention to discuss the importance of space in 
architecture, or its strange omission from mention in critical 
works, in this manner at any further length at this point in my 
text (this is effectively covered in Chapter 10, where it forms a 
major part of the main substance of the Chapter). But, because it 
is important that the centrality of space in architecture is 
understood and accepted from the outset, I have allowed myself 
the freedom to at least introduce the areas, albeit in a very 
simplistic and limited manner, for they constitute both the 
background and a major part of the study of the work that is 
reported here. For, as stated in the introduction, in all my time at 
architecture school as a student, I had never realised the 
centrality of space in architecture, and to what architects 
manipulate and create that distinguishes them from builders. 
2 It should be stressed that the relationship of these various problems is not 
necessarily one of scale: it is not, necessarily, a matter of fixing the site 
location, and then working out some plan, and then adding in the fixings, 
ending up with detailing and scheduling the door furniture - the 
relationship is not linear, moving from the general to the specific, at all. 
Often the site plan will come first. Equally, a door handle may be developed 
and assumed in later designs, thus preceding the site plan in a new job. The 
important thing is the ability to slip between the so-called levels, solving 
the various, interlinked problems that occur at each of them. 
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When, at last, I did, I discovered that there was no way of 
discussing it, of giving names and verbal representation to the 
substance of space itself, or the qualities that were attributed to 
it in the knowing yet inexplicit phrases of the architectural crit, 
"Y'know what I mean. " 
And so I undertook to explore, largely with my students, how we 
appreciate and perceive (architectural) space, with the intention 
of finding what I thought of as a common, shared verbal 
language, at least within the group who joined in the exploration. 
And, in all my innocence, it never once occurred to me that it 
might be that the reason almost no one talked about space, the 
reason, indeed, - they talked about everything else 
but space, was 
that, (unlike the wine) space is very difficult to talk about: the 
built fabric (the bottle) is much easier to describe, thus leaving 
the space contained to become apparent and tangible through the 
skilled inferences of the experienced. (The difficulty of attaining 
this is recognised in the length of an architect's training in the 
UK, which is at least seven years: one of the particularly difficult 
skills to be acquired over this period is the ability to "read" 
- drawings, by which is meant to be able to imagine the quality of 
the 3D space in the building through interpolation from several 
2D drawings of the containing fabric. Many architects, some of 
them even teachers, never acquire this skill. ) 
Thus, I started with a material and an aim: to explore how 
individuals understood this material - architectural space -, and 
to find a shared common language within which this group could 
discuss their experiences: a problem of perception, but much 
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more of cognition and representation - two areas that I was pre- 
occupied with and exploring, without really being aware of it, in 
another field (cybernetics, eg Glanville (1975)), and in a much 
more abstract and theoretical way. 
And, in order to help me in my search, I consulted psychology. 
Specifically, I was introduced to and looked into reflexive and 
conversational psychology (as represented, for instance, by the 
work of George Kelly (1955a, 1955b), and as proposed and 
discussed at Brunel University in the Joint Cybernetics / 
Psychology seminars organised by Gordon Pask and Laurie 
Thomas). And, naturally, I also looked into the burgeoning field 
of Environmental Psychology, which, I reasoned, might provide 
me with models and background in my search. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Environmental Psychology 
"By weighing, we know what things are light, and what are heavy. 
By measuring, we know what things are long and what short. The 
relations of all things may thus be determined, and it is of the 
greatest importance to measure the motions of the mind. I beg 
your Majesty to measure it. " (Menicus (ca 335 BC), quoted in 
"Mental Maps", Gould and White (1974). ) 
BACKGROUND 
It might seem that a subject that goes under the name of 
Environmental Psychology should provide a rich pasture in which 
to browse, for someone with my interests, problems and concern. 
But this turns out, unfortunately, not to be the case. In this 
chapter, I shall explain why this is so, and introduce the sort of 
psychology that appears to have the potential to be of greater 
relevance and value than Environmental Psychology (and was 
therefore used as a jumping off point) for the work I was 
undertaking. 
Any attempt at an overview of a field is bound to distort that 
field, and it is, of course, extremely dangerous to attempt to 
summarise, under even the very best of circumstances, a 
particular field of study. This is even more so when one ends up 
providing a critique that explains the essential irrelevance of that 
field to a study that looks as though it ought, at first sight, to be 
within the scope of - or, indeed, even ideally suited and applicable 
to - that field. In the case of the study presented here, and 
Environmental Psychology it is, however, not, quite so dangerous 
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as might be expected, for the difficulties arise from differences in 
concern, as demonstrated in their two distinct basic and in 
principle approaches. However, I nevertheless undertake this 
foolhardy and dangerous act fully cognisant of the risks involved, 
and hoping that what I have to say will not appear to be either 
arrogant or lacking in respect for a field that has different values 
of its own. It is just that its values are not the values I am looking 
for: its aims, assessments and interests are different from mine 
and have a different origin: and I shall argue, by isolating these 
characteristics, that the fundamental irrelevance of that work to 
what I am undertaking here becomes quite clears. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The Hawthorne Study 
The best place to start is often the beginning. Conventional wisdom 
often maintains that Environmental Psychology originated with 
the "Hawthorne Study" (see report in Roethlisberger and Dickson 
(1939)), frequently taken to be a model of experimental method 
and the articulation and expression of social psychological 
concerns. This study was of working conditions in a factory, and in 
particular, of the effect of lighting levels on the workers' comfort 
and performance, as measured by their productivity output. The 
hypothesis was that an increase in lighting level (up to a certain 
point, at least) should produce a corresponding increase in 
productivity resulting from the (luminous) increase in comfort in 
1 This point is agreed by a number of Environmental Psychologists with 
whom I have spoken and who have read sections of this text. 
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their working conditions. This hypothesis was, in its turn, based 
upon the idea that there was an absolute comfort standard of 
lighting level that humans aspire towards, and that increases in 
lighting level towards this absolute comfort level would, because 
of the increase in both the workers' comfort and their morale, 
make it easier to see the job to be done and, therefore, less tiring 
to do it, thus increasing performance as measured by output (ie in 
terms of articles produced) because it became easier to work. 
Equally, at light levels above this absolute standard, output would 
drop off, because of glare resulting from too high a level, resulting 
in visual discomfort or disability (the two distinct types of glare 
that are recognised in the lighting sciences). 
The hypothesis and conditions assumed, and the experiment that 
was carried out caused, at the time, great excitement, being hailed 
as introducing an important new branch of psychological 
endeavour and study, which became known as, firstly, 
"Architectural Psychology", and, more recently, "Environmental 
Psychology". This new field would contribute to our knowledge of 
the environment's role in conditioning our behaviour (and help us 
work more efficiently, thus increasing profits). However, perhaps 
there would not have been quite such a stir, had it been generally 
realised that the hypothesis had not been proven! 
For what occurred under conditions of the experimental tests was 
exactly not what had been predicted by the hypothesis. Instead, it 
was discovered that, as the light level was increased, performance 
did not vary at all significantly when taken over a substantial time 
span. While there was an immediate improvement as lighting 
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levels were raised, this soon dropped off back towards the levels 
of output previously experienced. It seemed that common sense 
was to be denied. 
In the end, it was the assumption of absolutism that was found to 
be lacking. The human response to light level is not directed 
towards what may be defined as an absolute preferred level. 
Rather, humans adapt to the ambient level they work at, becoming 
conditioned to it. And, the Hawthorne study showed, while their 
performance does improve as the lighting level is raised, it soon 
levels off and then dips back to the performance level that existed 
prior to this lighting increase until another increase is provided. 
These increases can be continued more or less indefinitely, for the 
glare threshold goes up, too (actually, there is a convergence of 
limits here, so that finally, in the long term, increases do lead to 
problems associated with difficulties caused by both types of 
glare. But the result nevertheless stands: as the lighting level is 
increased, performance improves and then dies back towards its 
former level as the new, higher light level is accommodated. (This 
effect is now widely known, for, as a result of this mechanism, the - 
standard level of lighting expected for the comfort of the workers 
in work places increases every year, roughly requiring a doubling 
of lighting level every ten years. ) 
Why introduce this example at such length? The answer is not 
because of its inherent interest, nor because of its place at the 
initiation and as the foundation of Environmental Psychology. 
Rather, it is because it so clearly demonstrates the assumptions 
and aims that were present from the beginning of Environmental 
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Psychology, and which, generally, continue up to the present day. 
And it is these assumptions, to a great extent although not 
exclusively, that make the work done under the aegis of 
Environmental Psychology of little relevance or help to my work. 
The Assumptions 
What, then are the assumptions made, and the aims and interests 
expressed in the Hawthorne study? And what other assumptions 
and aims are to be found that are fundamental in Environmental 
Psychology, and which lead me to largely discard it as a source, 
example and inspiration? I think I can summarise them as follows: 
a) That it is possible to divide up the experience of the 
environment into the experience of a number of uniquely and 
absolutely distinct and fixed factors, and that our experience is 
made up of the summation (however attained, and by whatever 
mechanism) of the experience of these factors: that is to say that 
the determination of variables that are accepted as existing in 
some a priori sense (ie, the lighting level is significant: we 
experience the environment through the summation of our 
experience of the lighting level and other salient variables). 
b) That such variables are absolute and immutable, and that 
they can be assigned values that are also absolute and 
independent (ie, the lighting is the lighting is the lighting level, 
and nothing affects ur experience of its value except the 
lighting level itself). Thus the value of such variables is susceptible 
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to objective measurement, and such measurements have meaning 
in terms of the way we experience the environment. 
c) That changing one variable independently from any 
others, will lead to a unique change in the experience and 
appreciation of the environment as expresses through 
quantitatively assessable environmental performance, and that 
such change may legitimately be made in isolation from other 
variables, because our appreciation of the environments is 
effected, in the first place, through these individual variables. 
(Note, however that designers know, through experience, that it is 
very rarely possible to change one variable independently of 
others, and that a change in anything leads, inexorably, towards a 
change in everything. ) 
d) That performance, assessed in terms of a measurable 
variable - in the case of the Hawthorne study, of productivity - is 
an adequate expression of the experience (in this case, the comfort 
and delight) of the human both in and of the environment. 
e) That the effect of our understanding of our existence in 
the environment should be of immediate (and assessibly 
measurable) use: by understanding how, for instance, light affects 
performance, we should be able to increase performance (ie, 
productivity). le, the criterion is (instant and immediate) 
USEFULNESS2. 
2 This assumption is in sharp contrast to that indicated in the quote, in the 
Prologue, taken from George Spencer Brown's "The Laws of Form" (Spencer 
Brown (1968)), and also quoted in Lilly (1973). See also Glanville 
(forthcoming). 
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f) That any effects of changes made to the environment are 
properly expressed through the medium of social consensus and 
agreement rather than individual appreciation, and that uniform 
social behaviour, which is the expression of such social consensus 
and agreement, is indicative of a communal experience, 
appreciation and understanding of the environment by all 
individuals (ie, the interest is in the universal behaviours, not the 
individual conception). 
g) That human experience can properly be measured, 
assessed and presented in a meaningful manner by reference 
solely to observable behaviour, and that there is no need to be 
concerned with the congnitive processes of our mental images and 
accounts of and valuations placed upon such experiences. The 
interest is that of the behaviourist rather than the cognitive 
psychologist, and excludes all but behaviour from consideration. 
(Of course, this accurately reflects one of the great curses that 
American psychologists, in spite of the work of Kelly (1955a) 
(1955b), continue to cast upon the study of psychology (see, for 
- instance, Skinner (1972) and compare it with Pask 1980) and 
(1987)). It is interesting, in this light, to wonder how any sense 
can be made of behaviour, or how it can even be observed to be 
behaviour, without there being some cognitive process and 
evaluation by which to make that distinction, in the first place. ) 
h) That the obvious hypotheses (for instance, variables, 
predictable behaviours) are viable assumptions the central 
importance of which should be re-inforced and supported, and 
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that the research that should be carried out should be intended to 
support them (or, at worst, deny them only locally3). Thus, the 
Hawthorne study never questions whether the approach or the 
"obvious" (to whom, and why obvious? ) variables should be 
assumed to have any significant value: rather, they are considered 
as undeniable and self-evident elements of a "true" global view, 
open to negation but not to the charge of irrelevance: the humble 
approach of developing an hypothesis to explain and account for 
what is observed and in order to discover what is significant, 
through observing and questioning, is not considered, the 
arrogance of the presumptively general view being preferred. 
Snace and Environmental Psychology. 
Apart from these limitations, there are also two further concerns 
exhibited in the sort of research carried out in conventional 
Environmental Psychology that make it of doubtful value and 
applicability for designers of spaces, and for the consideration of 
- architectural space that is my concern, here. 
Firstly, the interest expressed is in the user and his performance. 
This is quite reasonable, but is not of much help to those whose 
concern is with designers. The question of design, of how things 
come to be and come into being, and of how any discovery 
emanating from psychological studies such as Hawthorne may be 
used and integrated into the wholistic design process is never 
discussed or even considered. Ie, this is a case of evaluation after 
3 By deny locally I mean that some individual point may be rejected, but the 
overall view should be maintained. 
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the event, rather than suggested integration into the creation of 
the event. (This is a very real difficulty, and leads, directly, to, for 
instance, the design scientist's complaint that designers never 
learn, and pay no attention to all the useful things that design 
scientists have done for them, which is counter-balanced by the 
designer's complaint that the scientist confounds and overloads 
him with facts that are formulated in a manner unsympathetic to 
the actual activity of designing. It is also the case that an 
assessment of a particular environmental design does not help a 
designer by telling him how to improve his designing: it only tells 
him whether what he proposes may or may not. be not acceptable. ) 
And, secondly, the concern is not with space, but, in contrast with 
almost anything but space4. 
Another Example 
A fuller example that supports this last statement can be found in 
a useful summarising introduction to Environmental Psychology 
by Canter (1974) [E, 1. i to iv]. In this example, experimental 
subjects are invited to decide which of 4 sketches is of the most 
4 This point is confirmed in discussion with Environmental Psychologists. 
Sime (1987), himself a product of the major UK Environmental Psychology 
factory (University of Surrey) reports, in verbal communication with me, 
that on one occasion he felt obliged, at a conference, to get up and ask when 
anyone was going to talk about the environment, about design, about space 
and architecture, so little is this considered. However, the field is changing 
slowly, becoming both more "designerly" and more reflective and reflexive 
in the sense in which Kelly introduced these notions into psychology 
(Kelly (1955a) (1955b)). By a similar token, the account I give, here, of 
Environmental Psychology is a little unkind and out-of-date, but it does 
reflect the state of the field that pertained when I was carrying out my 
experiments in the mid 1970's. 
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friendly room, a consideration that might be presumed possibly to 
owe something to the spatial qualities of that room. 
However, this experiment is, effectively, rigged, for not only are 
the subjects told what they must decide in terms of (in this case, 
friendliness, when any other quality might seem to them to be 
more appropriate), but also the experimental material is presented 
in a manner such that only very tiny range of variation is covered 
in the most blatantly obvious and prompting way (ceiling pitch, 
furniture arrangement), so that the subject is directed that he 
must make his judgement in terms of these factors: this, in turn, is 
said to demonstrate both that these factors are relevant, and that 
they do indeed have something to do with friendliness. But this 
experiment produces no evidence that this is really so in any 
conditions other than those in terms of which it has been highly 
restricted, which, it can thus be seen, only really supports the 
views of the experimenter because it exists in the experimenter's 
own highly controlled and restricted universe, not allowing for the 
existence of any other views! And it is the experimenter who has 
decided that what matters is the ceiling pitch and furniture 
arrangement (and has chosen how they are to vary): which 
selection may or may not be "right", but which clearly has nothing 
whatsoever to do with architectural space, preferring instead to 
deal in isolated element variables, presented through a highly 
edited, fixed viewpoint, 2 dimensional linear image of a supposed 
3 dimensional spatial reality. The experiment is not concerned 
with space, at all, but only with so editing the possible range of 
responses that the experimenter's assumptions (ie, that ceiling 
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pitch and furniture arrangement affect the friendliness of a room) 
and the ideas behind them must almost certainly be confirmed. 
The above paragraphs, characterising (some branches of) 
Environmental Psychology through its set of assumptions and 
operations, aims and interests should make it clear, I believe, how 
so many studies carried out within the area (at least in those 
branches of Environmental Psychology for which my 
characterisation is adequate), are rendered essentially irrelevant 
and counter-sympathetic to the concerns that I am trying to 
confront. And they are so irrelevant not because they represent 
bad work, but because it is in and of the desired nature ascribed 
to them to be so. Nor can recent changes and refinements in 
technique overcome the basic philosophical differences in concern, 
no matter how much they move towards softening the approach 
and taking the less obvious and more ephemeral into account, or 
how they attempt to accommodate the more cognitive approaches 
of psychologies that interest themselves in individual differences: 
to hope for that would be to hope that careful blending would 
actually turn tea into coffee, or, more closely to my earlier 
metaphor, water into wine. 
OTHER APPROACHES 
Not all of Environmental Psychology can be properly characterised 
according to these conditions. There remain at least four other 
approaches that may be considered as part of the field. And, 
although none turns out to be ideally and particularly helpful to 
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us, they should be introduced in this short survey, for more 
reasons that just completeness: they also have their nice points! 
a) The first of these is the approach of the Urban Geographer, 
particularly his concern for Social Schemata and Mental Maps of 
Urban spaces. 
b) The second is the Orientation in the Urban Landscape 
approach of Planning Theorists. 
c) The third is the Symbolic and Psychoanalytic approach of 
Jungian psychologists. 
d) The fourth is the Semiotic approach culled from the study 
of Semiotics, and probably prompted by developments in literary 
criticism. In this category I also include the approach to spatial 
understanding and description through literature, although this 
may possibly not be a happy conjunction. 
Urban Geography 
For some years now, Geographers have concerned themselves not 
only with the projective measurement and mechanical 
representation of space on the surface of the earth that we are 
familiar with through cartography (see Glanville (1980b), in 
Appendix C), but also in the difference between such mechanical 
projections of space and other representations of space that better 
reflect individual spatial experience and valuation, ie in the 
productions of maps based on individual mental models generated 
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from individual personal spatial schemata5. This work has usually 
been carried out in towns and cities, probably for three main 
reasons: the density of population and hence the possibility of 
comparing different schemata presented by individuals living 
under similar locational conditions; the fact that there tend to be 
recognised social groupings and problems within urban 
environments that are frequently attributed to specific 
environmental factors, thus making research programs eligible for 
funding that examine local perceptions of such environmental 
factors; and, finally, the simplicity of creating comparable 
individual maps where there is a firm, regular and detailed 
cartographic base onto which to project the individual mental 
maps that define personal spatial schemata (which there is in 
towns, the more especially so where the town is built on a grid- 
iron plan). See [E. 2. i to iii and E. 3. i to iii]. 
There are a number of techniques that have been developed for 
the extraction of personal mental maps, and these, in turn, have 
been seen as being indicative of, for instance, areas of desirability 
and danger, and known and unknown areas within a city's fabric, 
together with social sharing (eg, ganglands). In some cases, major 
social theories have been based on concepts deriving from mental 
mapping processes (eg Wilmott and Young's (1950) epoch making 
notion of the communal social space, defined by shared physical 
edges for all inhabitants of the community and, consequently, 
remarkably akin to a ghetto, in East London -a finding 
fortunately, to my mind, no longer universally supported by more 
5 For an extremely lucid overview, see Gould and White's (1974) "Mental 
Maps". 
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recent work in the field). In one experiment I carried out with art 
students in Belfast, but which I have not formally reported, I 
discovered, perhaps not surprisingly, that mental maps of Belfast 
could be used to determine which of 3 groups - ardent Catholic, 
ardent Protestant, and mild "agnostic" (fortunately the majority) - 
the students belonged to just by looking for blank and 
unconnected areas within their mental maps6. 
Such work is fascinating, and does at least permit that individuals 
may evaluate and image a "common" area differently (so 
differently that one is left asking, on occasion, how the supposedly 
"common" area can still be considered to be so). But the scale of 
the space dealt with is far outside that which is normally the- 
architectural designer's concern, and, in spite of discussions in 
architecture about so-called "urban room-s" (and, indeed, rooms in 
gardens), the nature of the city as a source of material, and the 
social intentions in the research are not really those of the 
architectural designer concerned. with making spaces (albeit that 
users of cities may be thought of, in some senses, as designing- 
their own (uses of the) city). And, in these studies, the spaces are 
evaluated by users, not by designers, and the-editorial / selective 
design that the users do is not really quite the same design 
activity as that practised by architects. 
6 Some examples, together with my own original work, may be found in my 
PhD Thesis (Glanville(1975) [E. 4. i to vD. it is interesting to contemplate, 
here, just what we would have to learn about orientation and mental maps 
of spatial perception if we were to look at how the Melanesians (and until 
recently Polynesians too) navigate the open seas, or the camel drivers the 
Sahara and the Aborigines the Australian outback on their songlines 
during their drcamtimes (eg Chatwind (1987)), or how the old Finns could 
navigate the mid-winter forest at night (Mead (1968)). There we might find 
examples to assist our understanding. 
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Urban Landscape 
However, although the idea of making urban spaces (including 
rooms) is an age-old one and has long been part of what architects 
consider as their realm, they have only recently been prepared to 
examine it extensively and with appropriate scholarly care. In 
particular, Kevin Lynch (1960), in "The Image of the City", has 
proposed a perceptual model of orientation, progression and 
spatial appreciation in the city, based on avenues, landmarks, focii, 
etc.. In his analysis, he argues that successful cities are constructed 
around such elements, which the contemporary civic designer 
must, therefore, keep in mind (if his urban design is to be 
successful both as a compositional entity and as a place which can 
be used with simplicity of orientation - often termed transparency 
- and joyous delight by inhabitant and visitor alike), by both 
hooking into existing urban elemental compositions, and making 
similar compositions of his own. There have been other similar 
studies (Cullen (1961) particularly springs to mind) of urban 
composition (including much detailed-work), but , again, they 
fall 
short of what is being looked for: partially because of their urban 
scale, but also because of their tendency to be prescriptive in 
much the way that the Hawthorne study was: the theorist has 
some ideas, formulates them and explores them through this 
formulation, checks them out and then presents them as a 
(prescriptive) recipe for success. 
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Symbolic Psychology 
There remain 2 other main approaches. The first of these I shall 
refer to as the symbolic. Although Jung is the origin of this 
approach (which becomes delightfully apparent in "Man and His 
Symbols (1964)), it is probably clearer to refer to Bachelard and 
his highly influential book "The Poetics of Space" (1969). In this 
book, Bachelard posits a metaphor for dwellings, extending 
Heidegger's notions of living and dwelling (1975). The metaphor is 
the human body, with the attic as the head, and the psychological 
identification of personality with the room of birth. I find this sort 
of work very hard to appreciate or accept, for I cannot go beyond 
the images that seem to me both preposterous and pretentious7. 
This is, undoubtedly, a weakness on my part (and I know many 
who I respect and who value this sort of approach). Thus, I am not 
really in a position to argue for or against this work: all I can say 
is that I find it so uncongenial and distasteful that I find I cannot 
consider seriously it at all. 
Semiotics - 
The second approach I find nearly as difficult. It is the Semiotic 
approach. In a sense, my difficulty with this approach is similar to 
that I have with the symbolic, but, in this case, I find the 
arbitrariness of interpretation distressing, not in the sense in 
which de Saussure (1966) espouses the arbitrariness of linguistic 
attachment, but in the attachment of meanings, most of which 
7 And I usually find the language ponderous and opaque. 
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seem mainly to convey a dark, Freudian picture more of psyches 
of those who attach them than of the spaces themselves! For the 
semiotic approach (see, for instance, Jencks and Baird (1969) and 
Bunt, Broadbent, and Jencks (1980)), when applied in architecture 
tends not towards the structuralism that has hit literary criticism 
(see, for instance, Kermode (1975)), but towards another very 
symbolic interpretation of meaning8. However, having said that, I 
should note the more literary interpretations of the experience of 
architectural space9. One of the first in recent times was by 
Hanson (1976), who compared the quality of spatial description in 
the writings of Thomas Hardy (who was, by training, an architect) 
and Jane Austin. Her analysis is largely concerned with two areas: 
the detail and specificity of place descriptionlo - which she shows 
to be very shallow in Austin's case compared to the richness of 
Hardy - and the social significance that may be attributed to 
places and the actions that are staged in and at them in the novels. 
But this, again, is not an examination of space and our experience 
of it per se, but rather of space as the location for the staging of 
8 I, in fact carried out a type of linguistic analysis (based on the 
grammatical structure, and the propensity of locality and spatial cases) into 
the relationship between Finnish language and Finnish architecture. This 
was, however, a much more formal examination that the other works 
referred to. I am not at all sure that the analogy drawn has any continuing 
value, but it was an interesting project to undertake, and helped me, as I 
now see, understand in a very preliminary and imprecise way some of the 
ideas that form the basis of Chapter 10 
9 This is an approach that is eternally popular with architecture students in 
their major piece of critical work, and many of the best explorations of this 
approach have been by students whose work is only readily available in the 
departmental libraries of the schools where they studied for this piece of 
work. 
10 The relationship between space and place always presents difficulties, 
and I shall not try to resolve them here. 
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other things, the qualities of which events the spaces are then 
imbued witht 1. 
II I accept that my rejection of these latter two approaches is less than 
scientific, and is not rigorous, but I find myself so put off by them, and so 
unable to give them a fair examination, that I feel I must admit it and allow 
myself to discard them, at least for the time being. I recognise that the 
failing is mine, and regret it. 
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HAT TYPE OF PSYCHOLOGY MIGHT BE SATISFACTORY? 
If these various efforts at constructing theories in different 
branches of what may be thought of as Environmental Psychology 
do not satisfy our requirements, the question follows as to 
whether there is any psychology that will help. 
In attempting to answer this question, it will be helpful here to list 
just what the requirements being called for are, for it is in these 
requirements that the answer, should there be one, lies. (The 
requirements are, naturally, . largely the converse of the 
items on 
the list of assumptions, aims and interests of Environmental 
Psychology already introduced above. ) 
What is required is: 
a) A psychology that supports learning (including learning 
by the experimenter), through the construction and modification 
of ideas and their relationships, rather than one that is based in 
testing ready assembled hypotheses (ie, an open and reflexive 
psychology, in which the experimenter is recognised as an active 
participant in the experiment). 
b) A psychology that is not concerned to blindly perpetuate 
its own pre-determined valuation of its aims, assumptions and 
interests regardless, but is prepared to consider how these are of 
relevance, benefit and appropriateness to the subject in hand. A 
psychology that is open and undecided, as opposed to one that is 
certain it already knows what it is dealing with and how to do so - 
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that it has the answers. (This is almost akin to saying a psychology 
that works like anthropology. ) 
c) A psychology that is concerned, in the first instance, with 
the participating individual, and with the individual cognitive 
processes, understandings and values of each subject involved, 
rather than with gross and generalised behaviour. 
d) A psychology that is not necessarily predicated upon the 
existence of absolutes and variables, which looks for qualities 
before (and, possibly, instead of) quantities, that is not obsessed 
with measurement. 
e) A psychology that can look at our experience of 
(architectural) space in and of itself, and not as reflected in and 
through behaviours that may or may not indicate, through actions 
other than the experiencing of space, how we do experience space: 
a psychology that is concerned with cognition in preference to 
behaviour, and that is capable of and willing to be adapted or 
accommodate the project in hand. 
f) And, finally, a psychology that is capable of helping 
explore and reveal a way of describing a new field covering an old 
experience. 
Perhaps such a psychology only barely exists, and perhaps it may 
never do more than that. But there are psychologies that have at 
least some of the above characteristics, the sorts of psychologies 
that are based on the individual and which accept what is 
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frequently described as a "constructivist" position (as defined at 
length, philosophically, in von Glasersfeld (1987)). One such is the 
Psychology of Personal Constructs of George Kelly (there are, of 
course, other Construct Psychologies, which will be mentioned 
where appropriate), which has been an inspiration both to me and 
to many others - others who have been able to develop ideas and 
techniques that are akin in spirit to Kelly's, applied necessarily 
differently in different areas. Perhaps this work is a step towards 
further development: I would hope so, for it is this sort of 
psychology that I have followed, albeit imperfectly, and which I 
have chosen in preference to Environmental Psychology, because, 
as I have shown, Environmental Psychology is neither tuned nor 
turned towards my interests, which, as will become apparent, 
Construct Psychology is. 
But, before that, we should examine the design act and research 
into that, to see what it may have to offer us in this context. 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
chapter 3 
DESIGN RESEARCH 
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CHAPTER 3 
sign, Research. Definition and Design Research 
"And though they wrote it all by rote, they did not write it right" 
(Lewis Carroll (1967), "The Hunting of the Snark") 
The work I am concerned with here is not primarily design and 
the act of designing, but with the way that architects (can be 
taught to) understand and refine their perception of 
(architectural) space: and thus with the nature of space itself, and 
how to communicate experiences of it. However, since architects 
are designers, and since this understanding is intended to be of 
general use to designers when designing in whatever field, it is 
appropriate to introduce some ideas of what the design process is 
and how it works, all the more so because it is possible that 
consideration and investigation of the design activity may throw 
some helpful light on how to examine space itself. 
As an activity (and I shall here normally use the word "design" as 
a verb), design is, I am convinced, rather mysterious (in part 
because it involves the creation of the new), for it seems to be 
describable in as many significantly different ways as there are 
those who wish to describe it. Furthermore, it seems to be an 
activity that defies most of our conventional explanations of how 
to define problems so that they may be solved with designerly 
quality': and of how to proceed in solving them, as I shall show. 
1 Quality is the big undefinable here: and yet, as many workers have 
claimed, it is central. Theories of quality are rare, just because theories are 
usually concerned with quantity, and are ill-equipped to deal with 
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Problem Solving and Design 
To start with, design is not Problem Solving (although it does 
solve, or rather, dis-solve and re-solve problems), at least in the 
sense of problem solving methodologies, from the traditional 
scientific approach to the various attempts at sideways problem 
solving (such as de Bono's "Lateral Thinking" (1970), or, less 
excessively, Polya (1954) (1957)). (Architectural) design is rarely 
undertaken in a situation of much obvious and immediate 
precision or the unchanging stability of "conventional" problem 
definition, and that which it does have, while it may (or may not) 
be central to the purpose of that which is to be designed, is 
certainly not the sole central concern. In fact, when Maldonado 
(1965), (also Maldonado and Bonsiepe (1964)) and his colleagues 
at Ulm attempted to define a process for designing that was 
of scientific", rational, objective and completely unarbitrary, they 
did not create, as they had set out to do, objects that were 
exclusively and uniquely fitted to their purpose, and utterly 
without (subjectively determined) style: they created instead the 
Braun range of household goods that, in their '60's heyday, were 
almost uniquely and instantly recognisable as being the product of 
a particular and highly visible "house style" [D. I. i]. And, in effect, 
many of these objects were extraordinarily arbitrary in their 
design - to the point where their function was sometimes 
investigation of the "variables" they usually work in terms of. of course, 
these variables are names for qualities. However, there is a project (called "Support, Survival and Culture" - de Zeeuw (1986)) which is running in Amsterdam, and of which I am a member, which is specifically concerned 
with the notion of quality. 
67 
compromised - because the method used to generate them was 
arbitrary (while not admitting to it). It depended upon the 
definition of criteria sets, and their assembly together to give the 
solution that was realised in the unique union of all these sets: but 
the criteria had to be chosen and defined, and it is rare indeed 
that it is not possible to choose some criteria that will not share a 
unique union with all others. (Even should this be possible, it is 
not hard to find and specify some novel and unpredicted criterion 
that will not fit such a union. ) 
If the critique of Maldonado's approach is that it is arbitrary. in 
the selection of its criteria, that of, for instance, the builder- 
developer's housing projects is that it can hardly even be said to 
(actively) select quality criteria at all: normally, such projects 
(which are low in quality in almost every respect from standard of 
weatherproofing to the elegance of the siting of the house in its 
surroundings) are generated by an optimistic mix of borrowed 
fashion and unimaginative planning: the house is seen as posing a 
problem to be solved insofar as there is a plan to be compiled so 
that it works in terms of connectivity, furnishability and 
habitability (although it is remarkable how many schemes fail 
even this simple criterion), and most of everything else is dealt 
with by the assumption of the trimmings and trappings of a 
superficial, stylistic solution together with a number of ill- 
conceived "features". Here, the problem to be solved is seen as the 
arrangement of a plan: the rest is a matter of fashionable dressing 
up. Sometimes it works. But all too often the result of this 
simplistic approach is a pastiche, an impoverished mess with a 
scarcely adequate plan embodied in a building that demonstrates 
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the lack of concern and love for it that the so-called "designer" 
manifested, and an equal lack of richness of thought and of detail. 
And space, the architect's medium, is considered as a commodity 
to be supplied in quantity rather than quality. 
From these examples, I hope it has become apparent that, as I 
asserted, designing is definitely distinct from the business of 
simple problem solving, and that problem solving approaches are 
not likely to be of primary use in designing: indeed, it is possible 
that there is, for the designer, no solution to a so-called problem, 
or at least that, initially, even the range or type of the solution is 
not apparent, and could never, therefore, be placed, beforehand, 
within a solution set. But this is not, I repeat, to claim that 
designers do not confront problems, or that, in designing, they 
should ignore them. Of course they should solve the problems (or 
rather, I believe, re-solve and dis-solve them). It is, rather, that 
problem solving methods are not generally intended for the 
design activity, for many of the "problems" a designer has to face 
appear contradictory, when they are stated, and otherwise cannot 
be made apparent in the first instance, becoming clear only during 
the process of designing - often in a way that feels very 
inadequate when verbalised - emerging so that, frequently, it is 
through the achievement of the solution that the problem becomes 
explicit (designers are particularly - and properly - adept at post- 
rationalisation, for pre-rationalisation presumes that there can be 
nothing new, and experience tells us otherwise). In designing, it is 
often the case that the solution defines the problem. 
DESIGN 
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What, then, is design (in contrast to "Problem Solving")? Its 
etymological source is Latin (it entered English via Old French): de 
(out) + signare (to mark). However, one must be careful, for the 
value of etymology is in indicating histories and in helping trace 
developments in both linguistic form and meaning, rather than in 
defining proper contemporary usage. I believe that, nowadays, 
"designing" has properly come to represent something altogether 
more magical: the intentional creating of something from nothing: 
the making, purposively, of the novel. (I mean, here, that this 
activity is undertaken by the agent intentionally or purposefully. ) 
For an architect, this involves the creation of space, together with 
its containers and generators. For designers in other fields (with 
which we are not specifically concerned), it usually indicates the 
creation of some individual and physical object such as, for 
instance, a piece of furniture, a business image or house-style, a 
street sign or an advertising poster. 
Such an activity has a number of odd features, many (but not all) 
of which are consequent upon this characterisation. For instance, 
there is always an initial aim in doing a design (although possibly 
the only aim is the self-referential one: to do some designing, 
often referred to as "doodling"): and this aim may turn out, in 
terms of the end product and its post-rationalised justification, not 
to be in the least bit important except insofar as it provided a 
starting point and initial direction. This is not to deny that for 
many designers (including architects) there is usually some 
(minimal, or at most, medial) externally supplied set of aims most 
of which have to be satisfied eventually in some manner or other. 
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Furthermore, the activity is creative and generative, in that it 
results in something coming into existence where there was 
nothing before, even though there may be a strong precedent for 
what is produced (or, in the extreme case, a straightforward copy 
is made). Thus, design, as an act, involves and is fundamentally 
concerned with making something where, previously, there was 
nothing, with the creation of novelty, even where such novelty is 
constituted of ready-mades or re-creationS2. And, finally, design, 
insofar as it is concerned with problems, is concerned with 
problem definitions that are incomplete and imprecise, and unable 
to generate, mechanically and without arbitrariness, solutions, 
where the problems that the designer faces may change, appear 
and disappear as the process of design proceeds, and where the 
problems that are actually, finally solved only become clear upon 
the solution being arrived at. (The designer knows that he has 
reached a solution, I believe - and shall elaborate later - through a 
process of recognition3. ) 
There are other points about (architectural) design that are 
curious, but which originate from outside requirements normally 
2 This is not the place to attempt a serious philosophical discussion of those 
hoary old chestnuts: viz. what qualifies as new - and in what circumstances 
- and what are the "degrees" of creativity: which are, I suspect, almost 
certainly meaningless notions, anyhow - for the new is new to him to 
whom it is new at the moment when it is new. Heinz von Focrster (1974) 
makes this point nicely when, in the "Cybernetics of Cybernetics". he 
asserts that the notion of "re-prcscntation" used in the Theory of 
Representations is meaningless: it is, rather, as Wittgenstein (1971) in 
effect asserts in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosphicus". a "presentation" of a 
particular, unique concurrence of understandings. 3For a general discussion of the role of such attitudes in C20 arts, as evinced 
specifically in the work of Marcel Duchamp, Jean Tinguely and Robert 
Rauschenberg, as well as John Cage, see Calvin Tomkins "Ahead of the 
Game" (1968). 
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laid upon (architectural) designers, in and as a result of their 
working environments. These are also largely concerned with the 
nature of the initial problem definition, and, although "externally" 
generated, become a necessary part of the design process as a 
result of the regularity and frequency of their occurrence. 
The first such point is that some requirements may be unstatable 
in any generally communicable way. This may be for a number of 
reasons, such as the inadequacy of (the specifier's control of) 
language, and the inexactness of terms used in describing certain 
experiences (colour is often taken as an example of this: when is 
orange red, when yellow, and is it not brown, anyhow? ). Later in 
this account, I shall introduce the notion that there is a conflict 
between the way in which we perceive space and the way we 
utter sentences, which makes communication about spatial 
experience seem extremely difficult in an ordinary verbal 
language. This conflict also affects the value to the designer of 
many research results in Environmental Psychology, as I indicated 
in Chapter 2. At very least this difficulty leads to under- or 
ambiguous - specification of the problem, to use terms from the 
field of Problem Solving, which inadequacies in specification are - 
only worsened by the amorphous nature of the actual person(s) 
for whom a design is (often) being made, such as the fictional 
council tenant or office worker! 
In contrast, the second is the proliferation of possible descriptions 
of problems, caused by the large number of people and agencies 
whose particular interests are allowed to influence the 
specification of problems for the problems that the architectural 
72 
designer is to solve, such as the various officers (planning, fire, 
building) and the assorted facets of the paying client (building use, 
client's public image, amortization accounts). Their concerned 
interventions can easily lead to overspecification, contrast and 
conflicting interests in outlook and weighting of criteria and, 
frequently, outright contradiction. 
And, finally, there is the simple unknown or unknowable (eg 
change in technology, politico-economic climate or wilfulness on 
the part of the client himself changing his mind), which is perhaps 
best expressed through the effect of the evolving design itself: for 
the creation of the design changes, as if proceeds, the conditions (it 
is, after all, specifically intended as an intervention) affecting the 
conditions under which the reasons for wanting the design 
commissioned in the first instance are perceived and remain 
viable, and opening new possibilities that were not (obviously) 
present in the first instance. 
Thus, all (architectural) design takes place, of necessity, in a flux 
that is both internally driven by the nature of the design activity 
itself, and, equally, is externally generated by requirements 
placed upon and opened up by the design itself4. 
It should now be clear that the conditions under which 
(architectural) design takes place, and the activity itself, are very 
4 Thus, a former teaching colleague of mine, who has remained a successful 
architectural practitioner, Stephen Gage, insists that the only true measure 
of an architect's competence is his ability to accept continuous, endless and 
profound change, and contradictory conditions being placed upon him all 
the time that the development and realisation of a commissioned design 
continues. 
73 
complex and indeterminate, out of which not only is something 
generated where there was nothing, but also what was, at best, a 
very imprecise, incomplete and hazy set of requirements becomes 
something of extraordinary precision, clarity and finality: a 
substantial built object with an amortized lifespan normally taken 
to be 60 yearss. So it is of interest to consider if, and, if so, just 
how this activity is explained and accounted for by theorists and 
researchers, and what justifications are given for any findings. 
DESIGN RESEARCH AND METHOD 
The field in which this is done is called Design Research or Design 
Method6. However, it seems to me that, as I have in effect 
asserted above, there are as many accounts and explanations as 
there are theorists. So, before I attempt to give an indication of 
the range of their theories, I will explain why this variety is 
almost inevitable. 
The basic problem for a researcher into design is that the -field is, 
of necessity, as I have asserted, interactively interventionist and 
concerned with the imprecisely defined7. - It is, therefore, 
5 How designers handle this imprecision is of great interest, although 
outside the scope of this thesis. I have discussed it in Glanville (1984), 
which can also be found in Appendix I. 
6 There is an international brotherhood of Design Research Societies that 
successfully support this field, even if most examples given here are taken 
from the English-speaking world. 
7 It is also very expensive to execute architectural designs, and almost 
impossible to arrange "hard-nosed trial-runs": if a building is built, it can 
rarely be knocked down and re-built if (when? ) it is found to be 
substantially inadequate, although this is now happening to some housing 
estates that were built in the '60's. It is interesting to consider whether, and 
if so why these buildings were so bad, and how they have been allowed to 
acquire an unquestioned universal symbolism indicating rottenness in the 
state of architecture. 
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impossible to carry out experiments which involve realistic, fair 
and precise comparisons between various approaches and 
of solutions" that different individuals propose, just as it is not 
possible to use placebo style control groups in experiments. Nor 
are the conditions in which some design proposal exists repeatable 
in the sense that a scientist looks for repeatability. Furthermore, 
the decisions made by (architectural) designers are not generally 
reversible or undo-able, either when achieved in the physical 
environment or when simply projects on drawing boards - the 
first because of the complexity of their intervention and the fact 
that they have created a change of some note for the sentient 
inhabitants of the physical environment, which means they cannot 
really be considered as prototypes or seriously modifiable tests, 
the second because designing is learning, and what the designer 
has learnt cannot simply be erased. Thus, ideas about how design 
is or should be carried out are not comparable or testable in any 
serious conventional scientific sense. And, indeed, different 
responses to a design brief are often welcomed precisely because 
they allow the client to look at various responses to his inexactly 
defined requirements, and choose that with which he feels most 
happy (this, for instance, - is one of the purposes of the 
architectural competition). And it is this test, the test of feeling 
happy or at least relatively content with, that is applied to the 
alternative theses produced by each theorist, about what the 
design process is and how it works. 
Schools of Deign Research 
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If the designer and his activity of designing, as depicted above, 
now seem both clearer and more familiar that they did at the 
beginning of this Chapter, it is because I believe we are all 
designers (as Kelly (1955a) did when introducing the notion of the 
01 personal scientist" ) and thus find that, after explanation, the lack 
of familiarity and the remoteness go. In my private pantheon, 
design and learning (as Pask has observed as long ago as 1961, 
humans are machines for learning) are both very hard to 
differentiate and of supreme importance (Pask (Pask (1985 et 
seq) now talks extensively about the "Architecture of Knowledge", 
to re-inforce this point). Our own individual bodies of knowledge - 
our knowing, which we use and embody in our base for action - is 
designed by each of-us for our own personal aims: again, Kelly's 
point about our personal assembly of our own personal constructs. 
Thus, what scientists do is also a form of design: not only in the 
manufacture of scientific knowledge, but also in the acts of 
experimental testing (experiments are designed, and elements in 
experimental set-ups are re-arranged until some pattern is 
discerned in them, as I assert in "The Question of Cybernetics", 
(Glanville (1987))). Design is a basic human activity, for we are 
always making, organising, making constant and editing what is, to 
each of us, novelty at the time it is new8. But this is not central 
except as an assertion of a philosophical position, to this thesis, 
and I will develop it no further here. More detailed arguments 
may be found in "The Architecture of the Computable" 
(Glanville(1980a), and Appendix G) and "Why Design Research" 
(Glanville (1981), and Appendix F), and I believe Medawar (1963) 
8 See footnote 2 of this Chapter. 
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was making an essentially similar point in his classic radio talk, "Is 
the Scientific Paper a Fraud? ". As I said, if the designer, as painted 
above, and his activity of designing now seem more familiar that 
they did at first, it is because we can probably all recognise basic 
acts of living, when they are pointed out to us. 
Having said which, Design Research is a very wide subject, with 
participants who range from the mechanist to the mystic. I shall 
summarise here the range of main positions as I see them. (For an 
extraordinarily encyclopaedic overview, see Broadbent's 
remarkable "Design in Architecture" (1973). For a more modest 
and more recent survey, see Lera's "Empirical and Theoretical 
Studies of Design Judgement: a Review" (1981b). ) 
Mechanism 
The mechanistic position may be epitomised by the Ulm school of 
Maldonado, already mentioned in discussing the precision of 
definition (or, rather, lack of) in design problems: I will not add 
further explanation here. But, related to this position, is the 
position of those who believe that rules can be adequately defined 
for the mechanical (ie, frequently, computer) generation of 
successful design solutions. This position is occupied by those who 
attest one of two different belief structures. The first is that of the 
person dealing with a particularly complex but "properly defined" 
problem (calculating the trajectory, deviation and consequently 
necessary burns for moon shots, for instance): but he is not really 
designing, in the sense that I have espoused. The second is that of 
the person who will propose a model that seems to perform 
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adequately when run on a machine. Such a model may have little 
or nothing to do with the so-called variables (should they turn out 
to exist at all) and their structural interconnections, for the only 
criterion is that they perform "as perceived reality does"9, over a 
defined and limited range, and who maintain that when the range 
is extended, their models will continue to act in this manner. Such 
models are synthetic (as opposed to simulation) models, to use 
George's distinction (1971). They can tell us nothing about what is 
going on in the assumed reality modeled, nor is there any reason 
at all, other than blind optimism, to believe their predictions 
within, let alone outside, the defined and limited initial range. 
Such models were initially developed by Forrester (of magnetic 
core memory fame) (1969) (1971), and had a vogue in what was 
called "Systems Planning" (Chadwick (1971), McLoughlin (1969) 
and Meadows et al (1972), in their "Limits to Growth"), but are 
now less in favour, due to the obviousness of their essentially 
arbitrary nature. See [D. 2. i]. 
Mysticism 
At the other end of the scale, the mystical position about design 
may best be represented by J. Christopher Jones. (I find myself, in 
my own arguments and to my continuing surprise, favouring this 
camp, although my disagreement with Jones is fairly basiclo. ) 
Jones's current position derives most particularly from his interest 
in the music, events and writings of John Cage (eg "Silence" (1966), 
9 Whatever that means. 
10 I summarise in more specific terms than used in my arguments about the 
nature of design how I sec design, towards the end of this chapter. 
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"A Year from Monday" (1975)). (Earlier, his work was much more 
purposeful, model and orientation based - see his "Design 
Methods" (Jones (1980a)). ) What has really happened in his work 
is that, in looking critically at design methods he came to believe 
there was little justification for any of them, and therefore that 
anything was as good as anything else (from a logical point of 
view). Taking this position freed his imagination from the 
restrictions of causal thinking, and allowed the occurrence of 
arbitrary events which could be appreciated, in this frame of 
mind, for the beautiful occurrences they were. This reflects Cage's 
insistence that "anything goes", and that we would do well not to 
bend sounds to our purposes by organising them, but rather listen 
to whatever occurs (whatever we happen to hear) with and in 
wonder. Perhaps the critical article in Jones' development of this 
position is "St Ives by Chance" (1980b). A similar position is taken 
by the Boyle family (1986) (1987), who recreate arbitrarily 
selected bits of land as paintings, "without editing", so as to wash 
away the confusions and preconceptions that we allow to 
brainwash us, thus uncovering what they presume to be the 
hidden but true reality. What happened in Jones's case was, I 
believe, that he gave up belief in and hence acting upon the 
method and criteria of critical appraisal in order to assume the 
mantle on one (non-) method, thus becoming a performer of 
designs, and extending the range of use of various tools in design 
(see Jones (1984) [D. 3. i to xi])II. Naturally, as a "constuctivist" of 
sorts, I find this naive belief in a reality without interpretation 
touching but untenable, for even the interpretation of not making 
11 See also footnote 2. 
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an interpretation is, in itself, an interpretation, just as there is no 
action without an actor, including the action of not acting - an old 
philosophical disagreement that I doubt can ever be resolved by 
rational argument. 
Language 
In between these two poles there are several other identifiable 
positions. Perhaps that nearest to the mechanist is that of those 
who try to define, or, on occasion, design "design languages" 
(Language is the term they use)12. Probably the most influential of 
these in recent times (and one who is still one of the most 
productive and original) is the architect-mathematician 
Christopher Alexander. He attempted to develop a method of 
designing using diagram overlays, which had some of the 
characteristics of the mechanists' definitions and sets, but were 
also based on very careful consideration of the logic of how things 
fitted together. Titles are clear indicators of his concerns: "A City is 
not a Tree (it's a Semi-lattice)" (Alexander (1965)), "From a Set of 
Forces to a Form" (Alexander (1966)), and his early magnum opus, 
"Notes on the Synthesis of Form" (Alexander (1964)). See [DAi]. 
All were concerned with a language like method for producing 
appropriate forms and localities (rather than with space). His later 
work, centred around the creation of a "Pattern Language" 
(Alexander (1977)) is even more concerned with language and 
12 It should be noted that the idea of an architectural "language" is nothing 
new. It has, for instance, been common to talk about the "Language of 
Classical Architecture" (Summerson (1963)), and, indeed, a grammar-like 
notion of the correct assembly of architectural statements was certainly 
the norm in the Renaissance (eg Palladio (1965)). 
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with the conventional domination of language over thought, using 
terms such as syntax, semantics and pragmatics, and also with 
precedent. A similar general outlook is used by Hillier and Hanson 
in their "The Social Logic of Space" (1984), which again tries to 
find a syntactic structure to support decisions upon which sorts of 
(primarily) location plan arrangements are likely to be able to 
carry semantic meaning for inhabitants, but which is inhibited by 
the arbitrary nature of Hillier and Hanson's abstractions and 
patterns (that others are asked to assume and take on board, 
wholesale), and the fact that their approach is prescriptive rather 
than descriptive, thus generating laws that are restrictive rather 
than generatively inventive. 
Conjectures, Refutations and Tests 
A slightly different position has recently been taken by Broadbent 
in his professorial inaugural lecture "Towards a Theory of 
Architecture" Broadbent (1985)). He takes the work of Karl Popper 
(specifically "Conjectures and Refutations" (1963)) as a starting 
point to argue that designers work like scientists and other 
"reasonable" people, by making conjectures and then -being 
unhappy until they manage to refute them. As far as I am 
concerned the appeal of this approach must be tempered by my 
belief that we do not perform like this at all. Popper's work makes 
excellent sense as an ideal, but psychologically it is naive. Few of 
us will (or can) test all our ideas (I'm not likely, for instance, to 
check out my ideas concerning potentially terminal activities), nor 
do we want to: we are very conservative in what we do, working 
hard to maintain that which has become unmaintainably non- 
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sensical. And, as Medawar asserts (1963), it's not how scientists do 
science, anyhow. Nor is it always even theoretically possible to 
test ideas in order to refute them, as I have already argued, for 
that is part of my assertion about the nature of the design 
activityl So while I admire Poppet's view as providing an ideal, I 
find the refutation mechanism unrealistic, preferring the model 
proposed by Lakatos (1970). Nor does his view help me 
understand how to generate a (new) view, or even whether (and if 
so how) it is possible to do so. Do I make any random response to 
a problem that I have argued cannot be stated yet? But still, 
architects are very good at explaining ("justifying" is the technical 
term) what they did, after the event, and recounting tests they 
tried: and it is possible that the ideal is more achievable than I 
estimate. What is certain is that it is a very good creed that 
designers should, at all stages of their designing, test their ideas in 
as far as they can, and respect and act upon the failures they thus 
discover. 
Implementation 
We come now to a group of workers -who may be thought of as 
more concerned with the implementation of design decisions. For 
instance, James Powell talks about design as an enabling activity 
in his professorial inaugural address "Is Architectural Design a 
Trivial Pursuit" (Powell (1987)). By "enabling", Powell means two 
distinct things. Firstly, that design should be seen as an activity 
which enables people (including the designer himself) to do things 
better,, and secondly that work (meaning designing) should be 
done on providing tools that make the designer's job easier to do. 
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For Powell, personally and in practice, a large part of this involves 
the extensive use advanced technology to handle considerable 
quantities of information (much of it very hard to come by at first 
hand). For instance, working with a team of colleagues lead by 
Sime, he is researching behaviour in buildings on fire using 
computer controlled video disc (Powell and Sime (1987)). See 
[D. 5. il. Given that it is generally both difficult and dangerous, and 
also illegal to produce fires in buildings, this simulation allows 
real-time examination of a very rich set of data (including such 
intangibles as facial and bodily expression) and of the generation 
and evaluation of behaviours in conditions probably about as close 
to reality as is possible in practice. This work is leading to major 
changes in understanding (and hence, it is hoped, legislation) of 
how best to accommodate this risk so that its associated dangers 
are minimised, thus better enabling people to live and designers 
to reduce the problem. 
In contrast, there is also what may be thought of as a more 
European approach (sounding less similar-than it perhaps is). This 
would be epitomised by the work in Praxiology led by Gasparsky 
in Poland, and a group I -am associated with in the field of 
Andragology at the University of Amsterdam, led by de Zeeuw, to 
which work I shall refer to here (see de Zeeuw (1986) (1987) and 
some summarising comments by myself - Glanville (forthcoming)). 
This work is subfused with the notion of change, and the 
concomitant that change produces change and therefore exists in a 
different environment than that in which the change was initially 
required: this should indicate the similarity between their 
approach and the way in which I have describing design. This and 
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other side-effects have to be carefully considered, and at least a 
means for dealing with (containing, negating, celebrating, playing 
with) them has to be built in if change is going to be intentionally, 
knowingly and responsibly engineered. There is another 
important point: that if a professional is going to provide a service 
for others, that service should not reduce the autonomy, ability to 
accept responsibility for their own actions and self-confidence of 
the those for whom he is acting, rather than making the 
professional ever more essential and irreplaceable. (This is clearly 
a matter of designing in the sense that I have described the 
successful teacher's role as being to design himself out of a job). 
What is interesting about this group is not only that there are 
several research - projects being pursued, but also that theoretical 
aspects are being considered and developed, and models are being 
made and tested. Thus, de Zeeuw's group is attempting a 
theoretical analysis of the concomitants of change, which, if 
successful, will be of the greatest concern, relevance and value to 
designers, especially architects. 
My Position 
Although I work with this latter group, and share their 
enthusiasms and convictions, their basic concerns do not always 
marry up with those I find myself facing when I must, as a 
teacher of architecture, wonder what the architectural design 
process is. It is here that I find myself moving to the more 
mystical end of the scale, for I work encouraging people to make 
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the new (even if it has precedent and is only "new" to them)13. 
The creation of the new is, as I have asserted, essentially 
mysterious (it is what causes Mill's "Problem of Induction" in 
science (1843)), the source of that weakness in the position 
already ascribed to Popper - that he cannot account for the 
generation of novelty, only to the need for it. My account of the 
process of design can be summarised, simply, as holding a 
to conversation with yourself" (usually through the medium of 
making marks on a piece of paper). This is why doodling is so 
importand Having some sort of general and probably 
impoverished initial idea, the designer starts dreaming and 
doodling, gradually pulling ideas off the sheet either as they form, 
-or on 
later examination. This process is imbued with the idea of 
enrichment: the attempt all the time is to make something that 
does more, more beautifully, but it is modulated both by testing 
and by the transient immediacy inherent in the inquisitiveness of 
the aim-less wanderer: the ability to go off on side-tracks 
(because there are no main paths), the ability to enjoy and delight 
in the unexpected views as they occur (because there is time to 
"stand and stare"), the ability to decide to finish (recognising that 
an end has been reached) and the ability to start again 
(abandoning all previous work, if necessary). Gradually, through 
these processes (influenced by the working environment -a 
studio with its informality, chatty camaraderie, and the friendly 
participation of teachers "guiding from behind"), the student 
learns to wander effectively in the ideas landscape of his paper 
13 1 have, in fact, found. very recently, that it has become more and more necessary to talk in these more architectural sorts of terms, in tutorials 
with mcmbers; of de Zccuw's group in Amsterdam, so the differences in approach and concern may be becoming rather less noticeable. 
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and pencil. And, at points, he learns to say "Hold it! That's 
interestingl That's just rightl". It is this dreamy wandering in the 
conversation with the self, and the sense of recognition that, I am 
convinced, is what is special in what designers do (that is outside 
definitions of the norm), and is what makes design so wonderfU114. 
This imaging is based on my teaching experience as well as my 
time as a student, on how I design now (albeit that what I design 
is not architecture, but education), and on discussions with 
colleagues and friends. And, by way of specific justification, I 
argue this as a process which can be explained through the 
Cybernetic model of the Black Box, and the observer's 
development of a description for its behaviourls. See [D. 61 to v]. 
BUT THIS ISN'T THE EXPERIENCE OF (ARCHITECTURAL) 
SPACE 
But the trouble that should by now be apparent is that neither my 
own model, nor any of the above discussion of what design 
research is, and how design researchers have viewed both their 
field and the activity of design itself, has told me anything at all 
about our experiencing of (architectural) space. To use my 
analogy, it has been a wandering, essentially irrelevant and 
getting us nowhere with our problem, but, hopefully, pleasant 
14 1 should indicate, here, that I believe this way of behaving is positively 
encouraging to the generation of creativity in general, and can equally be 
taken as a metaphor for the creative work of the scientist. In a sense, what 
differentiates designers is not that they behave like this, but how often 
they do it, and how much it is expected of them. See Glanville (1988). 
15 Although I have often lectured about the relationship between the Black 
Box model and the activity of design, I have not yet committed this 
argument to paper. I expect to do this shortly, in a paper entitled "The 
Cybernetics of Design and the Design of Cybernetics" (Glanville 
(forthcoming)). 
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enough anyway! 
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CHAPTER 4 
My Problem 
My problem, then, was the following. 
I wished to access the cognitive structure by which, I believed, 
people generated their personal mental models of their 
understandings and experiences of architectural space, and to find 
a way of describing this experience and understanding, in a form 
communicable between different people, so that I could learn 
about it and teach it to my students, by the use of a fairly exact, 
precise and shared "language". 
And yet, even though there were the writings of architects and 
critics, and the work of researchers in Environmental Psychology 
and Design Research, none of this seemed either to fit the bill or 
even to be able to assist me in what I wanted to do: which, thus, 
became quite an undertaking, starting, as it were, from scratchl 
For, as I have explained, architects very rarely write about space: 
preferring, instead, to write about everything buts! It is a case, as 
I have already alluded, of confusing the bottle for the wine, of 
thinking that talking about the bottle will tell you how the wine, 
I This is becoming progressively less so, although most of the recent 
writing by architects and critics about space is still more bottle than wine 
orientated. A good example is the collection of papers presented at the 1984 
meeting of the Union International des Architects and published under the 
name "Man and Space" (ed. Dahinden (1984), and including the Zevi quote to 
be found at the beginning of Chapter 1). But it must be remembered that I 
am talking about a problem that existed in 1972, and which is to be 
understood against the background of that time. Hopefully, the field has 
progressed since then - and I would also hope that the work reported here has made and will continue to make a contribution to this development! 
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itself, tastes. And environmental psychologists and design 
researchers are intent on areas of concern, the uses of method and 
the justification of opinion that are also not really primarily spatial 
in the architectural sense I have indicated. 
So it appeared that, in order to have any chance of succeeding in 
my aims of solving the problem outlined, I would have to 
undertake to design and develop a set of concepts and research 
methods, as well as the desired spatial language, more or less all of 
my own and from scratch, using whatever few resources I knew of 
and could unearth and inventing the others as necessary. 
And yet, I did not want to invent a language and impose it upon 
others: that was too like the use of experiments to justify the 
researcher's own opinion that I have complained of in the 
approach of other workers: rather, I wanted something that came 
out of the social understanding of others, as all language, it seems 
to me, should, and with as little external reference given by me as 
was possible. 
My knowledge consisted largely of, and my leanings were towards, 
reflexive and constructive psychologies, self-assessment and self- 
expression of personal understandings, the sort of thinking that 
pervaded the work of Piaget. and Kelly, of Pask and Thomas, and, 
as it happened, of the new order in Cybernetics that had just been 
established by von Foerster, Brown, Maturana, Varela and Uribe, 
Beer, Pask, and in my own doctoral dissertation in CybernetiCS2, all 
2 References to work all these people can be found elsewhere in the text, 
where specific contributions are relevant (particularly in the 
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of which seemed to be sympathetic to my original wish not to 
enforce my views and expression, but to allow a group to generate 
their own language, from scratch, in a social environment. 
So I pursued this goal with my students as the subjects originating 
the language, with, as it turned out, less and less success (and, it 
began to seem to me, likelihood of success), as I recount in the 
next 5 chapters. 
Introduction). I am not giving references here. for it seems to me not to be 
relevant or useful to the argument, which is very general, in this chapter, 
to confound it with references. 
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CHAPTER 5 
First Experiment -a Shared Language 
"We think that if we can give something a word we can 
understand and control it. " (Laurie Anderson, Radio Interview, 
June 1987, with reference to the writer William Burrough's 
statement "Language is a virus from outer space. " (Burroughs 
(1968)). ) 
As I have recounted, I still had my problem: although there exist 
areas of study that I might reasonably have hoped would be able 
to help me devise means to assist in my 
-attempt 
to break into the 
big architectural mystery that I had denied myself access to as a 
student, and which I now as a teacher needed to get to grips with 
quite urgently, they didn't seem to be able to help me: their 
outlooks, concerns and modes of operation were quite different to 
those I believed I had analysed that I needed. And, even though 
space was reputedly the major concern of architects, I could find 
little or nothing they had written about it which was useful and 
that I could understand: what is written about is, as I have said, 
effectively everything but space. As to the discussion of space in 
practice (for instance, in the architecture studio), it became a 
combination of gesticulation and seemingly inarticulate, 
meaningless utterances of the sort "Y'know what I mean" (which I 
certainly didn't). Furthermore, I had students who knew as little 
as I did about this "material of architecture", and urgently wanted 
to grasp it and master its manipulation. What was it about space 
that made it so hard to talk about in an articulate manner, and 
what would make it less mysterious and more available to those 
not yet initiated into its secrets? 
94 
Under the illusion that everything that could be expressed ought 
to be able to be expressed in words, and feeding this view upon 
the prejudice that architects chose to present themselves as 
fuddy-duddy and waffly (being either intentionally oblique, and 
hence mysterious, or damned lazy), I decided to attempt to find a 
vocabulary (a "language", I called it) in terms of which to express 
with precision feelings about and understandings of our (ie, 
human) perception and experience of (architectural) space. The 
naivety of this view - that everything, including some of those 
things such as emotion which we feel so sharply but about which 
we talk so inadequately, should be precisely statable in exact 
terms - seems to me now astonishing, although the presumption in 
the undertaking does not. Architectural (theoretical) texts are 
usually so extraordinarily oblique as to be virtually 
incomprehensible: and, just at the beginning of the 70's, that 
(technological) optimism which particularly fired my generation of 
architecture students (allowing me my peculiar and highly original 
passage through architecture school! ) did not make our 
assumptions that we had finally got it right, that we could change 
the world and that the sky was the limit so peculiar or out of 
placel. 
am glad they did not, for in changing my views, over the years, I have 
been given the chance to enjoy a wider experience and learn more than 
most are fortunate enough to be permitted, and because I believe some good 
came out of the research I set out on. even if what appeared was not always 
immediately related to my aims (sometimes, indeed, effectively destroying 
them). 
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Thus began my attempt to develop within a group of (first year) 
students of architecture2, a set of terms (a language) generated by 
and agreed, socially, within the group, in which to discuss 
experiences and understandings of (architectural) spaces. 
METHOD 
Background to the Choice of Method 
The method chosen was based, as already indicated in Chapter 3, 
upon the notion of the personal construct that George Kelly 
developed in his Psychology of the Personal Scientist (normally 
called Personal Construct Psychology - PCT. See Kelly (1955a) 
(1955b)). The reasons for this were of two varieties: 
Firstly, as a psychology, being personal, constructivist and 
possessing a method which already had a technology (for instance, 
Thomas's early computer implementations at Brunel University, eg 
Mendoza and Thomas (1972), Thomas and Shaw (1975)), for the 
apparently precise external expression (referred to as elicitation) 
of personal constructs to others, PCT seemed appropriate to my 
aims and almost purpose made for my requirements. 
Secondly, I had access, initially through their joint seminars, to 
Professor Gordon Pask (then of the Cybernetics Department at 
Brunel University), and Dr Laurie Thomas (Director of the Centre 
2 Chosen because, since they were my students, I had ready and easy access 
to their time and efforts. 
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for the Study of Human Learning, CSHL, also at Brunel)3. Both were 
constructivist psychologists (with, initially, non-psychological 
backgrounds, just like me), both were concerned with explicit 
external representations and structures of meaning (as it 
happened, on computers) of personal understandings (which it 
was my intention to achieve), both were interested in teaching and 
leaming (which was my professional concern), and, to my good 
fortune and delight, both were available and willing to advise and 
help me. Furthermore, both had experience in the arts: Pask in the 
theatre and as an environmental sculptor (his "Colloquy of 
Mobiles" was shown at the "Cybernetic Serendipity" Exhibition in 
London, 1968 (Pask (1971)), and as a consultant to the 
Architectural Association School (AA), London (which was how I 
met him), and Thomas in working with sculpture students at St 
Martin's School of Art, London. It was this work of Thomas's that 
so particularly interested me, seeming in certain respects to get 
very close to what I was attempting, for he had used Kelly's 
technique of construct ranking scales together with actual pieces 
of sculpture as elements, in order to get sculpture students to be 
explicit about both their preferences and their construing of 
sculptural objects, by-passing the need for speech4. 
3 Pask was then supervising my studies for a PhD degree in Cybernetics 
(Glanville (1975)), as Thomas is the supervisor of the work presented here. 
have remained a member of the CSHL, and have also retained close working 
links with Pask in basic research, course design and writing. 
4 The relevance of this work will become obvious. below. when I introduce 
the method I decided to use. Although I have discussed his technique with 
Thomas on many occasions, I have never found, nor has he ever directed 
me towards, a really good reference: and some points still remain hazy. For 
that reason, I refer to this work of his, which is central to my efforts, 
through his joint paper (Thomas and Pope (1971)), which is the nearest I 
can get. 
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Material Requirements of the Method 
The experimental material had to accommodate a number of 
distinct requirements: 
The use of tangible, repeatable material, that could be stored 
and used in the same way (be taken as being seen the same way) 
by all subjects on all occasions. This is not so easy with 
architectural material. 
To be personally viewable by each subject, both individually 
and in groups, and to be shared between those group members. 
To be individually and clearly labellable and to appear 
obviously suitable for verbal description. 
The experimental method had to accommodate the above, and also 
permit: 
Individuals, and their working in and between groups (ie, - 
socially). 
The verbal expression of individual understandings of visual 
spatial experiences as a source of potential communication within 
and between groups. 
The modelling of how other participants understood and 
experienced the same material, so that it could be discussed and 
agreement arrived at. 
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The testing of the results for similarity of use and hence the 
sharing of understanding necessary for the assertion that a (social) 
language has been developed. 
This is a tall order, and the consequent method used relies very 
heavily upon my understanding, through discussion with him, of 
Thomas's St Martin's method. 
Account of Method Used5 
The subjects chosen were first year students of architecture in the 
academic year 1974 - 5, from one of the teaching- units (of which I 
was a member) at the AA School6. They were chosen because of 
their continuous availability on a regular basis over a long period. 
In the end there were 9 regular participants, although a few 
others took part on an occasional basis (their contributions are not 
referred to separately here). 
Several of the Appendices make reference to this experiment. For a 
general overview of this and the other two experiments presented here, as 
well as several others, of peripheral interest, that I have carried out, see 
Appendices A and G. 
6 It should be explained that the AA does not work in the manner of a 
conventional architecture school. The 5 year main course is divided into 3 
sections: First Year (I year's duration), Intermediate and Diploma Schools (2 
year's duration each). Each of these is made up of several "Units" (small 
groups of staff who develop an individual course appropriate to where in 
the school they are operating, and whose courses are selected by the 
students in a sort of gross cattle market at the beginning of the year). This 
particular unit was one of three in the First Year. and was quite explicitly 
the most experimental, and the one that most questioned the status quo. For 
a fuller description of the AA's peculiar educational approach, history and 
environment, see any Prospectus from the last 15 years (cg "Architectural 
Association School of Architecture Prosepctus, 1987-8") 
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The material chosen was a collection of 35 mm colour slides that I 
had taken of the remarkably fine Tuberculosis Sanatorium at 
Paimio, Finland, designed by Alvar Aalto, 1928 - 33. These 
apparently satisfied the requirements (mainly of handling and 
identity in viewing): and it just so happened that I had a large 
collection of such slides and an intimate knowledge of the building 
(and could therefore clarify any points arising), and that the 
building is highly regarded internationally. (For a brief 
introduction to this building, and a summary of themes in Aalto's 
work, see Glanville (1978a). See [A. 121 to v] for some of the 
chosen slides. ) 
In order to allow each student to -begin with slides of views 
he 
found interesting for their (architectural) spatial qualities, the 
collection of about 180 slides was shown to the 9 participating 
students, and each selected 5 slides. From the 5, a further selection 
was made reducing the number to 3 each (the interim stage was 
included so that each student had 3 slides both personally chosen 
and exclusive to him. Thus, there -was no duplication of interest 
through possession). (For -technical reasons, 5 extra slides were 
included, but were not judged to threaten the results, and their 
presence will not be further remarked). Thus, we had an 
experimental material of 32 x 35 mm slides of one building, 
selected from the original collection of ca 180 by the students7. 
71 was aware that it might have been better to have chosen from a wider 
base than one building and from a wider experience than students early in 
the Ist year of a5 (academic) year course. The students were chosen as the. 
only subjects readily and reliably available to me -a problem that has 
always occurred - and I wanted to limit my participation in forming their 
opinions, so I choose to use the building I had most slides of, giving the 
hopefully credible reason to the students that it was a good idea to have one 
building and examine its space consistently and in detail. 
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We then divided into 3 groups (A, B, C) each of 3 students (1,2,3) 
and each with 3 slides (i, ii, iii). Later these groups would be mixed 
up in various ways. 
The slides each student brought to the group were pooled, and, in 
accordance with Kelly's procedure, 3 of each collection of 9 were 
selected at random. These were positioned along a5 point 
construct ranking line, in such a way as to have a singleton at one 
end (say the low end) and a pair at the other (say the high). This is 
the means by which Kelly elicits a construct from an individual, 
and it is of the greatest important to him8. (Kelly's method in 
eliciting a construct was to ask that the pair should be isolated, 
and an explanation given of what was held to be similar in the 
pair that was different in the singleton. ) I asked that each student 
do this in his group, in turn, with a randomly selected triple, 
telling the others in the group what the construct he was using to 
describe spatial qualities, and giving further elaboration, if 
necessary. See [C. I. i]. 
After several attempts by each student, more slides were added, 
to be placed at any of the ranking points on the construct line 
(and, often, in between these points), as seemed appropriate [C. I. ii 
and iii]. Although there was a very precisely specified set of steps 
8 As time wore on, this stipulation became less so to me: I found I was 
interested in the concept of a constructivist psychology, and the 
availability of the technique. rather than its precision in dealing with 
pathologies and the analysis of psychoses, which Kelly-the-psychoanalyst 
was. I am not alone in varying from Kelly's procedure: many of the most 
eminent of his followers. such as Fransclia (see Bannister and Fransella 
(1971) have done so. See, also. any of the Proceedings of the Biennial 
Meetings on Personal Construct Psychology. 
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to be followed, students then (and all other students / subjects I 
have worked with since) have found it impossible to stick to 
exactly, and I no longer believe it to be strictly necessary or 
practical to be rigid about this. 
The next stage involved one student setting up the construct, and 
the other 2 in the group placing the remaining slides on the 
construct line, where they felt the first one would have placed 
them, explaining their reasons. In the case of major disagreement9, 
the first would move the slides placed by the other two to other 
positions that better fitted in with his ideas, and an "argument" 
would follow, in which slides were moved and explanations 
- exchanged until an agreement was reached, and the construct 
named, or the students gave up that attempt to reach an 
agreement in despair. See [C. 2. i to iv], although these illustrations 
are of more immediate relevance to examples mentioned in 
Chapter 8. 
This process was continued with other initial triples. In theory, it 
should have happened for all possible combinations and until 
substantial agreement was achieved virtually all the time. In 
practice, students got bored and / or failed to increase the number 
of construct names they generated. Nor was it possible, under the 
circumstances to cajole students to conjoin or split constructs, as is 
possible with such computerised programs as PETRA (Shaw 
(1981)), Shaw and McKnight (1981) and Thomas's own programs 
(eg Thomas and Shaw (1976) (1977)), especially when such 
9 Generally, one in which the difference in position was more that one 
ranking position. 
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programs are used individually. Also, in practice, the discipline of 
the initial triple being arranged by one and the other slides by the 
others in the group, etc, was not adhered to: it was simply too 
mechanical and repetitive to maintain the interest of students 
over a prolonged period. At the time I was concerned, although 
there was nothing I could do about it. However, experience since, 
using a variety of objects (and often not allowing any form of 
verbal comment or communication) has shown that this fluidity is, 
in itself, very revealing in an enriching and unpredicted manner, 
and allows an extraordinary and desirable form of interaction. 
(See Appendix E for a more precise description of the method, as it 
has been applied on other occasions. ) 
Members of the groups were now re-allocated so that the new 
groups were made up of individuals from each of the 3 original 
groups, delegated to act on behalf of their original group, and the 
whole process was repeated, with further construct names being 
generated. By now, these construct names had become terms, with 
a single word or phrase being used to describe the whole sense of 
the construct. (Although pole qualities could be extracted from the 
students by slow and painful interrogation, they did not want to 
use the origina!, construct names in which the polar duality was 
expressed, preferring the terms. ) 
If time, and, more importantly, patience had permittedlO, we 
would have had cross-checks between these new groups, but, 
10 We worked on this project for a total of 25 x2 hour long weekly sessions, 
with me carrying out collation and any appropriate analysis in between the 
sessions, to feed back to the students where relevant at the beginning of the 
next one. 
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apart from informal conversation and over-hearing (we were all in 
one room), this was not possible. 
What we did have, however, was a list of construct terms: a list 
about 100 items long. This, however, was an unhandlable list both 
for experimental purposes and for general cognitive processing 
(see George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus 
Two" (1959) for a delightful argument that there is a limit - even 
if, nowadays, the limit he proposed of roughly seven simultaneous 
data is no longer accepted). So it was necessary to reduce the list 
to a more handlable length. 
This was achieved by not very democratic and rather ham-fisted 
means. Because of a lack of time available, and also because of a 
general reigning tedium resulting from the length and intricacy of 
the negotiatory processes that had been involved, I felt that 
asking for much more negotiation, even if it might have lead to 
fairer and more personally relevant results, was unlikely to be 
well greeted by the students, or, at best, would merely to lead to a 
proliferation of terms as subtleties of understandings became 
further terms for the group. Instead, we used a crude technique in 
which, under my highly directed and rather forceful chairmanship, 
the students were obliged to reduce the number of terms. This 
was achieved by ignoring the difficult ones (in the sense that 
noone could be very explicit about their meanings) and the ones 
that refused to "fit in", and the rather gross forced forging together 
of the others until we were left 15 terms that were accepted, with 
more or less grace, by the group, and to which Kellyan polarities of 
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range of meaning were attached1l. By this makeshift and crude 
means we arrived at the basis of what we hoped was a common 
"language" in which to describe at least some aspects of the 
understanding and experience of (architectural space) in response 
to a single building (Paimio Sanitorium) and through the medium 
of a collection of slides selected (from a larger collection taken of 
that building by me) by the students [F. I. i]. The question, then, 
was whether, after all this rigmarole, this "language", in use, had 
any social validity. 
- The examination of this question was undertaken by exploiting a 
very simple procedure. All 32 selected slides were shown (in a 
sequence that attempted, within the limit of the slides selected, to 
provide a guided tour of the building) to the group, who were 
asked to note which of the 15 terms they would use to describe 
their experience and understanding of the architectural space 
depicted in each slide. After this, their notes were removed, and 
they were asked to rank the same given terms in the order of the 
frequency with which they believed they had used them. 
RESULTS 
This process, it was assumed, would show some social 
commonality in the choice of which terms were used in describing 
11 This way of arriving at a group concensus of agreement is quite 
commonly used in management exercises and studies. See, for instance, 
Janes (1987). 1 have used this sort of approach on several occasions, without 
there being too bad a feeling amongst other participants (for instance, in 
the generation of a Hypcrtext Guide to "Impossible Worlds", resulting from a 
course on that subject, that I am currently composing with my students in 
Amsterdam, being constructed in the Apple Macintosh Hypcrtext 
Environment called "Guide", by OWL (1986)). 
105 
each slide, and also show, by the similarity of the believed to the 
actual frequency of use, how confident the students were in using, 
and how well they understood their use of, the "language" they 
had so painstakingly generated. 
However, what was actually discovered was not at all the 
similarity that was expected. The terms selected by each student 
as appropriate to describe each slide were quite different, with 
some students using, on average, many terms (max 7.72) to 
describe each slide, and others using very few (min 2.34), which 
made it hard to carry out a significance test on the usage of terms 
between each of the individuals (because one used more than half 
the terms per slide to another's less than a sixth). 
Furthermore, there was very little general pattern in the overall 
use of terms, so that one could only, at the most, modestly contend 
that there were strong patterns in those used most and least by 
the group at any level of group significance. This seemed to 
indicate that, within the conditions of the test, the terms were 
used by each individual in quite different ways (they were 
considered applicable to completely different slides, and a wide 
variation of numbers of terms were, on average, used. Nor were 
any slides consistently much more or less popular than others 
[F. 2. ij). We had, it seemed, failed to find our social "language" (set 
of terms), and each student would choose to make quite different 
utterances (selections of the terms) expressing his understanding 
when confronted with nominally the same experience of 
architectural space (ie the same slide). 
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This confusing finding was further borne out by the confidence 
rankings, comparing believed with actual frequency of use of the 
terms by each individual, where it was found that the relationship 
between the two rankings was so low as to be only accountable to 
chance. (Using a Spearman's Rank correlation test (which had to be 
slightly rigged since the formulae I could find were only given for 
even numbers - Segal (1956)) the correlations were between 
0.656 and -0.300 with an average of 0.286, standard deviation 
0.370 over the 15 terms. See [F. 3. i]) 
So it appeared that, not only was there effectively no agreement 
between the students about the use of the terms, but also the 
students had, individually, very little idea of each term's re ative 
importance to them, expressed by frequency of their individual 
usages. 
However, by some streak of good fortune (caused by my 
frustration and disappointment with our verbal failure), I invited 
the students to draw diagrams that indicated the kernel of what 
they thought each of the terms meant. And, lo and behold, the 
resulting sets of diagrams each produced appeared, Visually, by 
and large to be very similar, both to me and to the participating 
students [F. 4. i]. 
It appeared that, in spite of the enormous effort we had put into 
developing together a collection of verbal terms (a "language") for 
use in describing our understanding and experience of 
architectural space, we had failed - at least, until we presented the 
terms in a diagrammatic visual form. Undoubtedly there were 
107 
weaknesses in the experimental method, although I doubt that 
any method that attempts to derive a precise social language and 
requires the prolonged active and interested involvement of 
intelligent participants could be developed that did not have such, 
or at least similar, failings. However, some weaknesses that may 
be particularly pointed to are: 
Slides of buildings are not architectural spaces, but selected 
and highly composed 2 dimensional records made of them by a 
photographer. 
Crushing the terms together may have so lost a precision that 
might have been essential to the individual original- terms that the 
results could well have been, in effect, either such gross 
distortions as to be meaningless, or completely new and therefore, 
unnegotiated terms. 
The process went on for so long, and was so demanding, that 
boredom, forgetfulness and carelessness inevitably crept in. 
The students were too inexperidnced to have developed any 
way of experiencing or understanding architectural space12. 
The experimenter was, likewise, too raw, too naive and too 
ambitious in attempting such a bold task13. 
12 But accepting this point would suggest that the lay public are even less 
equipped, which would be very sad, for, while professionals and specialists 
undoubtedly do have expertise. the total exclusion of the non-expert would be tragic and might be considered to render the expertise irrelevant. 
13 The notion of the dangers of naivete, ambition and innocence is brought 
into question in Soudijn's "Creativity: a 'Tour d' Horizon' in impossible 
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However, these did not seem important to me at the time (many 
did not even occur until much later). What immediately gripped 
my imagination was that, while there was no agreement in the use 
of the terms verbaft, when they were translated into diagrams 
there was a remarkable similarity between the expression by each 
student of the meanings of the various terms expressed visually- 
And so I started to consider that I was getting no results because I 
was using a language of the wrong form: a verbal (and hence 
serial) language to express a visual (and, I was to reason, 
wholistic) experience. It looked to me as if I was using an 
inappropriate medium. So I set to finding another way of 
exploring (which, as it turned out, - largely and fortuitously 
disposed of the other potential sources of failure referred to 
above. ) 
And at least I had some spin offs (see Chapter 8). 
Worlds" (1988) ,a survey of the field, in which he notes many authorities who claim such qualities as necessary for creativity to exist. 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
chapter 6 
SECOND EXPERIMENT - 
THE BLINDFOLD SURVEY 
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CHAPTER 6 
Second Experiment 
"A Picture is worth a Thousand Words" (Traditional) 
I had singularly failed, in spite of the immense efforts of all 
concerned, and a really rather precise and exacting method (even 
if it had been allowed to slip a little) requiring explicit responses 
and necessary social interaction, to develop with my group of 
students a collection of terms that they used with consistency 
either individually, or in the group as a whole, when describing 
their experiences and understandings of architectural spaces (as 
edited, preserved and presented in photographic slides). These 
results had all looked most depressing until, on the off chance, I 
asked each of the students to draw what the terms meant to him, 
upon which they came up with remarkably similar visual 
diagrams. I took this to indicate that the problem lay, somehow, in 
having required verbal (as opposed to visual / diagrammatic) 
descriptions, and that, if I wanted to get at the understandings 
and experiences individuals have of space (through whatever 
cognitive structures they have developed in order to produce and 
maintain their understandings), then I must use some visual 
means of exploration and expression. For, my purpose in 
developing a verbal language had been to communicate these 
understandings, and, if I couldn't make such a language verbally, 
then I had to try to get at the presumably largely visual 
understandings directly. 
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For, from the diagrams that were produced, and their apparent 
similarities, it seemed that there were, indeed, cognitive models 
that could generate these diagrams and that were waiting to be 
accessed, if only I could find a wayl. 
Yet there was an apparent difficulty here, for how could I get at 
these cognitive structures (and hence mental models) if I had no 
means of sharing understandings through some form of explicit 
external expression of them, which would permit all the 
individuals to express their cognitive structures, and allow me, as 
experimenter / director, to try to understand them? (This is an old 
problem for the study of mental processes: how much is in the 
thought, how much in the expression? The only possible practical 
position seems to me to be that taken by Wittgenstein in the 
"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1971), to the effect that you 
cannot see behind what you cannot see behind - which is like a 
screen - and that, therefore, all you can see is what you take to 
be 
an expression or projection of something you presume to know to 
be behind the but, yet, can never confirm either to be that thing 
that you presume to, as it were, cast its shadow like the Balinese 
Wayang puppet theatre, or even to be present at all, for it may 
just be the screen itself. ) 
I This is, of course, the concept behind, and demonstrated in "mental 
mapping", particularly as used by geographers is exploring the notion of 
locality in cities. See, for instance, Gould and White's "Mental Maps (1974). 
As it happened, I had, independently, developed similar ways of imaging 
the city (city structures), and Annetta Pedretti had developed a distortion 
technique for demonstrating discrepancies in understandings of urban 
space - see later in this Chapter, and Appendix A. 
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Since my problem was that I had no means of expression (no 
language), and had not been able, in spite of the efforts of myself 
and my students, to develop one, how could the cognitive 
structure I wanted to believ e was there ever be expressed in such 
a way that I could examine it, and so that the group could 
communicate and comment upon their understandings between 
themselves? 
I thought about mental maps (such as were introduced in Chapter 
3 and footnote 1 below). Here some form of spatial understanding 
could be obtained by looking for distortions between personal 
maps and cartographically generated ones. This might provide 
some basis for action, were it not that architects' formal drawings, 
while similar to cartographic projections (see Glanville (1980b)), 
are not so in that most particular of respects - architects drawings 
are made of as yet non-physically-existent artefacts. 
Further, there is the fact that architects' drawings generally 
represent structure (walls, floors and windows, etc of the 
container) and the space has to be interpolated between them: 
they do not really express space at all, but, rather, its physical 
container (the bottle, not the wine). The interpolation skill 
necessary to permit the interpretation of spatial qualities from 
architectural drawings of walls, floors and windows, etc is, in fact, 
very difficult to learn, and is one of the reasons an architect's 
training is so long, and his drawings are so deceptive (seductive? ) 
to the public. Furthermore, architecture students are encouraged 
to draw "properly" (that is, within an accepted and quite rigorous 
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convention, which both dominates their means of exploration and 
creation of possible architectural spaces). 
Finally, even should it be possible to get architecture students to 
express their cognitive structures, their mental models for 
understanding and experiencing space, how, other than by getting 
many drawings and then talking about them with the students 
(impossible, in exact terms, as I had already discovered, and, 
therefore, bound to be full of sentences of the "Y'know what I 
mean" type that I still did not understand) would the 
commonalities, the cognitive structures become apparent? For, the 
difficulty of handling visual material, especially in terms of the 
mathematical precision normally required by, for instance, 
statistics, is, as Pask has commented (1975), notoriously difficult. 
Therefore, I rejected the idea of using a straightforward mental 
map type of approach. But there did still seem to be something 
powerful in the idea of distortion that mental maps use as one of 
their means of expression in order to present and make 
comprehensible individual differences. So I wondered if it might 
be possible to access mental models, by somehow restricting the 
availability of information, by distorting the means of accessing it 
(rather than presenting information conventionally), so that the 
cognitive structure had to really fight to apply itself to exploit (or 
create) a mental model of (a particular) space, which cold then be 
presented so that the "distorted" image of the space could be 
compared to the space when presented without informational 
distortion, even if this involved the use of standard architectural 
drawings. 
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Hence was born the idea of forcing visualisation to take place 
through and in spite of the denial of access to the visual sense: the 
idea of carrying out a "Blindfold Survey" of a space, where the 
subject was allowed to explore the space by any means they liked 
except vision, but were required to draw what they believed the 
space looked like: that is, to represent, stage by stage in their 
development of a mental model, through drawing, what they 
thought this space they had explored but had not seen looked like. 
And it also seemed to me, then (although, again, I am no longer so 
sure) that the space to be surveyed should be unfamiliar, so 
students could not simply latch onto their ready-made 
"archetypal" mental models (which came, as it were, rather like 
the drawn experimental room mentioned in Chapter 2, ready built 
and fully furnished, and such as they might have of, for instance, 
sitting rooms), but rather should really have to search the 
cognitive structures in their minds in order to construct something 
-a mental model - unfamiliar and novel, from scratch. le, not a 
space for which they had already constructed, through their 
experiences, a "package deal" model such that no effort of 
visualisation was either required or relevant. 
I was not and am not aware of any other experiments of this type, 
even though it lies, I believe quite obviously, within the scope of 
the constructivist approach to knowledge generation and 
experimentation2. The only experiments that use some form of 
2 Although it should be remarked that the children's game of feeling 
objects in order to guess, while blindfold, what they are is clearly similar in 
concept. I have carried out some analyses of this game at children's parties. This transfer across senses is one of the experiences that is commonly 
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sensory deprivation I am aware of are John Lilly's experiments 
(reported in "The Centre of the Cyclone" (1970) in which he 
deprived himself of virtually all sensation and certainly all change 
in sensation, and passed into a LSD induced reverie, Jack Vernon's 
experiments on panic, hallucination and sense of time reported in 
"Inside the Black Room" (1963) - which experiments are, I 
suppose, but formalisms of ancient Sufi meditation practices and 
Guinness Book of Records attempts for the longest habitation of 
mine shafts and. caves - and R. L. Gregory and J. Wallace's (1963) 
"Recovery from Early Blindness: a Case Study" in which they argue 
that the visual perception of their subject, a man who regained the 
sight he lost when only a few months old, was never as in 
normally sighted people, because the man had had to learn to 
"visualise" from a particularly restricted realm of touch 
experience, since, for his own safety, he was not allowed to touch 
all sorts of dangerous things3. Of course, work has been done on 
the effects of sensory deprivation used as an inhuman device in 
torture, but that is quite another matter with a different purpose 
altogether. 
However that may be, I am not aware of any experiment in which 
access to one sense was specifically excluded, and transference to 
that sense was required to be made from other senses, in order to 
attempt to access the cognitive structure used with the excluded 
sense. And so I could find no precedent to use in the design of an 
described and given as an explanation, by those who go blind, as to why 
they cannot state when, exactly, they did loose their sight. 3 Thus, for instance, he could never draw the front of a bus, because, as a 
blind child, Gregory and Wallace argue. the front was far too dangerous a 
place for him ever to be allowed to stand and touch, for fear of being run 
over. 
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experiment into which this characteristic was built as the over- 
riding concern, to allow me access to the mental models I 
presumed were produced by individual's using their cognitive 
structures. 
METHOD 
Reguirements of -the 
Method 
The experimental material had, therefore, to have certain 
characteristics 
Whatever space was used had to have features that could 
define space to the temporarily "blind". (In practice, a room with 
walls, floors and windows, etc.: ie, a bottle for the wine. ) 
There had also to be an anteroom which did not give too 
many clues (and certainly no views) as to the space to be 
surveyed, in which students could remove blindfolds to draw, and 
which they could enter and leave, preferably independently, while 
still blindfold. 
The space had either to be safe for the ( touching and feeling) 
blind, or the subjects had to be very carefully supervised 
which might distract them. 
4 On the first occasion this experiment was tried, a warehouse space being 
converted into an art gallery was used. This involved a very long walk 
along planks over a basement that was being excavated and upstairs, into a large space that was missing one wall. All of this was overcome, but the last 
student (on this occasion, each student was taken to the space individually 
and alone, and had the space to himself) cut a hand on some broken glass 
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Aff angements had, ideally, to be made for students to 
experience the space, and to try to draw it, alone. (This was 
usually not possible, and not even the strongest insistence could 
stop them looking at eachother's drawings, and asking whether 
another had found this or that. ) 
Account of Method 
The experiment has been carried out on 7 occasions (2 of which 
were rather threadbare versions that I assented to solely in order 
to make certain limited and particular points to the participants). 
In all, about 140 students have taken part in a Blindfold Survey 
(some more than once). With minor variations, on all occasions the 
procedure followed essentially the same course, and the essential 
results did not vary. They will, therefore, all be represented, here, 
by an account of just one attempt, (as it happens, the second), 
which took place in a multiple editing room at the London Film 
School, with a dozen students from the 2nd and 3rd year of the 
architecture course at the AA, all of whom had also taken part in 
the first run of this experiment 5, -and several of whom had 
and had to stand perfectly still, blindfold, with a tourniquet around her 
wrist while I left to find a chemist with a bandage. Thus we leamt about 
safety! This space also lacked an anteroom, leading to terrible difficulties 
for the students when trying to develop their visualisations through drawing and then returning to test their ideas. Ever since, I have run 
several pilot studies for an experiment. before deciding on an experimental 
procedure. 
5 The 3 other main locations were: a basement disco at the Bedford Comer Hotel, London, for which Air India supplied blindfolds (in distinctive styles for both ladies and gentlemen) and recorded the event for their staff 
magazine; a ramped outdoor area at Brunel University (with members of 
the CSHL); and an emergency exit staircase from the lecture hall at the Art School of Ulster Polytechnic (as it then was) in Belfast. This latter event 
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participated in the first experiment, described in Chapter 5. The 
run described here was the most thorough and wide-ranging of 
the seven. 
The students were blindfolded and led, individually, into the space 
to be surveyed, and then to the anteroom, which they were taken 
into in order to remove their blindfolds. From then on, they were 
allowed to roam freely (as long as they were blindfolded) around 
the space, and to return to the anteroom at any time to make a 
drawing, look at an old one, or check test results, having removed 
their blindfolds [B. 1J to iv]. When they felt they were learning no 
more, or they had completely lost interest, they were allowed to 
leave. In practice, it was not possible to keep the students from 
bumping into eachother (quite literally), and although speech- 
silence was maintained, they got some sense of the space from 
their collisionS6, just as they did from inevitably glimpsing the 
drawings others were making. 
provoked an extraordinary response. - The blindfolded students scrambled all 
over a vertical glazed shaft- which housed the staircase, and which came 
down onto an open concourse. They had no idea, but their activity caused 
the shaft to be surrounded by army commandos crouching, covering each 
comer with their guns pointing at us all. This, in turn, caused a queue of 
busses on the main road, with all the passengers looking over at what was 
going on. This, in turn. created a semi-circular audience that surrounded us 
and eventually started pelting us with empty cans, stones ctc. At this point 
we ushered the students out. It was an extraordinary experience, that says a 
lot about that troubled place. Our reaction (that is, the reaction of the 3 of us 
conducting the experiment) was of suppressed but hysterical laughter, 
which is probably not very easy to understand unless you have visited 
Belfast. It also says a lot for the students that, when they were told, they too 
laughed and they were not angry with us for letting this dangerous 
situation continue, to our nervous amusement. 
61 cannot object to the information gathered through the collisions, since 
all they were being intentionally denied was visual information. 
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As well as their attempts to draw their visualisations, and the way 
they were developing, students were also asked to describe the 
way they had gone about collecting their information and building 
their visualisation (the tactics they had used). 
Whether or not the students had actually managed to create a 
visualisation of the space was tested by asking the students to 
draw the space not only while they were able to move in and out 
of it, but also some time later, on the premise that, if they had 
created a successful visualisation that had any pote ncy for them, 
they would be able to recall it with some degree of power, 
accuracy (consistenc y) and conviction. 
A survey session would take 1 1/2 to 2 hours, including drawing 
time. This was typical for all runs of the experiment. 
RESULTS 
The -students' drawings were generally of plan type (there were 
occasional perspectives). Since architects nowadays often "think in 
plan" this was not surprising7. I suspect that most people faced 
7A major reason comes from an assertion of Le Corbusier. In "Towards a 
New Architecture" (that curious translation of "Vers Une Architecture" 
(1927)), Le Corbusier asserts "The plan is the generator", thus placing 
planning and layout at the centre of the architectural stage, and 
encouraging the idea of space as a vertical projection from the plan plane. 
This is in stark contrast to his definition of architecture as "the masterly, 
correct and magnificent play of forms brought together in light" (quoted 
in Broadbent (1987)). and has ]cad to the strong dominance that the plan, 
and notions of planning (as opposed to spatial delight), have held in much 
architecture since the 1920's. Until very recently. students have been, 
under the influence of the slogan, encouraged to think of the creation of 
space in a building as secondary to the planning. Hence, also, the concept 
of "elevating" a plan after it has been completed. I think this also helps 
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with the task would also do this, because the way most search the 
space is by following the walls around, feeling upwards and 
downwards at selected points, and because few have been trained 
in the expression of their spatial sensibilities through drawing. 
(There are few spaces where a normal human being can touch the 
ceiling, but when the students could do so or could find some 
device such as a broom that they could use as an extension, thus 
reaching the ceiling, they were very intrigued. ) 
The drawings they did during the process were, typically, fairly 
crude, and were certainly used, in part, as aides-de-memoire and 
prompts, for they would go back out to check over things that 
they were uncertain about, or which seemed to them to be 
nonsensical, and then add more information, enriching and 
modifying their drawings - and, one supposed, their mental 
modejS8. Their graphic crudeness is to some extent a reflection of 
their abilities in graphic presentation and expression, which was 
not expected to be generally developed at this stage in their 
architectural education, but it is hard to see how this limitation 
can be avoided, but also probably reflected their uncertainty and 
their wish not to take too long before they could out and discover 
more, in case they were forgetting anything. 
It was quite common for students, while (blindfoldedly) 
examining the space, not to venture out into the centre of the 
space at all, but rather to hug the walls (with amusing and 
explain the use of the plan as the main way of exploring the spaces used in 
the "Blindfold Surveys". 
8 This really il a case where Broadbent's architectural "Conjectures and 
Mutations" (see Broadbent (1981)) fits the bill. 
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interesting results when 2 bumped into eachother). This helps 
explain the lack of detail in drawings concerning what was to be 
found in the centre of the space (which was sometimes very full of 
things). Even when students did venture out, they often managed, 
with uncanny - almost extra-sensory - skill, to miss things that 
were there, and were visually obvious, such as columns (although 
this may not be as surprising as it appears, at first glance, to be). 
There was, also, often a difference between the drawings which is 
so extreme that it is hard to reconcile them as being of the same 
space. This may be to do with orientation and other, similar 
factors. But it is certain that such discrepancies would not be 
expected between drawings drawn by unblindfolded people, even 
though they had been in the space only a tiny fraction of the time 
that the blindfold surveyors were there. See [B. 2.1 and ii]. 
The attempts to explain essential tactics used in trying to build an 
image of the space indicated that the students were, in the main, 
attempting to generate an image of the space in one of 5 distinct 
ways. In one, they constructed an imaginary grid, and attempted 
to visualise the position of walls in relation to this grid, much in 
the manner that a lot of space planning is done. In another, they 
thought that the wall had to contain the space, and therefore saw 
it as one continuous element that they tried to wrap around until 
the end joined up with the beginning. The third was to imagine 
the space as a balloon being blown up and taking on the form of a 
restrictive (and hidden) container or mould. The fourth was 
somewhat similar, where the space was thought of as being like a 
fluffy and slightly amorphous ball, or a lump of clay, which the 
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student firmed up bits of until the whole thing was firmly and 
finally modeled. The fifth tactic was not any of the above and may 
be characterised as "highly individual". I find this tactic very hard 
to grasp. See [B. 3J to v]. 
The drawings that the students undertook of the space after some 
time had elapsed produced quite unexpected results. (The delay 
period is normally about 4 weeks. ) I had assumed that, if they 
appeared to have created, initially, some drawings that were 
reasonably convincing as visualisation, indicating what I took to 
be a robust mental model, they would be able to remember the 
visualised space. But the resulting follow-up drawings were 
abysmal: they lacked conviction, detail and precision: they were 
scarcely husks. 
I found this surprising and distressing, and so did the students, 
who said they really couldn't remember the space at all, but they 
were sure they would have if they really had seen it. I took them 
back to the survey space to let them actually see it with their own 
eyes wide open. The response was almost incredible. A gasp of 
astonishment in unison, eyes open wide, amazement. "It's nothing 
like I had imaginedl" And they were not talking about the 
enrichment that naturally occurs when you "add" colour or light, 
but about the sense of the space actually being, of its actuality and 
immediacy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wrong again! I was beginning to get used to it. In spite of all my 
efforts to encourage the synthesis of a visualisation by denying 
sight and thus preventing immediate and direct viewing, requiring 
instead a transfer between senses via the cognitive structures that 
generated mental models, the results were so poor that they could 
hardly be considered as visualisations at all, and were so lacking 
in content in the students' minds that they were not in the least 
memorable. As consolation, I should have had the tactics, but I 
was not really interested in them, seeing them as a potential 
eventual spin-off: they were not central to what I wanted to find, 
so I wasn't looking for anything very special in them, and missed 
any opportunity there might have been there. (In retrospect, I 
think they might, with a lot of work and further research, turn out 
to be worth a very great deal. However, the dispersal of the 
original student groups, and the length of time that has passed 
since would oblige a completely new beginning, if they were to be 
used. ) I hadn't managed to tap what I had wanted to tap: the 
cognitive structure that allowed people to create mental models 
demonstrating understandings of space by assembling together, or 
growing, a balanced and evaluated selection from their cognitive 
structures - as it were, a personal repertoire of deeply held and 
well-developed spatial ideas that an individual would use in 
setting up his mental model of a particular space. 
It seemed that I had made only one discovery, and it was obvious: 
if you stopped people seeing, they did indeed stop seeing. 
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I was downhearted and distressed. I had failed again. Of course, a 
way forward was staring me in the face, but I couldn't, for the 
moment, and in my disappointment, see that. All I could see was 
that I couldn't find a way into these supposed cognitive structures 
that, in spite of all the discoveries represented by the body of 
"cognitive sciences", I was beginning to think might not exist. 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
chapter 7 
THIRD EXPERIMENT - 
CONTROLLED VIEWING 
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CHAPTER 7 
Third Exl2criment 
Quote: "He who hath eyes to see, let him see" (The Bible) 
The saga of failure continued. I couldn't construct a "language" and 
I couldn't, it seemed, access the cognitive structures I believed 
people had and used to account for and generate their mental 
models that constituted their understandings of their experiences 
of architectural space. At least, not in the ways I had tried (in 
spite and as a consequence of all my arguments about what is 
expressed and its mode of expression, and that which (was 
assumed to) lie, in Wittgenstein's (1971) manner, behind this 
expression). These attempts had involved, firstly, the carefully 
contrived attempt to construct a socially shared (verbal) 
"language" of terms in which to describe. the experience, and, 
secondly, the exclusion of the visual sense in order to tap the 
visualising ability of the cognitive structure to interpret different 
sensory material from the nbn-visual senses, in the creation of a 
visual mental model-of a space. I just couldn't make it work. The 
terms weren't shared, and the users had little awareness of how 
they had used the terms, themselves, because, I reasoned, they 
were verbal, not visual. The change in sensory input wouldn't 
cross over from one sense to another under the circumstances I 
had arranged, and there was no lasting sense of reality, to the 
experimental subjects, in the images of the drawings because they 
did not, apparently, represent visualisations. 
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Or was that it? Surely we transfer information between senses? 
(For instance, wine tasters would argue that much if not most of 
the experience of a wine's taste comes from smell, just as certain 
smells, such as the dankness of a dungeon, are quite distinctive, 
and bring to mind quite precise visualisationsI. ) I was not happy 
to think that our senses were so exclusive. Some people, for 
instance, see colours when hearing sounds (the composers Scriabin 
and Messiaen are examples, and have peppered their scores with 
allusions to the colours to be seen with particular harmonic and 
timbral structures). Whenever I see a picture of Strasbourg 
Cathedral, I hear it2. That is not intra sensorially exclusive: the 
senses do indeed cross over. So we can reasonably assert that 
experience shows that the senses do not only blend together, but 
also cross over when we deal with architectural space, bringing 
about, for instance, "visualisations" as a result of the perception of 
entirely different sensory material3. 
I For me, the most marked expression of this is the smell and sound of the 
old Gentleman's lavatory opposite platform 16 at Waterloo station. It was so 
distinctive that whenever I hear the sound. or smell the smell, not only the 
smell and sound. but also the sight of that space immediately springs to 
mind in great detail! - 2 What I hear is an amazing low pitch that wah-ed and wah-ed as the 
harmonic overtones modulated while I walked around the cathedral, 
changing its timbre as the standing waves unraveled: a wonderful 
experience that shows my simplification of architectural space as 
constituted of the purely visual for what it is -a simplification (but I knew 
this: it is a simplification of both convention and convenience). This 
strange, absorbing and haunting sound was caused by the action of a kango 
hammer on the outer skin of the cathedral, cutting out rotten stonework for 
replacement! 
3 The cross-overs described here are between intra sensory material that is 
present: in the Blindfold Survey, visual sensation was removed as 
completely as was practicable, and so the cross-over can now be seen to be 
of a different type to that in the other examples given here. This may be an 
explanation, although it did not occur to me at the time. I wonder, for 
instance, how much of an orchestra's sound I could imagine from just 
watching them. 
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However, for whatever reason, the visualisations the students 
were getting from their "Blindfold Surveys" were not doing the 
crossing over. I was confused, and leafed aimlessly through the 
drawings the students had made until a quote on one brought me 
back to life. "I can't remember, but I could if I'd seen it. " Maybe 
the senses do cross over, but maybe it is very difficult for them to 
do so when one sense, the very sense that by being excluded is 
being encouraged to express itself so that it can be examined, has 
been removed. So maybe I should consider whether there was 
another way of getting at the cognitive structures, the mental 
models, but, in contrast, this time through the sense of vision, 
itself? And maybe the way the students had been obliged, by the 
very nature of the visual restriction imposed upon them by the 
experiment, to build up their mental models, step by step, 
gradually trying to construct a sense of some unknown whole from 
the sum of parts that they could only acquire (and thus assemble) 
in a linear sequence as they felt and fumbled their ways around 
the spýace was not how we experience things, at least visually. 
After all, as I, myself, had argued, "A Part is a Whole in a Role" 
(Glanville (1978b) (1980a), and Klir (1985)). 
I remembered the instantaneity with which the students had 
reacted upon actually seeing the space that they had surveyed, 
blindfolded. Could it be that when we see spaces we see them 
instantly as one, a unique whole, in some kind of a gestalt-like4 
41 am not convinced that the Gestalt psychologists (see, for instance, Katz's 
excellent "Gestalt Psychology" (1951)) mean quite the same by a gestalt as I 
mean by a whole. The difference as I see it is that a gestalt is still seen as 
being composed of parts, than which it is. however, greater. My notion of a 
whole is much more "top-down". and I see the "parts" as becoming 
accommodated (in Piaget's (1973) sense) in a process of enrichment. The 
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object, perhaps elaborating and enriching them through time by 
the addition or incorporation of detail, rather than by taking stock 
of all the elements present and adding them slowly together to 
create the sense of the whole (but how do we know they are all 
the elements, and that the elements are elemental: we have here a 
problem akin to that of sub-atomic particles - see Glanville 
(1980c))? Perhaps if the first, wholiStiC5, case were so, it would go 
some way to explaining how, in some rooms with which we are 
extremely familiar, we nevertheless gradually see things that we 
say we had never noticed before (and how are we to know they 
were there before they were' noticed? ). I thought of how I would 
describe a room in words. I would tend to talk about how I got to 
it, and then sketch a general outline of what I thought was 
important, finally adding in detail as necessary. This was what 
Ginali had shown in her analysis of the layout of New York 
ApartmentS6 using Discourse Analysis (although she did not grasp 
this point: for her it proved the value of the analytic tool, rather 
than the way we perceived the space and sequence of spaces). It 
was the way, as I recalled, that writers generally tended to 
describe rooms - unless there was some particular object within, 
or part of the room they particularly wanted to draw attention to 
("The logs crackled in the fire"). And it was also how I would draw: 
difference is, perhaps, not immediately clear, and a little difficult to grasp, 
but it is, I believe, important. This is why I do not (any longer) refer to my 
wholes as gestalts. 
51 prefer to use the incorrect and idiosyncratic spelling "wholistic" (etc) 
that the "correct" version "holistic", for it reminds me - and, I hope, others 
- more immediately of the intent in the word to refer to a sense of 
wholeness, without need for recourse to knowledge of the Greek original 
"holos" = whole. Since we spell the word "whole". and not "hole". I feel quite 
justified in my idiosyncracy. 
6 In spite of my best efforts, I have not been able to trace a reference to the 
paper that presents this argument, although I have read it. 
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indicating the generality of the shape and then enriching it with 
detail. 
And so I took it that the instantaneity of response could probably 
indicate that the identity of the space (or was it the room), its 
sense of wholeness, was what came first. And this assumption 
could account for both of my earlier failures: for in both, the parts 
were being given priority, and the whole had to be constructed, 
willy-nilly, from them. Thus, as I have indicated, the "language" 
we evolved was based on names for characteristics and qualities, 
and students were asked to explain their understandings through 
these terms, which were necessarily partial: and the blindfold 
survey naturally lead to the serial accumulation of (felt) details, 
that the students attempted to compose together to give the space 
visual identity. Yet, it is a truism of Cybernetics, and Sytems 
Theory in general (including Gestalt Psychology), that the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts, and so there must be something 
that exists and gives identity beyond just the constituent 
elements. 
And so the new question that arose was, could I test this: could I 
find a means of controlling tile viewing of a space by experimental 
subjects so that I could extract an expression of their experiences 
of that viewing which could be examined, and, if so, how could I 
evaluate these expressions as results? 
The answer was, I decided, yes. I could arrange to allow views of a 
space for different periods of time, and I could ask for drawn 
expressions to be made from the visualisations of this space that 
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the subjects made during their controlled period of viewing, which 
drawings could be examined. If my hypothesis was right, the 
space as represented in the drawing of a particular viewer who 
caught only a brief glimpse should be pretty much as recognisable 
as that of one who had a long time to examine - except, in all 
probability, in richness of detail. And I could push the viewer who 
was only permitted to view the space for a short time to hunch his 
way in his drawing, going as far as he dared in including more 
detailed elements, even if it meant that drew things he did not 
feel absolutely sure of, or guessed at or invented. 
Thus was born the experiment I called "Controlled Viewing", which 
I have performed under different circumstances on 5 occasions 
with a total of about 100 students, and which I have extended for 
use as a design device (I would almost risk calling it a "method"), 
that I detail in Chapter 8 and, as catalogue presentations, in 
Appendices K and U. 
7 Three of these five occasions have, in fact, used the experiment as a 
design method. The individual perceptions as demonstrated in drawings 
made after only brief viewings were compared to drawings made with free 
visual access, and the differences used as the sources of designs (referred to 
under the generic project title "MOTIF 8"). On these three occasions, two 
different sites were used: St Paul's Church, Covent Garden, and, twice, 
Bedford Square, London. The projects were done at the AA School and 
London International Summer School for Architecture. 
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METHOD 
Reguirements Of the Method 
A means of controlling the viewing period (ideally all 
sensation should be denied except during the viewing period, 
because of the clues that can be picked up and may bias the 
subject's notions of the space he is in, to either his "advantage" or 
"disadvantage", but this is simply not practicable). 
A space of some distinctiveness and unusualness, and with 
some degree of complexity in detail, so that it may not be claimed 
that the subject was working-in a space for which a conventional 
psychologist could claim there ought, naturally, to be some 
"archetype". 
An unfamiliar space8. 
A space that could be freely accessed by a blindfolded subject, 
and that had an anteroom or other similar area in which drawings 
could be done after the controlled viewings of the space (but 
without seeing the space itself). (In this experiment, naturally, 
subjects were not allowed back into the space until their drawing 
of the space were considered complete. ) 
8 Although on one occasion what should have been a very familiar space 
(Bedford Square, London, home of the AA) was used, and the students were 
not allowed to see it but were asked instead to draw directly from memory. 
They had not been primed that this was what they would be asked to do. It 
turned out that it was such a familiar space that hardly any of the students 
had bothered to notice it, even though they had been going there daily for 
3 or so years! 
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Account of Method Used 
(There have been several variations in the method used, 
depending not only upon development and refinement, but also 
particular circumstances as they presented themselves, and the 
desired outcome (ie experimental data or basis for design). The 
particular occasion I shall refer to here was that used in the 
Controlled Viewing of the club room of the Covent Garden 
Community Association. ) 
Students, wearing blindfolds, were taken individually into the club 
room (being guided by the experimenter). They were taken to one 
of several particular view-points, and allowed to remove their 
blindfold, on instruction from the experimenter, for a selected, 
pre-determined set period: 2 seconds, 10 seconds, 1 minute, 5 
minutes and "as long as you like" (in practice, generally about 15 
minutes. These students were permitted to perambulate, since 
they refused to remain stationary). At the end of their allocated 
-viewing time, they put their blindfolds back on and were guided 
out of the room. As soon as they left, they were encouraged to 
make a drawing of their understanding of the room (they had not 
been allowed to make any notes or sketches while in the room). 
They were invited to invest their drawings with as much detail as 
they could. 
The drawings were then pinned up, with no extra information 
(such as name and viewing time), and were examined by each of 
the participants in the experiment, all of whom were invited to 
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determine how long a viewing each drawing represented. As has 
already been remarked, visual material generated in psychological 
experimentation is very hard to handle as raw data. In this case, 
some students were, inevitably, notably better draughtsmen than 
others, just as some undertook the exercise with much more care 
than others. Furthermore, the experience of standing at one spot, 
blindfold, and then being allowed a controlled period of viewing of 
a (highly eccentric) space is hardly commonplace, so there was an 
element of unfamiliarity that might "throw" some more than 
others. But it was hoped that the students could be assumed to 
have based the judgements they made on at least some 
commonality of experience within the group which would make up 
for some of these difficulties by the use of what I hoped was an 
established group "community of interest", where shared 
experience would act as a basis in the making of the judgements, 
RESULTS 
The results of the experiment demonstrated that there appeared 
to be little or no correlation between the length of the period of 
time of viewing represented in the drawings and the time period 
of viewing that the group, as a whole, assumed to be represented 
by each drawing9 [G. I. il. Where there is some relationship it is in 
the drawings representing a second viewing (the shortest period), 
although it should also be noted that those given the shortest 
viewing tended to be less competent and committed draughtsmen 
9 Although, it must be admitted, there may be a problem associated with 
limits in short-term information storage and handling of the sort raised by 
Miller (1959) and already introduced. I cannot see any way around this. 
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(this was nothing more than the luck of the draw, and is the sort 
of bias that it is hard to avoid or compensate for). When I ask 
teaching colleagues looking at the drawings, or hold straw votes in 
lectures, showing slides of drawings, neither my colleagues nor the 
audience is any more capable of deciding how long a viewing the 
drawings represent than was the original group [G. 21 and ii]. It 
was certainly possible for even those students with the shortest 
viewing periods to invest their drawings with a lot of detail, 
although that detail was generally found to be somewhat less 
"accurate" that that drawn in by those who had had a longer 
viewlO, when compared to the club room itself. 
It was also found that students could redraw the room two weeks 
later, with a sense of conviction that it actually was the room they 
had seen, and with a fair degree of similarity and accuracy, as 
interpreted by both the student-draughtsmen, themselves, and by 
me, the experimenter. 
10 It is precisely this "inaccuracy" that provides the source material for 
designs carried out in the MOTIF 8 exercises, where the inaccuracies in the 
drawings representing short viewing periods (when compared to later 
drawings made in situ and with unlimited time) were taken to be 
assumptions that the student made about the nature of space and 
architectural elements. and thus to be constituents of mental models. The 
tactics by which the drawings were composed were also taken into account, 
and were translated into design strategies, and strategies for the 
exploration of the original space through the design produced by the 
student using the information I have indicated. (Because of the reflexive 
nature of the design as undertaken in these projects, they are rather 
complex to explain in full, although, there is a summary of the intention of 
these exercises in Appendix J). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It appeared that my supposition that there was a sense of 
wholeness and immediacy in our experiencing of architectural 
space was true: that we do indeed perceive space as some sort of 
totality - in the manner that I have described as a "whole": and 
that we then add in, either through the richness of our memory of 
the particular space, or through the richness of our imagining 
generating associative embellishments, what we think of as 
"detail". In fact, this imagining in of detail, together with the self- 
conscious -awareness of how the representative drawing was 
executed, provides an access that probably even falls into line 
with Wittgenstein's (1971) assertion about the nature of evidence 
and its relationship with reality, as to how we understand our 
experiencing of architectural space, and which was used in the 
generation of the design projects that were completed under the 
generic headings "MOTIF 8". (See footnotes 4 and 6. ) However, it is 
precisely the privacy and self-consciousness, and the arbitrariness 
of the chosen space for viewing that makes the information that 
each student generated and exploited in MOTIF 8 so unavailable to 
external analysis. 
Thus, this phase of my search had ended. I had demonstrated my 
tenet concerning the essential wholeness in the experiencing of 
space, that helped me explain and understand the problems that 
my students had experienced when made to try to construct 
understandings by serial and partial experience, and in moulding 
experience to match a language built out of terms that represented 
characteristics. I had got students to make mental models of their 
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experiences of spaces that they could represent through drawings, 
and in which their presumed cognitive structures could be allowed 
to participate in a demonstrable manner by proposing 
embellishments that appeared in their drawings but could be 
found, by the students themselves, upon visiting the space, not to 
be present in the original. But I had also ended up with a method 
that produced results that, in as far as they could be 
comprehended, could be comprehended and used privately by 
each student, but which were not really accessible to others, at 
least under any circumstances that I could establish. 
And so I was left having demonstrated what was probably 
blindingly obvious all the way through to all but myself, feeling 
rather lost and at the end of an undistinguished cul-de-sac. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Three St)in-Offs 
"On the whole, Id rather be in Philadelphia" (Deathbed assertion 
of W. C. Fields) 
PREAMBLE 
If my quest so far had failed in its main aims, it had produced a 
number of other benefits - and not only those I have indicated in 
some detail (such as my learning), but those which, in as far as 
they have been mentioned at all have, generally, only been 
mentioned in passing. These came in the form of spin-offs - and it 
may even be that the whole penultimate Chapter of this story (still 
to be told) should also be considered as a spin-off. 
Of the various spin-offs, three stand out as being special, for they 
involved the development of general techniques that may be used 
in various ways quite independently of the experimental arena 
that I have been concerned with here, and because they work. It 
is these three that I introduce in this chapter, briefly describing 
how they originated, the techniques themselves (with a fuller 
description where there is not one in the appendices), and their 
ranges of usefulness. In a sense, After all the gloom of repeated 
failure, these are pearls that mark success, no matter how 
unintentional, and are therefore of special value. 
The three are referred to as (in chronological order of invention 
and by the names under which they have been published): 
"Construct Games"; "Construct Heterarchies"; and "MOTIF 8". 
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Games 
In the experimental attempt to generate a "language" ( or rather a 
shared set of terms) within and through which to describe the 
individual experience and understanding of architectural space, 
and to communicate it socially within the group of experimental 
subjects, I had used a technique, based on my development 
(following extensive conversations), of Thomas and Pope's (1971) 
realisation of Kelly's constructs for sculptors exploring the values 
they attributed to pieces of sculpture. 
The technique that I arrived at was a complex procedure in which 
groups of students using a collection of slides of a building as their 
basic material, revealed their constructs to eachother, and then 
began guessing how other members of their group would arrange 
a particular selection of slides in a construct (by building a 
conversational mental model of each other group member), 
eventually beginning to construe together as a social group, and 
reaching mutually acceptable constructs within the group. (The 
technique has been more fully described- in chapter 5, and is fully 
documented in Appendix E. ) - 
It struck me that this was not the only possible way by which 
socially agreed constructs could be derived by a group of people 
arranging a collection of objects along a construct line, nor was the 
original purpose of developing a shared descriptive "language" (of 
terms for use in describing socially experiences of architectural 
space) the only possible use for such social construing. 
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In the technique as already recounted, all the elements were 
arranged along one bi-polar construct (ranked) line, and, as it 
turned out, participants (when in the interactive group construing 
mode) would often move even those elements that were placed at 
the ends (poles) of the construct (in supposedly fixed positions) - 
for they indicate the meaning / semantic range of the construct - 
as they hunted for some arrangement that had meaning for all of 
them. So that, the common changing / reselection of the pole 
elements allowed the development (and change in semantic range) 
of the construct being negotiated and finally agreed, which 
compromise allowed the generation of some completely new but 
genuinely shared construct that might be far removed from the 
initial one asserted through the- original selection and positioning 
of the pole elements: ie, the social act of negotiated construing 
produced a result that derived from a sort of (not necessarily 
verbal) conversation, the progress of which could be recorded by 
noting which elements were moved where, when, and by whom 
[C. ld to iii]. 
Another sort of compromise could be generated, however, if the 
group's freedom was circumscribed, and the pole elements 
remained absolutely fixed. Yet, since the groups had been made up 
of 3 people, (largely for "conservative" reasons, although it is 
conventionally sensible to have more than 2 participants), a 
simple bi-polar construct line would not accommodate all 3 
participants making personal assertions at the same time. So a 
triangular version was evolved, in which the poles were fixed (by 
a complicated process of wrangling between pairs), and the 
remaining elements were, then, fought over by the participants, in 
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order to force a (not always very happy) compromise between the 
views of all 3. This technique is also described in detail in 
Appendix E. 
The spin-off is, however, more than just a couple of techniques for 
the elicitation of shared constructs: it is the creation of an 
environment in which groups may "play" together, and, through 
playing, discover. The first of the techniques has proved more 
useful for this, because, apart from the feature that it may be used 
with non-verbal material (which it shares with the second 
technique), it does allow general development and the generation 
by the group of the completely new, and because it is 
"conversational" 1. 
This has been demonstrated, for instance, at the 3rd International 
Congress on Personal Construct Psychology (held at Breukelen, the 
Netherlands, 1980)2, where my primary intention was to 
introduce the technique as an aid to non-verbal construing. On this 
I The centrality of the Conversation (meant in the refined technical sense 
as first introduced by Laing (see Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966), and the 
more poctic_Laing (1970), and since developed by Pask (1973), (1976a), 
(1976b) and (1976c), and Thomas and Harri-Augstein (1985) as the 
appropriate paradigm for studies in the areas of human and social sciences) 
is assumed throughout this work. The conversation is appropriate because it 
accommodates the simplest imaginable mechanism for the interaction of 2 
sentient beings - that each may respond to the other -, and builds on from 
that with its insistence on the modelling by each participant in the 
conversation of the behaviour and mental processes of the other (ic, I am 
another's other). Within this paradigm, anything that is not (potentially) 
conversational in form is trivial. My own recent work on control and 
interaction (specifically Glanville (1987a), (1987b) and (forthcoming)) 
supports this view, and shows the requirements for a formal consideration 
of interactive system to operate both actively and interactively through 
consideration of the information transmission characteristics. seen as a 
product of the cybernetic variable, variety. 
2 And on many other occasions, for instance, as a research tool for the 
generation of group discussion in Amsterdam, and at Portsmouth in order to 
highlight aesthetic differences in taste between students. 
143 
occasion, Congress participants were asked to bring along 6 objects 
(as opposed to 3 slides) each, and the construct lines for each 
group of 3 were drawn on the floor. (I have found it very helpful 
to use the floor: it stops people playing too many power games and 
getting too grand, although one prominent psychologist has 
refused to take part, claiming it was undignified to crouch on the 
floor. ) 
My demonstration did, indeed, prove my point about the 
technique. The room was full of silent, slouched and hunched 
figures seriously moving cigarette lighters and packets of asprin, 
handkerchiefs and wallets, passports, keyrings and flowers around 
the floor along the chalk construct lines, and reaching conclusions 
that were agreed arrangements, and that were, indeed, both non- 
verbal and, rather more interestingly, apparently also non- 
verbalisable constructs. But it also became apparent that the 
actual activity of playing the game was, itself, extremely revealing. 
Amongst the comments heard afterwards, the late Don Bannister 
Consultant to the CSHL) remarked that he had no idea how 
aggressive he was until this game had revealed it to him, and 
there was a general concensus that playing the game was a 
wonderfully rewarding psych o-therapeu tic exercise. See [C. 21 to 
iv], which feature Bannister playing. 
Construct Heterarchies 
There was, however, also a second technique, deriving from the 
same experiment that was intended to develop this same 
"language" (of terms) for the social description of the 
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understanding of the experience of architectural space, which lead 
to the development of the Construct Games. This was based on the 
idea of examining whether students might derive and relate the 
terms that they had elicited working as a group, together, in some 
manner that would exhibit any similarities between their views. 
In order to introduce this idea here (the technique is detailed in 
Appendix H), I need to refer to Pask's work. Pask maintains ( Pask 
(1973), Pask and Scott (1972). Pask, Scott and Kallikourdis 
(1975)), for reasons both commonsensical. and logical, that what he 
calls "topics" (things that may be learnt) must be so arranged that 
any one topic in a knowledge structure may only be derived from 
at least two other topic (otherwise there is, strictly speaking, no 
source of difference between the topics to generate the novelty 
and distinction of the new topic), and that, if topic A can be 
derived from topics B and C, say, then topic B must equally be 
able, somehow, to be derived from topics A and C, and topic C, 
likewise, from topics A and B: and that individuals might, 
therefore, progress on their learning Odyssey within the particular 
area of knowledge being studied, through the vast circles of topics 
relevant to a particular subject in whatever, personal heterarchy 
forming manner they chose. 
It occurred to me that, in the collection of terms we had generated, 
some of the topics should be seen, by the students, as related to 
others in such a manner that the interaction of 2 or more of the 
other topics in our list might generate that particular one (also in 
the list), as in Pask's scheme. In fact, it seemed that, if what we 
had was a reasonably complete and coherent collection of terms, 
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then most of them should mesh in with others, none should be 
unconnected (for the unconnected ones would not be part of the 
general collection), and, even, that the students might relate some 
of the terms together in similar ways to eachother (ie, with 
common derivations) if the terms held similar meanings for them. 
So the students were asked to show how they believed each term 
was derived from at least two of the others (and the special, "catch 
all" term "A", used to indicate all the seriously required but 
missing-from-the-list terms)3. Multiple derivations were allowed 
[C. 3J to iii]. The results, in the original usage4, were, in the light of 
the lack of commonality of usage of the terms that had already 
been found, not surprising: each student had a remarkably 
different collection of derivations. 
However, there was an interesting side-result: the nature of the 
heterarchical. structures formed when the consequences of the 
term derivations were displayed, unraveled from the derivation 
forms and presented as a personal heterarchy (see [C. 4. i to iv] for 
how to transform the ring form into a heterarchy), seemed to 
reflect very accurately the teacher's (ie my) opinion of how the 
3 In the original usage, the terms were placed in a circle, and connected 
arrows drawn to show derivations. This technique, similar to that used by 
crossword enthusiasts in solving anagrams, was suggested by Heinz von 
Focrster. I have also used a matrix table, which is easier for large 
collections of terms (over, say, a dozen), but this form is less immediately 
explicit. 
4 Other uses have been various. The technique has been used, for instance, 
as a management toot to help organise terms so that personalities and 
beliefs could be examined, as the provider of a personal mirror for students 
to examine how they learn and think, and for the generation of knowledge 
structures allowing multiple routes to be taken through them, specially in 
the current development of the "Impossible World" Guide document with my 
students in Amsterdam (using the Hypertext rcalisation "Guide" on a 
Macintosh computer (see Glanville et al (1988)). 
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students tackled projects and, indeed, generally set about 
designing and learning: those who sailed through, simply, appear 
to have straightforward heterarchies, those with confused minds 
have great difficulty in leaving the base level - for everything is 
interconnected, and any start is, arbitrarily, as good as any other, 
so that no hard and fast decision can be made from which to 
progress -, and those who get into a mess in the middle having, 
literally, messy middles [C. 5J to iii]l I cannot and do not claim that 
this is an "objective" finding: I am not even sure how it would be 
possible, objectively, to test this finding, or even whether it can 
ever be tested at all, but my experience did find a reflection I felt 
to be true in my interpretation of the diagrams. 
And another important use became apparent: for one of the 
central problems in dealing with any form of Computer Aided 
Learning (or, for that matter, non-linear (course) book such as a 
Hypertext document, eg Nelson's computerised original Hypertext 
Book "Literary Machines" (1980-4,7), or Powell's Interactive 
Videodiscs, such as the "Behaviour in Fire" test and training disc 
(Powell and Sime (1987))) is to find means of describing 
alternative, legitimate and "Hygienic" ways of moving through 
(learning) a field of knowledge, and of trying to match learning 
style to how the material is presented to a particular student. (See 
Thomas and Harri-Augstein (1985) , and Pask (1976a), (1976b) 
and (1976c). ) The technique allows this: experts can relate topics 
and the alternative relationships they propose may be constructed 
into the knowledge structure as providing an enrichment to the 
possibilities that may be followed. Further, by getting students to 
show their topic derivations and charting the route they followed 
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through the topics, it is possible to check for gaps in their 
knowledge and for accuracy of derivation. This possibility is, of 
course, just why Pask was interested in (mis) using the technique5, 
and why the CSHL sponsored certain developmental work on it. 
"MOTIF 8" 
The final spin-off reported here took the form of a series of design 
projects going under the generic name "MOTIF 8" (motivate - get 
itl), already described to some extent in chapter 7, and 
represented in Appendices J, K and L. These push the 
understandings gained in Controlled Viewings to an extreme of 
reflexiveness, and use this effect to generate designs based on the 
self-referential, personal use of personal understandings of 
personal understandings in the generation of designs. 
The process is almost, but not quite, as convoluted as that 
description makes it sounds. It requires two constituent conditions 
/ elements. The Controlled Viewing element is familiar, and I shall 
leave discussion of its role until later. The second element is a 
design vehicle, what would normally be called a "brief" for a 
building. The requirement is for a vehicle that is in some way self- 
referential, paralleling the reflexive use of the findings of the 
5 Pask has used the technique I describe, but, in doing so, forgot his most 
important point: that unless there is something to make a topic change into 
another, both will be the same - and whatever makes the one change must 
also be a topic about which we can learn (Pask (1976a)). Pask allowed that 
one topic could be derived directly from another. whereas, in my 
technique, it is necessary that there are always at least 2 topics interacting 
to make a third. Hcnce the use of the "catch all" topic "A". which means that 
some topic is required and being used that is not amongst the set already 
defined. 
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Controlled Viewings. One such design project is the design of an 
exhibition of (or monument to) some existing building, sharing, 
with that building itself, the same space: a (new) building that 
provides a key to the understanding of the original building, of 
for which it is an exhibition, within the space of that building, but 
by adding to it, r ather than destroying it. This exhibit building is 
to be constituted of the results of the student designer's own 
perceptual processes: ie, the exhibit will be an exhibit of how the 
particular student understood and experienced the particular 
space in question, as a product of the student's own way of 
understanding his experience of space, as evaluated by himself, ie, 
an exhibition demonstrating one person's key to understanding 
that of which the understanding is the exhibit. 
To let the student discover the nature of his experiencing of the 
space, he was subject to a Controlled Viewing - the first required 
element mentioned above. (See [G. 2. i to iii] for photographs of St 
Paul's Covent Garden, which was used as one of the sites for this 
exercise, and for which Dunnett's scheme - see later - was 
designed. ) However, in this case, the student was instructed to 
push his drawings of the space as far as he could, well beyond - 
even the furthest he had imagined possible: to consider whether 
there was something he might have left out, and, if he thought so, 
to invent something appropriate if he could not exactly remember 
what he thought he had seen. He was also asked to record the 
manner and sequence in which he drew the building, ie his tactics 
in re-creating and representing his experience of the building and 
its space: for instance, did he draw in all the windows in outline, 
and then add in the panes of glass, or did he draw in each window 
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together with its panes of glass in full detail, one at a tiMe6 .9 (For a 
near analogy in the use of architecture related to memory and 
visualisation, see Frances Yates' seminal "The Art of Memory" 
(1966), and her abbreviated and specialised article "Architecture 
and the Art of Memory" (1980). ) The student then drew the same 
space while both sighted and within it, taking as long as he wished 
(thus creating, in effect, a "control" drawing). Finally, he was asked 
to compare the two (sets of) drawings both for content and for the 
drawing tactics used. Those that were produced after the 
Controlled Viewing were taken to be of greater significance than 
those drawn in the space, for they reflected the students' 
assumptions and beliefs about what they thought ought to be (ie, 
in the terms of earlier Chapters, they made more explicit use of 
the student's cognitive structures in the creation of the mental 
model). So, differences between what may be, a little improperly,. 
called the "invented" and the "recorded" spaces, details and tactics 
were noted. It was these differences that provided the insight, as 
evaluated by the student (I defy any other person to do it, for the 
meanings of these drawings and of the gestures in them are 
representations of intuitions, assumptions and -understandings that 
are intensely private, and not really publicly articulatable), and it 
was an exhibit of these insights that was to be created. See [G. 31 to 
iii] for a scheme designed in this way by Charlie Dunnett. 
6 In recent research work, yet to be reported, 1, working with a team oif my 
students at Portsmouth Polytechnic, have examined how children represent 
their notion of "home", both verbally and visually. One thing that we are 
looking for is whether children use tactics such as those described above in 
drawing their notions. I hope that it may turn out that there arc specific 
rcprcscntational styles, similar to learning styles such as are reported in 
Pask (1976b, 1976c). 
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Thus, although there was no "scientific" data resulting from this 
process, there were the relatively hard "facts#, of exhibition 
building designs that the students believed reflected and 
introduced others to how they had understood the building and its 
space through their own mental models, to be demonstrated 
within the building under consideration, itself: ie, their 
"commentary" on the building became a part of the building in 
p hysical form, as Opposed to remaining conceptual. Reification 
with a vengeance! 
CONCLUSION 
In three quite different ways, spin-offs that resulted from the 
quest for a solution to my problem were developed, and turned 
into demonstrably useful devices, standing on their own, without 
necessarily needing to be part of the experiments in and through 
they were, initially developed. They are: 
i) a couple of "games" that allow both social and shared 
non- verbal construing, and an alarming form of self-revelation 
ii) a means of reflecting upon learning styles and tactics, and 
of constructing complex knowledge structures 
a way of designing that takes on board, explicitly, both 
personal spatial understandings and their use as a commentary 
upon the space of which they were understandings. 
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While these techniques cast little light on, and offer no solutions 
to, my problem, they can be seen to have considerable use and 
value, in quite different ways. So that, even in these spin-offs, 
themselves the results of failed attempts (from which something, 
at least, was learnt by me), there is a further added value, a 
further special enrichment, which, in a peculiar way, reflects 
exactly my characterisation of learning and design. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The End is in the Beginning fand yet you go on) 
If you could finish it ... you could rest ... sleep ... not before AI know ... the ones I've finished thousands and one . 
all I ever did 
... in my life ... with my life saying to myself ... flnish this 
one ... its the right one ... then rest ... sleep ... no more stories . 
.. no more words ... and flnished it ... and not the right one . (Samuel Beckett, "Cascando" (1964)) 
My researches so far recounted had led me to a conclusion about 
which I was less than happy. It appeared that my quest was, 
indeed, for something as unrealistic as the philosopher's stone, 
and, even though I had, in the search, incidentally acquired some 
fortunate and valuable learnings and spin-offs along the way, I 
had consistently failed to solve my problem. 
However, I had, I believed, at least discovered that the visual 
sensation, if no other, of architectural space is understood in terms 
of a whole, into which detail is added in a process of enrichment. 
(This ties in very closely with some of my ideas of how architects 
design - see chapter 3 and Glanville (forthcoming) - which is not 
surprising, since the result helped me formulate my ideas. ) When 
we view a space, we get an immediate sense of its totality, its 
wholeness. This makes it, at the very least, extremely hard (I 
would, I think, still maintain impossible) to build an 
understanding of our experience of it in terms of combinations of 
characteristics (although we might describe strategies used in 
developing our understandings, in the manner, for instance, of 
Discourse Analysis as was mentioned in chapter 7). Thus, it is 
probably absurd to attempt to provide an isomorphic 
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representation of our understandings of our spatial experiences 
through a "language" constituted of individual and separate terms: 
indeed, if we have to try to construct an image of it by the 
assembly of component parts (as in the Blindfold Surveys), we 
have the greatest difficulty. Thus, attempting to find a collection of 
constant and socially agreed terms by which to describe 
understandings of experiences of (architectural) space is not likely 
to (and, in the case reported here, did not) either prove or provide 
a viable proposition. 
And so I am, in the end, still left with my problem: what about 
architectural spacel?. Can our understandings of our expe riences of 
architectural space actually be described at all, and, if so, by what 
means? Can our experiences and understandings of it be made 
available, through explicit articulation, to others? Can we discuss it 
at all in any coherent, clea r and cogent way? Is to hope to do so a 
vain hope? 
But, if, in contrast, the answer to these questions is (in spite of the 
failures presented as the body of this thesis) "Yes! ", how can we 
talk about our experiences and understandings of architectural 
space. 
I remembered, as an 18 year old, going to visit the composer 
Harrison Birtwistle. This was before I started studying 
architecture, while I was still writing music. He placed 2 musical 
I Although, through years of teaching and utterances such as "Y'know 
what I mean", and, equally, as a result of undertaking this research, I am no 
longer, I believe. quite so baffled and ignorant as I was when I started out. 
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scores in front of me, one of Olivier MessiHen's "Chronocromie" 
(which is full of strange time signatures) and one of his own 
"Monody for Corpus Christi", and then he left me alone for 3 hours 
in his kitchen. When he came back, having gone shopping for the 
nappies and tinned peas, he asked me what I'd discovered. I asked 
him about the time signatures in the Messiaen, the notation of 
which was new to me and which I didn't understand and could 
only guess at, and then I demanded that he tell me about how he 
had constructed his piece. He refused. He said that analysis was 
something you did for yourself, and that the purpose of analysis 
was not to learn about what someone else intended (the art work 
should do that, directly and without excuses): it was to tell you, 
and, thus, to help you learn about yourself. That was a terse but 
profound lesson, and one I try to keep in the forefront of my 
thinking. Although I don't always succeed. 
And I remembered an early lesson when, as a first year 
architecture student at the AA, the painter and Blues critic Paul 
Oliver asked me to analyse a painting. Not having fully absorbed 
Birtwistle's lesson, I refused ("There's no point in trying to get into 
Beethoven's headl Analysis of what others mean is impossible, so 
why do it? "). Oliver asked me to prove it was impossible to 
analyse a painting, so I set to it, using a painting by Paul Klee - 
"The Mount of the Sacred Cat". By the end of the day, I had of 
course proved analysis was not only possible but also worthwhile, 
and I had already found out a lot about me, drawing an analogy 
between the way Klee handled his grids and MessiNen controlled 
his rhythms. (This lead to my first published paper, "Klee and 
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Messia"en", Glanville (1966). ) 1 think I had, by now, fully learnt my 
lesson about analysis, even if I did not always remember it. 
And so it suddenly occurred to me that there was no more getting 
away from the consideration of how I understood (how I 
understood) space. I had to take into account, and account for my 
own experience. In particular (and especially since one of the 
purposes of my research was to undertake some learning myself), 
I began to wonder how I could have failed to look into how I could 
both account and recount to myself my own understanding of 
space? Analysis is for the self - the lesson I had learnt from 
Birtwistle and Oliver. Why, I began to ask myself, had I been so 
mean, unrealistic and lazy as to expect others to do my work for 
me? Where were all the assumptions of new order Cybernetics (in 
which I already had a doctorate) that I was involved in reflected 
in my approach to this area? How could it be that I had failed to 
attempt to take cognizance of my own cognition as well as 
attempting to take cognizance of the cognition of my students? 
Was real the answer (scientific) caution, as I supposed, or a simple 
lack of daring? Whichever it was, I had, now, to look for myself: I 
could no longer justify asking others to do what I would not do 
myself I 
I decided, therefore, that M examination of space, the 
phenomenon that I constructed and construed, needed attention. 
Not just attention, but my attention, I had to look into how I could 
account to myself for how I thought of space. I had to be prepared 
to take a risk, but with the humility of the child enquiring, NOT as 
an imposition to be made by me upon the subject. And what I 
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could find out, from and by myself, I would have to be prepared, 
eventually, to put to others in the "what if" manner. 
But in this account I am not really being entirely honest, either. 
For the idea that there were ways in which I (and, I hope, others) 
can construe and communicate our experiences and 
understandings of architectural space hit me head on, as I shall 
recount, (with the immediacy and clarity I associate with Saul's 
vision on the road to Damascus) at the first Mayan architectural 
archeological site I ever visited, in Palenque, Mexico, in 1981, 
when the local English speaking guide, a maths teacher by 
profession, took me, a Dutch companion and colleague on the trip 
and a well-prepared middle-aged American couple up the steps of 
the "Pyramid of the Inscriptions" and told us of the mathematics 
of the Mayans, and its embodiment in their buildings. 
And it is from that story that the final part of my account stems, 
an account in which I shall explain what I have been able to learn 
from assuming that I can both make and explain my own 
(personal) constructs about architectural space that permit it to be 
treated as a phenomenon, which I take to be the beginnings of a- 
new, and grand research programme, and, yet, which already has 
at least some value in accounting for this particular personal 
scientist's experiences and understandings, and in which I shall 
also speculate about future directions and developments in my 
research. 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
PART THREE: 
A New Beginning 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
chapter 10 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR 
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Architecture--and Space for Thoughl 
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"Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has 
himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or at 
least similar thoughts. - So it is not a textbook. " 
(Wittgenstein "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1971)) 
PROLOGUE 
Unlike most endings (at least, as we choose to recount them), this 
one represents a new beginning rather than a conclusion. As I 
have indicated, I had, by and large, failed, although I had learnt a 
lot from my failures. But I had also realised that I had omitted 
myself from the experiences being represented, and that if I 
wanted to d evelop a way of describing experiences of 
(architectural) space, I could do worse than rely on my 
experiences. 
I also decided that, since I had failed to find a means of describing, 
socially, the experience of space, in spite of the best efforts of 
myself as experimenter and the participating student subjects, I 
could not go on: and for some eime, as I have explained, things 
stood still, apparently stagnating, but actually fermenting in the 
quiet of the back of my brain, while I used the techniques and 
discoveries that we had nevertheless made "merely" as teaching 
devices. 
And yet there were three personal, revelatory experiences, apart 
from the failure of my experiments, that suddenly opened up the 
whole field to me in a completely new way, releasing the 
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(figurative) gasses and liquids of the potent forment that had been 
brewing up in the back of my brain, and which formed the basis 
for this new-beginning that I like to refer to as a research 
programme that is only just beginning. 
The three were: 
A visit to the Mayan City of Palenque in the Chaipas region 
of Mexico, my first experience of this architecture. 
Discussing the apparent non-spatiality of Greek Temples 
with two architect friends. 
Realising (as I suggested above) that I had excluded myself, 
my own greatest resource, from participating in the whole 
experiencing and describing process, and that, to be true to 
my aims of learning, and the philosophy of both Kelly and 
his followers - especially at the Centre for the Study of 
Human Learning - and my cybernetic colleagues, I could not 
allow myself to do that. By taking on board my own 
experiences of space, and trying to find a means to account 
for them and to explain them to and for myself, I could both 
treat space as something in its own right, and use the 
development of my means of explanation and description to 
try to improve both the quality of my own experience and to 
communicate about this with others. Thus, I had, in fact, 
learnt to exerience architectural space myself, in the course 
of the work done - an ability I had not had at the beginningl 
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I do not believe I need to further justify or explain the third 
revelation. All that is remarkable about it is how long it took me to 
realise it. But the first two need elaboration, and, because they are 
stories, I shall tell them as such. 
DTSCOVERTNG MAYAN ARCHTTECTURE: SPACE AND ZERO. 
Palenque is a Mayan city (in the Mexican state of Chaipas) dating 
from about 600 AD, and celebrating, particularly, the King Pacal. It 
is at the end of a savannah, in the foothills of Sierras that 
eventually rise to Guatemala. I arrived there one August morning 
in 1981 after a bumpy and dusty ride from the oil town of 
Villahermosa (centre of the earlier Olmec civilization) in the back 
of a lorry. 
On affival at the entrance to the site, I was approached by a man 
who asked in English if I wanted a guide. Being completely new to 
this sort of stuff, I said yes. He lead the small party I was with in 
to an amazing world of pyramids, Temples, a palace, ballcourt and 
other buildings set in lush meadows around a rivulet, and 
surrounded by dense green jungle banked steep up the hills [H. 5. il. 
The sun was brilliant and hot, the sky blue with random white 
clouds, and the shadows cast provided great contrast. It was a 
truly amazing first experience of a Mayan city, never to be, nor in 
fact forgotten. 
The buildings were extraordinary. Generally rather squat, they 
had unnecessarily, even unjustifiably thick walls with either 
lintels or coffered arches at their openings [A. 3. vi and vii], and 
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were often covered with intricate carvings in several relief layers 
(although this is more remarkable at other sites, such as Uxmal 
[A. 4. i and ii], in the Yucatan). Above them were freizes, also 
ornamented, crowned, frequently, with an intricate "cock's comb", 
and the buildings were raised on plinths (pyramid bases being the 
most marked of these) and immediately surrounded by lawns. 
They were built of a light brown-grey stone that the sun bleached. 
On the pathway into the site, as all this revealed itself to us, the 
guide explained that he only did this job in the tourist season, and 
he was sorry about his English- (which was, incidentally, fine), but 
he was only the local school's maths teacher. 
One of the first buildings we approached was the "Temple of the 
Inscriptions", a pyramid unique in Mayan architecture in that it 
contains a burial chamber in which is the sarcophagus of King 
Pacal (Pacal = shield) [A. 3. i and ii, H. 6 i and ii]. It consists of a 
steep stepped pyramid base with a stairway up the middle, and a 
small "hut" on topt. 
Panting, we reached the top, perhaps 75 feet up. There, our guide 
lead us towards the Temple building itself. This is a relatively 
modest building with five equi-sized and equi-spaced openings 
that occupy the long wall facing you as you ascend, inside which is 
a long room with three anti-chambers. As he took us slowly across 
the platform, he began to explain about the tomb within, and how 
I The form of the Mayan temple is taken from that of the Mayan house-hut, 
which still exists virtually unchanged all over Mexico to this day. See Turvil 
(1987) and Gallenkamp (1987) for good summaries of the development of 
Mayan Architecture: I am no expert. 
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it had been found. But as we got to the central opening in the 
extremely thick wall, he stopped, and asked the most unlikely 
I 
question: 
"Did you know the Mayan's were very clever mathematicians, and 
they invented the concept of 0 (ie zero)? Did you know that 0 is a 
very special number with properties quite unlike any others? " 
I answered that I did know a little about 0 existing as a notation 
that permits the subtraction of a larger from a smaller number, 
thus symbolising the crossing over between the positive and 
negative number series (which it allows to be generated), 
consequently also having strange effects on ordinal numbers, 
division etc., but that I did not know about the Mayan's having 
invented it. 
He then went on to say, "Well, they built their mathematics into 
their buildings, and we are currently in the space they considered 
as 0.112 See [1.1 i to iv]. 
I thought about this for a little, because I could not immediately 
understand. We were, after all, only standing in a doorway. And 
then, suddenly, it all became clear to me. The doorway, together 
with the wall itself were an embodiment -a representation, even - 
of the 0 space, the transition from outside space to inside space, 
21 have not been able to find any information to either confirm or deny 
this assertion in any of the (few) books on Mayan architecture, in English, 
that I have been able to locate. Its absence should no longer, however, 
appear entirely surprising to the reader. since it merely confirms my point 
that little discussion in architecture is concerned with space. 
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from positive to negative. And so my mind began racing. Didn't 
that make sense of walls with pilasters, of the galleries of 
Mediaeval Cathedrals, of niches and bays carved into walls, of 
columnated and pilastered walls, of military corridors within 
castle walls, of the spiral staircase enclosed .... the list went on and 
on. With this one, simple remark about a mathematical idea we 
now take for granted (even if it is immensely sophisticated and 
not generally very well understood), my schoolteacher parmime 
guide had suddenly explained so much to me that he had literally 
opened my eyes. For the first time I could see a value beyond the 
cosmetic in architectural decoration and articulation. For the first 
time I had been given an insight that helped me to understand my 
experience of architectural space. For the first time I could 
understand what the spatial function of a wall was - and, 
therefore, why the Mayans built them so unnecessarily and 
unjustifiably thick. 
It really was a revelation, for which I have to thank that school 
teacher. And it doesn't matter in the least whether he was right 
about the Mayans, in the context of this work, for he had provided 
an eye-opener and a way of experiencing and discussing space 
that made immediate sense to me3. 
3 This attitude to the purpose and meaning of analysis was first explained to 
me by the composer Harrison Birtwistle who, when I asked him about the 
construction of one of his pieces, replied to the effect that the purpose of 
musical analysis was to learn to understand yourself. not the mind of the 
composer of the piece. This was re-inforced by Paul Oliver, the painter. jazz 
and architecture critic, who insisted, when I refused to do a pictorial 
analysis for him, that I prove that there was no point in doing one. This, 
naturally, led to me doing an analysis, and to my first publication. "Klee and 
Messiaen" (Glanville (1966)). 
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The Space of the Solid Blot): the Greek Temnle. 
In Chapter 1,1 asserted that there was an alternative way of 
looking at the difference between Greek and Roman architecture 
to the traditional one of style and engineering (the manner of, 
for instance, Pevsner), considering it, rather, in terms of the way 
that space was generated and contained. Having been brought 
up in the Pevsner tradition, I was very surprised when I 
discovered this. 
The discovery came about thus: 
Separately, and in great bemusement, I asked two architectural, 
colleagues, Dick Bunt and Leon van Schaik, what it was about the 
Greek Temples that made them so spatially significant to 
architecture, when they were essentially just rather elegantly 
decorated "solid" lumps, with internal access restricted to the few 
special priests permitted to enter, and which, therefore, through 
their privacy and solidity, had, to all intents and purposes, no 
socially real space in them. 
The answer I got from them was that the space was generated out 
from the Temples themselves: that the space they were making 
was outward going, and external [I. 2. il. This was, to me, a 
completely novel concept, for I had failed to connect what I knew 
about, for instance, the relationship of an English Cathedral to its 
Close, and of its spire and the space generated around it (which 
was of great significance for several reasons, including navigation), 
with the the siting of the Greek Temple, just as I had failed to 
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realise the significance of the altar and its spatial influence, 
especially when used in the highly centralised plan referred to as 
the "Greek Cross" [1.2. ii]. Indeed, speaking figuratively, the Greek 
Temple can be taken to be a sort of altar, with the landscape, 
itself, forming a shell or container4. I had considered space as 
exclusively internal: elevations of buildings were essentially 
murals and reliefs. The notion of the Cathedral Close as a space 
generated by the Cathedral and defined by the Close bounds was 
unrecognised even if accepted [H. 9. i]. 
This new idea (to me) that there could be space outside, and, even 
more, that buildings, even solid lumps, could generate space 
outwards from themselves, was also a revelation. It made sense of 
the way some critics speak of the "space" occupied or generated 
by a piece of sculpture, and it allowed me to view the "periods" of 
architecture in a completely new way, a way that reflected means 
of spatial generation rather than changes of style and structural 
developments. It even appeared, I was told, that participation in a 
Greek ritual could occur so long as you could see the Temple: ie, 
the building had a spatial influence, a domain it controlled, that 
could extend for miles around itself. 
Thus, Greek architecture (in terms of its main public buildings, 
Temples and theatres and urban routes) takes on a new position 
as the final and glorious culmination of a long tradition, rather 
4 This point was first made by Vincent Scully (1962) in his remarkable book 
"The Earth, the Temple and the Gods". in which he introduced his exposition 
of this notion of space and the Greek Temple. See also Boyarsky (1972) for a 
thorough account of the siting of Greek buildings and towns within their 
surrounding landscape, and the significance of the inter-relationship and 
sequence of the buildings and public spaces. 
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than the high point of a tradition that was to go down-hill with the 
Romans, to whom was left, as I hinted in Chapter 1, the task of 
initiating a new one [H. 21 and ii, MAJ. 
(When I finally got to see these Temples, this architecture, as I did 
in that Mecca of Greek culture (Turkey) 4 years before writing 
this, I knew why architecture students were told to go and 
experience it, and I knew how foolish, once again, I had been not 
to have done so. But I also knew that the explanation I had been 
given held good for my understanding. ) 
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THE BEGINNINGS OF A WAY OF DESCRTBTNG MY SPATIAL 
EXPERIENCES. 5 
I have already, above, introduced a means of describing some of 
my spatial experiences, through the Mayan concept of the wall as 
embodying the notion of 0 space, with the outside as the 
equivalent of the + ve and the inside as the - ve. And I should like 
emphasise the metaphorical nature of the analogy between wall, 0 
space and mathematical 0, to prevent any possible 
misinterpretation resulting from literalism. But before I examine, 
develop and integrate this concept, however, I shall return to the 
Greek example. 
51 should like to emphasise several points about the undertaking in this 
chapter, here, for some readers of earlier drafts have found them difficult. 
The first is that this is a personal document, and what I produce here has 
the value associated with such a document (if it has any value at all). It 
makes no claim at being universal. The second, concommitant with the 
first. is that the revelations presented here arc revelations to me: no one 
can share my revelations, although they may help create in others their 
own revelations - just as I cannot do other people's learning for them. 
Indeed. these personal revelations may have no revelatory quality at all to 
others. The third concerns the notion of language and term (which I have 
addressed in chapter S. and to which I shall return in chapter 11): other 
readers have suggested that the word "template" would be more appropriate 
than the word "term". I see the point (especially insofar as I also use 
_diagrams): 
a template is something you hold up and compare other things to 
or make them from, which is much what I am doing here. But a template 
cannot, as I understand it, really be part of a language. and it is a language 
I wish, and need, to assist developing. Then, there is my approach to 
explicating the terms I introduce. This involves the media of words, 
diagrams, photos and drawings - all of which are necessary. It also involves 
an approach to complimantarity between terms (akin to Kelly's construct 
polcs, yin and yang, and all those other, similar partitions of the universe), 
which treats the terms as. themselves, phenomena used to describe other 
phenomena, and where terms arc understood as often covering a 
continuum also inhabited by their compliments (and / or opposites). I do 
not, however, exclude the middle (as in the law of the excluded middle): 
indeed, it is from the interesting and , valuable existence of 
the middle (zero) 
that the understandings I describe here in the first place derive. Finally, I 
also make extensive use of analogy and metaphor. I do not mean, for 
instance, that a wall IS mathematical zero. I do mean that they perform 
certain similar functions (and that I derived my understanding of the one 
from the other, by analogical reasoning). I have attempted to make sure 
that the analogical nature of my intent is apparent in the text. 
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Asnects of - 
Sonce in Greek Architecturp 
The Greek Temple is, of course, a much more sophisiticated 
architectural object than I have just indicated, and it was p_DJ 
without an inside: around the back of the Temple, there was, 
typically, a room used by the priests (from which they would 
announce, in the appropriate God's voice through a sort of trumpet 
amplifier, whatever message seemed necessary, and enjoy the 
sacrificial offerings left for the God). But the space inside was 
essentially private: the public space was not only outside the 
building, it was also generated outwards from the building, which 
was, to all public intents and purposes solid [A. 2. i to iv]. 
Thus, in considering the spatial concepts involved in the Temple, 
we have a number of terms that help us indicate the nature of its 
spatial operation. These terms (with their compliments) are: 
Inside (or internal) / outside (or external) 
Inward / outward 
Public / Private 
Solid / Void6 
6 It will be noted that these terms do not refer, exclusively, to the visual 
sense. It is important, for me and, I believe, for the development of any 
serious language in which to describe experiences of architectural space, 
that the current almost exclusive pre-occupation with the visual is dropped 
in favour of a wider sensory base. Spaces can be touched, smelt, even tasted. 
And the importance of sound in buildings cannot be ovcr-estimated. Indeed, 
my overriding image of Strasbourg Cathedral is not visual (I am not sure I 
could recognise the interior visually), but acoustic. Although, for reasons 
of brevity, I shall largely use the visual metaphor, non-visual senses should 
also be taken as included. 
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and it can be asserted that the nature of space, in the case of the 
Temple, was that public space was both outwardly generated and 
external - and the building was publicly solid - yet it was 
internally private, through its private internal space. 
Then what of other Greek buildings? 
Consider, for instance, the Greek Theatre (classical Greek buildings 
were, as with the buildings of most periods and styles, of such 
general uniformity, developing so consistently, that I take it, 
under the particular- circumstances prevailing in this work, as 
reasonable to talk in such a generalised manner [A. 1 i to vii])7. 
The Theatre consists, essentially, of 4 elements placed in a 
landscape. There is a raised stage with a lower forestage and a 
wall behind it, and there is a vast sweeping auditorium, rising up 
in roughly a semicircle and at about thirty degrees elevation. 
Where possible, the auditorium structure was built upon a natural 
slope, but not always - which lead to some remarkable and vast 
supporting structures. In as far as possible, the Theatre was 
situated in the landscape so that it could take advantage of the 
views, and also so that it could exploit the natural evening air 
updraft to aid the vast audience to hear. The action of the play, 
generally, takes place on the stage, and the chorus is located on 
the lower forestage [H. 3. i]. 
7 Although much conventional architectural history is, as I have said, 
naturally concerned with accounting for developments within the types, 
and the historical sequence of occurrence of particular stylistic and 
planning details (ie, the development). 
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Spatially, we have, in my analysis, something very similar to the 
conditions pertaining to the Temple, for the whole purpose of the 
spatial arrangement is to allow the actors to perform (outside) 
outwards from the stage, and for all those within view (ie, within 
the auditorium) to be able to participate in the action. There are, 
naturally, differences: the backstage area in the Theatre (behind 
the wall) is private and interior, but has much less significance to 
the public than the interior of the Temple. It is also possible that 
the role of the landscape in the Temple and Theatre differs. But 
the central duality of the public container of a private interior 
space dominating and generating a vast outside space outwardly 
from it holds for both. 
I do not wish to push this characterisation of the Greek 
architecture too far, for its relevance is to demonstrate that the 
dualities I have mentioned can be used in the description of an 
analysis of spatial experience, rather than to insist upon their 
essential correctness, or their absolute universality. Nor is it my 
intention to present an architectural history8 based on these (and 
8 However, I should perhaps remind the reader of two example cited earlier 
in this work: the architecture of the Egyptians and of the Romans. In the 
case of the Egyptians, the Pyramid is a clear example of a building 
containing an intensely private space (its privacy supported by centuries 
of myths such as "The Curse of the Mummy"), which generates, outwardly. 
an enormous external space, dominating, as it does, the surrounding desert 
for ten's of miles [H. U]. A variant is the Temple at Luxor, which was carved 
out of the rock starting from the top and working downwards, thus 
originally creating an internal (and relatively private space) with no 
external space at all! This architecture is closely related, thus, to the 
architecture of the Greeks, inasfar as I have presented my initial analysis. 
The architecture of the Romans and all since, however, differs in its basic 
spatial conception in that. while it certainly had buildings which almost 
only generated external spaces outwardly (for instance. Triumphal Arches, 
Viaducts), it also had a majority of buildings with large and public internal 
spaces, and spaces that were generated inwardly. These include important 
public buildings such as baths and courthouses, which, in their form as 
Basilicae, introduced another level of complexity. and provided the basis 
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other descriptions I shall introduce later), although as Zevi (1974, 
1983) has pointed out, it is necessary, and should be undertaken 
as part of the future research programme that this work 
(particularly this chapter) lead up to, and, I hope, start. Rather, I 
shall return to the Mayan concept of the 0 in space, for in it there 
is a further concept that can be applied to the Greek, and which is 
central in the constellation of the descriptions I am developing. 
Zero Sonce and-Mayan Architecture (the OriLlin of the 
Thick Wall). 9 
As I recounted above, one way of considering how the Maya 
understood space was as consisting of three varieties of space (as 
opposed to the "normal" two - inside and outside). These I have 
referred to, in deference to my mathematical guide at Palenque 
and in order to differentiate between the two differing notions of 
spatial construction, as being positive (+ ve, ie outside), negative (- 
ve, ie inside), and zero (0) space. The difference lies in an analogy 
to the transitional nature of the number 0, that is the edge 
between inside and outside space that is defined by some 
boundary that has the property of existing, distinct, on its ownIO, 
from which the cruciform church plan of European Christendom 
developed. 
91 do not. by this, intend the chronological origin, but the origin of my 
understanding of* the concept of a0 space analogically embodied in a thick 
wall. 
10 This notion, of a boundary existing in its own right and with its own 
distinctive qualities, becomes central to the distinction logics introduced to 
Cybernetics by George Spencer Brown's "The Laws of Form" (1968). The 
work on the nature and consequences of his logic for the properties and 
bchaviours of boundaries was largely carried out by me (Glanville (1979). 
Glanville and Varcla (1981), and a note to Glanville and Varcla by Glanville 
(unpubl)). I shall leave summarising our findings (which were developed 
before I visited Palenquc, and without any thought of the notion of zero 
that takes, as a metaphor, such a central place in this chapter). 
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Thus, walls and other dividing elements have "thickness" (the 
metaphor should not necessarily always to be taken literally) -a 
quality of being and of having spatial existence in themselves, and 
of having quality (self-identity / self-value)II. 
In looking at Mayan buildings, we find this is exactly what 
happens. The insides and outsides of the buildings are defined by 
walls, ceilings (often coffered or vaulted) and floors that are 
literally thick. But the walls, themselves, have intricate surfaces of 
carvings, made, on the outsides, to several depth levels, often 
painted on the insides. The roof springs from an architrave that 
projects in several steps, often with a freize, and the floor 
continues outside the building as a plinth that drops below the 
threshold, which extends as a platform around the building and 
finally descends (steeply and dramatically in the case of the 
pyramids) to the level of the surrounding land. (See [1.3. i] for a 
typical section through such a wall, based on both Palenque [A. 3. vi 
and vii] and Uxmal [AAJ and ii]. ) In a simplified form this can 
even be found in the (to this day surviving) traditional house-hut, 
with its mud platform, overhanging thatched roof, and adobe walls 
[A. 6. i]. 
What this gives us, in terms of spatial experience, is a series of 
concatenated zones that exist in their own rights, each of which, as 
a result of the nature of boundaries, has an inside and an outside: 
II One criticism often made by both users and certain schools of criticism 
about Modem Architecture is that the walls are so boring, flat, thin, 
lacking in character. The argumcnt about thickness offers a theoretical 
cxplanation of this failing. 
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ie, a series of zones, each of which can be a 0, + ve or - ve space, 
which leads, eventually, to the amazing construction of the 
(logically paradoxical) outside external inside space of the 
courtyard [1.3. i, A. 3. iv and v]. This indicates the power that the 
Mayan spatial concept has over the more traditional and 
straightforward inside / outside interpretation. 
I referred to the Mayan concept of space as the origin of the thick 
wall, and emphasised in footnotes that I did not mean either that 
this "origin" was chronological, but rather the origin of my 
understanding, or that "thickness" should be taken as literal and 
material thickness. For, clearly, examples may be found of a 
concept such as this that precede the Maya by centuries, if not 
millenia. One such is the aforementioned Greek Temple. 
As well as the elements I have already introduced, the Greek 
Temple shares much in common with Mayan buildings (including 
its putative origin in the simple, peasant hut - see Stevens' 
criticism of this concept as presented through the idea of "The 
Noble Savage" (Stevens(1966))). For instance, it, too, sits on a wide 
plinth approached by steps from ground level, and it has a raised 
threshold. The roof projects, significantly, out over the eaves, and 
there is a decorated frieze along the main axis. It has literally 
thick walls, but, instead of carvings on the wall, it is surrounded 
by a colonnade of roughly equi-spaced columns which create a 
wall-zone of their own, and a further zone between them and the 
thickly constructed wall that defines the ultimate interior spaces 
[11.2. fil. (The comparison with the Egyptian Pyramids is interesting 
[H. I. il, for their walls, although immensely thick (literally), are 
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almost as bland and simple in their approach as those so often 
criticised walls that were produced by so many of the Modern 
Movement architects. There is a sense in which metaphorical 
thickness equates with richness and enjoyment. ) 
Nor, of course, are Greek Temples alone in this. All sorts of 
colonnades. arcades, niches, carvings, articulations, screens etc 
have the same sort of richness through their metaphorical 
thickness - hence the delight in going along bridges, and the 
English tradition of the "Long Gallery" [A. U]. The most remarkable 
single example I have come across is the "Colonnade Room" in the 
Hermitage in Leningrad [A. 11A to iii]: a room with a colonnade 
down the middle, pilasters-and niches around the walls, and a 
colonnaded gallery above accessed from a staircase carved, in 
layers, into an end wall. 
Thus, it can be seen that, using only this small selection of terms 
derived from the accounts of two experiences, a tour round 
Palenque on my first visit to a Mayan site, and the explanation 
that the space of the Greek Temple was generated outwards from 
it, it is potsible to begin making a description of the space and of 
the experience of the space of at least some buildings. And so arise 
four questions: 
Can this collection of terms be extended and codified, for 
general use? 
Do they describe experience? 
Can their use clarify and amplify experience? 
Do they work as a means of communication between people? 
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The latter three can hardly be answered precisely, in a manner 
supported by hard scientific evidence, for the moment, although I 
could assert what I believe to be true, from my limited 
experience12. They are the questions that are to be answered by 
the research programme I propose, and are clearly massive 
questions, far beyond the realm of this (or, indeed, any) thesis. I 
shall return to them, in a different form, in the chapter 11, where 
I go some way towards suggesting modes of investigation, possible 
outcomes, etc.. But the first question can be answered, at least in a 
limited form, by extending and codifying what has already been 
presented here. 
AN ENRTCHED DESCRTPTTON BASED ON THE MAYAN 
TNSTEAD OF THE GREEK 
I have listed some of the characteristics by which Greek 
architecture may be characterised (ie, through the use of which I 
can describe my spatial experiences of it) as being: 
12 Which is that they do both describe, and amplify and clarify my 
experience (hence this chapter), and that. when used even with first year 
architecture students as a teaching device, they do communicate. In fact. at 
Portsmouth Polytechnic School of Architecture, the terms 0, + ve and - ve 
space have become a sort of in-house jargon used by many of the students 
and staff in discussing the spatial intentions in architectural designs. Thus, 
students with whom these terms were used and in terms of which projects 
were set during their first year course, have, in their final year (1988) 
produced major (final) designs rich in thick walls of both the articulated 
and the habitable kind. For an unsolicited student comment upon the 
usefulness of these concepts in discussing and generating architecture 
(both Mayan and in general), see Turvil (1987). It is clear that the 
introduction of these concepts has lead to a type of architecture and 
architectural understanding in which the quality of boundaries - walls. 
zero spaces, ctc - has been far more widely and richly considered than has 
generally been the recent case. However, more work is obviously required, 
the first part of which is being undertaken in 1898. 
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Inside (or internal) / outside (or external) 
and 
Inward / outward 
Public / Private 
Solid / Void 
and I have shown that, in the case of Mayan architecture, at least, 
there is a similarity between the first of these pairings and the 
Mayan concept of + ve, 0 and - ve space. But there is a major 
subtlety that exists in the Mayan schema (as I have taken it from 
my school maths teacher), which is absent, yet, I believe, sorely 
needed in our account of the Greek, and which also has a serious 
philosophical parallel and base. I shall explore these here, before I 
look at the other pairings for possible enrichments, and then at 
some further ways for the potential description of spatial 
experiences. 
To talk of an inside and an outside is to talk of a boundary 
between them, which boundary creates them. In architecture, this 
is normally a wall, roof or whatever, which is taken to absolutely 
distinguish the inside from the outside. 
However, such walls may not be such simple dividers, for they 
may - indeed must - have qualities of their own. There does not 
exist a wall or a roof that is without its own substance (and 
therefore character), no matter how trite or self-depreciating that 
substance may be. In Greek architecture, many walls are made 
into purposely and particularly rich "zones". Thus, the elevations 
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of a typical Greek Temple will have, as I have explained, not only 
the screen-wall itself, but an area in front of that, and then some 
columns, sitting under (in the case of the front and rear 
elevations) a projecting pediment that extends beyond them, all 
sitting upon a raised plinth with steps from ground level up to it 
[A. l. v to vii, A. 2. iii and iv]. 
With such an arrangement, it could seem hard to determine just 
where inside stops and outside begins: and this is a common 
problem in architecture, for few walls (at least until recently) are 
literally thin, simple and un-interrupted13. They have windows, 
doors, porches. The great English Perpendicular Gothic churches 
had the first "picture windows". The walls of the Renaissance 
Palazzo are moulded, columnated, pedimented and rusticated. Yet 
we talk about inside and outside. 
This is where the Mayan concept of 0 space, missing in our 
account of Greek architecture (and in all our accounts, generally), 
comes in. Whereas in the inside / outside paradigm, the wall is 
seen as a boundary the only characteristic of which is that it 
divides the inside unambiguously from the outside, the notion of 0 
space allows for there to be a space of distinction between the 
inside and the outside which is at once a part of both and yet is 
neither, having a distinctive character of its own Oust like its 
source analogue, the number 0). Then, by -convention, (Greek) 
13 The closest example to a thin, uninterrupted wall that I know is that at 
the back of the patients' "airing" wing at Aalto's Paimio Sanitorium. which 
is seven stories high and has only one small ground-levcl door in it - which 
is carefully obscured in the photo [A. 12. iv]. It is unarticulated and makes a 
bold architectonic statement. Other examples (cg so called "curtain walls") 
do not have this sort of expressive power. 
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inside and - ve space are essentially homomorphic, as are outside 
and + ve space, the subtle difference being that, in the "Mayan" 
case, there is a shared "zone" between the + ve and - ve space (the 
0 space) which is lacking in the original inside / outside paradigm 
[I. IJ to iv]. 
Using this notion of 0 space, it is much easier to accommodate the 
actuality of the Greek Temple in description, for the "wall" 
betwecn inside and outside is seen as being part of both yet, 
having a character of its own, being neither. 
Thus, for the Temple, the whole of the area from at least the base 
of the steps to the inside edge of the opening in the wall (at the 
back) may be taken to be a0 space, with + ve space outside and - 
ve space inside14. 
However, although this may seem, at first glance, simple and 
elegant, it is highly sophisticated, and should be seen rather as 
complex than simple. In order to discover why, it is necessary to 
turn, for a moment, to Cybernetics. 
The work of George Spencer Brown, and, following it, of Francisco 
Varela and myself, has already been mentioned both in the 
Introduction and in both the text of and a footnote to this chapter. 
It turns out to be of central relevance and significance here, for it 
14 The convention governing whether + ve space is inside or outside is 
entirely arbitrary. I am sure I have used + ve to indicate inside before now. 
But a convention must be established, and this is it. it may turn out to be an 
inversion of some actuality, but then so is the convention of electrical 
polarity! 
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is concerned with the nature of boundaries in a fundamentally 
philosophical mannerI5. I shall therefore introduce a brief 
characterisation, and a summary of the argument. 
Distinctions, Boundaries and M6bius Strips. 
Spencer Brown begins his revolutionary book the "Laws of Form" 
(1968) with the command "Draw a Distinction". He asserts that it is 
in the drawing of a distinction (making a mark) that some object 
(a value) is distinguished from all that has not that value. He 
develops, from this initial assertion, a calculus of great beauty, 
sophistication, power and terseness. 
Varela (1975) pursued this notion in terms of a re-entrant 
calculus, that is, a calculus for self-reference, a condition "essential 
to the viability and continuity of, for instance, living systems 
(Varela is a biologist, and worked with Maturana and Uribe on the 
conditions necessary for a living system to continue living, 
published as "Autopoiesis" - Varela, Maturana and Uribe (1974)). 
15 This happy co-incidence of Cybernetics and Architecture goes back a 
long way - to the roots of my interest in Cybernetics 20 years ago. I used 
notions I now find to be remarkably similar to those I present here in 
analysing the boundary (s) and connectivity (s) of a small Yorkshire town, 
Kirkbymorcside. In that analysis, I provided what was, in effect, a twisted 
taurus of sometimes intersecting, sometimes concentric boundaries. with 
communication gateways. These boundaries succeeded cachother to great 
depths, and seemed to provide a very rich description of the experience of 
"place". Ever since. boundaries have fascinated me (I have a collection of 
slides of their international variety, and give lectures on the topic), and I 
frequently use them. and conflicts between them, as a means for setting up 
projects for both students and myself. See Woolston, G, Hambury, C and 
Glanville, R (1967). 
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I noticed that there were a number of apparent flaws in Spencer 
Brown's assertion16. One such derives from the difference between 
the mark and the value. If it is the drawing of the distinction that 
differentiates, what differentiates between the mark and the 
value (which are the constituents of the distinction)? Surely, in 
Spencer Brown's terms, it is another distinction. In which case we 
have an infinite regress of distinctions. This can be resolved by 
saying that the distinction marks its own value, in which case it 
does not cleave a logical space (as Spencer Brown thought it did). 
It is as if the distinction were, metaphorically speaking, a M6bius 
strip rather than a circle. However, the problem with this is that 
then the value of the mark is a "self" value, where we have been 
hoping to obtain a value that we, as outsiders (others) can treat. 
Under these circumstances, a distinction, seen for itself, cleaves no 
space and is only itself. But seen from the point of view of an 
other (ie, us), the mark is drawn again and again within and / or 
without itself in order to create the separate value. This is the 
infinite regress of self-reference, which Varela, in one-sense, and 
both of us, in another, have shown to be logically necessary. 
16 For the full arguments see Glanville (1979). Glanville and Varela (1981), 
and the unpublished note, Glanville (unpubl. ) which I prepared as a 
condensation and summary of the joint paper with Varcla. 
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THTCK WALLS AND RTCH EDGES 
finside and Outside: + ve, 0 and - ve Space, and -the 
Thick 
wa Al 
If we consider that the wall (and roof) of a building are the 
equivalent analogy of physical embodiments of the mark of a 
distinction (thus bringing together Architecture, Cybernetics and 
Philosophy in mutual enrichment), giving rise to the value of the 
space, this infinity may be thought of in 2 ways. 
The first is, again, Spencer Brown's. He insists that, if you draw a 
particular distinction once, and then draw it again, you have still, 
in effect, only drawn the same distinction. Then, no matter how 
often a distinction is perceived and enjoyed, it remains the same 
distinction. le, we may look, and look again for as many times as 
we like, and we are drawing that distinction. Translated into 
architectural terms, by looking -at a wall and the space it makes, 
you are re-inforcing and strenghtening the character and existence 
of that wall (hot taking away its soul, as some have thought about 
photography). 
The second (and more important) is that, if you draw a distinction, 
then you must draw another one within its space, and then 
another, to create the value. (It is the continuous drawing, again 
and again, of the next distinction that continuously re-creates the 
value. ) These distinctions may be seen as layered, thus enriching, 
eg (and architecturally speaking), the wall that is the mark with 
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its own value. So not only is the wall seen as being, in itself, 
literally thick, it is enriched by having further distinctions (space, 
columns, pediment, overhang, plinth, steps) added to it - 
potentially ad infinitum, but in architectural practice, not quitel 
That is, there may be many interpretations of where the building 
begins - which gives it metaphorical thickness. 
Consider, for instance, a fairly typical Mayan section, that of the 
Governor's Palace at Uxmal in the Yucatan. Here, there is an 
opening that is indeed through a literally thick wall. On the 
"outside", there is a step, creating a threshold. There is also a very 
deep relief carving in 3 layers on the exterior surface: so deep that 
the wall can. hardly be said to have a recognisable and clearly 
definable surface. Above this carving there is a projecting eave, a 
moulded cornice. Below the threshold, there is the plinth, with 
steps rising from the ground level. It is hard to know where the 
building begins, for there are many possible interpretations of the 
0 space, and the + ve space seems to be constantly re-defined 
outwards [13. il. Perhaps the most extraordinary Mayan building of 
this -sort is to be found at Chichen Itza: a building, called the the 
Temple of a Thousand Columns (attached to the Temple of the 
Warriors), which consists only of columns, and is, in effect, just one 
great thick wall [A. S. i to iv]17. 
You may find a similar elevational treatment to the Uxmal 
Governor's Palace18, in the building at Palenque called "The Palace" 
17 It is interesting to compare this with the way that almost all beginner 
architecture students choose to draw walls, etc, as pencil thin lines, as if 
there was no substance, either physical or intellectual, to them! 
18 And generally throughout Mayan architecture. 
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[A. 3. iii to vii] (the names for Mayan buildings are products of their 
archeological discoverer's fevered imaginings), where the sectional 
arrangement is like that at Uxmal, but which is also turned round 
upon itself, forming a courtyard of the sort I referred to earlier, 
where the outside, which is outdoors, becomes - through the action 
of wrapping round - another inside [1.4. i]. On some occasions, this 
process may also happen within a building, for instance in Aalto's 
"Rautatalo" [A. 13. i and ii]. 
This notion of thickness, metaphorical as well as literal, which is 
the physical realisation of 0 space and of the continuous re- 
drawing of distinctions that I have summarised as resulting from 
the creation of boundaries, together with the ideas of + ve and - ve 
space, may be explained and compared with the traditional idea of 
inside / outside by means of diagrams. I believe the relative 
richness of the + ve, 0, - ve space idea, of the thick wall, in 
comparison to straightforward and simple inside / outside can by 
now be clearly appreciated, and I will, henceforth, take it as read. 
Therefore, I sh all turn my attentio n to the three other ideas of 
space, deriving from the Greek, to both enrich those that can be 
186 
enriched and to find a diagrammatic embodiment of each19. 
19 1 could go into a number of examples here, but will not. except by way of 
indication in this footnote. For to do so would be to undertake the research 
programme, and would certainly extend this work far beyond its intended 
scope, making at least one further Phl). Nevertheless, it is my conviction 
that the relevance and value of the means of describing space that I am 
presenting here should be obvious, and may be appreciated by anyone in 
possession of a plan and picture book of examples taken from architectural 
history. As indicative, however, consider the sculpted form and use of 
pilasters virtually omni-present in buildings of the Renaissance: the 
complex forms, whether in terms of secondary columns or carving, of the 
grand churches of the Romanesque and Gothic periods: the use and 
celebration of corridors and their various siblings such as long galleries, 
arcades, colonnades, etc. all of which are thick walls for living in (it is nice 
to contrast this idea of the corridor as provider of delight with the mean 
attitude of today, that it is wasted space): the internal courtyards and 
balustrades of industrial architecture from the last century: the tunnels 
and lighting, and the carved foliage spilling over surfaces of Art Nouveau: 
one could go on and on, giving example after example from paths through 
the landscape to coastlines, from mirror glass to mazes. The point that I 
make is that the notion of the boundary space-to-be-inhabited, and of the 
richness and multi-distinguishedncss of edges is widely used, yet we do not, 
today take cognisance of this. For further specific evidence, there is a 
series of (architectural) lectures that I give on this topic to students, 
covering boundaries, edges. corridors, axes and the drama of progression. 
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Jnwards I (Static) / Otitwards. 
This pairing concerns, as we have seen, the dynamics of the 
generation of space. It is clear, from the discussion so far, that 
Greek architecture was primarily concerned with the generation of 
space outwards from the building, rather than within it, while the 
Romans added the quality of space generated within the building 
from the enclosing surfaces, an aspect which seems to be a 
relatively minor concern for the Maya. (This contrast between 
outward and inwardly generated space provides the evidence that 
I have argued to support my claim that there is a significant 
conceptual difference between Greek and Roman architecture. ) 
But, here, too, there appears to be a quality missing, as the quality 
of the wall in itself was missing in the simple dialectic inside 
outside: the quality of stasis. In contrast to spaces which are 
focussed inwards (for instance, the Colosseum in Rome) or thrown 
outwards (as with the Greek Temples and the Egyptian Pyramids), 
there are spaces without any such generative property: static 
spaces of tranquility. One example is the Chapter House of the 
English Monastic Cathedral (I think particularly of Bristol and 
Salisbury). Another is the prison cell as originally designed to 
Bentham's specification as the "New Model Prison" (Evans(1982)), 
such as was created by Barry and Jebb at Pentonville [H. 15. i]: a 
space which was designed to be self-contained, without any 
sensory or spatial focus, devoid of sensory connection with the 
world outside the cell as it could be made. There are, naturally, 
many others: most spaces designed for reflection or contemplation 
are of this sort. 
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Are there, then, similar sorts of Mayan spaces? I am not sure, but 
I believe that most courtyards, being simultaneously both inside 
and outside spaces, belong in this category, which would make 
Palenque's Palace an example. In fact, it is remarkable hard to 
visualise what actually occurred on a Mayan site, for the buildings 
that remain, in their apparent grass surrounded and splendid 
isolation, are (as is usually the case) the grand and ceremonial 
buildings. Yet, in between them, the land was full of adobe huts 
and small chicken yards, inhabited by the ordinary citizens - and 
it is the problem of visualising this that contributes so greatly in 
making any assertion about static space difficult [1.5. i to iii]. 
Solid / (Tntermedinte) / Void 
Although the medium of architecture is space, the material which 
allows the articulation (and, hence, enjoyment) of such space is the 
solid physical material of which buildings are, in truly mutual and 
complimentary fashion, made. For any architectural space to exist, 
there must be something to define and generate it Oust as that 
something needs space within which to remain distinct). Thus, 
there is a reciprocity between solid and void in the creation of 
architectural space, a reciprocity with which we are all familiar, 
and yet which tend to forget in favour of the convenience of 
discussing only the solid (which is taken as the more tangible and 
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being, as it were, the mould, without which the space would not 
exist)20. 
20 The creation of a space may be thought of as taking place in one of two 
ways: carving out and constructing. In the first case, the conccpt is of a 
solid lump, which is carved until there is both an interior and an exterior 
that is appropriate (one thinks, mctaphorically, of Michaelangelo's 
assertion that David was in the picce of marble: all he had to do was see it). 
In the second, space is seen as the given, into which are inserted solids, 
planes and lines that create objects containing and excluding parts of this 
space - the idea made most explicit in constructional and polemical terms in 
Tatlin's tower. 
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It is clear that architecture depends on this reciprocity. Without 
solidity, space would run amok and, being undefined, would be 
undifferentiated and therefore undiscussable2l, just as, if 
everything were solid -with ou t-void, we would never be able to 
experience it. And yet, to talk only of solid and void is to be, in my 
opinion, over-simplistic, for there are architectural elements 
where the two are so inter-twinedly equal that there is no longer 
a contrast. I refer to such* inter-twining, in this context, as 
It b intermediate", but it is clearly very similar (if not identical ) to a 
thick wall [L6A to iii]. Examples of such an intermediate would 
include the "Temple of 1000 Columns" [A. 5. i to iv], and parts of 
many "heavy" buildings. For instance, spiral staircases within 
columns, and most ambulatories around the altars in Mediaeval 
Cathedrals, and that most particular of spaces that is between the 
main body of a highly articulated wall, and the major space next to 
it. 
Public / Private 
This is the equivalent in the availability of a space to 
the"forbidden fruit" concept. There have always been spaces that 
are private, that is, to which access is explicitly restricted, by 
whatever means: physical, legal, gender-based, class-based, moral, 
traditional, even spiritual. The ordinary house is an obvious and 
everyday example, and the rituals involved in entering it may be 
21 This rebuts Scruton's (1979) rather silly argument to the effect that if 
architecture is about space, why not discuss open fields: a trivialisation of 
architecture made, typically, by one who has not been educated in its 
appreciation, but rather in the philosophy of aesthetics. 
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of the greatest importance22. It is often argued that the English 
make a particular fuss of this, with front gates to front gardens, 
porches, storm halls, and special rooms only used for entertaining. 
But other examples abound: the spatial qualities of the Egyptian 
Pyramid are exactly reflected in respect of its public and private 
aspects - the outside space is intentionally public, while the inside 
is intensely private (as is the case with most Graves and Mausolea) 
[I. 7, J to iii]. Napoleon, at Les Invalides, was so intensely aware of 
this difference, and its potential, that he had the public viewing 
gallery (inside the building, overlooking his tomb) so raised that 
the public had to pay abeisance to the dead founder of the Empire 
by explicitly bowing their heads to look at the tomb. In contrast, 
Monastic Cathedrals had another interesting way of asserting the 
public and the private within the same building shell. At the altar 
side of the crossing, where the choir begins, they placed a screen 
called the "reredos", which was acoustically transparent but 
visually virtually opaque, and prevented most forms of human 
intercourse. Thus the public congregation and the monks could 
take part in the same service without "soiling" one another, for the 
monks could retain their seclusion behind the reredos, while still 
leading the service in the presence, and for the benefit of the 
public at large [1.8. i and ii]. 
Clearly, then, the idea of public and private has an enormous 
effect in architecture. But the idea, itself, has an interesting 
characteristic that is similar, in some respects, to the behaviour of 
22 See, for instance, my description of entry zones in Finnish farmhouses 
(Glanville (1970,1977)), van Schaik's (1980) description of degrees of 
privacy in southern African settlements. and, indeed Margaret Mead's 
discussion of (particularly) access to houses in New Guinea (1942). 
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the 0 space. For there are degrees of privacy: just what is public 
and just what is private is by no means absolute, both potentially 
existing along a sliding scale. Thus, in a house, some rooms are 
more public than others, even within the group of inhabitants (as 
in the English "front room"), and a "public" space, such as Trafalgar 
Square may seem quite exclusive to some either because they feel 
themselves not to be part of that public (they may be agrophobic), 
or because the space is taken over by a particular group for a 
particular event (such as the C. N. D. protest meetings). Indeed, 
some cliquish so-called "Public Houses" are most particularly 
private, and the sensitive stranger would be keenly aware of this. 
FURTHER TERMS 
If it can reasonably be claimed, as I have done above, that the 
four elementary and essential terms within which Greek 
architecture has been discussed by, for instance, Scully (1962) 
may be seen as both general in their application and may also be 
expandable rather in the way that the Mayan notion of space 
enri6ed the classification of outside (+ ve) and inside (- ve) space 
by adding 0 to give a subtler interpretation for which there is, at 
least in the case of the making of boundaries, a serious 
philosophical and logical base, it is worth asking whether any 
more such terms exist. I believe they do. They are fairly familiar 
terms which have already, by and large, been introduced into 
architectural criticism (although they are not all in general use), 
which have a similar power to describe our experience of 
architectural space to that of the four terms already introduced, 
and which can also be expressed diagrammatically. 1, therefore, 
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include them here as providing further concept-tools that are 
intended to, and I hope will enrich those which I have already 
presented as relevant to the research programme I have outlined. 
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Transp-grency / Translucency / Onacity 
The term transparency (used on its own) was given its current 
currency by Colin Rowe in a delightful article entitled 
"Transparency, Literal and Phenomenal" (1976). The point Rowe 
was making was that, while we can consider transparency in the 
literal sense of being able to see through things (albeit that how 
we see through - the quality of the literal transparency - may be 
very varied, ranging from plain glass windows or even open holes 
to layers of screens, glass blocks (as in Chareau and Bijvoet's 
"Maison Dalsace", also known as the "Maison de Verre" (1927 - 
32), one of the buildings that was most influential in inspiring 
Rowe's article), there is another sense of transparent - the 
transparency of statement, meaning, even interpretation [1.9A to 
v]. So, as has been observed, the reredos of the Cathedral is at once 
visually (virtually) opaque, yet acoustically completely 
transparent. 
Thus, to return again for an example to Aalto's Sanitoriurn at 
Paimio, the building is transparent insofar as it is a matter of 
relative ease, particularly when the programme of the "Modern (or 
International) Movement" is known, to interpret the type of space 
that the elevations enclose - the phenomenal transparency of the 
building. Therefore, it may taken as being obvious, in, for instance, 
the elevation to the right hand side of the main entrance, that 
what is behind the long strip windows should be a series of long 
strip spaces (it is, in fact, a stack of corridors) [A. 12. ii], while the 
other side of the same wing, made up of identical cellular windows 
indicates a series of cells: the patients' rooms [A. 12. iiij. 
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These parallel meanings of the term "transparency" delightfully 
echo the two interpretations in + ve, 0 and - ve space, of literal 
and metaphorical thickness. Nor does the similarity cease there: 
for transparency in the literal sense, has an intermediate state 
between itself and its converse (opacity), which is open to myriad 
interpretations - as is the nature and extent of the thick wall, or 0 
space. This may be thought of as translucence (to use a term from 
lighting), which exists, in a variety of ways, in the middle ground. 
Space and Anti-Space 
These terms were introduced by Peterson (1980) in an article of 
the same name. In some ways, Peterson is handling concepts that 
are closely related to several of those already put forward here, 
although his approach and concerns have different origins and 
foci: for instance, he is largely concerned with inwardly generated 
space, and, I suspect, considers the outwardly generated as at least 
inferior, and possibly not really space at a1123. Where he 
contributes something that has not yet been introduced into the 
scheme already presented here is in his notion of the leakage of 
space - and hence its loss of identity as space - when it is not 
adequately defined: that is, space looses its identity as the vessels 
that contain it begin to lack coherence, rather as wine seeps out of 
the cracked or badly corked bottle -a type of mutuality. 
23 If I am right about this, he is thinking in much the way I was before I 
enquired from my friends about Greek Tcmples. 
196 
It is probably easiest to present this concept of leakage and its 
root in lack of definedness, by reference to open urban spaces. 
(Although Peterson discusses buildings and, particularly, their 
interiors, at length in his article, he does not use those examples to 
present the idea of leakage. [1.10. i and ii]) A fine example of an 
urban space that does not leak can be found in Bedford Square, 
London24 [1.113]. Here, the uniformity of the buildings around the 
square, and the tight planning of the corners so that even a major 
road running through the square does not disturb its identity, 
create a cohesive and tightly defined square with a sense of 
identity and enclosure: it certainly does not leak. By way of 
contrast, Sallyport25' in Old Portsmouth, is so weak on one side, 
and so lacking definition at what should be the corners, that unless 
in the vicinity of the Round Tower, or facing and close to the wall 
by the sea, it has almost no presence or definition, and the space is 
without character or distinction, just leaking away 
There is, however, one rider that should be pointed out concerning 
the notion of leakage: this is that leaky containers do not contain, 
and are, hence, contradictions of themselves. The existence of this 
paradox may explain why we seem to find leaky spaces 
24 The location of the Architectural Association. Appendix L is a catalogue 
for an exhibition of one of the design projects I set, based on the "Controlled 
Viewing" technique, that was based in Bedford Square. The background 
photos and the plan are of that square. 
25 In my opinion, one of the potentially most delightful urban spaces, 
which is, at the moment, a lost opportunity. There is, however, now a 
chance for it, as the weak side has been virtually completely demolished 
(winter 1987-8) and is not yet built on. It will be used as a site in terms of 
which to explore the ideas presented in this chapter. during the academic 
year 1988-9. 
197 
unsatisfactory: our brains recognising the paradox, and thus 
causing us unease26. 
Connectivity 
Another aspect of space (particularly internal space) is its 
connection to (and with) other spaces. There are basically two 
complimentary sides to this: the nature of the connection between 
spaces, and the nature of their division. 
Connection / Separation 
Connection implies also separation. In the extreme, connection 
breaks down and separation is complete. (This is equally true in 
reverse: in the extreme, separation breaks down and there is 
connection, becoming, in this extreme, continuity without 
distinction (Spencer Brown's "perfect continence"). ) The extreme of 
connectivity occurs when many activities take place 
simultaneously in an open space. While we often come across this 
situation in open places (urban spaces, parks, etc), it may happen, 
also, within a building, as with Norman Foster's Sainsbury Centre 
at the University of East Anglia, a gigantic "hanger" with no 
articulated divisions of its own. Conceptually closest to this, but 
having some articulation of divisions, is the arrangement of a 
"chain" of spaces connected along some common route, rather as 
26 This paradox must not be confused with ambiguity, where spaces mayt 
for instance, be understood as being inside or outside, or part of more than 
one other space. Such ambiguity gives much of the power that we 
appreciate and rind more than satisfactory in Mics van der Rohe's famous 
Barcelona Pavilion. 
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shops occur along streets. The next step towards separation is 
where the connection is to some extent impeded or broken, either 
by a temporary (and moveable) barrier, or by a barrier to direct 
access. This is the role that a door fulfils: to separate, yet connect 
two spaces. Finally, before total separation, there is inferred 
connection. This is most often achieved by such compositional 
devices as the setting up of axes. Many an urban landmark works 
in this manner - as Lynch(1960) has rightly pointed out - and 
such devices can have enormous power, creating a sense of 
connection even when there appears to be a barrier in the way, as, 
for instance, in the case of the drive and gateway at Stowe House, 
where there is a driving sense of connection, which, it becomes 
revealed, is hindered by a lake that exists in- a dip between the 
gateway and the House [A. 9. i, H. 11A, 1.12A to iv]. 
Division 
Related to connection and separation is the notion of Division. Just 
how spaces are divided from each other is a matter of some 
importance in achieving the type of -connectivity desired. Division 
occupies a scale from total division to total lack of division, a scale 
very similar to that occupied by Connection / Separation. But what 
is of interest here is the stages between. There appear to be 3 of 
these. The first is explicit division, where 2 spaces are clearly and 
articulately divided from eachother. I do not, here, refer to 
impeded connection, as introduced above, so much as to the type 
of division that may be found so often in the English terrace house, 
where two rooms are separated by a type of frame with doors that 
fold away. In contrast to this is the division of the thick wall, 
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where the frame is no longer solid, yet is still quite explicit, as 
may be found in the Hermitage's "Colonnade Room" [A. ll. i to iii]. 
Finally, there is the implicit division that is just hinted at [1.13. i to 
V]. 
Scale and Si7e 
Scale and Size are two concepts that have been used in 
architectural criticism, probably since before it even formally 
began, and which are so closely related that it is sometimes hard 
to clearly differentiate between them. The difference can probably 
best be explained by reference to the relative and the absolute. 
Size is absolute: a space (and the building(s) associated with it) 
may either be big, or small, or somewhere in between. However, 
although size is (relatively! ) absolute, what consititutes big and 
small depends to some degree upon function. Thus, what may 
constitute the space of a small urban square would be almost 
inconceivably large as a bedroom, just as a small palace will be 
much bigger than a big house. In contrast, scale is definitely 
relative, and refers to the existence of a space in the context of its 
function, and of other spaces around it. A tower block or 
skyscraper will seem "out of scale" in a rural village, while being 
entirely "in scale" in Manhattan, where a cottage would be of quite 
inappropriate scale. To use an analogy from computing, size is 
absolute in a way similar to the way a digitizer has absolute co- 
ordinates (although both the actual size of the digitizer and its 
resolution may vary according to its function), while scale is 
relative in a way similar to the way a mouse has relative co- 
ordinates. V 
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Thus to talk of space in terms of size is to talk in absolute terms 
(in relation to some function), while to talk of space in terms of 
0 scale is to talk of relative size: relative to the context of the 
surrounding spaces. 
Proportion 
Closely allied to the notions of Size and Scale is that of Proportion, 
a concept that surely hardly needs any introduction. Proportion, in 
architecture, refers to the ratio (produced by division) of the size 
of various elements, for instance, the height to width to depth 
proportions of a space (and its generating solid). Proportion, and 
what constitute "proper" proportional ratios, have been at the 
forefront of architectural criticism for as long as size and scale, just 
as they have also been dominant in discussion of other arts, 
particularly painting, sculpture and music. Indeed, Plato, who 
perhaps originated the discussion in a formal sense, can appear to 
be totally dominated, in much of his thinking, by the idea of 
proportion, and related concepts such as perfection. However, I do 
not wish here to join the arguments for and against various 
proportional systems, merely to note that proportional ratios are 
of significance in discussing the experience of architectural space, 
even if the mathematical precision of proportional systems may be 
a rather over-exact way of expressing that a space feels "tall and 
narrow", for instance [1.14A to iv]. 
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Modelline 
The final concept that I wish to introduce, here, is the concept of 
the modelling of space. It is true that, in terms of light, most 
modelling is done on the building fabric, for we appreciate light 
when it has some material substance to illuminate. The light we 
see in space is either failing upon us, or becomes apparent by 
illuminating the dust particles suspended in the air. However, with 
sound27, for instance, the story is quite different. In any large 
building, one way the space is articulated is through the 
occurrence of standing waves (the effect I was referring to when I 
said that my memory of Strasbourg Cathedral was acoustic), which 
produces an effect similar to the "wah-wah" effect (increase and 
decrease in intensity of harmonics) when the space of the building 
is traversed. It is also articulated by reverberation and echo: the 
effects of sound being reflected within the space, giving it its 
acoustic life. In the case of sound, it can truly be said that it 
moulds, models and articulates the space28 in a manner that 
combines the characteristics of both solid and void. 
SUMMARY 
Thus far, I have introduced and elaborated upon the four terms 
that have been used in the explanation of space as used in Greek 
27 For the purposes of architectural analysis, sound may be thought of as 
slow light. Light waves create similar interference patterns to sound waves, 
but our senses do not distinguish them as they do in the case of sound. 
28 For an example of an account using both subjectively and objectively 
measured descriptions of the acoustic experience of space, see the rcport of 
a survey carried out on Southwark Cathedral by first year students at the 
Architectural Association School (Gillieron and Glanville (1975)). 
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architecture, and modified them, so that they are, I believe, richer 
in content, by introducing to them ideas that essentially concern 
the quality of distinction and differentiation, thus, on occasion, 
accommodating certain philosophical points (in effect, a logical 
non-excluded middle), which derive, initially, from my experience 
of Mayan architecture, and what I have referred to as its thick 
walls, or 0 spaces. These were characterised as + ve, 0 and - ve 
space (where 0 is also referred to as a thick wall, and + ve and - ve 
are outside and inside respectively); inward / (static) / outward; 
solid / (intermediate) / void; and public / private. 
In fact, it is -the + ve, 0 and - ve space that is the real innovation 
here, which inspired the other modifications, and is the means 
which gives me both the most powerful single way of describing 
my spatial experiences in a way that students have found to be a 
particularly strong way to generate an architecture of richness and 
interest. 
I have also introduced and elaborated upon 6 other terms that are 
of use in describing experiences of architectural space: 
transparency / translucency / opacity (due to Rowe); space and 
anti-space (due to Peterson); connectivity (connection / separation, 
division); size and scale; proportion; and modelling. 
I have illustrated the terms by reference to buildings in relation to 
which these various terms might be used, as well as by verbal 
description and by a collection of diagrams. 
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I have not, however, carried out an extensive analysis of any 
individual buildings, for the reasons already given, viz that my 
essential purpose, here, is to outline the beginning of a new and 
massive research programme, the need for which has resulted 
from the discoveries, including the failures, -of the earlier 
experiments I have already described, relying upon m_y 
experience and understandings (which I had, in effect, excluded 
from the experiments). Nor is it my intention to begin such a task 
here, although I indicate some of its features, requirements and 
possible outcomes and uses in the next (and final) chapter, where 
I also discuss certain features of a more abstract, general and 
performative nature that I believe emerge from (are inherent in) 
what I have presented in this chapter. 
However, I would feel that I might reasonably be accused of 
cheating if I did not indicate, at least, how some of these terms 
might be used in an analysis of (my) experience of some 
architectural space. This I will do by taking a short, analytical look 
at perhaps the most original and idiosyncratic building ever 
produced in the United Kingdom, the home of Sir John Soane, 
architect, surveyor to the City of London. 
SIR JOHN SOANE'S MUSEUM 
Sir John Soane's Museum, in Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, was the 
architect's private residence, left to the Nation as an Architecture 
Museum by the architect upon his death in 1833. 
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It is, by any standards, a remarkable building, although it is 
beyond the scope of this work to consider it in tot029. 
0 1 shall concern myself virtually exclusively with the library, and 
(to a lesser extent) the dining room, that form the front section of 
the ground floor of the central house (no 13) of the 3 houses that 
Soane eventually occupied. 
These 2 rooms, the library at the front overlooking Lincoln's Inn 
Fields, the dining room behind it looking (like Soane's beloved 
breakfast room [A. 10. v] next to it) into the central courtyard, are 
connected and almost continuous. Their division is implied by a 
small, partially transparent, protruding nib of wall and an 
articulated, curved downstand from the ceiling that exists between 
the two, otherwise continuous spaces. This division is further 
emphasised by the quality of the natural light which, coming from 
the Fields (which are to the south), illuminates the library through 
the front windows, with the dividing downstand helping to make 
the dining room relatively darker [A. 10. i to iii]. These two front 
windows are placed within a (both literally and metaphorically)- 
thick wall, which serves an an intermediate zone between the 
interior and exterior of the house, and which is defined in a 
multiplicity of ways: the window itself in the fabric of the brick 
wall, inside which there is a narrow passageway (as is also to be 
found in the drawing room, directly above on the Ist floor 
29 For an interesting and in depth analysis of the building, see van Schaik 
(1985). For a historical account see Summcrson (1986) (7th revised edition 
of the 1955 original). For a fine collection of Soane's drawings of the 
building, to gether with some photographs, see the book "John Soane" 
(cditcd by David Dunster) in the Architectural Monographs Series. 
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[A. 10. iv]) which runs through between the windows, inside which 
is another thick wall defined on either side by pilasters and 
double-skinned archeS30. 
The walls of both rooms are also "thick", exploiting several layers 
within the so-called "tartan grid" that van Schaik (1985) shows 
Soane to have used extensively, both in his own house and 
elsewhere, as a basic organisational device [1.15. i and ii]. Taking 
the library as the example, the side walls are made up in several 
layers. The most internal layer of the wall is formed into a semi- 
circular arch surrounding, at each end, a flattened arch. Within the 
space made by these arches and the back of tile wall space, there 
are recessed bookshelves, filled with books, with a large mirror in 
the centre. These do not, however, rise up to the springing points 
of the arches, but stop short, leaving a recess above them, which is 
partially filled with further mirrors. Here, the space is generated 
both inwards (the reflection shining back at you) and outwards, 
with the further recession of the thick wall's space, creating a 
boundary to the room that truly exists in its own right and with its 
own character (A. 10. i to iii], and which, thro-tigh the open space 
ambiguity left just below the plane of the ceiling, also creates a 
rich thickness in the ceiling. Thus did Soane create a pair of spaces 
of great richness ýand beauty), for which several of the terms that 
30 The window was not originally on the outcr skin, but was on the inside, 
with the edge area being an exterior verandah on both this floor, and the 
floor above (the south drawing room). It should also be noted that the 
colours in the building are in the process of restoration to those originally 
used by Soanc. The modifications to the colouring that had continued since 
his death had radically changed the building, but it is the modifications that 
are usually referred to and illustrated. In contrast, the originals, as they are 
being replaced, are truly shocking. and a real eye-opener to those who had 
become accustomed to the old replacements. 
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I have isolated above provide means of description of the 
experience 1, at least, have of these spaces that seems appropriate 
to me. 
CONCLUSION 
As I have indicated, this is only a beginning. It may seem a little 
strange to finish the main explorative work of a thesis with a 
beginning, and to end that beginning with a conclusion. What I 
have attempted to cover in this last chapter should be seen as an 
attempt to outline the start of the development of a diagrammatic 
and verbal language in which to describe experiences of 
architectural space, together with, in some cases, some explanation 
of how the terms came about and a justification and elaboration of 
the meaning of these terms, together with some examples. It 
should not, however, be seen as an attempt to explore them much 
further than this. Nor should it be forgotten that what has been 
presented here has been presented as very personal, an account 
and extension of a personal revelation3l, and as a way that I can 
see of going forward in-a research programme: it is not presented 
as a truth, let alone THE TRUTH. 
However, some questions do arise, and remain to help form the 
next steps in the research programme. They are: 
31 As personal as Saul's: but without, it is my hope and sincere intention, 
the insistent self- ri ghtcousncss of the reformed. who believes his truth is 
the only truth, and assertively proselytiscs those who do not, cannot, or do 
not wish to agree. 
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Does it work: can the terms be used for a meaningful 
analysis of a large range of architectural spaces? 
Can the diagrams and verbal descriptions interact as a 
language for discussion and communication of experiences 
between people? 
Can they be developed in range and scope, and can their use 
together lead to the generation and expression of new thoughts - 
both about architecture, and as expressed in its making? 
My work on this has only just begun. Only now have I refined my 
understandings so that they might constitute a research 
programme. Only now have I managed to develop a description, 
justification and codification of some of my concepts of 
architectural space, so that I can begin to explore and develop. 
Only now have Ia few words of vocabulary, so to speak (my 
terms, and their verbal and diagrammatic expressions), with 
which to begin to try to speak. Only now, in the final chapter, can 
begin to grasp and sketch out the consequences of these 
understandings. The process has been tortuous, but I have learnt. 
The process will be tortuous, but I will learn. 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
chapter 11 
LEARNING: A SHORT HTSTORY OF THE 
FUTURE. 
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CHAPTER 11 
Learning: a Short History or the Tuture 
"Spatial experience is outside the door and inside the head. My 
wish is to make human space in space. " (Anthony Gormley (1985)) 
PREAMBLE 
Nothing is. ever quite as simple or straightforward as the dramatic 
account would lead us to believe: indeed, that is a significant part 
of the role of drama in our lives. The Research Programme to 
which I have referred is not so simply and striaghtforwardly 
unformed and virginally nascient as I have indicated - any more 
than any of the positions, questions and experimental tests that I 
have described have been. Therefore, I include this final chapter 
which, while almost appearing as an aside, is in truth an indication 
of what has already been learnt, what is to be learnt in the 
immediate future, what may be learnt eventually (for I have not 
been able to learn to give up this optimism, in spite of everything), 
and how what may be learnt may be evaluated and used, thus 
generalising further lessons. So this is a_veritable history of the 
future. 
Aspirations: something old, -something new 
It is salutory, on reaching the apparent end of (as well as during) 
the course of a piece of work, particularly one as extended, and, on 
occasion, apparently directionless as this, to return to reflect upon 
and consider the original aims. In this case, I find the experience 
more than salutory: I find it extra-ordinary. For what I set out to 
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do in the very beginning, and what I so singularly failed to do, 
directly, with success (apart from my personal learning, and that 
of those students who participated, together with associated spin- 
offs) during the course of my "peregrinations", was to find a 
language in terms of which to describe and discuss, socially, 
understandings of individual perceptions of architectural space. It 
appeared I had failed to do so, and, in consequence, I certainly 
despaired, ' often even loosing track of my intentions. 
Yet, in the preceeding chapter, I discover I have, in a sense, found 
something that begins to resemble this, that is, to achieve the aims 
of making a language for social use, albeit by means very different 
to those originally considered. -So that, in spite - or, perhaps, even, 
because - of all the failures, it seems that the hoped for aims are, 
possibly, finally beginning to be achieved. 
It thus becomes necessary for me to return to the notions of 
language and of learning, to clarify my more developed attitude to 
both, and to explain how I see the work presented in ChapterlO as 
the beginning of a Rdsearch Programme proceeding, being tested 
and evaluated; and proving its value, as well as introducing at 
least some of the facets that may influence and form the Research 
Programme, daring to go beyond the perhaps rather coy 
presention I have already made. 
LANGUAGE 
The original notion of language (or, more properly, "language") 
with which I was initially concerned was, as I have indicated, at 
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once very naive, and rather sophisticated. Its naivetie was 
contained in the notion that a language could be the sum of a 
collection of the terms of which it was constituted. It was these 
terms that we attempted to isolate (using PCT) in the experimental 
events described in chapter 5. In contrast, its strength and 
sophistication came from the assumption that meaning us 
established by interaction between participants, ie, 
conversationally (see Thomas and Harri-Augstein (1985) and Pask 
((1976a), (1987)), in contrast to the rather more "wired into the 
brain" notion of language proposed by, for instance, Chomsky 
((1957), (1968)), thus satisfying, for instance, the conditions 
proposed by Maslow ((1954), (1959)) and others for a "creative 
encounter". - 
The intention behind this search for terms was to be able to 
describe, in a communicable way, architectural experiences. This 
is, of course, a quite reasonable facility for a language to be 
assumed to have, and it allows two kinds of interaction: the 
communicable- assertion of potentially equally valid experiences 
within a peer group (such as a group of students or a group of 
practising architects); and teaching (by, for instance, the 
clarification of the student's ideas by the teacher, and the explicit 
encouragement of the student to develop concepts and experiences 
- naturally, in the light of either the student's or the teacher's 
world view). Both were the kindling intentions, and neither were 
achieved before the insights leading to the work described in 
chapter 101. 
I Assuming that they are achieved, at least to some extent. there. 
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However, a language is more than just a collection of terms, be the 
terms verbal, diagrammatic or both. For this reason, I feel it 
necessary to highlight my attitude to language here. 
Language is a cultural artefact, and, especially important in this 
context, it is constituted in the continuing developing and enacting 
of a set of relationships: between (that which is) the described and 
the described; the described and the describing; the describing and 
the describing; (and, completing the circle) the describing and the 
described. And those who participate, also circularly, in this 
(essentially, even necessarily, social) activity. 
Such a phenomenon is, of course, seen in terms of the social (actor) 
actions involved, multi-levelled, as well as circular: the 
development of described / describing is circular, but only 
because there are levels of social action that engender and affect 
their interaction, within a culture, just as linguistic action is also, 
formally, circular (Pask's conversations, of course (Pask (1973))). 
And, anyhow, such circularities consitiute potentially, a myriad of 
other circularities (Glanville (1982)). Thus, the idea of a language 
existing, in any fixed and final form, and without these levels of 
recursion, is not to be contemplated. So that, when I discuss, here, 
my ambition to create a language, it should not be understood that 
I intended something monolithic, all on one level, constituted of 
isolated items that lack relationships (linguistic, social and 
cultural) - even if the initial attempts (floating the terms of 
Chapter 10) may seem to be that flat and isolated. 
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It follows, therefore, that I cannot claim (nor do I see) what I have 
presented as being a language, any more than the set of terms I 
was seeking in Chapter 5, and which I naively referred to as a 
language, is. But it is, I believe, a beginning, in the way that it is 
sometimes assumed that our ancestoral apes ostensively created a 
connection between sounds and items by uttering and pointing at 
the same time, thus allowing them communication by the building 
of Saussurian relationships (de Saussure (1966)). If they can be 
used to help build relationships, socially, in ostensive pre- 
languiage, and between them, thus enriching all, it is possible that 
a genuine language, as opposed to a set of -terms, may evolve. 
It is also the case that the development of a language not only 
makes it possible "to speak about", but also to look at the various 
"speaking abouts" in order to assess them. 
LEARNING 
Since I carried out this work through the Centre for the Study of 
Human Learning at Brunel University, it is appropriately 
incumbent upon me to discuss whatever learning has so far 
originated in this work, and its immediate use in helping further 
learning in the short term future. But, anyhow, I would want to do 
this, since I am a teacher and, as I have said, I believe a teacher 
must be, above all, the supreme learner - maybe even more than 
the student. 
This document stands as an indicator, a symbol, for one piece of 
learning: for it traces, albeit in hindsight, my progress through an 
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extensive and extended learning process - as I have indicated 
throughout: hence the personal, first-person presentation of MY. 
experiences. In this respect, the whole experience has been a 
learning process. But, then, it seems to me almost impossible to do 
anything without learning - even if failing,, for recognising failure 
is, itself, a form of learning. However, the more appropriate 
question, here, is whether there is anything of value in the study 
and improvement of learning beyond that embodied in this 
document as my own experience, and, possibly, communicated to a 
reader who learns something, himself. 
The answer is a tentative yes. As I have noted, the notions of the 
"thick wall" and of +ve 0 and -ve space have, in particular, been 
found useful by both students and colleagues at Portsmouth 
Polytechnic, where discussion is often based around these terms, 
and where many students have taken to attempting to explicitly 
build such concepts into their designs. I believe this will continue 
and grow in strength and influence. 
So that now that I have evolved a rather richer set of terms, I 
shall aim to introduce them to colleagues and students, to see 
whether they, alone or with other terms that may come from their 
active involvement or be imported directly from elsewhere, also 
become part of our architectural description currency. Indeed (see 
Research Programme below), one particular effort will involve the 
extensiýe use of the terms in both analytical and design work over 
the course of a6 month period, thus providing for both evaluation 
and expansion. 
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Finally, and on a dirrerent plane, it should be remembered that, 
for any form of assessment of learning, language is necessary. I 
am not making the argument that being able to describe 
something makes it easier to learn about that something (although 
I believe this is true, if perhaps undemonstratable), but rather 
that without a common means of communication for discussion 
ABOUT some area of concern, it is impossible to make critical 
judgements and evaluations (of, for instance, progress). In order 
for learning to be studied, it is necessary to have some means (a 
language) through which communication can take place, an a priori 
for evaluation and criticism. And, in order for that evaluation and 
criticism to be meaningful, there must be a common language for 
disputation to take place through. In this sense, language is an 
action enabler: noone would know whether 1, for instance, had 
learnt anything in the studies repOTted here, unless I had acted to 
express, through some mutually comprehensible medium, what I 
have done. 
Thus, the development of the terms indicates learning by me, and 
has made possible learning by my studentS2 and colleagues, and 
has made it possible to discuss that learning. 
THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: first steps 
If this were a grant proposal, it would be necessary to define quite 
explicitly what work would be undertaken to achieve some 
explicit, pre-stated and defined objectives, and what the 
2 Including. I trust, those who took part in the experiments and projects 
from which those presented in Chapters 5,6 and 7 arc selected. 
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anticipated results would be. I believe this is an awful way of 
structuring "pure" (particularly as opposed to "applied") research, 
because it is deterministic rather than designerly (Glanville 
(1981), (1984)). It is, however, in this case, both inappropriate and 
impossible. Research is necessarily both interactive and generative 
(de Zeeuw(1986), (1988)), and to think of it otherwise is to do 
both it and those who undertake it a grand disservice. 
Imagine sitting down in order to create "English" from scratch. The 
result would probably be like Esperanto: an andequate 
interpersonal code, but a slave language, as opposed to one that 
opens up opportunities - that has, as we say, a life of its own. 
"English" came about , at least in part, through an open and shared 
development, and there is no doubt that any language not only 
allows us to utter, but also promotes certain utterances over 
others - ie, it limits us. That is the trade off, the price of 
expression: action resuces potential freedom. 
It is the same with this Research Programme. It will involve many 
people, with the same common concerns mentioned, and with their 
own interests and influences, who may participate in the 
development of a language (including personal and group dialects), 
where the language will not only facilitate certain communications, 
but also necessarily act in limiting that which can be said. It is the 
desired nature of the beast, and is why I decline to define and 
schedule the Programme. It is not Popperian (1963), Kuhnian 
(1970), it is not Ackermannic (1961) nor is it even Lakatosian 
(1970). It is, itself, a design project: a massive one, shared 
between many, that intends producing a social artefact, if it is 
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anything at all - and that will be, to a large extent, the appropriate 
measure of its success. 
However, there are a number of initial stepping off points. And 
those that I can foresee, I will introduce below. 
I have already mentioned the use of some of the terms that I have 
developed by students and staff at Portsmouth Polytechnic School 
of Architecture. Over the next couple of years, it will be possible, 
through my teaching programme, to examine the full contents of 
Chapter 10, to test their usefulness, and to edit and expand them, 
according to the requirements of a select group of both students 
and staff , so that they become richer and more applicable. 
Other 
ways of discussing space may also be incorporated, deriving from 
the experiences of my contributing others: and the relationships 
between the various terms and groups of terms, and the quality of 
experience will also be developed. This will be done in both the 
analysis of existing architectural spaces, and through the designing 
of new ones (for which a spatial explication in the growing 
language may be expected)3 . If this work produces agreement 
and enjoyment, and the students seem to improve in their design 
abilities and their ability to discuss their designs cogently, it must 
be judged, by any standards, a success. 
3 This work falls short of the aim to make such a language generally 
available for social action, unless the students, for instance. arc considered 
to be what might be called "clients" in a more social environment. In part. 
this is because education is normally thought of as taking place away from 
the distractions of the "real world". I do not wich to argue the pros and cons 
of that view here, but it would be nice to be able to involve non-studcnts in 
the Programme. 
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At the same time, we will attempt to produce a series of both 
verbal and diagramatic terms and relationships using the Apple 
Hypercard program, to make our discoveries more generally 
available, and to allow a wider debate both within and without the 
School. The creation of this resource, and the monitoring of its use 
and modification will, I trust, indicate both some features of its 
usefulness, and how the "language" grows in interaction. 
Eventually, it is hoped, this might become a more public device, 
allowing a wider public to begin to interact, thus further 
increasing the range of the language, and making the concept of 
self-help and an archite ctural actor language more viable (de 
Zeeuw (1986), (1988)). Maybe we will yet achieve "Firmnesse, 
Commodotie and Delight". (This is a partial answer to the 
shortcoming pointed out in footnote 3. ) 
The results of, these initial steps may, it is hoped, lead to the 
development of a usable and enriched language (as opposed to a 
set of terms) that will make it easier for the client (student, 
architect, architect's client) to express and evaluate both needs 
and experiences, and to learn from their own actions, perhaps, 
eventually, without even the initial aid of an expert. It will also 
make possible the Architectural History of Space that Zevi (1974) 
asserts is yet to be written. 
After this, what? 
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VALIDITY 
A Research Programme is usually expected to demonstrate the 
validity of its findings by some agreed test procedure that will 
generate a repeatable result. Such a sensible scientific criterion is, 
however, neither helpful nor relevant in this case, for the whole 
purpose of the work is interaction and change, and to interact so 
as to produce change, rather than the production of some fixed 
and repeatable entity: by definition, learning can never do that, 
unless it is considered not as an experience but as an (empty) 
token. 
Should an agreement (in Pask's (1976a), (1980) sense) be - 
achieved by a user group of this language, that will be regarded 
(as I have said) as a success. But there are criteria other than such 
an agreement. They include the central idea of generosity - ie, if 
what is produced aids people without taking away from them, it is 
judged a success. They include usefulness, not in the overriding 
sense of the dominance of the pragmatic, but in the sense that 
there is nothing wrong with being useful (in whatever way). They 
include the more classical idea that is perhaps akin to Occamis 
Razor: that if less explains more, or something becomes richer than 
it was in its application, it is deemed to be better. But most of all, 
the criteria are those that provide the foundation for (and are yet 
being developed in) the Research Programme "Support, Survival, 
Culture", being undertaken at the University of Amsterdam. These 
include the concpet aims of growing self-help, expert mystique 
removal, and failure prediction such that it is also remediable. 
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That mammoth Research Programme, however, is another story, 
not to be told here4. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a sampler, nothing more: I have argued that it cannot be. It 
is a future hope, the beginning of a wandering that will, some 
time, end somewhere (Glanville (1978b), (1980a)). It is a hint of a 
possible way forward, but it is not what this document was about. 
That was like an alchemist's search for the mythical philosopher's 
stone. But, just as all the good of early chemistry came out of the 
alchemist's continuously failing search, so, perhaps, something has 
already come out of my failures. As far as I-am concerned at this 
moment, and in this text, if the text has communicated to you it 
has, to some degree, worked: it is, to some degree, useful: and it 
has, to some degree, supported self-organised learning. What more 
could be wanted? 
For a summary. see de Zceuw (1986). 
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WRODUCTORY NOTE 
The illustrations to the Thesis "Architecture and Space for 
Thought" are presented in this Volume. They have been separated 
from the main text so that the appropriate illustration may be 
viewed with the appropriate text, regardless of the availability of 
space on the page by the text, or the illustration having already 
appeared earlier in the text. 
However, they are not arranged, as might be expected, in the 
order in which they are cited in the main text (Volume 1). This is, 
in part, a response to the citing of illustrations more than once, but 
is mainly designed to create a coherence in the illustrations 
themselves, so that, for instance, all the various views of Paimio 
Sanitorium appear together, rather than being interspersed with 
the other illustrations that would appear between the various 
views were it possible to follow the text sequence - thus giving a 
better overview of the building. 
I should like, also, to add a note about the quality of the 
illustrations. Several of these exist only in old dia-positives of 
what were, in the first palce, very delicate and soft drawings. The 
processes of reproduction, here, have involved making negatives, 
printing (photographically) and then photocopying the prints. The 
result is that some illustrations are several removes from the 
originals: indeed, in the simple case of the original slides of mine, 
the minimum copy trail finvolves the slides being copied to 
negative, photographically printed, and then photocopied. What is 
remarkable, under these circumstances, is that there is any 
discernible image at all! So I ask for indulgence in the case of 
images that are not as clear as you or I might wish. 
It is hoped that, nevertheless, this unusual arrangement will prove 
to facilitate the reader's access to and enjoyment of the Thesis. 
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A. 141 Invisible Non-Physical 
Border, Watch Tower on Finno-Soviet 
Border (Also Known as the Iron Curtain) 
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SECTION B 
Blindfold Surveys 
B. II The London Film SChool, 
Central Editing Hall 
yy 
1 ý2 
ný 
IV Disapearing Ginget, ly aL tlie End of a Blindfold 
Týie blind the blind? C, 
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L--- I 
qC%p" I 
II 
En *. 
M-OWIRL 
VIC-- 
B. 2. i Blindfold Survey: Drawing of Disco, Bedford Hotel 
0 
B. 2 li Blindfold Survey: Another Drawing of Disco, Bedford Hotel 
, efoco 
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B-3-i Blindfold Survey, Tactics: 
Imaginary Grid with Walls overlaid 
B-3-ii Blindfold Survey, Tactics: 
Incomprehensible Private Device 
B-3jii Blindfold Survoy, Tactics: 
Balloon Being Blown up to Fill Space 
B. 3iv Blindfold Survey, Tactics: 
Forming Corners from Ill-defined Cloud 
B-3-v Blindfold Survey, Tactics: 
Bending the Straight Line Round 
Comm Polk (4LN" ftmk 
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SECTION C 
Cons-tructs 
36 
C. 11 Construct Ranking Line 
A 
I 1- 
C. I. h Construct Ranking Line: Poles Established 
A 
9 C, 
ubE. F. 4H1 
C. Hii Construct Ranking Lino: Fully Laid Out 
37 
C. 2. ii Group Construing: 
Setting out the Original 
Construct Poles 
Group Construing: Beginning 
38 
39 
Q. ý C-31 Creating Construct Heterarchios: 
An Original, Empty Circle 
"0 '. L1 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
/ 
.. --. 
C-3-ii Creating Construct Heterarchies: 
Beginning to Fill in the Circle 
C-3-ift Creating Construct Heterarchies: 
A Completed Form 
--ý o r- 
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(i) 
so" Lo ii- 
C. 4. i Creating Construct Heterarchies: Base Line and Base Elements 
(ii ) L, 
%. 
LO 
C. 41 Creating Construct Heterarchies: Setting up the First Level 
Gii) Lz 
Li 
LO 
CAM 
L3 
L2 
LI 
Lo 
Creating Construct Heterarchies: The Second Level, with a 
Double Bind 
C. 4. iv Creating Construct Heterarchies: Using the Double Bind to 
Create Another Level 
3 
z 
-to 
CAV Creating Construct Heterarchies: The Final Heterarchy 
devived. from the Completed Form in C. 3iii 
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C. 51 Student Construct Heter archies: Too Many Goals (People) to 
be Satisfied 
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C-51i Student Construct Heterarchies: Gets Lost in the Middle of a 
Task 
(iii) 
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C-5-iff Student Construct Heterarchies: No Matter where You Start 
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SECTION D 
Desian Research 
4.3 
V% 
1). 11 Braun Electrical Fan Heater: This One Caught Fire I 
44 
Decision to plan 
Description of Formulation of 
existing system plan goals 
Spatial Projection II Operational 
Mooel of of existing F objectives 
system system I 
Derivation of alternative Factors or 
spatial models of the variables 
future system II 
Facto 
Selection of Evaluation of 
optimum projected models 
interaction 
model II against goals 
-4 
matrix 
Requirements Linear graph or net 
as factor 
representing the diagram 
structure of the problem 
Graphical synthesis 
J_T 
Design 
lot in lattice order ttice 
Projected optimum Evaluation 
spatial sy3tern 
and 
II 
feed back 
Hand adjustment I 
of output 
I 
Compu to r 
decomposition: 
matrix 
input 
D. 21 A Typical "Systems Theory" Planning Chart (of 
Interconnections) 
I 
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A map of St Ives. showing Camara positions and the direction from 
which each photograph was taken 
D. 31 Jones's Random Photography of St Ives: Map of Locations 
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Aýorograph 0 
Taken before the chance photographs to show the area of St Ives 
where they were to be taken. and as on example of a 'typical' holiday 
view 
Jones's Random Photography V-3-11 
of St Ives: Conventional Photo 
Photograph I 
For this and the other chance photographs. I was obliged to be seen 
photographing obviously 'odd* views and experienced. for the first 
time. the slight embarrassment of to doing. This turf accountant's 
shop. which does not correspond to my notion of such a place. or to 
my notion of 'St Ives', Is perhaps the one that reveals most of that 
mass of experience we Ignore. or cannot assimilate consciously for 
want of any 'idea' or 'stereotype' capable of Including It 
D. 3. iii Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo I 
joholograph 2 The first of several photographs, in which I had to stand Ignoring 
I prettier' views behind me, to take what looked like ddiculously close- 
up shots of seemingly dull walls etc 
D. 3iv Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 2 
a 
photograph 3 
The chopping of the windows, and the slightly provocative 
arrangement of rectangular areas in this photograph, would suggest to 
me now that it was done deliberately like this. to hold attention. If I did 
not know it was done adhering to the chance process as closely as 
possible 
D. 3, v Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 3 
Phorogroph 4 
While taking this one. I was beginning to feet the experiment was a 
mistake. I'd have preferred the envisaged adventure of having to knock 
on a door to say that I was obliged to take a photograph of. say, the 
Inside of a house, because the chance process had led me to that spot. 
(That accident did not occur. 1 To take this photograph. for which I had 
to stand alongside someone's house and direct the camera along a wall 
instead of at It. felt like something too trivial to be tolerated. Its 
amazingly difficult. for me at least. to do something that Is so bereft of 
any purpose that is self-Wdent. or easily explainable to bystanders. 
Although the camef a did not show It. some of the photographs were 
taken with other holiday-makers at my elbow: for others. like this one, 
there was nobody in sight and I was almost trespassing 
/ 
D-3-vi Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 4 
photograph 5 
I'd looked at this signboard several times before as It was near to 
where we were staying. It Is something of an Intended 'tight' In Itself: a 
recognisable point of interest' such as a guide might point out 
D. 3-vii ' Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 5 
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photograph 6 
For this photograph. the chance process put a point on the water In the 
harbour. I should have obeyed it and swam out with the comers. or 
hired a boat. As I was short of time (the points being quite far &part and 
the whole process taking longer then I'd expected). I compromised by 
directing the comers at the chosen point from the nearest spot on the 
quay. This seems to have resulted In what Is very clots to a 
#Composed'holiday snap. I'm always impressed by the way In which. 
given a thing to photograph. It Is so very difficult to stop oneself 
conforming to some preconceived notion of composition (eg 
eighteenth-century landscapes or Dutch Interior paintings) every time 
one aligns the viewfinder. The Wowfinderl A view, it seems. is not 
what's there, what one's eye Is capable of looking at and noting: but a 
memory of what others have done In composing what they saw? 
D. 3. viii Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 6 
photograph 7 
Perhaps the oddest photograph In Itself: half a car and a bit of a house. 
Who would ever take such a picture? Some years later. my sister saw 
these slide$ and recognised this house as the one her family had rented 
when they went to stay at St Ives. After many such seemingly spooky 
coincidences, arising from chance processes. I have begun to be 
surprised not at their occurrence but if. by chance, they do not occur. It 
seems to me now that such unexpected connections exist betweart 
many of the features of ON we thought to be unconnected. Our 
everyday perceptions are to narrowed by Immediate purpose and 
intention as to hide from us most of the 'connectiveness' of life. 
Deliberate chance processes break out of this a little by obliging us to 
pay attention to what we are normally Incapable of noticing. Is that it? 
D-3-fx Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 7 
photograph 8 
Another Close-up of a wall which. had I not known Its origin. I'd say 
was the work of an ani3t-photographw intent on drawing attention by 
deliberate disregard of a recent convention in 'how to compose a 
picture' 
D. 3. x Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 8 
48 
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photograph 9 
Again, though not a tourist's view of things. the chance process S.... 
. e. : Z.., 
to have led to the kind of composition reminiscent of what some artists 
A might well contrive t. 
M-Z". 
D. 3-t Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 9 
photograph 10 
This last chance photograph is missing. The accident of losing It gives 
us the opportunity of looking at something I did not expm at all while 
taking the photographs: an Image of St Ives that leaves everything to 
the imagination; or else an image of the frame, or Idea. of 
'a photograph' free of content 
I. 
D-3-3di Jones's Random Photography 
of St Ives: Random Photo 10 - the Dud 
Photo 
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PRISON WORKSHOP 
00 
3 Cr 
.0 1j, 
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off 
TENDENCIES 
. 8; 1 
Prison Workshop-Relational Synthesis. by Anthony Ward. This is an application of Christopher Alexander's Method. in 
which the various Relations of a Prison workshop are indicated diagrammatically and then fused to form a complete diagram 
of the workshop 3S 3 geometrical abstraction. The Relations themselves are based upon observations of what people are seen I 
to do in existing prison workshops (observed user-behaviour patterns or Tendencies) I 
D. 41 Application of Alexander's Method from nNotes on the Synthesis of Form", by Anthony Ward 
i 
1 
al, 
lmllcý-s at his Video Disc .ý 
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D. 61 The Black Box Model Dovoloping. - 
Input (1) and Output (0) 
I 
D. 62 The Black Box Model Developing: 
Difference (f) observed by Observer 
D. 61ii The Black Box Model Developing: 
Output for Me Box is Input (F) for the ObserVer, 
and Vice Versa 
D. 61y The Black Box Model Developing: 
The Observer Appears. Black to the Box 
D. 6. v The Black Box Model Developing: :T 
Thus, Blackness is Reciprocal 
I 
of II 
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SECTION E 
Environmental Psychology 
54 
E. 11 Living Room, E. l. ii Living Room, 
Pitched Ceiling Flat Ceiling 
I -iii Interview 
Room, 
Pitched Ceiling 
E, liv Interview Room, 
Flat Ceiling: 
Which Do You Prefer? 
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E. 2. iii Mental Map of Detroit: Ralph 
I 
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l 
.1 IvIap of London Showing Difference between Personal and Cartocraphic Space: Expansion along the Central Tube Line 
1,132 Map of Lond 
Cartographic 
UtMUN nwm 
)n Showing Difference between Personal and 
Space: No Knowledge of the City or East End 
1 
E-3-iii Map of London Showing Difference between personal and 
Cartoc,, raphic Space: An Expert's View is Still Distorted 
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© 
concentric 
E. 4i 
1. -1--101, 4#AW "r 
9 
Conceptions of London's Structure: Concentric (with idealised 
diagram) 
---tO 4&AWJ GINr 
radial 
E. 4-ii Conceptions of London's Structure: Radial (with idealised 
diagram) 
lattice 
EAiii Conceptions of London's Structure: Semi-lattice - ie, village - 
(with idealised diagram) 
zone 
EAiv Conceptions of London's Structure: Zones (with idealised 
diagram) 
grid 
EAV Conceptions of London's Structure: Grid (with idoalisod 
diagram) 
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SECTION F 
Terms and Statistics 
59 
TEIIINIS 
I ax is 
verticality I horizontolity / depth 
2 surface 
hord / soft 
3 containment 
closed / open 
4 scale 
small / large 
5 mechanical 
parts con move 1parts can't move 
6 building as setting 
dominant / subordinate 
7 space's feeling for users 
human I non-human 
8 core being pointed to 
hierarchial I anarchic 
9 symbolic reading 
suggestive I iconnic 
10 opening in boundary 
transparent I opaque 
II diversity 
complex / simple 
12 movement 
continuity / discontinuity 
13 where I am . inside / outside 
14 from where I am what I feel 
inside / outside 
15 context 
important / weak 
ST IM EW 1,1 1S]", 
130 
131 
02 
03 
105 
93 
if q; 
50 
78ý 
I 93 
cz 
F, H Descriptive Terms Chosen, in Which to Discuss Architectural 
Space 
F. 21 Terms Arrived at for the Discussion of Architectural Space: 
and Their General Usage by Each Student (Indicated by 
Letter) over the Range of Slides Used 
60 
rank believed term 
I where I am , 
actual term 
surface 
2 from whem I am what I feet 
3 surface 
4 building as a setting 
5 context 
6 scale 
7 axis 
8 diversity 
9 space's feeling for users 
10 core being pointed to 
II movement 
12 mechanical 
13 containment 
14 symbolic reading 
15 opening in boundary 
scale 
where I am 
from where I am what I reel 
axis 
containment 
space's feeling for users 
diversity 
movement / building as setting 
mechanical / context 
core being pointed to I opening in boundary 
symbolic reading 
F-3i Use of Terms: Belief Compared to Actualit7 
61 
1, 
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F. 41 Graphic Illustration of One Term (Containment) by Several 
Students Involved in Project 
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SECTION G 
Controlled Viewing and MOTIF 8 
63 
G. 1. i Drawing of Covent Garden Community Centre by a Skilled 
Draughtsman,, After a 15 Minute Viewing 
G. Iji Dra, oAng of Covent Garden Community Centre by a Relatively 
Unskilled Draughtsman, After a2 Second Viewing 
64 
2 seconds 
10 seconds 
I minute 
5 minutcs 
indeterminatc 
number of choices 
ideogram 
2 seconds 
10 seconds 
I minute 
5 minutes 
indeterminate 
G. 2 1 
0-6 .] W-.: ftl %00 -1 -1 -1 0.1 
I "I,, I 1" 11 I'll" 11 P" 1 0-: 61 11 11-4 11 1, "- 11 -14 11 - 11 "- I number of choices 
ideogram 
Table of Presumed Time of Viewing Represented in Drawings 
of Covent Garden Community Centre, Made by Participants 
65 
MOTIF 8 Design, Based 
on Controlled Viewing of St Paul's 
Church, Covent Garden, b7 Charlie 
Dunnett-. Developmental Sketcries 
66 
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SECTION H 
Architectural Drawings 
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H. 6ii The Burial Chamber with Sarcophagus, Palenque 
H. 6i Elevation and Section of the Temple of the Inscriptions,, 
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Figa Charles-Edouard Jeatincret. Dom-Inu skeleton. 
1914-15: the structural generator or the architect*s later C, 
vocliblilary. 
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SECTION I 
Architectural Diagrams 
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1.111 Diagrammatic Plan of Bedford Sq, ShovAng Lack of Leakage 
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APPENDIX A 
"Amazin g- Space! for the Architectural Stimulus-resl2on5e 
Rat? " 
from: 
Architectural Association Quarterly, volume 9 nos 2 and 3,1977. 
r 
Architectural Association Quarterly 
An illustrat; on from the book Tromes Plones ('An Introduction to the Architectural 
Study of Grids') by Jean Zeitoun (published in French by Dunod. Paris 1977) 
Published by 
the Architecrml Associatioa 
34136 Bedford Square 
Loadon WCr 
Arcllite=ral Association r977 
'-'Olume 9 numbers 2 ond 3 t977 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
Ranulph Glanville 
AAQ volume 8 number 4 R2nulph Glanville wrote a 
=e -a state of the art - of work in the field of repre- 
ýzg spatial understandings. The major criticism he 
4 was that, for all of the interest that the work showed, 
voided the main question: since it always assumed the 
. Us, the qualities in terms of which we should 
tesent our understandings, it was not researching what 
ýabks raight be really appropriate, but rather whether 
never variables we could think of were at all usable. 
other words, it is the experimenter (who as a good 
Mdst, will not take part in the experiment) rather than 
ý; uticipant who will decide in what terms the parti- 
2: t should describe his experience. In that article, he 
qromlsed to present a position derived from research 
3 aliat variables would be really appropriate. This is 
C article. It is in two main parts: a text elaborating a 
: ý4; and a series of brief descriptions of the experi- 
ZU referred to in the thesis, their results, and samples 
teir data. (In this edition, it is not possible to present 
4 inventory of all experiments and courses, which 
Zber over 2o. ) There are (for a change 1) no references: 
% but not all, can be found in the previous resume. t 
G! =YiUe does not think they are very relevant in a 
zi Lke this, which should stand on its own feet, un- 
1-red by others. 
r-4): 
4z to thesis 
", =nes of experiments (numbers I- 8) 
Think of some space, preferably one you hardly know. 
Then describe it, as well as you can, and keep on doing 
so until you really can't describe any more. When you've 
done, work out the order of the description, ic what you 
were first interested in, what next, and so on. Finally 
take your description back to the space and compare the 
two, looking specially for things you got wrong. 
I have not carried out the above as an experiment but I 
include it, because, if you recognise what I say here in it, 
you will have an infinitely more convincing demonstration 
than any amount of experimental evidence. If you want 
to use it so, read no further until you have done so. 
I venture the following description of what happened. 
When you went back to the space you had described you 
found your description woolly and/or downright in- 
accurate, but nevertheless recognisable; that you started 
by trying to describe and define the space as a whole, and 
then worked through to various details; and that some- 
times you started inventing - you weren't quite sure how 
things were, but you thought they ought to have been like 
you described them. 
From this we can extract various points. For instance: 
-that we have a 'cognitive model' which helps us under- 
stand space, and which allows us to re-invent and re- 
member it (sometimes wrongly); 
-that when we try to describe a space we try to indicate a 
whole and then to elaborate on the parts; 
-and that even when we don't know something well (and 
the converse, finding something new in a room we've 
always known, holds equally true) we can describe it - 
and rccogaise it. 
The thesis that I have developed (and it's likely to 
continue developing and changing) is based on these 
observations. Its main points are that: 
x we understand spatial experience as a whole, not as 
a collection of parts (ie'top down's notbottorn up"); 
2 when obliged to experience space through the medium 
of a collection of parts, we do not understand it; 
3 we each have out own cognitive model which allows 
us to understand, remember and recognise space; 
4 this cognitive model permits us to invent, re-invent and 
attribute qualities to spaces; 
5 means of representation of spatial understanding need 
to reflect the struc=e of this model, ie to work from 
'top dowa'and not'bottorn up'. 
I shall describe the evidence supporting each point 
from experiments carried out in the AA School under 
the titles which follow: 
Aa space as a whole 
London can be considered as being made up of areas 
(parts). And yet, a group of students who try to locate 
these areas can do so only with very lin-dted accuracy 
(experiment z). One can argue, fairly, that ignorance can 
be overcome. No doubt a GLC official concerned with 
defining borough boundaries could do this test. But this 
misses the point, for all those students are still alive and 
living in London. That is to say that the inability of the 
students to accurately locate the parts separated out for 
them has not prevented them having an understanding of 
London, the evidence for which is that they recognise 
such a dangerous place, and are still alive I 
But is there positive evidence to affirm this ? When 
students were allowed to see an unfamiliar space for 
controlled time spans (2 seconds, to seconds, i minute, 
5 minutes and for as long as they liked) and were asked to 
draw it, it was found that they could and that the drawings 
showed a sense of completeness (experiment 8). Even more 
interesting, they had no great difficulty remembering the 
space to days later. When the drawings were pinned up 
they had great difficulty in estimating accurately how long a 
view of the space each drawing represented: the period of 
viewing appeared not to be of great significance. From 
this, one concludes that the experience of space is under- 
stood as a whole, not as a series of (ready chosen) parts. 
By way of confirmation, students who had surveyed a 
room blindfolded, trying to visualise it, were astonished 
by the room, when they actually saw i0 The whole was 
definitely not just the sum of the parts. (experiment 6) 
B parts obscure this whole 
This blindfold survey can tell us more. One accepts that 
colour and, to a lesser extent light are things one cannot 
experience when blindfolded. But texture, surface, dis- 
tance, scale, angle, and detail can aU be felt and can be 
tested (try, for instance, pacing out diagonals). One would 
imagine that, given a cognitive model, the removal of 
visual aspects of space from direct experience would 
encourage other senses to substitute where possible, and 
thus allow visualisation. But that is not so: a quick 
glimpse makes a whole understandable, but three hours of 
continuous search by feel does not. 
There is, however, a difference in these two modes of 
perception: the glimpse allows the instantaneous experi. 
ence of a whole, but feeling is a prolongued serial activity; 
one collects one chunk of information after another, 
trying to add them in to visuallse the whole. The first is 
'top down'and the secondbottom up'. 
Further evidence in support of this can be found in the 
failure of the attempt to find a coUection of terms with 
which to describe spatial experience (exPeriment 4). The 
painful isolation (by a group) of iS terms with which to 
describe spatial experiences, produced almost complete 
incomprehension when used sociaUy. On being asked 
which terms they would use to describe a set of experi- 
ences, the students chose very differently. Even more 
remarkable was the lack of personal knowledge, for they 
ranked the terms in the order they felt they had used them; 
their rankings were then compared to the actual use 
rank. Between the two there is an almost insignificant 
connection: the students simply did not understand how 
they had used their own terms. 
Here, too, they are being asked to experience in terms 
of parts, not wholes. It seems that the cognitive model, 
liking to work from 'top down', finds itself confused when 
the structure is the opposing'bottorn up'. 
C cognitive modeh help us understand 
There are some people (notably behaviourists) who deny 
the usefulness of such a concept as a cognitive model. 3 
In their world, we are (sophisticated) deterministic 
machines running a series of programmes converting in 
input into an output. In their view, the cognitive model Is a 
fraud. It cannot, therefore just be assumed, so I shall 
present some evidence in its favour. Of course, the 'top 
down'/'bortom up' distinction is evidence, and more. 
The main features of a cognitive model is that it 
provides a personal interpretation of reality. That being 
so, we would expect major differences in the ways that 
different people using the same means of representation, 
express their understandings of the Isame'thing. 4 
Consider, for instance, the ideas of direction and dis. 
tance in the city (experiment j). It would appear, from 
common experience, that we frequently find other people's 
ideas different to ours. Annetta Pedretti invented an 
elegant technique to show this, which generates individual 
maps that would be, if our understanding was Euclideanly 
cartographic, circular. ' They never are (they are rarely 
even vaguely circular). They elongate, fragment, change 
direction; they are extraordinary pictures of those things 
we call distortions but which are actually differences 
between our cognitive modcls, shown by comparison to 
the cartographic model. 
Another piece of work, equally revealing, was done by 
Tirn Richardson to present a composite view of Leaden- 
hall market, culled from maps drawn by half a dozen 
Lloyds clerks. It shows the differences between them by 
&: W; h Glanville 
I doubts as to what is where: 
tere is a pub at a cross roads called The Lamb. 
is a Post Office separated from the pub by a blank 
There is a cafe separated from the Post Office by a 
t; ace. Next to the pub on the other street is a 
: thop or possibly a supermarket or possibly a huge 
aýzj Lloyds Old Building, or Lloyds might come 
te cheese shop/supermarket or there may be no 
i at all. Next to one of these there is a bank which 
a fact be Lloyds (not the bank). This bank forms a 
Ito Lime Street and the street leading to The Lamb. 
=of the block is occupied by Lloyds, unless Lloyds 
t; the entire block apart from the Post Office. ' 
Ixther level, the article I presented in AA Q volume 
L* t argued for the reality of a cultural awareness, 
44 in the cognitive model which was the common 
'between Finnish architecture and Finnish language. 
Cy, we can refer to the understandings that were 
', t7 the students using the 15 terms that were derived 
I iscussion of space (experiment s). Asked to examine 
to they thought these terms related, each student 
cd a hierarchy of meaning relationships, which 
t d. -ought of as a personal knowledge structure, 
A technique invented by Kaduyn Findlay. These 
4a considerable difference in structural orgaaisa- 
rtich was attributed to different learning conditions). 
4o showed a considerable difference of opinion 
kv the terms related, which apin argues for the 
ZU of the cognitive modeL 
ri: ý# mdels jewate qualities 
I Uu L%at one catches a very brief glimpse of a space 
'T*g else, eg a car) I have argued that it is recog- 
is a whole (experiment 8). But we are all familiar Is way we elaborate on that, deducing qualities it whole (so that we say 'Yes, it was an Oldsmobile - 
4 fte with a roof-rack, I think. Yes, it must have 
I It: ow Oldsmobile with roof-r2ck, about 1965% 
I t6d to describe a space, as I suggested at the 
ý4 ef this article, then I have ventured that you 
14 gut sort of thing at some point in your descrip- %S is where the cognitive model shows itself. 
4, tI-c c=aordinary result that a brief viewing of a 
SpaCC was pretty much as good as a long one, requires of 
us one Of two explanations: either that the whole, as in- 
s==eously perceived, cannot be elaborated; or that 
our ability to elaborate comes from the inventiveness of 
the cognitive model. But we have already dismissed this 
first option, for we can find something new in a room we 
have known for years. It is the abiLry of a brief viewer to 
elaborate his view of the whole, developing and inventing 
details from his cognitive model, that makes it possible for 
his description to be as complete as that of a longer 
viewer (although not necessarily as accurate: but untested). 
And so it is with remembering and recognition. If we 
cannot make a whole (as when we survey a room blind- 
folded), we have nothing to invent from. We may re- 
member a part, recognising it when we see it later, but 
we do not remember the whole. This has been observed 
to happen: comments, (extracted during an attempt to 
re-draw a visualisation from memorys 4 weeks after such a 
blindfolded survey) such as 'I can't remember' and 'I 
could if I'd seen it', bear witness. 
On the other hand, the way in which students can 
generate a structure for London, shows how, given an 
idea of the whole, a student can easily generate parts and 
their relationships (experiment 2). It is interesting to 
compare this ability to the inability to locate named parts. 
E appropriateness of representations 
If you ask a group who have generated London structures 
to collect evidence for their views and present such 
evidence, you will find that the evidence for e3ch structure 
tends to be exclusive both in its content and its interpreta- 
tion (this, of course, is deeply significant for planners). 4 
This means to say that there is a mutu2lism between that 
which is being described and that which is describing: 
they both confine each other. If you ask people to consider 
the city from the point of view of its service systems (or 
Urban. Technologies), you will find that the view of place, 
space, distance and connection is very clearly defined, and 
quite distinct. There is a need for the representative 
system to match the system being represented. 
Consequently, if we wish to represent our understanding 
of space, we need to do so in a manner which does not 
deny the structure of our understanding, so we need a 
language that can express the whole and then refine it. 
In general experience, we know this because when we 
talk about a room, we first provide a general outline and 
then gradually refine out the detail (this is just how we 
would progress down a logic tree. ) I am not pretending that 
we do not do things one after another: but I suggest we 
do the more general things first. 
However, we, the expressers of our understandings, 
are not the receivers. And some methods of communica- 
tion allow us to perceive a whole and then elaborate 
details, not only in their content but also in their form. 
These include drawing. By contrast, spoken language 
has to be understood as a series of events, from which we 
can develop more general understandings. 
So I take the position that the means of representation 
we use should not only be capable of representing wholes 
before parts, but should do so in a form that is percep- 
tuaUy simila ; which explains why drawings represent 
spatial understandings well, because they also can be 
interpreted as wholes. 
, ntnt I 
Knowledge(1973) 
01 
on areas were listed, and an outline map of the GLC, 
lithe Thames was also marked, was provided. Students 
ktd to locate the areas on the map. The maps were 
610 a map with circles of 4 and 8km diameter, from the 
itSe'listed areas (derived from the Ordnance Survey). 
Irg was liberal: if there was any way that the student 
t-t got the area correctly located within the circles. it 
'*Cd. 
1 ,4 not find it hard to do this, but they got very low 
7'4 lowest accuracy was CP/, at both 4 and 8km scales. 
,, tst accuracy at 4krn was 31.6% and at 8km, 63.2%. The 
was 9.1% and 22.2% areas correctly located. 
below left: 
Marking map with 4 and 8km marking circles below: 
Table of results demonstrates clearly how inaccurate London 
knowledge is, and how little improvement there often is when 
the marking area is increased 
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E E 
V V, .V co V 
0 11: Q. 0. 
u 
Is .9 .5 
4; E E 
CID -ýi 
Ad 
co 
E E E 0. v v v v 
c C 0 
1-10 
0, ý10 
a is 0 0 78.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
b 18 4 6 94.7 21.0 31.6 22.2 33.3 
0& 
311 IS-8 S. 3 5.3 33.3 33.3 
14 23 73.7 10.5 15.7 14.3 21.4 
17 26 89. S 10. S 31.6 11.8 3S. 3 
f 10 00 52.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
22 26.3 10.5 10.5 40.0 40.0 
h 12 25 63.1 10. S 26.3 16.7 41.7 
i 15 3 10 78.9 15.7 52.6 20.0 66.7 
i312 15.8 5.3 10.5 33.3 66.7 
k801 42.1 0.0 S. 3 0.0 12. S 
Amazing SPOCC I 4S 
( 
tu M 
m gi 4) 
EEuu i5 0T lu 
-,. Z it 
0.0. 
Im Co 
-5 e9 Ir Co Im Co 
000 
EE 
3 
15 67 78.9 31.6 36.8 40.0 46.7 
m is 15 94.7 5.3 26.3 5.5 27.7 
n702 36.8 0,0 10.5 0.0 28.6 
0601 31.6 0.0 5.3 0.0 16.7 
p 18 3 12 94,7 15.7 63.2 16.7 66.7 
q722 36.8 10.5 10.5 28.6 28.6 
r 14 6 11 73.6 31.6 57.9 42.9 78.6 
8 11 04 57.9 0.0 21.1 0.0 36.4 
t512 26.3 5.3 10.5 20.0 40.0 
10 24 52.6 10.5 21.0 20.0 40.0 
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A's Structure (1973-7) 
" vm Schai k 
941 
structures (concentric, radial, lattice, zone, grid) 
I-v" to students as possible structures for London, and 
t4crmt was asked to depict in his own way how he thought 
4 mas structured. It was not obligatory to use the given 
ýem either singly or at all. 
W is used in 2 ways. Over the year or once, prescriptively. 
: P. v Iýhe year, its occasional administration shows different 
e4sto (and successes at) learning, in the ways a student's 
. ts develop. As a once-off test, its prescriptive use (when 
men structure's value has to be proven) demonstrates that 
c, i'v description will be validated by evidence largely 
Vmm that which proves another one. 
concentric 
._- 
_- >K 
radial 
IUI 
4: 14rawings by one student, made throughout the year, 
I'" the continuing development of the structure 
VII cleach of the five archetypal structures with drawings 
eA-is showimg each of the five structures being applied to 
%* Ux*n 
lattice 
EMIL-JR] 
F-IFI 
zone 
hW 
grid 
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experiment3 
Distance In London (compass version 1973-6) 
Annetta Pedretti 
description 
Students were asked to think of themselves as being in a 
helicopter looking down over London through a compass form. 
This form has 4 axe, which pass through a common centre, each 
axis being divided into 8 equal parts. The centre is said to be over 
Centre Point, and the end of one axis over Camden Town tube 
station. Students named the places which they believed lay 
under each dividing line. The position of each named place was 
traced off the Ordnance Survey, and the resultingly distorted 
axes were drawn, together with connecting circloids. 
results 
An accurate cartographic knowledge of London would produce 
straight axes and concentric circles. These never occur because 
human concepts of straightness and equal distance are not the 
same as the cartographic ones (hence we must learn to read a 
map). Every map so produced is different, but it is unwise to 
generalise: the maps are more useful to mirror one's experiences. 
6--4 
above: 
The compass form used to assess ideas of distance and direction 
in London 
ri ht: 
Three maps made by tracing the cartographic location of points 
marked on compass forms. Note the distortions from circles, 
the areas of ignorance and the different sizes. (All three maps 
use the same scale and orientation) 
1' 
ýP&fv --- 
ýnt 
no( Spatial Experience (1974-5) 
Ily's Repertory Grid technique was used interactively 
ofstudents to isolate and test mutual understandings 
ith which to describe slides of Aalto's Paimio 
tit Sanatorium. Negotiation of meanings between 
ftbers was meant to unify the terms. Tests or actual 
i by each member. and of each member's befieved 
e compared. Finally. diagrams were made of each term. 
n of 15 terms was satisfactorily but painfully derived. 
ict cover all aspects of description the students felt 
tt but did cover most, However, each student used 
very differently: one averaged 7.72 terms per slide, 
34. Furthermore. no pattern could be found between 
ages, and the students' knowledge of their use of 
:h was very inaccurate (giving a Spearman's Rank 
. -PI between 0.656 and -0.300 and averaging 0.286 
dard deviation of 0.370, over the 15 terms). 7 But when 
we drawn, there was an astonishing similarity. 
below: 
The 15 terms derived by the group of students, showing how 
each student used them in describing 32 slides. The scale is 0-30 below right: 
Ranking chart ofone student's actual and believed use of terms 
right: 
Diagrams of the term 'containment' 
TEIIINIS 
I 2xit 
verticality/ horizontality I depth 
2 surface 
hard I soft 
3 containment 
closed / open 
4 scale 
small / large 
5 mechanical 
parts can move 1parts can't move 
6 building as setting 
dominant / subordinate 
7 space's feeling for users 
human / non-human 
8 core being pointed to 
hierarchial I anarchic 
9 symbolic reading 
suggestive / iconnic 
10 opening in boundary 
transparent I opaque 
II diversity 
complex/ simple 
12 movement 
continuity I discontinuity 
13 where I am 
inside / outside 
14 from where I am what I feel 
inside I outside 
15 context 
important / weak 
IA 11 
03 
10.1) 
03 
fill" 
I 
93 
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4j $11 
rank believed term 
I where I am 
2 from where I am what I feet 
3 surface 
4 building as a setting 
5 context 
6 scale 
7 axis 
8 diversity 
9 space's feeling rot users 
10 core being pointed ta 
II movement 
12 mechanical 
13 containment 
14 symbolic reading 
IS opening in boundary 
actual term 
surface 
scale 
where I am 
from where I am what I feel 
axis 
containment 
space's feeling for users 
diversity 
movement / building as setting 
mechanical / context 
core being pointed to / opening in boundary 
symbolic reading 
rifflont 5 
r4 Knowledge Structures (1975): 
*nlmoped by Kathryn Findlay 
Otim 
ON IS terms derived in the 'Description of Spatial 
ýema'experiment was arranged in a circle on a form. 
M (*ho had used the terms) filled in the form according 
I rule that any term could be generated by at least two 
,. These term relations were transformed by a simple 
then to make hierarchies. 
warchies demonstrated that very few term relationships 
:N same for different students. Only 98 relationships were 
. of which but 12 were the same. When converted, the ýq hierarchies showed a remarkable variety, the forms of 
lould be interpreted as showing the students, learning 
below: 
Two personal knowledge structures. based on the rilled-in term derivation form 
right: 
A filled-in form, showing the personal derivation of terms by 
one student 
A 
axis 
surface 
containment 
scale 
mechanical 
bvilding as sc**. '%i 
space's feeltri fo, users 
core being po. -Nted to 
symbolic reading 
opening in boundary 
diversity 
movement 
where I am 
from where I am what I feel 
context 
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* Wdfold Surveys (1976-77) 
IM001 
-, eral such survey& have been carried out. In them. bI indfolded 
4ents were placed in unfamiliar rooms, and asked to draw 
em (they are allowed to leave the room and remove their 
rd:; lds in order to do this). In different versions students were 
led t* isolate elements in their drawings, redraw other 
4ents' drawings. and to represent the room (sti 11 unseen) 
m "mory. They were eventually allowed to see the room. 
im 
ýrwdent felt his drawing of the unseen space was adequate. 
ýý asked to represent the unseen space from memory 10 
rsto a rmnth later, they had very great difficulty. But when 
"d to see the space they were astonished at it. Even the 
"-,, t to redraw other students' work. in order to extend 
*V. andin did not change this. Most participants have found 
114ndfoldl'urveyto be a gripping experience. 
below: 
Drawings of visualising strategies attempted by students in a blind survey 
below right (lower): 
A perspective and plan drawn by the same student of a room 
that has been blind-surveyed 
below right (upper): 
Plan of the same blind-surveyed room by another student 
© 
444" g4. 
Amazing Spacel 53 
. '. II, -.. '. 
-UI __-__--- 
. '. a 4 . 
i-, 
' JJr : fl 
lor 
W. 
olp 
6 
iment7 
to% Distance and Directions (1976): 
:9 Pedretti 
X; Qn 
, vat am adventure playground were given a collection of 
4 ; laces at which they could take brass rubbings. They had 
tcmly about two thirds of these places, using the cI ues to 
*". The clues were of different types: pu rely verbal, route 
6"ýs. landmark references etc. 
Wdrem fare lyselected a verbal description, and were 
. *: arly averse to verbal route descriptions. Without ýom. when a verbal clue was chosen, it was classed as 
I" there was little success in following it, Visual clues, 
. 4,1y visual landmark referenced clues, were very easily 
below (upper): 
The eight qualities that describe the 16 Treasure Hunt clue types below (lower/ lower right): 
Sample clues, taken from three different Treasure Hunts, 
showing each of the qualities used in describing places 
ri . ght: 
Charts of selection (upper band) of clue types and success (lower band) in using them. by individual qualities, for three Treasure Hunts. The charts are not directly comparable and can 
only be taken as indicative since they are drawn for each quality 
and not for compounds 
1140: 1.1 
Y1.111HAL 'I NCI YISTIAL XSINGLE, 
verbal 
single 
sequence 
turn lert out or the playground 
go straight and turn into the third street on your lert 
it's right ahead 
verbal 
intersection 
event 
where the 28 bus going towards Kensington joins the 22 bus 
verbal 
single 
event 
in a long alley where lots orcors go to get repaired 
verbal 
single 
point 
in front of the 'Dental and Foot' surgery 
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visual 
s, ngle 
sequence 
I- 
9w 
visual 
intersection e 
event 
petrol 
stiation 
visual 
address 
Broughton 
ýBrOL 
visual 
intersection 
point -L hpr)th 
0 
rockinq horse 
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riment a 
roPed Viewing (1977) 
r. U were placed in an unfamiliar room, blindfolded, and 
Clowed to remove their blindfolds for controlled periods 
, 4: 2 seconds, 10 seconds. I minute, 5 minutes and also 
ý lorg as they liked. They were lead in and out but were not rUly prevented from moving inside the room. After they 
ftthey drew the room (and did so again, 10 days later). 
Mh drawing session. they pinned their drawings up, and 
; ed the time of viewing that each drawing represented. 
ý4ettt had particular difficulty in drawing the space, no 
it foe how short a time he had seen i0 Nor was there any 
Jty in remembering it, to re-present it 10 days later. 
rw, there is little correlation between the time during 
I V4 room was seen. and the guesses about this by the other 
, ; mts. (In 20 instances. only II cases had the largest vote 
,e &ctual viewing time, and in only 9 cases was there a 
1-ty vote for that time: furthermore. the majorities are 
r4lL With the exception of the 2 second viewings, the 
&ýon is fairly uniform). Spot checks with teaching staff 
red they were no more accurate in their estimates than the 
#4rg students. 
.e 
wogw*l -, 
below: 
Sketch of the room used for controlled viewing by a brie(viewer below right, 
Sketch by a longer viewer 
risht: 
Histogram of viewings: the hatched area shows the time the 
viewer actually saw the room, while the black areas show the 
guesses as to the viewing time that the viewer's drawing 
represents. Note the discrepencies I The scale is 0-12 
f 
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2 seconds 
10 seconds 
I minute 
5 minutes 
indeterminate 
2 seconds 
10 seconds 
I minute 
5 minutes 
indeterminate 
SF number of choices 
ideogram 
number of choices 
ideogram 
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ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
Ranulph Glanville 
APPENDIX B 
"Is Architecture just a Hollow Space? Or is it the Emply 
Set? 
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: Wph GlanviHe 
er the last five years, Ranulph Glanville has, together 
I jeteral students and colleagues, been working on how 
mi. erstand and might describe our experience of space. 
r: ý-, j uiih attempts to find appropriate verbal terms, he 
"t more and more convinced that such forms of 
)-, -don are not only irrelevant, they are structurally 
: rs. &ctory. Since arriving at that conclusion, he has 
i to examine the nature of spatial experience, andfiels 
ly and large, we understand little of Mis because we 
&: hq the wrong questioni. Thus, for example, the 
: im taken by most people working in thefield assumes 
ý the terms and ideal within which we can successfully 
wle our experience (the variables) are known. However, 
tir thf quenion of whether the variables used are truly 
n; tive, or are, rather, prescriptive, and oblige us to 
, ow experience to fit their mould. By asking people to 
, ip-e and reflect upon their experience, not within a 
, 5-mads descriptive frame of reference, but in such a 
ý Aa: their cognitive models can express themselves 
lqh ephareverforn: of description seems appropriate, he 
*, g to check the validity of these assumptions. 
I this article, he gives a general overview of work, 
m koulyfrom many areas by people interested in the 
.; on of how we might describe our experience of space, 
:; ý4 out the particular limits of each effort. (That 
I re lin; iu does not mean they are worthless, only that 
&# hwnan. ) In an article to be published in a later 
t ef AAQ, he will argue and illustrate the position he 
rpited at. 
: zijtýt argue that the perplexed situation in which 
-ýecrjxe Ends itself today is the result of a problem 
ý t; am There have been, throughout history, inherent 
ýp, ef space that have pervaded particular architec- 
0 &ad which have been formulated in ritual descrip- 
I ci erdering and organizing systems. Often, these 
: rj LAve actu&Uy been non-3patial, defining approaches 
:: 4 ways of, handling space through the description of 
Imeristics that define space, and descriptions of how 
cL"x It, rather than by describing space itself. In this 
, ==pts of symmetrh proportion, the orders, etc, 
4zi; atial, although they define spaces. 
I. it ha; pcus that different architectures have set up 
:a cf Limiting the handling of space by creating ritual 
:; crs Vorm&Used or otherwise) which provide a 
both for the generation, and the understanding of & 
t, -t of space. This is a way of creating and modulating 
&I ex; trience and &WlreneSS. b 
Recent developments in architecture would suggest 
that we are lost in & sea of spatial concepts, unable to 
handle the complexity of possible approaches: witness the 
extraordinary lack of confidence that currently promotes 
preservation of even the most mediocre buildings, in 
preference to trying anything new. We must be the first 
generation to be so lacking in confidence that the heritage 
we leave will be the refurbished work of others. But what 
should the current concept of space be? What happens 
after functionalism? The range of the spatial problem is 
simply too great, but a reasonable account discusses con- 
ceptual anarchy (in the real, non-periorative sense of the 
word), super-mobility and Inter-changeability, and oppor- 
tunity for the machine (ic, the computer and a very 
sentimental, CorbUSi2n attitude to mass production and 
social obligations). In this one makes one's choice, either 
in the traditional ostrich position or in a universe called 
'reality', confined by the plethora of rules, aspirations and 
charitable intentions which so preoccupy (rightly) those 
who actually build, as restrictions placed on legitimate 
action, or as obstacles to be hurdled or skirted. Few of 
those who take either position (or both) manage anything 
that is of substantially higher quality than banal and 
dreary, no matter how titillating or worthy. It could be 
argued that this has always been so -that architects have 
rarely been exceptional and that only the exceptional 
survives. But this is a distressing argument, even if it may 
be true, because it means that there has always been a high 
percentage of architectural dross, and that we haven't 
improved on it. Should we not, then, be able to? Could 
there be something we could try, in order to improve? 
And, if it is not true, would we not improve things today 
so that we at least approach the standard of earlier ages, 
even if we cannot pass it? 
Spatial theories I Given a feeling of inadequacy in our spatial understanding, 
it is interesting to look at the sort of work being done on 
space, and ways of describing it, today. As architects, we 
naturally look to our own heritage and to those who make 
the theories and criticisms of our own subject from within. 
Philosophy and ethics 
Space, as a distinct term, worthy of isolated discussion in 
anything like the sense we use today, was largely the in. 
vCnti0n of Camillo Sitte. 1 Of course, the word (and many 
under-standings of it) had existed long before. But architec- 
tural (and urban) 'Space' was the invention of Sitte. 
Developments of ideas concerning architectural space 
have been mainly aesthetic. Traditional devices, such as 
scale, proportion, axis and light have been brought to bear 
on the idea. Evenmally Giedion2 produced the startling 
idea (the one which so elegantly undermines Pevsner's 
crude dismissal of Roman architecture as engineering and 
which Pevsner seems to continue to rniSS)3 that the concept 
of space, although only recently named, had always been 
present in architecture and had taken quite different 
forms at different times. Architecture had moved into its 
own Einsteinian. phase: space and time were united in a 
developing physical form. From this provoking and acute 
analysis, there flowered three schools. The first, brilliantly 
initiated by P&nofSky, 4 related the concept of space at a 
particular time to the concept of the culture (or the mood) 
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of that time. Since Panofsky's devastating analogy between 
'Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism', attempts have 
been made, notably by Norberg- Schultz, 5 to generalize 
the analogy. c Unfortunately, few periods formalise their 
mood so clearly and precisely as 1130-40 to 127o. However 
that may be, the approach depends on some formal, quasi- 
philosophical statement being made, and until such a state- 
ment is made of today's philosophieS, d it is not likely to 
lead to our developing today's appropriate spatial preoccu- 
pations: and so it wiU always tend to post-rationalisation. 
Linguistics 
The second approach, much less pure, is that which draws 
upon the known and developing science of linguistics. In 
this case, an analogy is not drawn, as in the first, at the level 
of the abstract mood, represented in two forms (scholasti- 
cism and architecture), but between architecture as a 
functioning sub-system of the science and the science 
itself 6 (thus, architecture is a special form, epiton-ising and 
realising the generalized concepts of the science). There is 
no doubt that this is an entirely reasonable approach, if 
handled intSIligently and sensitiVely. 7 The science of 
linguistics is primarily concerned with the generation of 
meaningful representations of humanly formed con- 
cepts, and the architectural formation of space can 
reasonably be thought to be similar. $ The 'Language of 
Architecture' is, of course, no new title: in a way even 
Vitruvius9 is talking about this. Certainly discussions of 
the orders etc, assume that they are dealing with a lingu- 
istic description of the creators of space (wrongly as it 
happens: almost the last thing linguistics is about is lists of 
appropriate actions, and recipes for magic solutions). In 
this respect, the work of Hillier and Leaman is interesting, 
specifically, they appear to be trying to draw up, using a 
structuralist approach, a general linguistic system from 
which different architectural syntaxes may be generated 
(and to check these against actualitics). It is a slightly 
back-to-front approach. 'General Linguistics' is a general- 
isation of already existing specific linguistic studies while 
this is an attempt to make specific languages from an 
assumed general linguistic - which is clearly valuable, but 
has two limitations: it is a tool for making grammars - but 
most architects are not 'grammaticians' they are aspiring 
'writers' and they need to leun how to write; and, while it 
certainly does handle two-dimensional enclosures, it is still 
subject to the criticism inherent in the position I disclosed, 
Claude Perrault's 1676 reworking of the Five Orders 
M 
-I 
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that we don't know if the way It does this has any bearing 
on our experience and understanding of space, which exists in three dimensions, because we have never examined this. While language systems are interesting per se, that Is not 
our concern. 
A further development of this approach Is 'Semiotics' 
which its founder, the linguist, de Saussurelc wished to be 
a generalised theory in which linguistics Plays its pan - the theory of signs. It can be argued that this is identical 
with the much older theory of representations: it certainly 
has much in common with linguistic philosophy and in 
particular Wittgenstein. 11.12.1) This approach his two 
problems: firstly, that the theory itself is somewhat ragged; 
secondly, that architectural critics and commentators (eg 
jencks)14 use it in ways that are both architecturally and 
serniotically so banal that one must question the usefulness 
of their efforts. No doubt, the less trivial approach of men 
like Eco's will lead to results of some value but one does 
question whether an approach which puts space in a 
subsidiary position to its means of expression is necessarily 
the most promising. 6 
Aesthetles 
The final architectural approach Is the straight aesthetic 
one. The description of space in aesthetic terms is really 
the traditional form of criticism and it has been very 
successful while architecture and theory have worked 
together. But it Is full of remarkable assumptions which 
make the aesthetic treatment of space seem like a form of 
complex game. Fine, sensitive work has been done this 
century in the aesthetic examination of space: 
Le Corbusier's'6.17 proportions and images, 
Cook's images and coUage3,11 
Lynch's images and lines, 19 
Critchlow's lines and proportionS, 20 
Banham's mechanisms and eclecticisins, 2t 
Venturi's eclecticisms and transparencies, 22 
Rowe's transparencies and C0112gC3,23 
are a sufficient simple - but one is left, nevertheless, with 
the question of relevance. At certain times, MOSt games 
cease to be reasonable models of the real world, which 
reduces their ability to illuminate that world. 0 In a post- 
relativistic world of doubtful events occuring in the flux of 
space and time one can ask whether concepts such As 'Axis' 
have much to tell us about the basic malaises of our so-far 
unanswered, new problems. Indeed, those who work with, 
such concepts seem, In fact, to have their whole architec- 
turc formed by them, rather than the reverse. It is clear 
that attempts at the construction of proto-axial images in 
the most exquisite and transparent proportions ire not 
often helping us make pleasant new spaces. I suspect that 
this is largely because although these concepts may remain 
valid and valuable, they are neither necessarily relevant, 
nor wide enough in range to help us explain out contem- 
porary spatial quandaries. 
Non-architectural spatial theories 
If, as I believe, the general pre-occupational approaches of 
architectural theory are neither facing nor solving problem 
in the contemporary understanding of architectural spaces 
where else could one look? 
A certain amount of research has been done, by workers 
in fields other than architecture, into descriptions of con- 
R=ulph Glinville 
=Nrul spatial experience. Specifically) Sociologists, 
ztnpologists, eavironrriental psychologists, psycho- 
Tzists, perceprual psychologists, urban geographers and 
=; uter scientists have thrown in the glove. What have 
ry to tell us? 
I , act and society is sometimes hard to separate the sociologists and the 
ha geographers. For one thing, they often work 
jrd%er, and for another, they frequently exchange fields. 
J cf course, as generalising scientists they are interested 
g-, eralised understandings. This may be their greatest 
ikness. Consider, for instance, a major sociological 
coTery, the 'neighbourhood'. Young and Willmott's 
==ding analySiS24 gave sociological validity to the idea 
ých was quickly taken up (admittedly in a somewhat 
-!. 'jested way) by planners and architects. The idea is 
4-undly simple: a community can be seen to define 
a(in physical and geographical terms as if a community 
21 not define itself and still remain a community). As a 
ý4 insight, this confirms commonsense understandings. 
x it only works for those sorts of communities that are 
: &-aphically close - probably by necessity of work and/ 
cf historical circumstances - and thus have an over- 
ivering internal structure complete with a dominant 
: Z: te defining an outside. This fits oppressed communi- 
s particularly wellf - Welsh mining villages, East End 
=. mitics and even middle-class ghettos threatened by 
x=ways, for instance - but it doesn't fit all communities, 
I is a false gencralisation. Gareth Williams' gypsies and 
: uuj Pedretti's Ai truck drivers are two communities 
lzized by AA students for which a physical 'neigh- 
wrbood' is meaningless. I would hazard a guess that the 
j-. ty stockbroker belt communities are no more bound 
i teighbourhoods, in Young and Willmott's sense than 
ew two. The sociologist looks for social spaces, spaces of 
z=unal interaction. Sometimes these can be repres- 
: tl on cartographic maps, but this is rare and only 
a%ionally holds true as a gencralisation over a limited 
: Its Architects' (admittedly pretty weak-minded) 
t--; ts to transplant them wholesale, to New Towns, 
, ha Developments and Expansion Areas, simply re- 
ýcc the tentative nature of these spaces which 
in order 
v=k, presuppose particular types of both social inter- 
: km and community life-style. 
S=titnes hard to distinguish, the anthropologist, un- 
t the sociologist, his no axe to grind. His studies tend to 
: r4re descriptive (and consequently less prescriptive). 
4 theories of anthropologists and particularly Levi- 
n=, 'J. 26 have had a good hearing recently and have 
ta widely accepted, even by philosophers. Levi- 
azs's strucruralist notions have been developed by 
: tiucts as Typologies (in the AA, this view has been 
Licrated by Su Rogers and Elia ZengheliS, 27 and Leon 
ra. u) The view here, based on the examination of the 
4 ef space, of culturally remote societies (remote - 
ra= of cultural form or time), is that only limited 
ýýrs cf things are possible, ie that there is a finite and 
4u-ble universe. This is fine as an account of what has 
",, =d so far but it fails to take into account either 
14rl neorCM29.30 or the Law of High Numbers: that 
- i: assumes that the explanations of hindsight are the 
%a of prediction. Wittgenstein demonstrates that this 
attitude of Wstorical inevitability is void: " rather we find 
astonishing new things, after which we alter our explana. 
tions. 
But, even leaving this argument aside, one his to ask in 
what way, precisely, the examination of different situations 
can elucidate our problem, which otherwise merely leaves 
us bewildered. For all the usefulness, for instance, of Hillier and Leaman's research based on such views, one 
cannot help asking, 'What is the value of the assumptions 
that lie behind it? ' 
The extension of sociological approaches has been 
carried through, largely, by urban geographers. The 
popular idea of a geographer is now clearly out-of-date, 
and the urban geographer is often more interested in the 
mechanics of population movement than in the effects of 
ice on the landscape. A look at Emrys Jones'London Allai3l 
for instance, will show an attempt (using entirely arbitrary 
areas) to display the social structure of London spatially 
and to show changes in this structure. White and Gould's 
Mental Mapj32 the most readily-accessible introduction to 
the subject, starts with drawings of personal under- 
standings of urban spatial structures, and generalizes these 
into desirability contours for population movements. 
Morrill's and Johnston's bookS33.34 attempt to portray 
social structures in specifically spatial terms, thus combin- 
ing Young and Willmott's and Gould and White's two 
approaches. The trouble with this, from our point of view 
is that it's far too large-scaled. It is not about perception or 
desirabiNty of particular types of architectural or even 
urban space. It is about ways specific locations can become 
attractive and about simple, mechanistic reasons for this 
(eg, better job opportunity, low cost housing, social 
homomorphism). It may well be that such descriptions 
really account for the desirability of the locations we 
inhabit: certainly convincing correlations between them 
have considerable predictive power. But all they tell us 
about architectural space is that it is not often something 
which gives us a good reason to choose to live somewhere; 
which, considering the quality of most of today's product, 
may not be entirely surprising. 
Perceptual places 
The approaches made by psychologists also intermingle, 
not only with each other, but also with the sociologist's and 
urban geographer's, perhaps not surprisingly, since several 
of those most closely associated with environmental 
psychology in this country are also sociologists. 
Environmental psychology is the name by which the 
most obviously relevant work is known. In Britain, it is 
almost synonymous with the names of Lee, C2nter, and 
Smith although there is considerable work being done in 
the USA and Sweden. This is a field which should be full 
of promise: and, when it sticks to the more measurable 
aspects of the enviro=cnt (eg, heat, light and sound)35 it 
adds considerably to our understanding. The trouble begins 
at a more ambitious level, when the psychologist tries to 
examine what we prefer in the environment, because he is 
stuck with the same old problem: what characteristic can 
and should he try to evaluate? If there is no reasonable way 
of representing today's ideas (such as they are) of space, 
what can he test? Are there actually any such ideas? His 
answer is to resort to the old architectural vocabulary, 
liberally peppering it with references to the importance of 
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Experiment to link furniture, ceiling pitch and friendliness 
object features in the space, assuming that there arc suit- 
able descriptions. Thus, considerable effort can be put into 
examining the significance of the positioning of coffee 
tables in working-class housing36 which tells the architect 
that incorporating such and such a table, in such and such 
a position, will have particular symbolic meaning. But this 
really tells us very little about space itself: it tells us that 
a particular object can take on a role of token, and be 
treated as something around which an almost Jungian 
social ritual can be played out. 
On the other side of the coin is the preference test: this 
involves representing various altemative treatments of 
enclosures, and tells us a fair amount about people's 
desires within a very limited frame of refercnce. 37 
Would you prefer the window high or low? 
anstoer 'So that I can see out of it'; 
Do you prefer timber or concrete panelling? 
anstver 'Timber'. 
These are valuable discoveries, but they are talking about 
the trimmings, and they are talking within the framework 
of the conventions of architectural drawings which, as we 
all affirm, are not explicit (if they were, why would we 
have to learn to read them? ) In fact, the best piece of work 
of this sort I have seen, was carried out by Anthony Daniel 
in his first year at the AA, and showed how, by altering 
two or three line thicknesses on an elevation, you could 
entirely change people's attitude to what was otherwise the 
same thing. 
Sometimes this sort of work comes up with valuable 
insights: Canter's example of high-rise dwellers disliking 
their flats for reasons of design (up-ended cut-de-sacs) and 
mechanical dependence (it's a long way to climb), rather 
than because of remoteness (being up high etc), is just one 
raSC. 37 But, by and large, the problem of the description 
of spatial experience is never really faced: the concern is 
with operating standard terms (rather thin questioning 
their adequacy) and with object-tokens (rather than the 
relationships existing between them) while it is in these 
relationships that we find space. 
Why these HmIts? 
Why has this happened? It might be that psychologists and 
architects understand each other's field inadequately, or 
even that psycholgists are rarely called in by architects and 
so, although they give advice, their advice is not often the 
advice architects are looking for or listening to. Many 
psychologists will admit to this. But I have a feeling it is 
also to do with the 'origins' of the concern, as expressed in, 
for example, the work of the naive linguist Benjarnin Lee 
Whorf. 38 Whorf's hypothesis is a strange one, to do with 
listing. David Crystal claims it set linguistics back twenty 
years, because, while it was acutely observed, it concerned 
itself with object-tokens, and not with relationship s. 3 0 
What Whorf actually did was to connect vocabulary to 
events, that is, to claim that words give mastery over things, 
so that more words give more mastery: if there are more 
words for states of a fire, you have more mastery over that 
fire (Whorf was, like the American composer Ives, an 
insurance agent). This is true. But it appears that the 
mastery comes from the relationships between the words, 
not as Whorf believed, from the words themselves (which, 
as any lexicon shows, can only make sense through their 
inter-relationships. 
It is interesting that, since Whorf's effort, few linguists, 
psycho-linguists, linguistic philosophers have tried to con- 
tribute to understandings of space. They have been much 
more concerned with the formation of concepts and the 
relationships between language and thought. Work linking 
language and architecture has been carried out mostly by 
architects. The one notable exception has been Wittgen. 
stein, whose vignettes on space are telling, and indicate 
some of the difficulties encountered (and so rarely faced) 
when trying to represent spatial cxperience. 40 For example, 
, it could very well be imagined that someone knows his way 
around a city perfectly, ic, would confidently find the 
shortest way from any place in It to any other, and yet 
would *3c quite incompetent to draw a map of the city; 
that, as soon as he tries, he products nothing that is not 
completely wrong (our concept of 'instinct'). ' 
The evidence which I will present based on my own 
work, in a later AAQ article, specifically develop& this 
point of view. In brief, one of the main contentions, dis- 
covered in the earliest experiments, Is that people represent 
their ideas differently. Since ideas can only be assessed 
through some means of representation (and one believes 
Whorf about one's own ideas, at least In this respect), the 
best one can do is to examine such representations, equat. 
ing them with the ideas. Thus one maintains that everyone 
sees things differently, even though there is a commonality 
that allows us to speak of 'the same' (when I uy two things 
are the same, I am, in fact, insisting that they arc different). 
The implications for the nature of the Objects we perceive 
is as great as it is for the means of seeing, and in particular 
it means that we never see the whole of an Object (the 
Whole Truth), and that we can only describe an Object by 
using another one in its place. 41.42 Thus, the problem Is 
one both of representation and of the equating of two 
different perceptions. 
Consequently, one is concerned with the psychologist's 
attempts to grasp the mechanics of perception. Experi- 
ments such as the Ames Room, paradoxes such as the 
Necker Cube, deceptions such as the appearance of a shape 
from interference in other shapes, provide the main 
illustrative material. 43 But of course, what they are con- 
cerned with is the mechanics of perception, that is, how 
things such as the eye-brain interface Interpret Inform&- 
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and not with what the brain might think of this 
, rctation. 43 Perception and cognition are inextricably d, the opposite sides of the same coin, but they do 
to be mutually exclusive points of view: if perception 
. erned with how sensory information (signal) comes the world outside to us, cognition is concerned with 
Cur models of the world outside affect the way we see 
is, spparently, there (data). 46,47 Any description, 
h involves recognizing a similarity between what is 
ived, through a mental model of what is perceived, 
i way of representing it, is clearly cognitive, since it 
Tes this extemalising of the model of the world. So 
while we learn from the perceptual psychologist a 
of relationsl-#s between the informational struc- 
ef the world and the ordering of the sensory data we 
a from it, we clearly do not learn about the type of 
. 'etce or the ways we might usefully describe this. 49 
: Vuter concepts 
L-al set of people are concerned with ways in which 
-: jht describe space. Those who are concerned with 
,; acr simulations 
(or syntheses) and even computer- 
I design, must, of necessity, state formally the 
ýýa, and the relationships holding between them, 
"red in architecture. h Although one might hope that 
q-, roach could lead to some deep analyses and des. 
ý=s of spatial qualities we find rather the opposite. 
! ad of treating architecture as design most computers 
i! efing it as problem solving. 49 In using these terms I 
1: ning at the following basic differences. In problem 
zg one has a known starting point (the problem): a 
. (the solution); a 
field of operation (the problem to be 
4 sad the range of possible actions) and one operates 
: Cy through this. Any collection of sets and connec- 
t leads to the unique solution. But with design, the 
. k:: 4 the goal, and the field of operation are unclear 
1: ýq gell together, each modifying the other to create 
VUIC* Any collection of sets and connectives, in an 
d-zed field of operation, can have another contra- 
4-Y set generated: sO, 51 the unique solution disappears 
k-u one does not know which are the relevant sets. 
4, t1he computer's interests in design, where not to do 
'- 1: 
--g problems, critical paths etc, 
is sadly to do with 
r. ý4tjo=l topologieS52 (which any designer handling 
tý-ýsational problems can cope with)' or with set 
ýrrýc models, rather as described above, to provide an 
Mýrct`s Est of design criteria. The one, profound 
P, ý I know is Nick Negroponte at MIT, 53,54 where 
ý ';; -_; uter builds up use-of-space, and identity models: 'fren 
these remain inexpEcit as to the spatial qualities 
ý &SCM (if any). 
crad U the start of something big Z 
not be thought that I am just trying to denigrate -4 
Ur-rk thlut I have described. I understand as well as 
ý41 else the contingent reality researchers face, and 
its liclýts, and with appropriate allowancc made for 
) assumptions, the work adds something to 
; Z! mt=&ng and ability. 77he question is only about 
c ct I 
Lý. ts szd assumptions (which it sometimes fails to 
t respond to). If we are trying to understand how 
1=d space, to tap our cognitive models, then it is 
vital that we should not force such models into particular 
representational frameworks, for, as I have argued, we can 
only see the ideas through their representations. Unless we, 
as the originators of our own models, can be allowed to 
find our own ways of expressing them, so that we can see 
the relationship and so that we believe there is not too great 
a distortion, it will not be our model that we display, but 
the interaction of our model and an investigator's prescrip- 
tion. (I am fully aware that I am talking about an ideal, but 
an ideal is almost, by definition, something we should 
work towards. ) As far as I can see, virtually all the work 
on oiar understanding of space assumes an appropriate 
means of description and is hence prescriptive and distort- 
ing. What we need, before we can reasonably ask people 
to use such prescriptions, is the justified sense that they do 
relate to understanding without grossly distorting it. 
In consequence, if we want to generate ways of describ- 
ing, and to examine our cognitive models, we must take 
into account the limitations of descriptive structures in 
order to assess their appropriateness, as well as considering 
the nature of the processes of observation and description, 
and of observable objects. 
It seems remarkable to me that from the examination of 
what is currently a questionable field of dubious merit 
(architecture, and the architect's handling of space), 
evidence should come that I believe to be of profound 
significance to philosophical, psychological and representa- 
tion theories. I will try to expound them in my follow-up 
article, accounting for five years' work trying to nail-down 
our understanding of space. 
Notational references 
I use the word architecture in the widest sense adumbrating 
2 
urbanism, planning and so on. 
b 
How else can it be that the centrally-generated external Greek 
space, in which to see was to participate and be Included, is 
treated by modem man as in object-token, a thing to be 
approached and over-populated at the central generator? 
C For a detailed criticism of his work, see my review in AAQ 
volume 8 number 3. 
d 
I am specifically referring to a draft to a series of articles intended 
for publication in Architect's journal. I hope my reference to 
this draft source will not be considered unethical or misleading. 
barnes 
per se have no need to elucidate the real world, of course. 
r 
Although oppression is not obligatory. 
8 
Indeed Paul Lawless, of the AA Planning Department, recently 
delighted me with evidence that, using 45 different criteria, 45 
different sets of neighbourhood could be found in Manchester. 
h 
More cunning users can make computers participate in defining 
these, but this makes no eventual difference. 
i 
Although Peter Jackson has produced a programme which goes 
far beyond this, and generates surprising alternatives-33 
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It is well-known that it is far harder for an at ural speaker of a language to understand (in an academic sense) its gram- 
matical structure and limitations. Of course he understands 
them, intuitively and sub-consciously (if they Indeed exist) 
far better than the foreigner: that is why he speaks fluently 
and without flaw; and yet that natural speaker, considering a foreign language. will often notice things that shed light on his own natural language. In talking about . architectural 
drawings, architects are confronted with the same problem 
of familiarity. We can, of course. talk about architectural drawings as mechanical projections, or In a number of other 
ways; but we can also treat architectural drawings in a 
manner analogous to that in which language was discussed 
above. That is, we as architects may look at another similar, 
but distinct, 'language' in order to reflect on lessons we can 
learn about architectural drawings. 
It is this second approach that I shall follow here. As my 
'foreign language'. I shall use maps, which have an obvious 
similarity to architectural drawings, while remaining clearly 
distinct. What I want to do is took at the ways that the distor- 
tion and editing. which I shall show to be essential in making 
maps. are not a disadvantage, but actually provide a whole 
extra expressive dimension which the skilful cartographer 
exploits to great effect in creating his picture of reality. This 
is not, of course. an attempt at any profound views on 
cartography per se; rather it is the exploitation of one 
discipline in the service of another. 
The most important feature of cartography that I wish to 
concentrate on, is its inherent inaccuracy. This inaccuracy 
comes about in two ways, the first of which Is mechanical: the 
problem of projection. I should emphasise, straight away, 
that this inaccuracy should not be regarded as malicious. 
Since it is inevitable, it cannot be bad, any more than our 
need to breathe is bad. The question of accuracy is not even 
really one for comparative assessment. If you cannot be 
absolutely accurate, you can have no one standard against 
which to measure and compare accuracies. So I regard the 
inaccuracy of projection as benign, as generating the neces- 
sity for maps that must contain interpretation and cannot be 
thought of as neutral. 
The problem of projection Is essentially encapsulated in 
the problem of converting a three-dimensioned sphere into 
a two-dimensional plane, as is demonstrated infigure 1. This 
is a problem in principle. as opposed to a problem in the tech- 
nology of execution. There have, of course, been many 
attempts at resolving this problem in which a Imirtimum'of 
distortion is allowed to creep in. it is not the fact of this 
distortion that interests me; it is, rather. how it is used. Most 
of us have grown up with projections. such as Mercator's 
(figure 2), which display the world in such a way that the 
powerful European countries are relatively large and central, 
while the dominated Third World countries are com. 
paratively reduced in size. This is a product of a projection 
technique in which some parts must appear unduly large. 
But which parts are so enlarged depends on exactly how and 
where the tehnique is applied. It is quite possible to create the 
map in such a way that Europe appears small, while parts of 
the Third World (which, in Mercator's day, Europeans were 
busy conquering and exploiting) appear large simply by 
tilting and spinning the globe a bit before constructing the 
projection; obviously, not the sort of impression the princes, 
merchants and adventurers, who originally comrnissioned 
the maps, would wish to Create. It is still amazing and 
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salutory to consider the apparent and 'actual' sizes of. say, 
theUnited Kingdom and India, and the way they are reflected 
in the significance we give to each in our consideration of the 
world. 
As a way of demonstrating these differences, consider for 
a moment Buckminster Fuller's extra-ordinary dymaxion 
world-map; extra-ordinary because of its daring originality. 
In his article 'Fluid Geography', Fuller considered an 
icosahedron built around the world, with the land surfaces 
projected onto each face of the solid. This gives a remarkably 
small range of size distortion, and allows the icosahedron to 
be folded out flat by cutting along selected edges. So far so 
good; but what is interesting here, is what Fuller does as he 
unfolds his map; for he is quite aware of the arbitrariness of 
the decision of how to apply the projection and of its inten. 
tionality. Thus, he provides several maps which accord to 
different intentions in what he wishes to show. (figure 3) 
So it is also with the prime position at the centre of the 
map. It might seem sensible to us for the 0* meridian to run 
down the middle. leaving Great Britain at the centre of atten- 
tion (after all, we carefully engineered the meridian to pass 
through our Royal Observatory). But, in American atlasses. 
we Europeans are amazed to f ind the USA in the centre. with 
Europe posted to the eastern fringes of the map. 
Such distortions might be thought only to matter when 
dealing with at least large parts of spheres; but this is, of 
course. not so. For while the sphere-to-plane conversion 
problem disappears from significance, when the area of the 
sphere is small and the surface curvature is so minimal, that it 
can be considered as being flat; this does not get over the 
normal problem, when the surface is not a simple section of 
sphere but undulates, undulations having been relatively 
insignificant when still operating at the scale of the whole 
sphere. A good example of this problem is tackled by the 
Swiss Federal Topographic Survey. 
Even the most sophisticated of stereoscopic aerial photo- 
graphic techniques have not superseded the traditional skill 
of sketching (figu" 4). It is not just a matter of overhangs 
creating obscurities, or of shadows blotting out great areas, 
though this is problem enough. The sheer vertical distances 
may be so great, the cliffs so high. that interpretation errors 
and ambiguities in the photographic data require resolution 
by reference to straight -forward, old-fashioned sketches, 
which are used in preference to photographs precisely 
because the skilled surveyor can choose what to include and 
what to edit out, in a way that will help the cartographer 
decide on his interpretation. In such circumstances, the 
distance distortion can be infinite; a vertical cliff will appear 
to have no distance at all; and should corrective devices, such 
as shading or contour lines, be used, considerable de-coding 
and unravelling will be needed in order to ascertain the cliff. 
height. The estimation of distances along the mapped 
surface, is, under such circumstances, very tricky, and there 
are necessarily very real distortions. This leads one to the 
second type of inaccuracy in maps, the inaccuracy caused in 
editing and interpretation. The need for sketches in the Swiss 
survey provides a good indicative introduction. Map-making 
necessarily involves editing; not only, however, in the way 
described, but because maps are intentionally simplifica. 
tions. They are not intended to contain all available informa- 
tion (for instance the exact position of every boulder in a 
rocky field), but rather (in exactly the same way as a scientific 
theory) to contain the least possible information, arranged as 
unambiguously and simply as will permit a skilled map. 
reader to extract and generate an adequate image of that 
which Is mapped, In the terms in which he wants this image. 
This is usually achieved by the use of some consensual 
conventions: for instance, the scales, information selection, 
key symbols and colouring of our Ordnance Survey; but this 
is not necessarily so. Many maps derive their power and 
interest, either through deliberately breaking the conven. 
tions, or through setting up particular conventions more 
appropriate to the points being made. It is on these kinds of 
maps that I wish now to concentrate. 
If the projection distortions. in which the European 
countries appear relatively too large (and where Britain, the 
USA, or whichever country is making the maps, appears in 
the centre), are considered as propaganda, they are not the 
only ways in which propaganda appears in maps. There are 
several ways of doing this. In a sense, the most straight. 
forward involves a sort of Cestalt switch. in which the 
outlines of various countries are seen. not as the countries 
themselves, but as something else. This type or map was 
particularly common in the Victorian era (figure S). but is. in 
origin, much older. For example. the medieval map of 
Opicinus de Canistris (figure 6) which Is surprisingly 
'accurate', shows the Mediterrinean, with Europ-e and 
Africa copulating. Quite what the intent of this comment is, 
is not clear! 
However. propaganda can be served in other. less 
cartoonistic ways; for instance by changes in scale. This is 
very similar to projection distortion. but is far less 
mathematical and is also far more openly wilful. The sketch 
map of the United Kingdom produced by the Doncaster - 
Development Corporation is a fine example (fligure 7). and is 
a telling commentary on the way British northerners reel 
about the southerner's view that civilisation stops at Watford 
(or is It Potter's Bar? ). Or course, this map relies, as do so 
manyothers, not only on theamusing comments, but also on 
the common knowledge of the 'real' shape of the United 
Kingdom. Such maps may be used. also. to demonstrate this 
most clearly. A comparison of the sizes of Manhattan and 
Long Islands and Cape Cod, highlights the relative 
importance of the home city and its playground. Even more 
telling is the comparison of provincial, small-minded 
complacency of the Bostonian's view, in which the central 
portion or the USA is virtually empty. to the cosmopolitan, 
openness of the New Yorker's: a characteristic many believe 
continues to this day. These maps may bring to mind 
Steinberg's wonderful New Yorker magazine cover. or 
course. these are highly-Intentionally distorted maps, but the 
same sorts of characteristics may be found appearing quite 
unintentionally. In the recently-published British Rail 
Sealink map Vigure 10). showing connections from Britain 
to Europe, a marvellous 'little England' mentality is 
apparent. The main Island of the United Kingdom (note that 
Ireland Is absent) appears as big, and with as complicated a 
rail system as the whole of Europe; and the Channel has 
become merely a narrow river; (surely a novel conception 
since we joined the EEC). It is not only for these 
characteristics that this map is of interest. for it also reflects 
interesting attitudes to continuity and direction; after all, in a 
train journey, what matters to the passenger is the continuity 
of places passed through. and some approximate sense of 
their separation. The detail or bends in the track Is essentially 
irrelevant, and absolute direction is unimportant. In a sense. 
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places follow straight on, one after the other. Thus, the 
graphic exigencies that require the positioning of Milan in the 
space at the European left-hand centre of figure 10 is in no 
sense offensive, although we know quite well that, 
geographically, this is wildly inaccurate. Nor do we care that 
the distance from Grantham to Peterborough, in the United 
Kingdom, is shown as roughly the same as from Minsk to 
Moskva in Europe! 
The most familiar map using this sort of distortion must 
surely be the London Underground map, constantly revised 
and updated as new lines have been introduced. This map is 
not only a masterwork of graphic clarity, it has also had a 
profound effect on the way in which many, if not most users 
of London, have learnt the city, and has left traces of various 
geographical distortions in most of their minds. For 
instance. the apparent straightness of the District and Circle 
fines between Embankment and Gloucester Road stations 
(, Gloucester' was spelt 'Gloster' in the original 1886 District 
Line map). So successful has this map been that British Rail, 
for instance, have copied it for their 'Overground' map; and 
the New York City Transit Authority attempted a version for 
their infinitely more complex system: a map that ended up 
being over -corn plicated. and hence, thoroughly confusing. 
(in the last year. this map has been replaced by another, far 
clearer one that works as a sort of kit-of-parts). Distortions 
in geographical location have been used as a way of 
generating debates about urban knowledge in the Architec. 
tural Association School by Annetta Pedretti. I will not 
explain the technique here. (It is covered in my article 
'Amazing Space! For the Architectural Stimulus-Response 
Rat? 'AA Q volume 9 number 2/3 1977. and in moredetail in 
myrecently-published book Calculator Saturnalia G Pask, R 
Glanville, M Robinson, Wildwood House, London 1980. ) 
Were there to be no distortion, the map in figure 12 would 
consist or regularly-spaced axes surrounded by regularly- 
spaced perfect circles. That it does not indicates distance 
'distortions' which, upon enquiry. were found to run along, 
for instance, a regulary-used tube line: the Central. Applying 
a similar transformation technique to the tube map itself 
produces, from the square grid on the original. a meshed net 
of considerable irregularity (iligure 13). From such maps, a 
mirroring of personal, urban, spatial perception is possible. 
However, there are other aspects of these maps that are 
also or interest. In pursuing the concepts of continuity and 
sequence, we have the source of the route map. While we are 
all familiar, nowadays. with the sort of motorway route map 
prepared by the RAC and the AA, which accurately, but 
simply, reflect our perceptions of such journeys, we may not 
be aware that they have a long history. The sort of informa- 
don seen injigure 14 (which it is nice to compare to the map 
from approximately a century and a quarter before (ligure 
1J)) Indicates a refinement on that seen in the amazing 
Mathew Paris map from 1252 (figure 16). in that the towns 
are presented in plan, and the bends in the road are shown 
(while the road width is absurdly disproportionate); perhaps 
refinements of dubious value, unless the road is either very 
=bi&uous or very badly sign-posted! Paris's map is an 
extra-ordinary achievement, in which towns, a day'sjourney 
&part. are marked on part of the London to Rome route. 
(London is on the bottom left, running through Rochester 
and Canterbury to Dover, and thence, in the right hand 
column. via Calais or Boulogne, on to Beauvais. ) The towns 
are characterised by sketches of their appearances. and are 
spaced according to that other standard for measuring distance, time; (a journee was a convenient day's travel). This brings me to another point. As we know from our use 
of time in defining distance. distances and sizes in maps may 
represent things other than lengths and ground areas. The 
use of time in making maps continues today, and is most 
effective, as in figure 17 (which first appeared In New 
Society) showing Britain drawn in terms of travel times from 
London. The effect is extraordinary. with poor Stranraer 
posted, at nine hours, rather further away from London than 
Edinburgh. Times have since changed, of course. with New York only three and a half hours away by Concorde. there 
are many ambiguities: eg why isn't the time taken to get to the 
airport included?; but the cartograrn would be substantially 
the same shape today, as recent work by some first-year 
Architectural Association students has shown. It Is the shape 
itself that is so powerful and even shocking, a power which 
rests, once again. on the fact that we know the 'proper'shape 
of the United Kingdom, and so can appreciate the difference 
when an alternative form or projection is used; in this case, distance by time as opposed to distance by length. Similarly 
the two maps of Finland Uigure 18) which first appeared in 
Helsingin Sanomat. and which are drawn for acroplane 
(heavy black line), rail (grey line. Finnish trains are rather 
slow) and road (thin black line) travel times from Helsinki 
and from Oulu. makes the point not just about the type of 
projection used, but also its place of application; and re- 
inforces the points made earlier. 
A nice inversion of the representation of the distance-for- 
time substitution may be found infigure 19. This map, from 
Scientific American, shows the effect of the time-zoning in 
the United States. The central line indicates the 'real' time, 
with the white areas to the east and west indicating how 
much, late or early, each main city is relative to this. The map 
has been used to establish how changing time zone 
boundaries might effect savings of energy by allowing better 
exploitation of daylight hours. However. just as exact direc. 
tion is not important in the British Rail Seatink map (licure 
10). there are some circumstances under which not only Is 
direction irrelevant, but so is distance, and even what is pass- 
ed by. The most obvious instance of this is air travel, where 
one is simply processed (by a large variety of time-consuming 
distractions) from one place to another. This is demonstrated 
in the Swissair system map Vigure 20). where neither distance 
nor direction are intended to be understood as in the map at 
all. rather only the inter-connectedness. The Finnair system 
map Vigure 21). is another fine example, containing as it 
does, not only flight destinations. but also a complete 
timetable. In a sense, there is one further type of map that is 
even more abstract, yet, paradoxically, may be more real and 
less distorted than any of the others we have looked at. A fine 
example may be found in JRR Tolkeins's The Lord of the 
Rings (George Allen and Unwin, London 1954), where a 
completely invented world is demonstrated and elaborated In 
map form. There is an old history to this: Thomas Slore 
illustrated his Utopia with a map (, figure 23), and rather more 
eccentrically, there in the delightful ocean chart from The 
Hunting of the Snark (figure 24). Not quite so abstract, ire 
maps such as that in figure 2J. which was published by the 
Sunday Times in order to emphasise the Imbalance between 
physical size and population in British electoral constituen- 
cies. It may come as quite a shock to see just how tiny 
Scotland is compared to London, a shock brought home. as 
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with the travel cartograms (figures 17 and 18). by our 
familiarity with geographical Britain. The use of maps to 
make such sociological comment is extensive. Indeed a major 
reason for the initial mapping of cities was not only to show 
property and ownership. but also physical and social condi. 
tions. The tradition is continued in, for instance, London 
Allasand its off-shootA SocialAllasqfLondon (JShepperd, 
J Westaway. T Lee. Clarendon Press, London 1974) from 
whichfigure 26, showing the population structure by sex and 
age in each London borough, is taken. The point of this map 
is that, in a sense, everything cartographic in it is 
irrelevant! The names of the boroughs would surely be 
enough to communicate all the information that is intended 
to be communicated in the map. The map does, however, 
have the wholistic immediacy that visual media hold over the 
purely verbal; the set of maps collected together gives a very 
subtle and complex picture of the city. A rather more carto- 
graphically-based, sociological map. is the map prepared for 
the National Temperance League in 1885, showing the loca. 
tions of public house in central London (figure 27). 
This study in no sense runs the full gamut of maps; but 
then, it is not my intention to do so. What I have presented, is 
essentially a collection of maps chosen by me for their 
peculiarities. The simplifications and distortions involved 
are, I believe, a real bonus, because they may be used to 
advantage in expressing not just that which Is important. but 
also in obliging us to recognise that an interpretation must be 
made and understood as an integral part of the act of 
representing the 'reality' we see around us. 
Clearly, this is the position in which the architect, drawing 
some project, rinds himself. It is notjust a matter of mapping 
out the building, of constructing and exploring the 'realities' 
we perceive and make; but of selecting a way in which we can 
genuinely explore and develop our ideas in a manner which, 
while bound to distort, makes use of distortion that is both 
sympathetic and relevant. While the sorts of distortions, and 
their conscious and unconscious uses that I have shown in the 
making of maps, are in no sense to be taken as demarcating 
ways of arranging architectural drawings, there 6xe rich, and 
often subtle, analogies that each draughtsman may draw. I 
could try to do that for the reader, but I will not: not as a 
'cop-out', but because it is my firm belief that the deepest 
and most meaningful analogies for a designer. are those he 
constructs and maps out for himself. so that they truly reflect 
his own reality. 
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ABSTRAC 
In this paper I look at the notions of Impossible and Possible Worlds, 
showing how one can be converted into the other by the creation of novelty 
and explaining the responses one can make on finding oneself inhabiting 
an Impossible World. I then give an example of an inherently Impossible 
World which has been made to appear Possible and has thus created 
novelty (and great beauty: the example is painting). Finally, / examine the 
roots of Impossibility, and define a prellminiary taxonomy of the sources of 
Impossible Worlds. 
"Once we lose faith In the blanket formula of education, In the magic 
fashion In which education, using the passive capacities of children, Is to 
create something out of nothing, we can turn our atttention to the vital 
matter of developing Individuals, who as adults gradually mould our old 
patterns Into new and richer forms. " (Margaret Mead) 
WHAT AND WHYjMPOSSIBLE WORLDS 
An Impossible World is a World in which there are very few options but to 
be Imaginative - like a sort of assault and initiative course that demands 
Imagination. For even (or, perhaps, especially military) assault and 
Initiative courses demand of those sent on them great creativity in their 
thinkingl 
Thus, an Impossible World Is, in my terms, a world in which one finds 
oneself, In which one cannot see a Possible way to achieve that which one 
wants: usually, to escape from the Impossible World or to survive In it 
(which is tantamount to escaping its Impossibility). In this description, 'l 
believe I can claim a certain proprietary interest 1. 
Why, then, should there be any Interest in Impossible Worlds? My answer, 
which comes from 15 years of experience in exploring and exploiting the 
notion, Is because it may be Possible to escape If something new Is done 
to change the perception of the Possible: le, if there Is a creative act 
producing novelty. I have used this idea extensively in setting projects for 
my students over this time, in order to encourage them to be creative (to re- 
find the skill they had before it was schooled out of them ) in some sense, 
le, to use the idea to encourage the release or amplification of creativity. 
The fact that such novelty may only be locally novel (eg the proverbial re- 
Invention of the wheel) in no way takes away from it as an act of Individual 
creation. If every invention we each made had to be universal In its novelty, 
we would all be dead even in a constructivist world, for we depend 
constantly on individual invention just to create and maintain our cognitive 
being: so we are constantly creating new concepts that make sense of or 
modify ones that already exist for us, accomodating that which was 
previously unaccomodated into our new scheme. Nor, without this constant 
invention, would any objects of observation have obtained any constancyl 
(I am Intentionally avoiding the complexities of linguistic locution that are 
necessary to reasonably present a constructivist argument, In the Interests 
of brevity and comprehensibility, for this paper is not primarily about the 
nature, explication and implications of constructivist world views). The fact 
that any particular World is Impossible for one does not mean that it has to 
be so for another, nor that any World, Possible for one, is so for another. 
Were this condition not to hold, social learning (of the sort where re- 
inventing the wheel is deemed, in social terms and according to social 
criteria, to be a waste of time) would be Impossible. 
In claiming that, in order to escape from or survive in an Impossible World It 
is necessary to be creative and to make something novel, I am not claiming 
that these are the only circumstances in which creativity is called for, not 
am I claiming that to be placed in an Impossible World guarantees a 
creative act. There may even be catatonia: but then nothing new was ever 
achieved without risk being taken (otherwise it would not be new, hence 
unknown, hence unpredictable, hence new). 
Thus, the Impossible should be distinguished from the merely very (or 
even inconceivably) difficult: for, in the latter, there is at least the 
assumption of a tacit possibility absent in the former. (However, it may be 
Possible to redefine some very difficult situation so that it is Impossible. ) 
The difference is akin to that between a number that Is vastly, 
indescribably, Indefinitely large, and an infinite number: an exclusive 
difference of class. 
POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS 
Let me, then, start by explaining the dynamic that I see behind the 
relationship existing between Possible and Impossible Worlds. 
There are three of these dynamics. 
1) An Inhabitant of an Impossible World may convert It 
to a Possible World by the creation of (what Is to him, at least) 
novelty. 
2) An Inhabitant of a Possible World may convert It to an 
Impossible World (often by treating the Possible World 
Impossibly), again by the creation of novelty. 
3) An Inhabitant of a World, formerly Possible, made 
Impossible by him by the creation of novelty, may make that 
Impossible World Possible again, either by back-trackIng (the 
destruction of the novelty just created), or by the creation of 
further novelty. In the latter case, habits may be broken 2. 
An inhabitant of an Impossible World may take one of 3 courses vis-a-vis 
his current location (predicamentl): 
1) He may stay there. This will probably lead to a rather unhappy 
and vacillating existence (unless the inhabitant is that rare sort of person 
who thrives on explicit paradox), or lead eventually to catatonic behaviour: 
indeed, it is likely that many psychological pathologies may be explained 
in terms of the confrontation and inhabitation of Impossible Worlds. But not 
here. It is only of interest here, where I am concerned with creativity, in that 
some inhabitants remain inhabitants of an Impossible World by In effect 
following course 3) below and redefining the Impossible as Possible, 
probably without us ever noticing or him ever remarking it (le, the 
inhabitant survives). 
2) The inhabitant back-tracks out of the Impossible World, 
leaving by the way he came in, and returning to the safety of a Possible 
World. This is a familiar enough phenomenon, expressed, for Instance, In 
the phrase "backing off in the face of a challenge", and Is, again, of little 
Interest in considering Impossible Worlds as a source of creativity, 
although of much interest in the examination of management techniques, 
domination, cowardice etc.. 
3) The inhabitant escapes, reconstructing the Impossible World 
so that (at least to him at the time) it becomes Possible. This necessarily 
involves the creation of novelty already mentioned. This Is the area of 
response to the inhabitation of Impossible Worlds that is of Interest here, 
and which may lead to all sorts of Possibilities through the exploitation of 
the means of escape itself. Naturally, there is the risk element Involved, 
and 1) and 2) both indicate some (rather dramatic) results of Inhabiting 
Impossible Worlds without escaping satisfactorily 3. 
In the history of human achievement, we tend only to'hear of (major 
examples of) such escapes - le case 3) - precisely because this way of 
exploiting Impossible Worlds can lead to the creation of novelty, and Is 
therefore of value and interest (in our image of our civilization as 
"developing"): interesting enough for us to explore an example here of an 
Impossible World that has undoubtedly lead to the creation of novelty, the 
products of which are of great beauty. 
In the history of the development of Western pictorial art, one of the major 
factors has been that pictures have been made that appear to represent 
three dimensional (ie "real world") objects existing In three dimensional (ie 
"real world") space. 
But there Is an Impossibility here, for the picture plane within which this 
representation takes place is the 2-D (two dimensional) picture space (the 
flat surface of the canvas, for instance). Thus, the objects and their 
relationship in space that are being represented are being required, by the 
painter and later also the viewer, to inhabit an Impossible World of 2-D. 
And so we have an example of an Impossible World made Possible. 
This difficulty does not, of course, confront sculpture, most of which has 
been of figures (occasionally groups of figures), which are still 3-D, and 
exist in 3-D space such that the viewer can go around them, just as the 
objects depicted exist. It is only in this century, and almost certainly 
because of Innovations in. pictorial art, that sculpture has become 
concerned in any significant manner with such ideas as space contained 
within the the body of the sculpture (the equivalent of the architect's normal 
public Interior space as invented by the Romans), as opposed to 
generated around it, as with most sculptural and living figures do (in the 
manner that the Greeks generated their architectural space around their 
temples). This may help account for the extra-ordinary similarity of 
sculptural objects throughout the history of Western art, at least until very 
recently. 
However, for painting, the situation is markedly different. Any 
representation of 3-D objects inhabiting 3-D spaces within a 2-D picture 
space necessarily involves a translation (usually. considered an 
Information loss, although this is a very biased interpretation. I have shown 
some similar process also occurs in cartography, which Is faced with a very 
similar problem). 
This is the Impossibility that faces the painter: how do you present In a 2-D 
picture space objects related in space that may be understood as being 3- 
D 4. And, although we are all so familiar with an accepted way of doing this 
that it may at first appear neither to be nor ever to have been an 
Impossibility, it isl 
If we go back less that 1000 years, to the tradition of the Icon (which still 
flourishes, little-changed, today), we find a means of representing space 
that does not rely on the prespective projection that was Introduced by 
(and, indeed, some would say, generated) the Renaissance. For, In these 
older "pre-mediaeval" paintings, spatial relationship was not represented 
via perspective - and the figures were flat and posed In a set and stylised 
way we would now celebrate by the term "iconically". Instead, they were 
arranged in such a manner that the relationship of the figures in plan was 
simply drawn up as a sort of tiered elevation, with strong maintenance of 
the topological invariancies. (This is as if the whole culture perceived 
space in the manner of a pre-projective Piagetian child 5). 
There Is no doubt that these pre-Renaissance pictures have great beauty 
and value, nor that they did develop in several ways during their period of 
dominance, including their mastery of the presentation of 3-D objects and 
spaces within the picture space albeit using conventions and techniques 
quite different to those we are used to (for Instance, the relationship 
between height and distance was appreciated and represented, although 
explaining this leads to other problems that I do not wish to tackle here), 
but there is, equally, no doubt that this means of expressing 3-D In 2-D 
also ran out of both interest and steam, and, at least so far as the critic Is 
concerned, the problem of the Impossibility of the painter's World re- 
surfaced. So that, as a result, we had a change of style that we refer to' as 
the (a) Renaissance. 
In painting, this event is often placed for convenience and clarity at the 
divide between the more or less contemporaneous paintings of Duccio 
(pre-Renaissance) and Giotto (Renaissance). The difference can be 
summarised through reference to Giotto's rounded, composed and 
interacting figures (his groups could be understood as forming a whole 
together), and the integration of depth into his pictures by dramatic 
reference to a fixed vanishing point. 
And it Is this that indicates the change. Where, previously, figures had 
been drawn in their position in plan (almost as an architect draws an 
elevation, for architects have a completely different convention all of their 
own), they were now drawn according to a visualisation in which as 
objects recede they converge: a projective space that became formalised 
in the mathematical rules of perspective which generated the sort of 
projection we generally expect in a figurative picture (but which, it 
happens, is optically and mathematically slightly inaccurate). 
So that the Impossible World of the representation of 3-D In 2-D, form 
* 
erly 
made Possible by the representation technique of lconnic tiers and 
topological invarlancies, once again become Possible through the 
invention of the fixed vanishing point perspective projection. (This Is not 
the only interpretation. For instance, the fixed vanishing point and 
perspective projection gives a particular role importance to certain figures, 
and to the position of the artist. ) 
This escape from the Impossible guided the development of Western 
pictorial art for about 600 years, and moved from Giotto's fumbling first 
attempts through the mathematically explicit paintings of the mid- 
Renaissance, where the explicit perspective constructions predominate 
(usually worked out by architects, and built into buildings that could be 
used as models in support of the cause), on to the "tricks" of the Flemish 
and English Renaissance, full of devices to demonstrate the painter's 
virtuosity in handling perspective. Simultaneously, the Italian Mannerists 
began to dispense with the need to be explicit about the perspective 
constructions used, and to rely more on figure modelling and grouping, 
secure in the knowledge that their patrons and the public at large were 
fully educated and quite fluent in the conventions of perspectiV9, and 
needed neither clues as to how it worked, nor to be reminded at every turn 
that artists, having mastered it, really could control itl From this. it was only 
a step to the romantic and naturalist paintings in which figures t tre dotted 
around a landscape, full of hints of depth but with little or no ex:; l1cit 
perspective projection or fixed vanishing point, a line of develcpment 
finally ending with the whispy, misty paintings of the Impressionists and 
post Impressionists, in which the explicitness of the fixed vanishing point 
and perspective projection has totally vanished, and these devices, so 
clever In inventing a way of making an Impossible World Possible, and so 
valuable In offering themselves as both technique and framework for the 
exploration of 3-D space in the picture plane, no longer hold sway. 
And so, we are back where we were before the Renaissance stormed In: 
our World, held to be Possible for 600 years (and producing much 
wonderful work as a result) is no longer Possible, and we need a new way 
out of the Impossibility of representing 3-D In 2-D 6. 
Such a new construction was discovered by the Cubists (most particularly 
Picasso and Braques around 1910), who had realised that much of our 
experience and enjoyment of the 3-D World is through movement around 
objects in space, collecting a number of different views through which we 
create our own image of the totality (analogously to the way we guess what 
is on those facades and sides that are not visible but are imagined Into our 
Renaissance fixed vanishing point perspective projection picture). Their 
revolution was to use a collage of views to compose together In terms of 
the picture space a representation of the totality of the objects and spaces 
as appreciated in 3-D, which they did at just the time that there was 
developed, anyhow, a machine for capturing perspectives "without" the 
Intervention of the artist - the camera (in contrast to the camera obscura, 
often used earlier by artists to help them set up the perspectives they were 
to depict). 
Although this is neither intended as, nor could ever claim to be a history of 
Western painting, and although the point of Impossible and Possible 
Worlds has been made, it would be unfortunate not to give a passing 
reference to developments since the advent of Cubism 7. 
In terms of the dichotomy between 3-D and 2-D Worlds, there have been 4 
main streams: the first is the explicit continuation of what a scientist might 
like to refer to as the "Cubist research programme"; the second a retreat to 
a super-realism (while photography has moved away from its role as 
realist); the third and fourth have been to deny (interest In) the problem 
posed by 3-D and 2-D - in the first case by dealing only In the space of the 
picture plane itself, and in the second by allowing the picture plane to 
become In its own dght a 3-D object, creating its own relationships In 3-D 
space. Not that this is a full account of current painterly concern, for many 
painters have lost their hunger for the picture space all together. 
Thus has a World, Impossible, been (re-)made so that it seems Possible, 
by acts of great inventiveness - real creations of novelty - which, 
themselves became devices worthy of deep study and development, (at 
least In the case of the fixed viewpoint and perspective projection), which 
were exploited and developed by the community of painters (and sculptors 
and architects) for 600 years, with results of great beauty, Insight and, dare 
I say It, truth and which we love, admire and learn from. But this is just one 
example of an Impossible World. And, while it Is Interesting to consider 
others, it Is even more interesting to consider whether there is a way in 
which the range of Impossible Worlds can be organised to bring clarity to 
the sources of their impossibility. 
Any attempt at a taxonomy, and especially one attempted so early on In the 
life of an area of Interest, is liable, later, to be found profoundly lacking. Yet 
I shall attempt at least to initiate a discussion in this area by introducing 
what is at least a form of classification if not, perhaps, the taxonomy I am 
aiming for. 
Impossible Worlds may be defined as belonging to 3 groups, each with 
sub-groups, and sometimes with further sub-sub-groups. In the listing 
below, examples are given under each sub-group (and sub-sub-group) 
heading 
The 3 groups are charactedsed as being Impossible as a consequence of 
1) theoretical limits 
2) pragmatic limits 
3) problems of definition. 
Their degree of Impossibility seems to decrease In this order, but all are, to 
all Intents and purposes, Impossible rather than merely very difficult. 
1) theoretical limits 
Certain things are Impossible in principle, in our constructions of the World. 
It Is, for instance, Impossible, in principle, to attain a temperature lower 
than that of absolute 0 (OOK, -2730C). Equally, it Is Impossible for a system 
with less variety to effectively control (without applying extra limits) another 
system (Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety): this is one reason that teachers 
can only control a classroom full of children by restricting their Possible 
behaviours. Of course, the example given above of the Impossible World of 
3 dimensions being presented in 2 belongs here. 
There are occasions when it is Impossible to do things for serious practical 
limitations of a theoretical kind. Thus, Bremermann has shown that there is 
a limit to the amount of information that any fixed quantity of matter can 
compute within any given time. It follows, therefore, that matter can only, 
over its lifetime have computed a certain maximum, in principle. Any 
question that can only be answered (in terms of the form In which it was 
presented) by computing more information than can be compu! ed by the 
locally available matter in the locally available time is in an Impossible 
World. (One example is that the earth could have computed about 1090 
bits during its lifetime, yet the Possiblities in the number of chemical 
combinations for the exclusive choice of a combination of 5 materials 
(using the exhaustive search method) Involves 10100 bits, which exceeds 
1090 by the order of 1010 bits. Therefore, calling upon such a calculation 
establishes an Impossible World. 
1.3) Internal structurg 
Certain propositions are in some sense contradictory, with the 
contradiction arising internally, as a result of the structure of the 
proposition. Such propositions are called paradoxes, and fall Into various 
classes )such as the infamous "Catch 22"). A typical paradox, such as the 
pair of ýtatements 
"All Cretans are liars. 
I am a Cretan. " 
cannot be resolved in terms of the conventional logic we allow to delimit 
what constitutes propriety in arguments. These statements create 
Impossible Worlds (although, in certain religions, notably Zen Buddhism, 
they are used as aids towards achieving the enlightenment of a higher 
understanding, in effect, making the Impossible Possible by jumping into a 
different perceptive framework) 
2) pragmatic limits 
2.1) local limitation 
This is the Impossibility caused by some local limitation which Is private to 
the system and may be neither noticeable nor understandable at all to 
those not involved in the system. An example is the mental block. For 
instance, a person isolates a problem, and posits some solution that turns 
out not to work. So the solution is modified yet still doesn't fit. This Is 
continued, until the string of modifications becomes very confused, and the 
solution so messy it is probably no solution at all. The person has become 
so tied up In the way of thinking he had set himself off along that he has 
forgotten the problem, and has trapped himself In irrelevant detail. This is a 
local limitation that he has applied, and creates, for him, an Impossible 
World. 
Similar to 1.3)o this Is the World which becomes Impossible through the 
action of conflicting demands being co-existent (ie, a contradiction or 
mutual exclusion exists as a result of these demands). (The difference 
between this case and 1.3), apart from a certain precision In the logical 
conditions, Is that 1.3) Impossibility is due to Internal factors, while 2.2) Is 
externally generated, reflecting external factors. ) For example, there Is 
frequently a conflict between political expediency and long-term 
requirements, which creates an Impossible World (easily resolved by 
forgetting one of the requirements: usually, In this case, the long-term). 
3) Definition difficulties 
This sub-group has 3 sub-sub-groups: ' 
3.1 a) Worlds made Impossible through ambiguity 
3.1 b) Worlds made Impossible through under-definition 
3.1 c) Worlds made Impossible through over-definition 
Any of these may lead to or be symptomatic of the sort of contradiction 
found in 2-2) and 1.3). 
3.2) Inappropriate means of description 
There may exist a conflict between the structure and possibilities of that 
which is to be described and that which is the descriptor such that it Is 
Impossible for the other to represent the one. At a simple level, it Is 
Impossible to say some things in one language that may be said In 
another, usually for reasons of historical semantics and / or lack of 
vocabulary. (inhabitants of the Nordic countries have about 40 terms for 
different types of Ice, whereas the British have about 5. ) But there are also 
structural conflicts, such as those between global (wholistic) means of 
representation (such as pictures), and linear, ie serial (such as the written 
word). These have such different structures that it is demonstrably 
Impossible to represent wholistic activities, for Instance, in serial 
languages. 
in this paper, the value of the notion of Impossible Worlds, and our 
potential responses to them as having the potential to engender creativite 
novelty, have been described, and one such (the depiction of 3-D objects 
in 3-D space in a 2-D picture space) has been explored as an example, to 
show how an Impossible World can be made Possible, and how in 
becoming seen as Possible it has given rise to great creativity. Finally, a 
taxonomy of reasons why Worlds are Impossible was attempted under the 
three groupings Theoretical Limits, Pragmatic Limits, and Definition 
Difficulties. 
But nothing has been said on how to handle Impossible Worlds, how to 
generate them, and how to recognise when you have one. Appended to 
this paper there are some lists that represent first attempts to approach 
these three areas. They are not particularly well ordered, and some are 
frankly Incomprehensible (since they have private references which I do 
not consider worthwhile explaining here). But they do represent things I 
have found useful in the time I have been using the Impossible World 
notion, and they were offered to students in a course in Impossible Worlds 
that was 
held In Amsterdam just before the conference. The lists are tentative, and 
any suggestions will be welcomed. They are included, as it were, by way of 
IntroductionI 
This paper Is called "Impossible Worlds and Other Mythical Beasts". This is 
a reference to a story I once heard by, I believe, Steinbeck. In the story a 
man goes Into his garden, and, upon repeated questioning by his endlesly 
nagging wife as to what he's doing, replies that he Is playing with the 
Unicorn. She ridicules him, saying "The Unicorn is a Mythical Beast". 
Eventually, she calls the Mental Hospital, which send around a team with a 
straight jacket to collect him. When they enter the garden, the man tells. 
them that he is quite sane, but his wife is not. When his wife protests that 
he has claimed to have been out in the garden for hours playing with the 
Unicorn, he reminds her (and the team) that "The Unicorn is a Mythical 
Beast". 
She is removed to the Mental Hospital. 
He goes on playing in his garden. 
Somehow, this story seems appropriate. 
1 As far as I recollect, the term came into being as focus for this conference 
at a meeting concerning the research project "Support, Survival and 
Culture" In Amsterdam. At that time, the meeting's concern was with 
creativity. I explained that I believed (like Froebel) that creativity was 
teachable since we are all naturally creative, only we allow our 
educational systems to Impair our creative abilities, and that I believed I did 
Indeed teach it. When asked how, I explained that one thing I did was to 
place students in what were, to them, Impossible Situations, ie, I made 
them Inhabit Impossible Worlds, and then try to invent their ways out. This 
idea was taken up as an area for research, and as a way of approaching 
the study and eff Wing of creativity (early publicity for the Conference 
referred to "Problems of Creativity"). 
2 Thus, a smoker cannot exist without a smoke. This Is his Possible World. 
In order to break the habit he has to face the Impossible World of going 
without a smoke. The resolution of the Impossibility of this World Is to give 
up (create novelty In his life). He may also vacillate between smoking and 
not smoking in the Impossible World, which, as all smokers denied will 
affirm is very uncomfortable and makes you nervous, or he may retire back 
to smoking. If he is to invent a way out so that he can give up, he will have 
to re-design his way of constructing the World that is Impossible so that it 
becomes Possible. I make no attempt here to account for how that may be 
done, although there are some general suggestions In the appendices for 
techniques through which ways may be found of making the Impossible 
Possible. If I could really find a general solution, I should be very rich and 
famous. 
31 like to think of improvements In world athletics (track and field) records 
In terms of an Impossible World. In October, 1968, Bob Beamon, long 
Jumping in the Olympic Games In Mexico City, jumped 8m9O, thus 
bettering the previous longest recorded jump ( Igor Ter-Ovanesyan's 
8m3l , June 1962) by a staggering 59 cm. The concept of a world record is that It is the best ever achieved, and so the idea of improvement related to 
it Is, naturally, that you can only do just a very little better: le, attempts on 
world records are predicated on the records being the best ever achieved, 
and therefore only just imaginably surpassable, in extremis. In Beamon's 
case, folk-lore has it that before the Olympic final at which he broke the 
record, the other competitors said amongst themselves that they must not 
make Bob angry, because he was liable to really smash the record. He'got 
angryl The point of this story is that when something breaks the limitations 
applied to what is considered the Possible, hence defining the Impossible, 
a dramatic way can be found out of that Impossible World. There Is literally 
a jump in what is considered Possible. However such a dramatic re- 
definition of the Possible has prevented any other athlete getting anywhere 
near the record since, reminding one of Jesse Owens' earlier record 
(8m13) that survived over 25 years from the time it was set In 1935. 
4 it is hard, given our cultural tradition and centuries of training, to 
remember that there are other ways of perceiving 3-D space than the 
essentially projective manner in which we currently generally describe our 
experience, and towards which so much of our effort in the development of 
representational tools has gone, so that, for instance, almost the first thing 
one asks about any C. A. D. system is whether it projects perspectives with 
hidden line removal. But many other ways do exist, ranging from Einstein's 
space-time continuum to the very abstract, and n-dimensional spatial 
relationships expressable in topology, and include some very odd 
personal and private constructions. 
5 In discussing Piaget, Medina insists that it is unreasonable to attribute to 
societies the properties of individuals, as Piaget is inclined to. While I 
agree that this sort of generalisation is very dangerous, I must Insist that, In 
this case, the evidence of painting is conclusive. I believe Medina's 
disagreement is improperly founded. This is a case of society developing 
and sharing together ways of seeing (both philosophies and technologies), 
which have changed as a result of Society's continued Investigations. It 
does not mean that society, at any one stage, is less or more developed in 
its Intellectual skills and abilities, rather that it has found and favours 
particular ways of seeing and of presenting what it sees (which we cannot 
properly separate). This is similar, but not identical, to McLuhan's 
arguments about medium and message, because McLuhan Is concerned 
with the dominance of the character of the various technologies. 
Nevertheless, he does show that ways of seeing and of presenting what 
we see change with eachother, and that this bears no relationship to social 
intelligence, or, indeed social cognitive development. But then, neither 
does Plaget. 
6 The extra-ordinary similarity of this progress (in tackling an Impossibility 
and gaining all sorts of peripheral benefits from making it (seem) Possible, 
only to have to re-think everything again later) to our understanding of the 
progress of science Is, to my mind, both remarkable and rewarding. . 
7 My verbal presentation at the conference consisted, essentially, of a 
lecture that was a biased history of Western painting, examining this 
Impossiblity and the ways it had been made to appear Possible. It was so 
biased in order to emphasise this particular point, given limited time and 
concentration, and also exists as a full length illustrated lecture. The point 
here, however, it to concentrate on Impossible Worlds in general and in 
particular, and not on my garbled History of Western paintingi 
to follow in final draft 
to follow in final draft (including cross-referencing into the text, of course) 
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CONSTRUCT GAMES 
INTRODUCTION. 
This package contains the rules and forms for two games which 
are based on the "Personal Construct Psychology" of George Kelly. 
The games are designed for non-verbal use, and are social games. 
This is important because little work has been done on non-verbal 
construing (thinking), partially because there are few techniques, 
and also because it is notoriously difficult, not to communicate, 
but to comniunicate non-verbally in a precisely analysable way; 
hence it is hard to develop articulate social constructs. 
Most games have, as aft aim, the idea of winning. These games, 
. however, are co-operative: there 
is no winner, or rather all the 
players win if the desired end result can be attained. Both games 
are to be played by three players, although a fourth may: keep a 
record (in which case the role of record-making should rotate). 
The games may be played at whatever rate the players wish, from 
a gentle contemplative pace to a rush (although record-keeping is 
hard under such circumstances). The record of the games may be used 
as a reminder of the thought processes that the players went through, 
and gives information for analysis by standard techniques, if 
required. 
The forms that are needed for record keeping, as well as the 
game lay-out formats will be found after the rules for the games. 
These should be copied or photo-copied for each game. The games 
require a number of objects to be played with: each player should 
2 
bring six or nine (by agreement - in examples here we will use six)# 
These objects should be examples of things about which the players agree 
that they would like to make judgements. Alternatively, the objects 
may be supplied for the players to use (possibly by an investigator). 
The rules given may be changed and bent in any way the players 
(or investigator) feel appropriate, by agreement. 
6 
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THE FIRST GANE 
Requirements: 
Three players and possible fourth (record keeper), 18 or 27 objects 
to be used, copies of record forms. 
Aims: 
To develop social agreements about ways of thinking about objects, 
by attempting to complete arrangements in the manner of another 
player. 
Rules: 
Preliminary. 
Duplicate the game layout format so that play can be made on it 
(I find the floor is a good place to do this. ) Mark the left end 
"pair" and the right "differ". 
Pool the objects. Throughout the game, players should limit their 
comments: if necessary they may ask for/give an explanation, but 
comments should normally be restricted to "yes", "no". "agreed", 
"shall we move on? ". "have you finished? ", "are you sureV etc. 
Part 1 
Select three objects at random from the pool and give them to the 
first player, who will lead. 
The first player divides the three objects into a "pair" (which 
have some quality in co=on) and a "differ" (which has a different 
quality). Place the pair at the pole on the left and the differ on 
the right of the line. 
4 
The first player now places the remaining objects an the line at 
the appropriate approximate position (I to V). 
The second and then the third player (who have, so far, watched the 
first player) reposition any of the objects, other than the first 
three. on the line, showing where they think the objects should go 
between the poles. (Differences of one position - say II to III 
are not really significant, but II to IV is). 
The objects are then re-pooled, and three selected randomly for the 
second player, who repeats the procedure in the role formerly 
occupied by the first. Then the third leads. 
When each player has lead two or three times, and when the players 
% 
feel they understand each other's ways of arranging the objets, play 
* proceeds to part two. v 
Par t2 
Select, again, three objects at random from the pool and give them 
to the first player, who establishes the pair and differ as before. 
The second player now lays out the remaining objects as (s)he 
believes the first would have done. Then the third player modifies 
the second's arrangement, if necessary, to represent how Whe 
thinks the first player would arrange the objects. 
The second and third players now try to reconcile any (significant) 
differences they have by taking it in turn to move the (non-pole) 
objects until they arrive at an arrangement they both think 
represents the first player's arrangementq or they decide they can- 
not agree. 
The first player shows his arrangement to the others, and, if there 
is a (significant) difference all three players attempt tO cOlne tO 
5 
another agreement. 
The objects are then re-pooled and part 2 is repeated with first 
player 2 and player 3 taking the lead. 
If the players find they are not managing part 2 very well, they 
should return to part 1. When they manage fluent negotiation, 
agreeing object arrangements, they should proceed to part 3. 
Ear t 3. 
Part 3 is essentially the same as part 2, but is rather freer and 
=re fluid. 
The first player sets up the poles from three randomly selected 
% objects as 
before, but now all three players arrange the other 
a objects, negotiating an agreement between themselves asthey go 
along. Even the pole objects may be changed if this appears 
necessary. 
An agreement is reached when none of the players feel a pressing 
need to re-position any of the objects. (This usually happens 
quite suddenly: players just stop and smile! ) 
This process may be continued as often as desired, with the lead 
revolving in the usual manner. The point of the game, to arrive at 
agreements about non-verbal thoughts by considering how others are 
thinking, has been achieved. 
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THE SECOND GAME: 
Requirements: 
Three players and possible fourth (record keeper), 18 or 27 objects 
to be usedq copies of record forms. 
Aims: 
To develop social agreements about ways of thinking about objects, by 
incorporating some of another player's objects within your own arrange- 
men to 
Rules: 
6 
Preliminary 
_ 
Duplicate the game layout format so that play can be made on it. (I 
'find the floor is a good place to do this). Mark the pair and differ 
pýints and label the player locations. You will probably wýnt to have 
a copy of the step-by-step game position diagrams to hand: you will 
need them if keeping a record. 
Pool the objects. 
Throughout the game, players should limit their comments: if necessary 
they may ask for/give--an explanation, but comments should normally be 
restricted to "yes". "no% "agreed", "shall we more on? ", "have you 
finished? ". "are you sure? " etc... 
Part 1 
From the pool of objects each player is given three objects, selected at 
random. These (s)he divides so that there is a "pair" (which have some 
quality in common) and a "differ" (which has a different quality). The 
pair is placed on the left and the differ on the right of each player's 
initial playing position line. 
7 
I'- 
The remaining objects are now divided between the players and are 
positioned by each player at the appropriate position between the pair 
and differ objects (which are at the poles), according to how much of 
the two contrasted qualities represented at the poles each object has. 
When each player has completed this, they may exchange objects, and 
position any swapped object appropriately. Then the objects that did I 
not initially define poles are replaced in the pool, and the pole 
objects are "compressed" so that one player's differ and another's pair 
6 
fit together, as in the diagrams. Play now proceeds to part 2. 
Part 2. 
'Each pole now has three objects on it: two provided by one player and one 
bi another. But because these pole objects are not chosen by just one 
player, each player will have to re-consider the original qualities he 
was dealing with. This is shown by the repositioning of the-objects 
remaining in the pool between the poles, just as in part 1. 
When the objects have been re-positioned, and any exchange has taken place, 
the objects at the positions next to the poles are compressed, while the 
remaining objects are re-pooled. Play now passes to part 
Part 3 
The players divide up the remaining objects in the pool and re-position 
them, as in part 2. When all the objects are re-positioned, the two 
remaining positions are compressed, and play passes to part 4. 
Part 
Part 4 allows a revision of object positioning, by mutual agreement of all 
8 
players. After any such revision, the game is considered complete. 
The whole process may then be repeated as of ten as desired. 
Notes 
a) In as far as it is possible each player should try to arrange for at 
least one object to be in every position. 
b) Objects on pole positions may be exchanged or moved, but only with 
the permission of the player who originally placed them. Objects on 
positions that have been compressed should be treated similarly. 
c) Objects from the pool may be placed at any positions between and 
including on the poles, whether such positions have been compressed 
or no t. 
00 
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ELEMENT USE (both games) 
Player 1 Player 2 Player 
abc 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
THE FIRST GAME - LAYOUT 
.0 pair differ 
I Ii III 
Turn 
Game Part 
Poles positioned by 
Infil by 
Inf il in the manner of 
IV V 
make a 
record of 
element 
posi. tionk 
turn by 
THE SECOND GAME - LAYOUT 
Initial Layout 
pair I VI 
IV 
V 
differ 
IV 
III 
differ %VI I ), 
III IV V vi 
pair 
Aiffer 
C 
0 
A 
Play Layout 
B 
pair 
lst move 
2nd move 
3rd move 
4th move 
Direction of 
Play sequence 
-0 
C 
Final Positions 
represents compressed nodes 
0 
IIII 
C 
THE SECOND GAME - MOVES 
, ". 2nd move 
o reýresents noqe 
%! rasenl'b Ll, -) e- 
compressed this turn 
0 
4th move 
3rd move 
0 
Su=aary (conclusion) 
d1- 
am 
do 
ab 49 
o, 
', , - 
00 
ri'fl IIiII III I- II 
0- 
THE SECOND GAME - COMPRESSIONS 
player position of elements 
IV V vi 
a AI AII AIII AIV AV AVI 
turn 1b BI BI1 BIII BIV BV BVI 
c ci cli CIII civ cV CV1 
a AI BVI 
6 
AII AIII AIV AV AVI C1 
turn 2b BI CVI BII BIII BIV BV BVI AI 
c CI AVI cii CIII, civ cV CVI BI 
a AI BVI AI I BV AIII AIV 
tum 3b BI CVI BII CV BIII BIV 
CI AVI CII AV CHI . civ 
AV CII AVI Cl 
BV AII' BVI Al 
CV BII CVI BI 
a Al BVI AII BV AIII BIV AIV CIII AV CII AVI Cl 
tum 4b BI CVI BII CV BIII CIV BIV AIII BV AII BVI Al 
c Cl AVI CII AV CIII AIV CIV BIII CV BII CVI BI 
Element compression showing shared elements for each player at each 
turn in the game. 
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,, YT DESICN RESEARCH? I 
Ianulph Glanville 
? orts=o-. lth Polytechnic School of Architecture, King Henry 1 Street, ? ort3mourh, 
U-1 t3 
This paper considers the nature of scientific knowledge and of 
scientific research NOT as a paradin for design but, converselyo 
as a design activity in which particular (although not necessar- 
ily articulate) restrictions are allowed to operate. As such, 
considerations of science as design have a reflexive character - 
design is designed - and science/design is subject to all the 
problems that face such self -referential systems. Recent thought 
on self-reference is consequently brou3ht in to enlighten 
understandings of science/design. 
Science, it is therefore argued, may not be used as the yard- 
stick against which to measure design. If anything the converse 
is the case. And research into design should be considered as 
providing a paradigm for science. 
UTRODUCTION 
k large part of this paper could be seen as a paper an the philosophy Of science. 
-hat it intends addressing is the nature of research. Contrary to Bruch Archer 
(1979), 1 do not see there being a need for a new and special area of design 
research: rather, I think that what is called for is a modicum of hone3ty on the 
; art of the research c=munity- 
ht in a nutshell, what I think is this: research, itselfti4 a design activity. It 
is a far cry from the popularised misrepresentations of the scientific paper in the 
learned journal, as Medawar (1963) has shown us. And it is only because of the fraud 
; tpecrated through this form that some people feel the need to argue the specillness 
cf design research, while other people refuse to fund it. Design is a basic h=an 
&, -tivity, and is also the basic activity in scientific research. So that while I 
siree (Glanville (1980b)) with Archer about its specialness, I no longer agree about 
Its isolation. 
0: 4t is being expressed in the title of this paper is not what perhaps appears at 
first glance. 'What I want to get at is not so much why we --ust have a field called 
'ittign research" but rather why research must be considered as design. In fact, 
P. -t this way round, what I'm getting at then supports Archer's position perhaps 
Na =ore strongly than his own arguments: if research (and experimentation) is 
folp, there can be no excuse for not funding design research! But it also _37ves 
49ign research a rather special position, for, like the philosoph7 of science, 
litich tries to analyse scientific thinking scientifically, linguistics, which tries 
*1 talk about language in language, cr cybernetics, which feeds back information 
At n. ut feedback (only a cybernetician should be allowed to talk about his own field in 
ý14h a jesting manner), design research is, in fact, research into research: a reflex- fit field of study which will need to learn from and recognise within itself -all the ItaretUal devices developed in those other fields to resolve the circularities of 
Iftexivity and to admit the associated problems of self-reference vis-a-vis meta- 
tylls. 
! us the title of this paper expands: 
1., 'hy Design Re3earch? 
Why Design Design Research? 
Vhy Design ReSeArch Research? 
Why Design Design Research Research? 
Why not design research - What other options do we have? 
-and, of course - 
'Why Research Design? 
etc. 
UISEARCH 
ýSD EXPEMENT 
, he notioul of research that 
I want to attack is not the sophisticated and sensitive 
Me that a philosopher of science, 
in part because he is interested in theories 
itc., puts for-jard. It is the naive belief that science is conventionally pre-. 
Uctable and logical activity (the problem is that of induction), and that experi- 
, tats are I step-by-step, causally powered routines. 
t* SpplyiAg for a research grant, as any applicant knows, the most important 
't; uiremeýts are to explain exactly what you will do, what you will analyse 
(and 
Ohich statistical procedures you will use), what the results will be and how they 
fill be useful. These are absurd requirements. Not only is the association of 
utfulness with knowledge quite arbitrary, it is also banal in the sense that if a 
W piece. of knowledge is to appear, it may be that the insight resulting in fact 
Izitiates'a chain of new insights that produce all sorts of novelty which is use- 
'121. But behind this false utilitarianism there 
lies another serious misrepresent- 
Ition. If what is being carried out is really an experiment involving testing and 
zansformation - as opposed to, e. g., meditation only then the result can only 
Ot predicted as a hunch -a potential re-validation of some theory. Then, if the 
. vrong" result (or even no result) emanates, the experiment must be changed, to find 
:: t that gives a result that is acceptable. %low, say that the experiment to be 
: Arried out is a complex one in several stages, and something goes wrong early on: 
Itteral later stages will almost certainly have to be chinjed, in a manner whereby 
4: h. depends on the others. (This is a broad characterisation shared by many and 
, trhaps most cogently stated in Lakatos (1969)). 
kat I'm getting at here is a Kuhnian point (Kuhn (1970)) of the sociological and 
4ychological aspects of science, how we think of experiments. We tend to think of 
'4=, unless we are very careful, as they are written up, which$ of course, is 
"Icured by the appalling characature of science which we laarn in our school 
4; trizental apprenticeship: "method; observations; conclusions. " Any normal 
ýO-czunt of an experiment tends to present it as a logical step in the slow develop- 
k-. t and refinement of the (predetermined and unchanging) corpus of knowledge known 
It science. (This is exactly what leads to the familiar "problem of induction", the 
I, --. -ble=atic hub of all philosophies of science that assume this inevitability, see. e. q 
4 I=ers (1978M But this fails to take into account what actually happens in terms 
the actions of the experimenter and the effect the new knowledge may have on the 
ý--Ir; 
us. - 
y In very rare cases, which I consider as specially restricted and which are 
illy either very simple or very technological, is an experiment set up without 
Idea of the outcome to be tested being held in -nind, and without some part of the 
tri=ental procedure needing to be changed because it doesn't quite work. The 
tons of an experimenter, from his initial idea of what he might do to the creat- 
of some final, acceptable, working output are no more naively linear than are 
it of traditional designers - and every attempt to account for and create design 
Cesses-that function in such a linear, "problem solving" (i. e. simple causalist 
flow chartist) manner have, as we have seen, lead to sterility. The reasons for 
-hav-e--been-wide-I)f- expounded and are to do with such non-, jete..... i- this 
as chance and randomness, (Jones, 1979 ), creativity, learning 
& Jackson (1979), wholism, circularity and feedback, (Clanville, l')7qc, 1,7 ý, J). 
Such discoveries and arguments made in the field of Desi,, n Pese, jrch 
elaboration here! in fact, it is this very activity, (! esi, ýn, that lieq ýehind 
general ability to create the possibility of new outputs, be thev '-, illdings, sprý-)nl 
or knowledge from scientific experiment. This i-, "JOIVes -Zhe 
; ation of the agent involved, a fact that is now . -Accepted ýy virtually every philoso 
pher of science under the title "hypothesis dependency". 
(A nice example, probably known to most readers, is the perceptual svcýoj"'Zy 
cated by Gregory (1970), where he discusses the interpretation ()17 r*i I. -I , I,, 
e. g. the Necker Cube - 
I 
in which the image "reverses" in such terms. I have noticed, incidentally, that 
ýave difficulty creating the reversal, no doubt due to the dominance of one 
; -. ypothesis that comes from an architectural training in the 
e has, in fact been made. 
, chermore, -the-creation of fields of scientific knowledge can be looked at-in the r 
W way, as being designs. In fact, they are probably closely analogous to cities 
both scopeg scale, sociality, anonymity, time-span and conservertism (it is te-apt. 
Ito use, a building as a simplification of the city, and hence to develop an 
ilogy for science, although it must be remembered that it is a simplification, 
micularly in that it can be seen as terminating. But this endeavour must 3"Ait 
: -. "Ier Paper). 
0 1discovery of a new piece of scientific knowlýdge does not exist in isolation. it 
ý=latesý the attempt to create new knowledge (in order to test and refine the know- 
ýje alre , ady existing) and 
affects the local knowledge around it, in much the way 
zthe creation of a new building may "upgrade" an area and cause other new build- 
ýsto occur in the city. 
I 
sis tolsay that the purpose of scientific experiment is to produce output which 10 ýenly increases the scope of science, but also tests the already existing know- 
it, and, where it is found lacking, requires its modification: which, of course 
_=lateiright through the whole corpus requiring a constant change, just as, in zesigný process, the mis-fit of one element may require the change in a whole 
of decisions. In the extreme, of course, enormous changes may have to be 
4, completely altering large chunks, or even the whole face Of science as we 
tpreviously known it, just as, of course, building or social forces may create 
sive changes in a city. Again, philosophers of science have worked out elegant 
vacterisations of these processes - the falsificationist's Conjectures and 
.. ations (Popper (1969)), refined 
into Research Programmes (Lakatos (1969)Xand by 
Landau( 1931) considered as a far more aenerAl nethodoloiy paitiaularly Aýýliýable 
! tsign), and Kuhn's (1970) Scientific Revolutions. It would be interesting to 
: dder theories of design processes applied as a new theoretical basis in the 
.. -. sophy of science! 
ý: zcteristic of such a way of carrying out research are various behaviours normally 
0 "I. Jered rather improper and un-scientific, but constantly experienced by honest 
. -Czers. They include post-rationalisation of whatever happened (which scientists 
=*Ise in a highly restricted form through the learned paper format); attempts to 
'sin away and brush under the carpet failures by claiming they are 'not basically 
"int (much as scientists incompletely interpret - and, sometimes, as in the 
qttions against Sir Cyril Burt, actually fix - results, an experience surely 
yschoolchild repeating a famous experiment and getting a "w-rong"*answer will 
,. er);: working on 
hunches and sudden insights (ask a scientist how an idea came 
ýi and his human normalness will become apparent); and the admission of personal 
.. In& arising from mistakes. In 
fact, -it is these characteristics that, by and 
1 t, are evoked in order to explain the workings of the scientist's mind: "I had 
,. I! tn idea so I set about setting up an argument to support it and designin3 an 
[rL-ent 
that would test it. The experiment didn't work, but I didn't give up. I 
'#Ized away the incorrect data as resulting from poor experimental design, and, 
*'1sz3 from my mistakes, I redesigned the experiment. The new experiment gave me 
ýrtsult I wanted at 5% significance, which I judged to be proof of my point. " 
off With the standard description! 
'I have discussed abovep whether in terms of the output of individual experiments Itt growth of scientific knowledge, is research. And I have tried to show that 
vgý . -eats are designed and interpreted, and -that the inclusion of the output of an 
4pe- I-eat into the corpus of scientific knowledge is also a matter of desiqn, and 
rtýesign of the corpus. Thus I am claiming that research is a design activity in 
Ihe way any normal designer understands, that research involves and needs 
C:, just as research-as-design needs research. Design Research is, in effect, 
nindistinguishable from (at least major aspects of) research into research. 
* does "wrong" mean, under these circumstances? It means thatp according to the 
&. 1ge we have it doesn't fit our views (in hypotheses) and must therefore be 
rtct. 1 But it may be that view is w-rong. 
REFERENCE 
Lt 19 in this sense that design research is a reflexive subject in the m3nner of 
philosopSy of science, linguistics and cybernetics as I pointed out earlier. So, 
if design has lessons and possibly even provides a paradig-m for science, - or a' t 
least for scientific research - how might design learn from these subjects, and be 
reflected in them? 
The most important characteristic of these subjects is that they examine themselves 
in their own terms. For instance, the linguist discusses (natural) language in 
terms of (natural) language. This highlights a particular "problem" - the problenn 
of levels. In the classical paradigm, the something talked about is on one level 
and the something in terms of which it is talked about is on another, "meta" level. 
Much work has gone into exploring the classical paradigm, showing that it is 
impossible to describe something, with certainty, both completely and consistently 
in its own terms (GUel's (1931) Theorum). This gives rise to the "problem" of 
levels (also known as the "problem" of self -reference). Some subjects, , 'or instance 
the three mentioned, do and must talk about themselves in their own terms - that is, 
their meta-levels are the same as their levels (Pedretti (1980)). This leads to the 
difficultY that they are to be considered as incompletely and/or inconsistently 
described, in terms of the classical paradigm. But must this be so? 
At the extreme limit, a system which is dynamically stable and distinct (such as a 
living entity) - that is, something which remains independent, must contain its own 
description, so that it can reproduce itself without reference to others (. MaturAna 
(1970) and Varela (1980)). In this case, the level and the meta-level, the thing 
and its description, together are inseperable -constituents of the' thing. Thus, it 
must be that the classical paradigm is inadequate, for it rejects such self-referen- 
tial systems, which nevertheless clearly exist: as fields of study, as animals, and 
as, as some of those including myself, who are developing the theoretical consequen. - 
ces of such systems claim, everything about which we can know and think. (Glanville 
(1975,1978,1980a, 1980d), von Foerster (1976)). 
There are two w2Ys Out Of this. The first, conservative way is to attempt to patch- 
up the classical paradigm in order to reduce the problem. Such attempts (which, of 
course, follow the design principle of scientific knowledge already shown as the 
constant modification of the corpus of scientific knowledge) are, however, never 
likely to. succeed completely since they are in essence based on a way of structuring 
knowledge-which specifically excludes self-reference. Indeed, G8del, who provided 
the proof. of this, worked until his dying day to sort out how human intelligence, 
which he did not believe could be encompassed in the paradigm, could be accounted 
for - and failed*7 This approach will admit of highly specialised special cases of 
p4rtia: 4 or limited self-reference (e. g. Loefqren (1968)), but admits it cannot 
account for complete self-reference and therefore either shrugs its shoulders at. 
turns it back on it, or says it's really a problem. 
The seconA, radicai approach takes the position that self-reference is obvious and 
must therefore be accepted**, (e. g. Glanville, (1975,1978,1980a, 1980d). The 
. problem 
it then faces is to encompass, in a meaningful wayq the sort of level/meta 
*Thus Gbdel considered that machine intelligelhce, necessarily bound by the classical 
paradigm, 'could never, in principle, emulate human intelligence. In this view he is 
not alone! 
** An extended debate on these issues occurs 
on the Workshop Conferences on Self-reference 
in the privately circulated proceedings 
(Pedretti, 1980). 
level-reference of the classical scientific paradigm: that is, to redesign the 
vhole of scientific knowledge to encompa" not only the classical view (possibly 
modified) but also those things which are currently excluded. 
This is a call for a scientific revolution, and a lovely exemplification of the 
operation of Occam's Razor, (Glanville, 1980d). It is, in its own way, as profounc 
a revolution as that of Einstein's adumbration of Newton's mechanics, with as many 
r=ifications (as discussed in Chalmers (1978)). And, of course, design and desigr 
research are necessarily, as I have argued, in the vanguard of this programme. 
In taking this second view, certain basic tenets of the classical paradigm have, of 
course, to be modified: for instance, the concept of level. Levels in descriptiot 
and in knowledge are assu: med to be basic, in the classical paradigm, (e. g. Pedretti 
& Glanville, (1980) Glanville, (1980c)). But, if self -referential systems, which 
do not have such levelssare basic, then levels cannot be. Are there, then, any 
levels at all? Or is the whole of knowledge a sea of little isolated bits, unrelat 
ed (for relationshýps other than identity immediately generate levels) -a deceit. 
This would obviously be an awful thing were it so, for it would mean that scientific 
knowledge was an illusion (and, for that matter, the essential cognitive ability tc 
rccognise things) - which is as counter-intuitive as the refusal to accept self- 
reference. It also runs counter to the argument used in support of the radical 
view, that within it the classical paradigm may survive as a special, if limited, 
Case. 
The solution to this lies in remembering how it is that levels come into being. 
There may or may not be levels in nature - in the real world - but this we may not 
know because we can never see the real world cold, without interpretation, without 
hypotheses. The question of levels in nature is, anyhow, irrelevant. Science 
(and how often do we forget this in our oversimplifications) is a corpus of know- 
ledge, and a corpus of knowledge requires agents to know it. It is not constituted 
of cold facts, but of working hypotheses. The corpus of knowledge does not, a 
; riori, exist; it is constructed. The relationships in it have to be made through 
the act of relating, and they have to be expressed linguistically, and stabilised 
through shared interpretation in shared language (as demonstrated by Pedretti (1978 
kll this is done by the scientist, through reference to self -referential 7stems 
4s others. And it can easily be shown that the sort of mechanisms that must be 
Assumed for self -referential systems to be observable to others (without which 
Assumption there would 'e nothing I ef t to talk about! ) permit the making of such 
relationships and thus oi levels (Glanville (1978)). 
ýTbls, of courseq re-affirms the centrality of the scientist and his hypotheses in 
ý%aklng science - as a design act informed and supported by the very nature of design research as a reflexive system - and it reinforces the concept of science, 
Of levels, of concept formation as being a public endeavour, (as Chalmers (1973) 
lad Kuhn (1970) insist). 
lut it also provides the theoretical basis for the observer in any experiment - or 
the designer in any design - as being involved in a circular, feedback process in 
"hich the observer's description and the experimental arrangement's behaviour 
interact and modify each other until they are in apparent agreementg allowing pre- 
dictions to be made (inductively) without,, there being the need for any -recourse to It truth" (that word particularly inappropriate to design), hence removinj much of 
the "problem" of induction, and allowing a similar circularity to exist between 
the experimenter, the experiment, the experimental medium and the representational 
tedium (i. e. how to say something), (Glanville (1979d)). 
hid it provides a neat solution to the problem of absolute knowledge vs basic Ignorance. I think it is beyond argument, nowadays, that we only know through 12terpretatioa - as has been argued throughout. The problem here is how do we 
gain and hence have knowledge, in spite of our necessary basic ignorance? And the 
l4swer lies in-FF-edifference between self and other: we have no absolute know- 
le4ge outside the self, but we can have some knowledge, through the 'Idesiqn/ 
designer circularity" of others, in which relationships are developed between the 
various others, which are then assembled and represented in various levels. Any 
designer knows, of course, that design is a matter of few absolutes (except sociall 
applied absolutes such as regulations), and a lot of interrelated compromise$ 
which lead to some new "whole thing" (Glanville (1977)). 
Finallyq it is worth mentioning in passing a few further ionsequences of this point 
of view (which may be pursued in the literature). Designers know, from experience. 
that designing is a matter of keeping several things in mind (both consciously and 
sub-consciously) at once, and gradually getting them to fit together (often in quit, 
surprising ways). Theories handling self -referential systems require a similar 
performance. Rather than handling determinate elements in sequence, they attempt 
to synchronise several distinct elements to occur together. (Glanville (1978), 
? ask (1978)). The implications for this in computing terms, and CAD, are particulat 
ly important. Furthermore, the conventional views of representation (as a sort of 
coding) have to be changed to be both more subjective and more conversational - 
again something designers recognise in creating and discussing (both verbally and 
non-verbally) their work. This whole field is being exhaustively researched by 
Pedretti (in progress), who has also worked, with me, on aspects of elicitation and 
representation of spatial perception and architectural design. (Glanville, Pedretti 
& Jackson (1979), Glanville (1979a)) . Using the self -referential paradigm we can, 
in facts relate coding, communication, conversation, consciousness and intelligence 
as being manifested behaviour of groupings of synchroni * sed self-referential 
systems working together. Finally, the ideas of inside and out, of boundaries, of 
inherent properties become modified in such a way that properties of things are seer 
as being inserted by the designer, rather than being present as inherent in the 
first instance (Glanville (1979a)). 
It can thus be seen that the theoretical developments with regard to reflexive 
systems are not only fuelled by the nature of design research, but also account 
clearly for much of design as an activity and experience. 
WHY DESIGN RESEARCH? 
There remains one point to be clarified: the question of the title. "Why Design 
Research? " Why should we research into research, design design, and so on? 
The answer to this is, I think, rather shocking. There is, in principle, no reason 
at all. It is merely a matter of faith. The faith is rather that of the patient 
attending psychotherapy, of the person who believes that by becoming more aware of 
himself he will learn to perform better. This is a common educational belief, one 
to which 7: subscribe, but which can never be conclusively proved and which, in as 
far as my knowledge goes, has never yet been even circums cant ial ly demonstrated. 
(For instance, some people appear to benefit from psychotherapy while others don't. 
but who knows if those who benefitted might not have done o without therapy, or if 
those who didn't would have, if left alone? ). This, of course, parallels the whole 
business of usefulness and knowledge - we may knows but that does not necessarily 
=ean our knowledge is useful, any more than knowing about how we perform means we 
can improve our performance. 
Nevertheless, this is a position widely held in our Western Culture, that knowledge 
brings, as it were, power, and that through this power we can control, manipulates 
change things (e. g. espionage). In a sense, this is a justification for science 
and speaking materialistically we may claim that the technological embodiments Of 
týe advances made by science do indeed provide some justification for the pursuit. 
Then, since scientific knowledge comes through the medium of experimental researchs. 
research into such research would be seen to be not only justifiable but highly 
desirable since it should lead to improvement in the activity of research. Certainl 
given virtually the only available experimental training of today, which designers 
vill. recognise as the articling of an apprentice to an attelier, one wonders whether 
a nev and more "efficient" way of teaching experimenters might not emerge, as we 
believe (but are we right to do so? ) has happened with designers. But it is also 
ledge outside the self, but we can have some knowledge, through the "design/ 
designer circularity" of others, in which relationships are developed between the 
various others, which are then assembled and represented in various levels. Any 
designer knows, of course, that design is a matter of few absolutes (except sociall 
applied absolutes such as regulations), and a lot of interrelated compromises 
which lead to some new "whole thing" (Glanville (1977)). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning in passing a few further : onsequences of this point 
of view (which may be pursued in the literature). Designers know, from experience, 
that designing is a matter of keeping several things in mind (both consciously and 
sub-consciously) at once, and gradually getting them to fit together (often in quit, 
surprising ways). Theories handling self -referential systems require a similar 
performance. Rather than handling determinate elements in sequence, they attempt 
to synchronise several distinct elements to occur together. (Glanville (1978), 
Pask (1978)). The implications for this in computing terms, and CAD, are parciculai 
ly important. Furthermore, the conventional views of representation (as a sort of 
coding) have to be changed to be both more subjective and more conversational - 
again something designers recognise in creating and discussing (both verbally and 
uon-verbally) their work. This whole field is being exhaustively researched by 
Pedretti (in progress). who has also worked, with me, on aspects of elicitation and 
representation of spatial perception and architectural design. (Glanville, Pedretti 
& Jackson (1979), Glanville (1979a)) . Using the self -referential paradigm we can. 
in fact, relate coding, communication, conversation, consciousness and intelligence 
as being manifested behaviour of groupings of synchronýsed self -referential 
systems working together. Finally, the ideas of inside and out, of boundaries, of 
inherent properties become modified in such a way that properties of things are seer 
as being inserted by the designer, rather than being present as inherent in the 
first instance (Glanville (1979a)). 
It can thus be seen that the theoretical developments with regard to reflexive 
systems are not only fuelled by the nature of design research, but also account 
clearly for-much of design as an activity and experience. 
WY DESIGN RESEARCH? 
There remains one point to be clarified: the question of the title. "Why Design, 
Research? " Why should we research into research, design design, and so on? 
The answer to this is, I think, rather shocking. There is, in principle, no reason 
at all. It is merely a matter of faith. The faith is rather that of the patient 1-ttending psychotherapy, of the person who believes that by becoming more aware of 
himself he will learn to perform better. This is a cor=on educational belief, one 
to which I subscribep but which can never be conclusively proved and which, in as 
far as my knowledge goes, has never yet been even circumstantially demonstrated. 
(for instance, some people appear to benefit from psychotherapy while others don't, 
but who knows if those who benefitted might not have done Po without therapy, or if 
those who didn't would have, if left alone? ). This, of course, parallels the whole 
business of usefulness and knowledge - we may know, but that does not necessarily 
U&n our knowledge is useful, any more than knowing about how we perform means we 
Canimprove our performance. 
I hvertheless, this is a position widely hel-d in our Western Culture,, that knowledge 
i brings, as it were, power, and that through this power we can control, minipulate, 
thange things (e. g. espionage). In a sense, this is a justification for science - 
&ad speaking materialistically we may claim that the technological embodiments of 
*t advances made by science do indeed provide some justification for the pursuit. Then, since scientific knowledge comes through the medium of experimental research, 
Itsearch into such research would be seen to be not only justifiable but highly 
desirable since it should lead to improvement in the activity of research. Certa inl 
liven virtually the only available experimental training of today, which designers 
vill recognise as the articling of an apprentice to an attelier, one wonders whether 
4 new and more "ef f icient" way of teaching experimenters might not emerge, as we 1tlieve (but are we right to do so? ) has happened with designers. But it is also 
mceivable that doing research on research, 
design on design, could give us a 
: ale for comparison: for the body of research 
(for example) could be compared to th 
meralised view of research which might act as a 
(temporary? ) norm. 
Ius, given the (hard to justify but generally 
held) view that knowledge improves 
iings, if our knowledge derives from research, 
it is surely sensible to acquire 
iowledge of research in order to improve research. Since research 
is a design 
: tivity,. this, of course, means knowledge of design and 
design research. 
ider these circumstances, the beautiful activity that is science will no 
longer be 
ýen as mechanistic, except in retrospect. It will truly 
be understood honestly, as 
great creative and social design activity, one of the true social arts. And 
its 
iradigm will be recognised as being design. 
,, us design will take its true place as the basis for the activities that create 
-ientific (as well as other) knowledge, and will no longer be sneeringly and 
-ivially dismissed by those who adjudicate without creating, and who are 
fooled 
Ito believing that science is as she is w-rit. There will be no need for a special 
rea of design research, for-all research will be seen to be part of 
design research 
Ith that which we call, now, design research being the most basic of all. 
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ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
Ranulph Glanville 
APPENDIX G 
"The Architecture of the Computable. " 
From: 
Design Studies vol 1 no 4,1980. 
Di the following contribution by Glanville there was a 
conflict between making the paper clear and providing an 
illustration relating to its contents. Glanville's version as 
submitted, was intended to show, through its own develop- 
ment as a written paper, how a design may come into 
being. However, to help the reader avoid some mystification 
or frustration, the Editors have themselves redesigned the 
paper, parts of which have been set in a different sequence 
so that the empirical essentials of the contribution may be 
rapidly grasped, thus making the original introduction the 
The architecture 
of the 
Computable 
RANULPH GLANVILLE 
Portsmouth Polytechnic, School of Architecture, King Henry 
St, Portsmouth, UK 
Certain assumptions about the computable are shown to be 
rructured in a different style to that of the representation 
of our perceptions. This, it is argued, provides an analogy 
for the process of design. An alternative way of thinking 
about the computable is proposed, and certain applications 
in education are raised. 
THE COMPUTABLE 
What is meant by computable? This surely needs elabora- 
ton. To a cybernetician it means intentionally establishing 
a (productive) relation between things. To a computer 
scientist or programmer, it means something rather more 
restricted, namely the collection of tricks that a machine 
can be made to perform. The difference is important, for 
the cybernetic definition is more general and less confined 
thin that of computer science, but I suspect that most of 
the time when we talk of computing we are thinking of 
the litter. Yet this is exactly the meaning that I want to 
Question. 
Computability is often thought of in terms of the 
torts of electronic computing machine with which we are 
all now familiar. These machines* and their programs are 
distinguished by being (amongst other things): 
6 digital (that is, their values are always set in terms of some 
absolute initial standard, the bit) 
0 serial (that is, they handle one thing at a time and in 
strict sequence) 
0 variable-based (that is, they need prior definition of what 
is to be considered) 
I quantity-based (that is, they operate by considering how 
'But not@ that recent developments in computers using ganged 
microprocessors may change the machine interpretation from 
computing to what will shortly differentiate as Computing. 
conclusion. Should the reader so desire, it is po&dblo to 
reconstitute the paper as originally submitted by reading 
the conclusion, 'An Apparently Irrelevant Beginning'(in 
Box p223) and then the paper as it stands. 
Glanville draws heavily on recent Western percvp- 
tions of Zen Buddhism. This emphasizes the characteristics 
of 'wholes'and the subjective grasp of forms and other 
overall rela tionships 'in a flash. (There is, of course, a well. 
established Western heritage of discussion and research on 
such themes which ranges from the Greek philosophers to 
the present time). 
many bits of whatever variable there is, and they consider 
quality only as a definition of a variable). 
Remember, of course, that this is how their precursor, 
Babbage's Analytic Engine a worked. 
However, when computable is used in the cybernetic 
sense, it is not necessarily only 
" digital (because analogy is possible) 
" serial (because analogy only exists in a concurrent universe) 
" variable-based (because the computation may distinguish 
and define the variable) 
" quantity-based (because analogies do not necessarily 
require quantities but may be drawn between qualities 
alone). 
To differentiate these two orthographically, I will call the 
former definition (computer science's) computing and the 
latter Computing. It is in these two and the differences 
between them that this paper is interested. 
SPACE FOR PERCEIVING 
The difference between the computable and the Compu- 
table provides the basis for a good analogy in environmen- 
tal psychology. Almost all the work that has been done on 
how we perceive, conceive and remember our physical 
environment has examined the character of the computable. 
The typical way an experiment is setup, in keeping with 
the standard scientific procedure, lies in isolating and fixing 
all but one variable and then testing a subject's (verbal 
accounts of his) behaviour as that variable is changed. 
In doing this, things have been so arranged that the 
subject's experience must be accounted for through these 
variables and, furthermore, the subject's attention is direc- 
ted towards the experience he should be concerned with, 
since a cognitive subject is not inert, but conscious. This 
approach is similar to the computing approach, and has 
the two major features that in it variables are already 
chosen (by the experimenter) and the subject must perceive 
and account for his experience through these variables. (It 
was at this point that the second skeleton was recorded as 
part of a conversation. ) 
It is also possibletosetup (less hygienic) experiments 
which explore how subjects perceive and experience space, 
without assuming the variables, or even that there are such 
variables, ie experiments that are about the Computable. I 
have set up several of these, and it is my experience with 
them that has led me away from my idealistic, but 
childishly naive 'science rules' view of the 1960s. A brief 
account of these experiments is appropriate and fuller 
descriptions can be obtained. 9,10 
It should be understood that these experiments do 
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not, cannot, and are not intended to conform to the normal 
high standards of scientific objectivity. There are four 
reasons. First; they are not meant to be objective because 
they are concerned with personal experience as a cognitive 
process. Second, because the purpose in the experiments 
is exploratory and educational, for both the subject and 
myself, rather than data-productive, and these experiments 
are used as teaching tools and to develop ideas. Third, they 
are not interested in the testing of my (experimenter's) 
preselected variables but in the elaboration by the subjects 
of what their variables might be. Fourth, one cannot 
discuss cognition without discussing how it is represented 
(the cognitive processes are as Wittgenstein' 1 and Gregory12 
have shown, hidden behind their representations and are in 
no other way accessible), so that the experiments cannot 
actually directly tackle their main concern, but only its 
representation. These latter two are the normal conditions 
of experimentation where cognition is concerned, which 
may mean that some would prefer not to call my experi. 
ments' experiments, but something else. But to ignore 
them is to ignore the reality that psychology both is and 
works in, which we do too often and at our peri 1.13 
THREE EXPERIMENTS 
The first experiment (1973-74) was an attempt to develop 
a common (verbal) vocabulary through which a small 
group could discuss spatial experience. The techniques 
used were based on George Kelly's personal contruct elici. 
tation, 14 with extensions by Laurie Thomas. 15 From a 
large selection of slides of Alvar Aalto's Tuberculosis 
Sanatorium at Paimio, each subject chose three. Then 
groups of three subjects pooled their slides and made con- 
structs, first personally and later, by negotiation, as a 
group. Groups exchanged subject members so that repre- 
sentatives of each group could negotiate constructs. Finally 
the initial slides were shown again, appropriate descriptive 
constructs were named, in public, and another process of 
negotiation was used to reduce these constructs from over 
70 to the more handleable 15 listed in Figure 1. 
Axis 
Surface 
Containment 
Scale 
Mechanical 
Building as setting 
Space's feeling for users 
Core being pointed to 
Symbolic reading 
Opening In boundary 
Diversity 
Movement 
Where I am 
From where I am what I feel 
Context 
Figure 1. List of IS constructs 
After negotiating social constructs at great length 
and with considerable single-mindedness, one might reason. 
ibly expect that, when shown the chosen sides, 
0 each subject would use similar constructs much of the 
time 
0 each subject would have a fairly clear idea of how he 
used the constructs 
neither of which was the case. Not only did construct usage 
differ substantially between subjects but also, when a com. 
218 
parison was made between believed and actual frequency 
of usage, no connection was found (Figure 2). 
However, when asked to draw what each construct 
meant, a similarity did appear (see Figure 3). 
This experiment was interpreted as showing what 
architects have long known - that words are not very good for describing spatial experiences, which are infinitely better 
communicated by drawing. 
The second experiment (1975) grew out of this 
interpretation, and has achieved a certain notoriety. It Is a 
blindfold survey and, having on occasion taken part myself, 
I can confirm the findings from my own experience. In it, 
subjects tried to visualize and draw a previously unfamiliar 
(and unusual) space while blindfolded. They could leave and 
reenter the space and remove their blindfolds after they had 
left. Mostly they drew when outside, using their drawings as 
hypotheses about the space, though some tried to draw in 
the space (blindfoldedl). Sessions usually last 2-3 hours (by 
the subject's choice). In one particular session. I spent 
nearly three hours examining in minutest detail what I later 
discovered was the underside of a staircase, without 
being able to visualize It at all; even the (fairly accurate) 
drawing did not help me, and I had no sense of the whole. 
This finding is universal, and has been highlighted by the 
variety found in drawings by different subjects of the same 
place (Figure 4), as wel I as by asking subjects to draw the 
space from memory after a time lapse, to which the response 
runs: 'I can't remember it, but I could if I'd seen it'. 
AX14 
verticality I horinntality / depth 
2 surface 
hard / sort 
3 containment 
closed open 
4 scale 
small large 
5 mechanica: 
Parts can move /parts can't move 
6 building as setting 
domiriont / subordinate 
7 space's feeling for users 
humcri j l'or-humcri 
8 core t)etrl pointed to 
hterarchiciij varchic 
9 symbolic reading 
suggest: ve I icorinic 
10 opening in boundary 
trons. Mf emt ! mcije 
II diversity 
complex is, rrrfe 
12 movement 
continuity, ' discrti-quity 
13 where I am 
inside 1 outs. de 
14 from where I arm what I feel 
inside / mrside 
:5 context 
important I weck 
IA I' 1 %1. *, 
sz 
. 
. I. 
103 
401, 
93 
5- 
Figurel Total use oftho JS terms for each subject and each 
slide showing the difference in each subject's use and in the ways 
of describing each slid@. (The process olassembLing this data tends 
to minimize differences: the individual subject by subject, slide by 
slid* data is even more varied) 
DESIGN STUDIES 
ri wi FF 
Figure 3. Drawings of each su bject's in terpreta tion of the term 'con tainmen t. Although each su bject used each term differen tly, there is an 
obvious family resemblance between these drawings 
The idea behind it is that if deprived of visual infor- 
mation, the cognitive process of internal visualization will 
be used to form a picture of an unseen space and will, by so 
doing, demonstrate something of a subject's way of visual- 
izing (such as his personal spatial variables). The most 
revealing information of all, however, comes from the 
subject's reaction when finally allowed to see the space. 
This reaction is instantaneous -a sort of 'wow' of complete 
revelation, a moment of enlightenment, from which I con. 
cluded that it was not only that words were not much good, 
but rather that serial processing (words following one 
another, feeling one's way round a room from detail to 
detail) and particularly the division into parts was totally 
inappropriate to how we see space. 
To test this, I carried out a third experiment, in 
controlled viewing (1976-77). For this, another unfamiliar 
and unusual space was chosen. However subjects were 
allowed to see it, but only for rigidly controlled time periods, 
namely 2 s, 10 s, I min, 5 min, and as long as they liked (in 
practice normally about 15 min). They were asked to draw 
1-- ---j --0 ý 
ii.. .- ¶'N 
-- 
II i. 
_________ I -- 
FOuret Two plans of the SJMO room ("Ith a Perspective of the upper one) made from a bUndroldsurvoy bY two different subjects. NoN that 
#wn the basic plan q@om@ try is different. The room was, in fact, a discotheque with a central wooden dance floor and mirrored colutrins 
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Figure 5. Two drawings of the same room (part of an old warehouse) made after controlled viewings oldiffertnt times by different subjects. 
Note the differences in details (eg column capitals). The two subjects had very different levels of drafting skill, but It is nevertheless IlAra to 
guess how long a viewing each represents. The left drawing represents a 2s viewing (drawn byan unskilled draftsman) while the right was 
drawn by a good draftsmanaltor a 15 min viewing. When shown together, in lectures, the audience tends to lump them together at aI min 
viewing 
what they saw, after leaving the space and their drawings 
were then pinned up to form an exhibition from which 
each subject estimated the time of viewing that each draw- 
ing represented. Figure 5 shows two such drawings, and you 
may be interested to estimate how long a view each represents. 
The idea in this experiment was that, if perception 
of space is in terms of wholes rather than parts, it should be 
hard to guess how long a view each drawing represents, since 
the whole is seen instantaneously. This turned out to be so, 
as can be seen from Figure 6. 
WHOLES AND PARTS 
The interpretation I place on these experiments is as 
follows: spatial perception and the representation of 
spatial experience is a wholistic event, in which a sense of 
a whole is elaborated over a history into detail. The detail 
may be said to constitute the parts of the whole (actually, 
a part is a(nother) whole in a role). They are not predefined, 
but are elaborated over time through the subject's percep- 
tual interaction with the whole. This, of course, means 
the parts may always be elaborated into smaller subparts 
at a later time as the perceptual history develop& and 
hence there are no absolute variables, but rather personal 
ones that change, which can be accounted for by the 
author's Theory of Objects" and by Glanville and Pask. 17 
The mechanism is similar to that Piaget requires for the 
2 seconds 
10 seconds 
I minute 
5 minutes 
indeterminate 
development of obiect conservation. " This, again, means 
that there is a specific style (in Pask's sense of cognitive and 
learning style'9) to (visual) spatial perception; the gestaltist 
top-down experience as indicated in the tree of Figure 7. 
The top-down nature of (visual) spatial perception 
has consequences in perceptual mismatch, since bottom-up 
perception cannot work happily, for at least two reasons. 
The first is the difficulty in reconstituting the exact tree from 
the bottom, not least of all because to do so requires that 
the node is predefined. Several reconsitutions are possible 
even in the simple tree shown in Figure 8, and even assuming 
that the second reason can be overcome. 
The second reason cannot, however, be so easily 
ignored: for the bottom-up style of work there are two 
prerequisites. The bottom nodes must truly be at the bottom, 
with nothing below them, and they must be clearly and com- 
prehensibly defined. But the fact of the elaboration of parts 
(and the uncertainty about when this may happen) makes it 
impossible to determine that they really are at the bottom 
(Figure 9). And, anyhow, the defining of any of these parts 
involves their being treated as wholes so that they may be 
defined at a117 (ie their part-ness is a role they play in rela- 
tion to other roles, which must be apparent from the mid- 
way nodes, at once parts of the top and wholes of the 
bottomi) see Figure 10. 
Such an interpretation is borne out by two common 
experiences. Think of a whole, such as a familiar room, in 
number of choice% 
ideogram 
F4uzv6. Viewing times guessed for each drawing, with the actual viswing time indicated by tho hAtchingabov* the guesses. Even in the 
an oldrawingsrepresenting 2S viowings, not @von half the guesses war@ right. The pwiods were 2 a, JOS. I Ir%Ln, 5 min. and as long as the 
subject Mkod 
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Too 17 Down 
Bottom A up Fqv@ 7.7*ree indicating gestalist top-down exporience 
rqurt 8. Reconstitutions of simplo trot 
which you suddenly find a crack in a wall, ie a new part 
elaborated. (Without consulting others you can never know 
if it is new or if you have only just noticed it. ) It does not 
change the whole, of course, but there is no way that you 
would reconstitute the whole from that crack as being a 
new, fundamental, basic property of the room. That is, the 
Crack is not treated as a variable. 
Alternatively, think of how, generally, you draw or 
talk about a space. Try writing down a description of the 
room you are now in. Unless there is something particu- 
larly interesting in it, you will almost certainly outline it 
first and then elaborate the details. (You will not, however, 
describe the greater whole that the room exists in. ) Experi. 
ments in descriptions of New York flats '2 
0 indicate that 
this downwardness is more-or-less universal (although how, 
exactly, one progresses down the tree is open). So do my 
observ3tions of subjects drawing in the controlled viewing 
txperiment, where, I maintain, subjects outline the whole 
Ind then draw in more and more detail - frequently 
inventing it when they cannot refer to the space itself. One 
Of the drawings includes nonexistent capitals on the columns, 
set Figure 5. This is an assertion which I hope to examine in 
detail, particularly the strategy of each tree, later. 
This interpretation throws light on the other two 
IxPeriments, thus: the problem is not primarily visual/ 
virbal, but whole/part. In both cases it was necessary that 
I sPitial experience was acquired through parts - verbally 
býrough the accepted vocabulary in the first case and by the 
Issembly together of sequential touch data in the second. 
THE COMPUTABLE (AGAIN) 
If what I have said so far holds true, something important 
his been learnt about the computable. Undoubtedly much 
of our description of the world through parts is very power. 
ful and works elegantly and excellently. But not in all cases. 
At least in the case of the representation of spatial experience 
(which cannot be separated from spatial experience itself), 
we cannot define the parts beforehand (isolate the variables), 
and hence we cannot hope to analyse or synthatize our 
experience in these terms. This is to say. spatial experience 
is Computable but not computable. Spatial experience is 
not in terms of ready-made absolute standards, it is not 
serial (though it is historical), it is not variable-based and 
quantity is therefore irrelevant. 21 
The experience of a space is an experience of 
continuous learning and refinement, reflecting that side of 
man's nature that needs to explore experience and learn 
more than that which is needed to account and explain. 
Perhaps this is more general than we admit? It most certainly 
implies that the normal approach to computing and design, 
and to environmental psychology, is deeply anti this human 
experiential mode. 
DESIGN -A POSTULATE 
Now I will make a postulate. It seems that when we want to 
examine designing, we should examine how we represent 
things. This is because the process of (for instance) drawing 
is, in a sense, actually an act of design - the re-invention of 
the space is only different from the invention of the space 
in the sense that the space is assumed to have been invented 
already. Yet, to me-the-experiencer, my first experience of 
the space is my first experience, whether I am visiting a 
space someone else has created or making one of my own. 
Thus I am not very concerned with the difference between 
drawing from life and drawing from imagination. I take It 
as read that the manner of the representation of spatial 
experience is a good model for the understanding of the 
design of new spaces. 
THE QUALITY OF ZEN 
The postulate about design, the observations on the wholis- 
tic aspect of spatial perception and the impossibility for the 
experimenter of separating representation from experience, 
give rise to a particular problem. What is quality and how 
Figurv 9. Bottomless trot 
Whole 
Whole or part 
-Part 
? 
Oh dear 
Figur#10. Tr": Lsita part or. a whole? 
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do we recognize it ( without which intentional education 
is, of course, impossible)? 
I have argued that we perceive and represent 
spatial experience in terms not of predetermined, variable. 
like parts but of a whole into which the parts are elaborated 
over the course of a history. This is, of course, what I believe 
Pirsig Is talking about in his book on Zen, and is why I 
provide 'An apparently irrelevant beginning. It is even more 
what the Cage follow-up to Herrigel's archery story confronts. 
In terms of any performance criterion fle scoring on the 
target) the master archer who misses the bull's-eye is a very 
bad archer indeed, and should never be considered a 'master'. 
in our earlier terms, he fails at the level of the computable 
because he hits the wrong place I How, then, can he be a 
master? 
The answer, as we said, cannot lie in the method of 
assessment we would expect to apply, that is, in his 
measurable performance in a computable world. It does, in 
fact, lie in his masterly quality as an archer in the activity 
of shooting arrows from bows, not in the result. It is his 
relationship with the activity he undertakes - in a Com- 
putable world - that makes him a master, and it is in this 
necessarily undefinable but nevertheless recognizable way 
of acting that his masterly quality lies. 
And, of course, it is this recognition that is the prob- 
lem because it is not a matter of definition and cannot there- 
fore be programmed in or instructed. But it is recognizable 
to the Zen master who knows when others attain it Cen- 
lightenment'). In our culture we are so materialistic and 
reductionist that we forget this far too easily, even when 
falling in love (an activity frequently confused with sexual 
intercourse and quantified by orgasm counts): we recognize 
it when we see it, but try to define it by referring to other 
things and then it eludes us. Our master archer is a master 
not through his satisfying certain quantities of a number of 
variables, but because of the wholeness of what he does. 
This is the moral of the Zen story, and is where its 
sting is for designers, because if the observations I have made, 
and the arguments I have woven around them are right, then 
design is an activity to be engaged in the same manner as 
Zen archery. Design cannot be taught by the prescriptive 
definition of procedures, It is something that runs on recog. 
nition. 
The difference is like that between wandering and 
walking. in this sense: If you want to go somewhere specific 
and you know where you are and your route (by a map, pre. 
vious experience or whatever), you can walk straight there, 
going as fast as possible and resenting the time wasted on the 
journey. You do not enjoy the trip, it is just a boring nuis. 
ance. But you do not always walk like this. Sometimes, in 
the countryside for instance, you just start wandering, 
going nowhere in particular and looking at whatever random 
things you find, until suddenly you have the feeling of 
arrival and your wandering makes sense. This wandering is 
a process akin to that in the Computable and is the best 
analogy I can find for design, while that rushed and bored 
walk is problem solving and is computable. 
DESIGN 
At the heart of design, then, is a peculiar activity, for It is 
an activity that discovers a new whole without being able 
to define beforehand what this whole should be, but which 
nevertheless is recognized by the designer as being appro- 
priate (I do not deny that some things can and should be 
specified, of course. I want, however, to emphasize this 
different and unique aspect of the activity of design. ) The 
distinctiveness of this activity was recently convincingly 
22 argued, in Design Studies, by Bruce Archer. What is 
amazing is that we ever forgot it, and the manner in which 
we have ignored its importance and universality. 
Consider, for instance, the training of an experi- 
mental scientist. This man is being trained to analyse the 
real world so that humanity can better understand and 
account for it. He will repeat earlier experiments, and he 
will be taught that he deals in facts, coldly and objectively. 
However, this is really not Sis greatest skilll His 
skill is the design of new and successful experiments - 
sometimes by modifying existing ones and sometimes by 
acts of greater novelty. This he is never taught, It may 
never even be mentioned, and the passion and inspiration 
S : r' 
i: 
Figurell. Root plan of a kiosk to be collagod into Inigo Jonos'St Pauls'Church, Covent Carden. 
The kiosk (the middle box) was designed using intornution derived by the designer, Patrick Beale, 
from his perception of the space and is meant to present a key to his understanding of the space 
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needed are specifically excluded from his account. He i% 
of course, a designer, but he doesn't admit this or the 
importance his design ability has for the success of his 
experiment and hence his contribution to understanding. 
DESIGN EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 
But how can You teach the unteachable, learn the unlearn- 
able, screw the inscutable? For us, with our culture, the short koans, swordstick attacks, humiliations and privations of Zen are so foreign that we cannot grasp them, and, anyhow, 
what we want to learn is design, not Zen. 
The existence of the Zen master, just as the con. 
tinuing success of some teachers and some institutions, 
indicates that the Zen-like skills of design can be communic- 
ated. Nevertheless our success rate is low, and we badly need 
to improve our skill. But here the problem lies not only in 
the very small quantity of research that has been carried out 
on design but also its bias which has usually been towards 
the isolation and quantification of variables which, if my 
argument about spatial perception and Its relevance to the 
process of design is right, is exactly not what design is. 
Much of this research is so richly structured In terms of its 
assumptions that it is probably preventing the exploration 
and revelation of the very thing it is trying to get at. 
What is needed, then, is a more open-eyed research 
programme that will examine design as design, for design's 
sake, rather than as pseudo-sicence. I would venture that 
such a programme might be organized around how 
subjects draw from memory, and the differences between 
such a drawing and what is really there. I have used this 
technique as a reflective design tool ýa way of showing a 
subject how he perceives space and of using these percep. 
tions in designing a new space 23 (Figure 11). From this 
we may be able to find a better means of education. 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE COMPUTABLE 
What I have argued about the wholes, the distinction 
between the computable and the Computable, and about 
An apparently irrelevant beginning 
This paper is based on anqther written in 1978. ' Amongst 
the comments made about its forebearer was that the 
beginning was irrelevant; I believe the beginning was crucial 
and critical, but, even more, I believe its apparent irrelevance 
tells us a lot about design. 
At the moment I am designing this new paper. But 
I shall begin where I began in the other one. Why I did so 
will become clear later. 
In his book, Zen and the art of motorcycle main. 
tenance 2, Robert Pirsig continually tackles the definition 
of quality. To paraphrase outrageously, his point is that one 
does something well when one has a deep but intuitive 
involvement in it, not when one intellectualizes. Not that 
he is against the intellect, or its achievements. He is, rather, 
against our current pre-occupation which attempts to 
explain everything as being the proper operation of a collec. 
ton of procedures on a set of defined variables. His objec- 
ton then (and he speaks as a scientist), is to the overstret. 
ching we require from a frequently but poorly understood 
methodology - the Methodology of Science. He dislikes 
the indiscriminate use of the reductionist approach. 
In a book that preceded Pirsig's by a good 20 years, 
Eugene Herrige 13 writes of 'Zen in the art of archery. The 
traditional Japanese bow is apparently so powerful that a 
ttrong man can hardly tension it. Herrigel tells of the archery 
method in which, standing with the bow held above the 
head, the archer feels himself to be at one with the target, 
and finds that this somehow permits the bow to be ten- 
sioned and the arrow to hit the bull's eye. There was 
apparently a master archer who could unify himself with the 
target with such clarity that he would go down to the range 
and shoot bulls' eyes even in pitch darkness. 
John Cage was travelling with a Japanese friend on 
a train, and recalls, in SilenCe4 that he reported Herrigel's 
note about the archer's success with bulls' eyes in the 
darkness to this friend. Far from being surprised, the 
friend retorted that in Japan there was still living (at the 
time) a master archer who had never been known to hit 
the bull's eye, even in broad daylight. 
I don't want to mystify, and that's probably enough 
of Zen for the moment. But the reason for bringing it up at 
all is to ask an important question for architecture, a ques. 
tion to which I think there are a lot of misleading answers being given. 
The point with the master archer who so singu- 
larly fails to hit bulls'eyes is that, in any assessment based 
on performance specification and definition of aims, he 
must be deemed to fail, since he clearly doesn't score well. 
Yet he is considered to be a master archer. If that's so, 
his 'mastership' must come not from his performance, but 
from the manner of his engagement in archery. That Is, 
it is a matter for recognition, not measurement, and this, 
in turn, says something about quality, in the way Pirsig 
does (which, no doubt, accounts for his title). 
The Ultimate Question 
My introduction runs intentionally against the main flow 
of this paper. It is placed as it is not only to provide a 
constant source of back reference modulated through each 
following section, but, also, because this paper is an analogy 
for the activity of design ... it Is a design, laid bare. Even the skeletons for its construction, and their modification, 
can be found (in the Appendices). 
Now, however, I shall start from a different begin. 
ning; the ultimate question of design, the Universe and 
everything. 
The Ultimate Question, which I will discuss mainly 
in terms of architecture, is: 
What is computable? 
That is a very ordinary question (so is 'what is 6x 97 
(Adamss)). Its significance lies in concepts entailed by 
computability as we normally use the term: enumeration, 
definition, standard, problem statement, and so on. it 
involves the concepts of completeness, consistency, 
axiornatization, self-reference, paradox. These are fasci- 
nating areas, but here I will try to broach them only through 
the medium of architecture, not as a conceit, but because 
they are well-handled elsewhere. 47 
This paper is about what can be computed in 
architecture and 'The Architecture of the Computable'. 
(It was at this point that the first skeleton paper began). 
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design leads ot our reconsidering the manner in which 
we compute within certain task areas. In particular, we 
must not treat design as computable, because of the struc. 
tural mismatch: it is, rather, Computable, with the con- 
comitant changes that implies. It is only by making these 
changes that architecture and design will become Comput- 
able, for they depend on a type of process which has a' 
clifferent architecture. In this sense, the activity of design 
research becomes design, and the computability of archi- 
tecture generates the Architecture of the Computable. 
THE ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION - AN 
ALTERNATIVE OR PERHAPS A CONCLUSION 
The design that is this paper is a product of an accident. 
Half way through writing it I received from J Christopher 
Jones (with whom I had never previously corresponded) 
a copy of the paper he wrote for Design StUdie$, 24 which 
I had not previously seen. It turned out that he was doing 
the same thing as I was trying to do: that is, he wrote a 
paper that not only talked about design but was. explicitly, 
a design itself, reflecting that process just as I i, -ind this 
to do. He framed his paper with an introductof iection 
explaining this, which I borrowed in my originai, but has 
been changed in this version. The point is, of course, that 
it is extraordinary how designs happen. There was no way 
that I could guess beforehand that I would get a copy of 
that paper, itself composed with the conscious use of 
Chance, or that it would be in any sense relevant to what I 
was doing. Nevertheless it happened that way, and all I 
did was to exploit it, to wander (as I said earlier), and to 
find a way that let the ideas develop and grow, until the 
Paper and its content gelled. 
(This introduction was the last piece of this paper written. ) 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The work described here has, in the main, been carried out 
it the Architectural Association School of Architecture, 
London. Figures 1-6 first appeared in the Architectural 
Anociation Ouarterly, but are the author's copyright. 9 
REFERENCES 
I Glanville, R 'Leaving space for design'presented to Design 
Research group, North London Polytechnic (1978) 
2 Pirsig. R Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance Bodley 
Head. London (1974) 
3 Harrigel, E Zen in the art of archery Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London (1953) 
4 Calls, J Silence MIT, Cambridge, USA (1966) 
5 Adams, D The hitchhiker's guide to the Galaxy Pan, London 
(1979) 
Hofstadtor, D Gddel, Escher, Bach Harvester, Brighton, UK 
(19791 
7 Glanville, R 'Beyond the Boundaries'Proc. SGSR Silver Jubilee 
Meeting Springer, London (1979) 
Babbege. C 'On the mathematical powers of the calculating 
engine' reprinted in Randell, 8 (ed) The origins of digital 
computers Springer, Berlin (1973) 
Glanville. R 'Amazing s1mcel For the architectural stimulus. 
response rat? 'AAQ Vol 9 Nos 2-3 (1977) 
Gleaville, Ft. Pedretti, A and Jackson, P 'Ruing Construing', 
Proc. SGSR $; Ivor jubilee Meeting Springer, London 11979) 
224 
II Wittgenstein, L rl'*ctatus Logico - Philosophicus Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London (1971) 
12 Gregory. R 'The confounded eye' in Gregory. R and Gorribrich. 
E (ads) Illusion in nature andin art Duckworth, London 11973) 
13 Pask, G 'A conversation theoretic approach to social 
systems' in Geyer; F and van der Zouwen. J Sociocyberne tics 
Niihoff. Leiden, Netherlands 11979) 
14 Kelly, G rhe psychology of personal constructi (2 vofs) Norton, 
NY, USA (19551 
15 Thomas, L 'The tutoring of art students: applying an approach 
and technique based on the Repertory Grid'. CSHL, Brunei 
University, UK (19711 
16 Glanville. RA cybernetic development of epistemology and 
observation with reference to space and time (as seen in 
Arch; rectureJ PhD thesis, Brunei University, UK (1975) 
17 Glanville, R and Pask, G 'Design - putting skin on bones'in Powell, J, Evans, 13 and Talbot, R (ads) Changing design 
Wiley. London (1980) 
18 Glanville, R 'The Object of a concept and the concept of an 
Object'Proc. 4 EMCSR, Linz (1978) 
19 Pask, G and Scott, 8 'Learning strategies and individual 
competence' Int. J. Man - Mach. Stud. Vol 4 (1972) 
20 Linda, C and Labor, W 'Spatial netwoorks as a site for the 
study of language and thought' Language vol 51 no 4 (1975) 
21 Glanville, R Measure meant (in preparation) 
22 Archer, 8 'Design as a discipline' Design Studies Vol I 
No I (July 1979) pp 17-20 
23 Glanville, R MOTIF 8- am exhibition (19791 
24 Jones, JC 'Designing designing' Design Studies Vol I No 1 
(July 1979) pp 31-35 
APPENDIX 1 
(The working skeleton of this paper, with later modifica- 
tions indicated by numbers (the higher the later). ) 
The Architecture of the Computable, 
1. Zen beginning. ? What can be computed (and compu- 
tation as analogue for conventionally taught) 
1 perception of space, design, (learning) 
perception - parts and wholes. 
3. Wholes & wholes & wholes 
(examples + Linde) cf Canter's use of variables. 
33 Computability 
design - postulate 
recognition & Zen 
(Wandering, Zen *. quality) 
NOTE ON MEASUREMENT & STANDARD 
educ. type - design is different ... how does scientist design experiment? 
Insert 
design studio programs Motif 8 Hole in City, analogy 
etc. 
The architecture of the computable and v. v. 
You can start anywhere 
2. Insert essay skeleton (inc. numbering) somewhere - 
and show it as a way of designing 
2. The paper does what it talks of, is an analogy of 
design process, is an allegory of itself. 
APPENDIX 2 
(Two later skeletons, taken from conversational descrip- 
tions of what the paper is about. ) 
DESIGN STUDIES 
vi - computer scientists' a0 ca 
4 
ews of COMPUTABLE n", 'Ankogy' thýbnl'ý initially productiv relation which n , 
*cybýrnet ns i; cia beýv'seid with wholes (defines parts as consequence of 
ý, "ýanalogy ý, -. '4; ýý*-ýý- AHoW 18in"pute'r sc'ience'vi6i4 dominates research: the , , 
-. thirý' ibl ossi e iews; the p approach 
, Anilojy'of waridering'& walking' , ., 
- I -4 Wr ing a paper is a Iso designing and is an analogy for the , , ew i. s perce , p- -No; ýtRit_jpart'ia*l, `cf cybeirnetics'wholistic) vi process of 
6esign. ý 
,, tua . 11 yi naýproprl ate. Used because it's easy (we i 
have the ' Computable - recognize objects (Object constancy): per. . ', -'rýithdd6logy) 
but the other view. Design thus ception of whole and development of parts - which is "ght that way -ýý tho' design is not analytic but syn. thetic'ý ' ' 
one thing design does M and is how we perceive space 
i scie'tists ha" to design P'6u li "t e ar ha n ve _-Ia- 
ln'6ýýS ial. ' though not how ordinary programs work: if there are 
- 
, ý, 
ýjx* , omputer Science _ periments, 
but are not taught. C variables/things held in common we have to find them 
ý'-iornputable sometimes relevant, but always. out: they are not given. Boo to behaviourism I 
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Ranulph Glanville 
APPENDIX H 
"Construct Heterarchies. " 
From: 
International Journal of Man Machine Studies, Vol 13,1980 
Note: 
A slightly extended version appears in Shaw, M (ed) (1981) 
"Recent Advances in Personal Construct Technology", London, 
Academic Press 
Recent Advances in 
Personal Construct Technology 
Edited by 
Mildred L. G. Shaw 
Middlesex Polytechnic England 
1981 
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A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers 
London 9 New York * Toronto * Sydney San Francisco 
Construct heterarchies 
RANULPH GLANVILLEt 
School Of Architecture, Portsmouth Polytechnic, Portsmouth, U. K. 
This paper presents a technique for deriving individual construct heterarchies, and for 
comparing several such without loss of sharpness in the initial act of constructing. It 
explains uses-both potential and in practice. The technique is related to Kelly's 
Personal Construct Theory, and some of its limitations and implications for that 
Theory are explained. - 
Introduction 
The views of Kelly (1955), around which this issue of this Journal is developed, involve 
the personal creation of bi-polar constructs on which individual perceived elements are 
assumed to be located and which assemble together in a heterarchy leading to a small 
number of base constructs which are the key to the individual personality. While I doubt 
the universal validity of the bi-polar construct (see also Easterby-Smith, 1980)- 
especially for visual perception and when used in accounting for the act of design (which 
is the making of a new construct, which in itself, in Kelly's terms, requires a set of 
personal meta-constructs that permit the generation of a new personal construct and 
thus, also, of course, the generation of the personal -construct heterarchy), the elegance 
and simplicity of Kelly's vision has lead to its extensive application through simple 
mechanization in various program suites, (Shaw, 1978,1980; Shaw & 71iomas, 1978; 
Slater, 1977,1980; Bell & Keen, 1980; Leach, 1980; Easterby-Smith, 1980; Eshragh, 
1980) that are often found useful and personally rewarding (to the user). The assumed 
bi-polarity of a construct has even been brought into doubt by one of Kelly's followers 
(Rosenberg, 1977), and I find no need to insist on it. 7he relaxation of this require- 
ment brings Kelly's views of hetcrarchial concept organizatidn closely into line with 
other constructivist psychologists-especially, of course, Piaget (1972), and also Pask's 
work on learning and knowledge (Pask, 1972; Pask & Scott, 1972,1973; Pask, Scott & 
Kallikourdis, 1973; Pask, Kallikourdis & Scott, 1975). 
However, the discovery of (representations of) such personal heterarchies is not 
necessarily easy. Piaget achieves it by himself analysing his notes of observations made 
over long periods and of many subjects. Kelly does it through an iterative process of 
questioning, which also takes a long time. His followers use various modifications (e. g. 
Fransella, in Fransella & Bannister, 1977), interviews subjects and elicits constructs and 
their ordering herself). Computerization speeds up the iterative process as demon- 
strated in other contributions to this issue, but may be somewhat limited-in that it is 
wholly reflective-and even Pask's learning machines take a long time and suffer 
(though progressively less so) from their similarly machine-bound imaginations. 
t 7be work described in this paper was carried out, in the main, at the Architectural Association School, 
London. 
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Leaving aside the whole question of the bi-polarity of personal constructs, there 
remain two distinct technical problems that, although they have been resolved in 
various forms, could well be better resolved in practice. The first of these is the rapid 
generation of personal construct heterarchies, within a group of constructs. The second 
is the comparison of individual personal heterarchies of constructs-bctween common 
representations or between common heterarchial forms, without compromising the 
initial sharpness of individual constructs. 
I propose a technique that goes some way towards this, and will discuss some of its 
implications and limitations not only in Kelly's terms, but also in terms of other 
constructivist theories, and I will introduce some apparent by-products of the tech- 
nique. 
TECHNIQUEt 
The technique assumes a group of constructs (not necessarily bipolar) to be already 
chosen, but does allow for a portmanteau construct (usually denoted A) which 
represents the supra-ordinate construct "an important construct that's otherwise 
missing from the group". These are arranged in whatever manner is chosen, although 
experience suggests that arranging them-anagram-wise-in a circle is a good way, and 
this is the. way we will used here (Fig. 1). 
c) 
/ 
is 
jL4 
Ro. 1. A circle of eight constructs (here denoted by 
numbers), together with the portmanteau construct 
A, which is left outside the circle to highlight its role 
as covering something that is missing. 
FIC;. -2. A circle of construcu being filled in. The 
arrowhead points to the construct derived from the 
constructs at the bottom of the arrow stems. Note 
that more than one derivation may be possible, and 
that all derivations must be made from at least two 
other constructs. 
Each construct in the circle (excepting, by choice, A) is then considered in turn, from 
the following point-of-view. It is assumed that construct generation (within the closed- 
system of the construct group) requires the interaction of at least two other constructs, 
as is a pre-requisite in Pask's (1975) productive relation between "top ics-to-be-I ea rnt", 
for the following, very commonsense reason: if one construct "topic", or one of the 
author's "Objects" (Glanville, 1975,1978,1980a) comes directly from another 
tT'his technique has been described in a borrowed, variant form by Pask'(1976). 7le variation is strange 
since Pask neglects his own rule for topic generation in not requiripg at least two topics to entail another. 
'__-( 5 )--"__ 
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without the inclusion of some ýew information (necessarily from, in this closed-system, 
other constructs), it can only be the same as the single construct it is derived fro 'm 
(Fig. 
2). Thus, a participant will consider whether each and every particular construct can be 
derived by some sort of (not necessarily, but possibly specified) interaction between two 
or more other constructs. The derivations specified are shown by an arrowhead, 
entering the derived construct, the shafts of which emanate from the constructs which, 
acting together, produce this construct. It is normal-even to be expected-that some 
constructs will be derivatives of other constructs, themselves derivatives of the first 
(double-bind), and that some will not be derivatives of any others at all. 
7 
Fia. 3. A filled-in construct circle. Note that congtructs A. I and 4 have no derivations and will be placed at 
the base level when the heterarchy is assembled, that there is a double-bind between 2 and 8, and that 
construct 7 is completely unconnected. 
Having thus completed the interconnecting of the constructs in the circle, (Fig. 3), it is 
necessary'to rearrange them to demonstrate the heterarchial structure of each par- 
ticipant's understanding. This is done according to the following procedure: 
(i) Isolate out all constructs which have no arrowheads pointing into them, and lay 
them out upon a line at base level (Lo). 
(ii) At the second level (LI) place all those constructs derived only from those 
constructs on the base level. 
(iii) At the third level (L2) place all those constructs derived only from those 
constructs on the base and second levels. 
(iv) Continue until there are no more constructs to be derived and place all constructs 
that appear as top nodes on the same top level, since the only meaning in the levels is 
within their own branches of the heterarchy (Fig. 4). 
There may be four peculiarities that occur within the procedure which need special 
attention. 
(a) Some constructs may not be connected in at all, (e. g. construct 7 in Fig. 3). These 
are not part of the participant's heterarchy, from which they are isolated. They may be 
omitted, left on the base line or tabulated separately, at will. 
(b) The double-bind mentioned above may be encountered, where one as yet 
underived construct depends on another underived construct which in turn depends on 
the first. The normal way to handle this is to put all such constructs on the same level and 
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RG. 4. The creation of the heterarchy from a construct circle, shown in four stages demonstrating the four 
instructions. 
(i) Isolate out all constructs which have no arrowheads pointing into them, and lay them out upon a ba*se 
line. Crhe unconnected construct, 7. is omitted. ) 
(ii) At the second level, place all those constructs derived only from those constructs on the base level. 
(iii) At the third level, place all those constructs derived only from those constructs only on the base and 
second levels. Note the double-bind between 2 and 8, and the second (alternative) derivation of 3, which 
requires its level to change, as in the lower diagram, to the third level. 
(iv) Continue with the derivation of construct 5 (which is derived from three constructs), and note that 
construct 3, which was raised to the third level since it had a derivation depending on constructs 2 and 6 
already being derived, is also a point at the top of the heterarchy. 
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allow them to be used (together with already derived constructs on lower levels) to 
derive each other within the same level, (Fig. 5). Such an arrangement may even pertain 
on the base level. However, there is a justifiable argument that such a double-bind 
denotes a common but unelicited construct embedded within the constructs in the 
double-bind. Consequently, the double-bind may be broken by the insertion (on a 
(? 
OTh 
Do. 5. The double-bind between 0 and -y, which is resolved by placing both on the same level. 
lower level) of a new common construct, quite distinct from the supra-ordinate "spare" 
construct called A, and which may then be elicited and named, which, together with 
other constructs on other (lower) levels generates the two constructs that were in the 
double bind (Fig. 6). Note, however, that the elicitation of such a construct implies an 
expansion of the original circle , 
of constructs and a possible consequent alteration of the 
derivative connections, which will in turn require a reformulation of the heterarchy and, 
possibly, further and novel double-binds. 
FiG. 6. Tle double-bind between p and Y. which is resolved by calling upon a new, common construct (t) 
placed at a lower level. 
(c) A construct may seem to need to appear at more than one level in the heterarchy. 
Should this be the case, it should always be placed at the higher level. All that has 
happened is that there are two or more derivations, one (confusingly) relatively simple 
and another depending on the prior derivation of a construct the simple derivation did 
not need. 
(d) Under certain circumstances (only very rarely found) there are no underived 
constructs (i. e. ones without arrowheads entering them). In this case, the base level will 
consist only of double-bound constructs which are derived from but are also in their 
turn the derivation base of each other. This extraordinary event may be handled by the 
first double-bind technique. The second, requiring the assumption of sub-base-line 
constructs seeming a little esoteric. In the only case I have yet met, (Fig. 8(iii), where all 
constructs except A are on LO, all ccptructs were bound to each other. 711C pathologi- 
cal condition that could create this sort of confusion will be mentioned laterl 
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Fia. 7. Two heterarchies combined (alternative derivations are shown by the numbers of the constructs from 
which they are derived, rather than by separate arrowheads, which would in this case confuse the diagram). 
Each of the original heterarchies is a particular interpretation of the combined heterarchy, which also permits 
other, new heterarchies to be made. Note that the number of levels need not in all cases be the same. 
Applications 
There are three areas of application of this personal heterarchy generation technique. 
The first is the obvious one, for which the technique was developed: the personal 
derivation of a personal heterarchy from a collection of elicited constructs. Ile 
technique presented here is reflexive, and distinctively sharp valued, and no more need 
be said about this application. The examples in Fig. 8 show various different personal 
derivations actually elicited from a supposedly (but actually dubiously) shared set of 
constructs. 
The second is the social application. This may be thought of in two ways: the common 
form of heterarchies reflecting different constructs, and the common constructs 
reflecting different heterarchical forms. 
Consider two heterarchies of identical form, but generated from constructs that 
inhabit different universes-say the universes of mechanical springs and electronic 
oscillators (an example beloved of Pask). Here the forms of two heterarchies match, but 
the names of the constructs are different. However, the workings of both are so similar 
that they are analogous to each other and may both be considered as alternative 
physical versions of the one abstract heterarchy-viz. oscillator theory. This is a special 
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case, for it may not always be possible to establish similarities between the constructs in 
different heterarchies with the same form. But it may be, and anyhow the form itself has 
something to tell us, as we will discover in the third application. 
When the constructs are held in common, in name at least, the difference in the form 
of the individual heterarchies shows up different points-of-view. As such, each 
heterarchy shows an individual compilation of knowledge. These may be thought of on 
individual realizations of an Entailment Mesh (Pask, Scott & Kallikourdis, 1973; Pask, 
Kallikourdis & Scott, 1975; Pask, 1975), that is as Entailment Structures, and their 
relatedness may be computed by considering each heterarchy as a different unfoldment 
of a category, (e. g. Ginali & Gogucn, 1977; Open University Course Team, 1976, and 
also Leach, 1980). Being able to look at a collection of such construct heterarchies can 
also help determine the underlying assumptions made by several individuals and hence 
of what are conventionally thought of as their semantic networks (e. g. Katz & Fodor, 
1963; Winograd, 1972). This is obviously valuable when, for instance, there are 
irreconsilable differences, beyond negotiation, in industrial disputes, although any 
similar heterarchy generating technique could be used. The particular advantage of the 
technique presented here is that the initial sharpness is not lost, and the heterarchy 
generation is personal. 
The comparison of construct derivations has, however, another social application 
when a collection of these heterarchies is used together. Consider, for a moment, how 
several textbooks of some common subject differ. It is not that the things-to-be-learned 
are particularly different (although there may be some differences in terminology and 
certain fringe topics may not be universally included): rather, it is their precise 
interconnection and logical development. We normally refer to this as "difference in 
perspective". There is nothing inherently right or wrong in any of these arrangements: 
they are potentially valid alternatives, and may, of course, be set up as such, allowing 
each individual learner to follow whatever bit of whichever argument he finds more 
appealing. 
For some years Pask has used such alternative structurings of fields of knowledge, 
which are called "Entailment Structures" and are particularized versions of rather more 
general (and circular) "Entailment Meshes". The problem, however, with thi3, tech- 
nique is that a researcher has to extract the argument from several textbooks, and the 
learner cannot modify this arrangment. The technique given here allows a far simpler 
way of sharing the alternative arguments-that is, of course, of showing alternative 
construct generation and derivation heterarchies. That such alternatives are useful, 
Pask has shown. Imagine, for instance, trying to compose a manual on how an internal 
combustion engine works: the complexity of construct connectivity is considerable and 
to trim this to fit one overview is thoroughly risky because the particular way one person 
does it may be virtually incomprehensible for another, (Fig. 7). 
The third application is rather more arbitrary. It appears to be the case, but the only 
reason I can give for it being so is purely speculative. 
If personal heterarchies are examined, 'they appear to demonstrate characteristics of 
each person's learning ability. Take, for instance, the examples shown. To me, as the 
teacher of the students who produced them, they reflect precisely the problems I 
noticed each suffering in trying to execute an architectural project, as shown in the 
captions to Fig. 8. Such a judgement is, of course, quite subjective but I am not certain 
how that limitation can be overcome-or even whether it should be. 
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Fici. 8.11ree heter2rchies of 2 common subject matter generated by architecture students. Note the 
considerable difference in form, and the manner in which the reflect learning abilities. 
(i) 7"his student's learning was characterized by being relatively straightforward. but had the weakness of 
trying to please too many people at once. 
(ii) This student started well, but. at a point in the middle of a project would get confused and 
overcomplicate things. If this stage was passed, there was a happy outcome and a good project. 
(iii) Wis student could never get beyond the stage of having an idea and going away to consider it, as a 
result of which many objections were found, and some other idea would be grasped at. The student did not 
complete the course. 
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My explanation of why these heterarchies might reflect learning ability is that, where 
there are many constructs double-bound, there is a problem of having too much to 
handle at once (along the lines of Miller's (1956) argument on short-term memory and 
informative processing), or alternatively, of having to invent sub-constructs which split 
the double-bind; and that, where there are too many top points in the heterarchy the 
student is involved in a too-distributed set of goals which is, again, informationally 
unmanageable. Of course, the extra ordinary student for whom everything is inter- 
connected (Fig. 8(iii)) has a problem very akin to the (as yet fictitious) one for whom 
none are connected-where do you begin and what connection do you follow-a 
terrifying problem when looked at in this manner. 
Practice 
So far, in practice, this technique has been used on four different occasions. 
The first occasion, for which the technique was invented, was the analysis of a study 
syllabus for an architecture course in which jhe experimenter selected important terms 
from an international manifesto prepared by the teaching staff, and invited both 
students and staff to demonstrate their heterarchies. In fact, this was found to be very 
difficult, because the anagram circle technique had not been incorporated, and the need 
for construct generation by construct interaction was found to be hard to understand 
and even harder to remember in use. Furthermore, it was found that selection by each 
individual from the experimenter's initial selection of the terms that were significant to 
each of them meant that not only were the heterarchies difficult to extract, they were 
also consituted of such different terms that about the only thing which could be said of 
them was that each participant had a unique and distinct interest. 
For the second occasion, the names of the constructs were much more rigorously 
determined by the group (Glanville, Jackson & Pedretti, 1979). Furthermore, the 
anagram technique had become incorporated. As a consequence, it was much easier to 
derive and compare the heterarchies. It was on this occasion that the reflection of 
learning became apparent, and this paper has been illustrated mainly with examples 
taken from this use. 
Ilie third occasion was Pask's use where, from several heterarchies, he does indeed 
build up entailment meshes, and persuades participants to debate the relevant validity 
and generalizability of their various heterarchies. 
Finally, the technique has been used to generate a symposium syllabus by using the 
heterarchies that various participants at an earlier symposium (on self-reference) made 
of a collection of already debated named constructs. 
. On all occasions except, perhaps, the first, the technique has been found useful and 
rewarding. 
Conclusion 
This paper has presented a technique for deriving individual construct heterarchies, and 
for comparing several such without loss of sharpness in the initial act of construing, and 
has explained uses-both potential and in practice. The technique has been related to 
Kelly's Personal Construct Theory, and some of its limitations and implications for that 
Theory explained. 
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Kathryn Findlay first required the invention of this technique. Heinz von Foerster suggested 
the anagram form. 
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Appendix 
NOTE ON THE DISAMBIGUATION OF SOME POTENTIAL GRAPHIC AMBIGUITIES 
It has been pointed out to me by Gordon Pask, since this paper was first published in 
the International Journal of Man-Machine Studies (Vol. 13,1980) that there is an 
ambiguity in some of the figures-specifically Figs. 2,3,4,7 & 8. 
This ambiguity comes about after the event. That is to say, the ambiguity is not in the 
figure (or the procedure for its production) as it is made, but it becomes apparent when 
the figure is looked at as a finished object, from an external point of view. This 
ambiguity is graphical in origin, and may be simply overcome. If you look at Fig. 2, you 
will notice the arrows entering the construct labelled 3 have become ambiguous. It is 
simply hard to know from which other constructs 3 derives, and how many different 
derivations there are. This graphical problem is almost bound to occur. Another 
difficulty may be in sorting out which arrow shafts are which. But, equally, the act of 
filling out the form is not ambiguous, and is a procedure that is both enjoyable and 
relatively hard to cheat, for the method of transforming from the circle into the 
heterarchy is by no means obvious or simple. Thus, it is worth keeping the form, but also 
recording some further information when the form is being filled in, to remove the 
ambiguity, viz. the numbers of the constructs that produce whichever construct you are 
interested in. So that, by construct 3 in Fig. 2 should be recorded A, 4 and 2,6. (If the 
means of combination/interaction of the constructs is being considered, that may also 
be recorded, viz. AA4,6 -. 1-2. ) 
This sort of ambiguity also pertains in a similar manner in the heterarchical figures 
e. g. Fig. 4iv (the heierarchy of the circle filled-in in Fig. 3, which is the completed 
version of Fig. 2) is ambiguous in its cold state as a graphic object, and even 1, the 
heterarchy's creator, had difficulty in sorting out the derivations of the same construct 3. 
The full scale of this potential ambiguity may be seen in Fig. 7, particularly Figs. 7ii and 
7iii. The solution to this problem is of course anticipated in Fig. 7, where in adding two 
separate heterarchies the result had to be shown without graphic representation of the 
separate derivations which are notated by writing them by each construct. Thus 
construct 7 has the three derivations A, 4 and A, 4,7 and 2,6. 
This slight addition to the notational task should remove the ambiguities. 
ARCHITECTURE AND SPACE FOR THOUGHT 
Ranulph Glanville 
APPENDIX I 
"The One Armed Bandit. " 
From: 
Powell, J, Cooper, I and Lera, S (eds. ) (1984) "Designing for 
Building Utilisation", London, Spon 
Designing for 
Building Utilisation 
Edited by 
James A. Powell 
School of Architecture 
Portsmouth Polytechnic 
Ian Cooper 
The Martin Centre for Architectural and Urban Studies 
Department of Architecture 
University of Cambridge 
Sebastian Lera. 
Department of Design Research 
Royal College of Art 
LONDON NEWYORK 
E. & F. N. SPON 
THE ONE ARMED BANDIT 
Ranulph Glanville 
Portsmouth Polytechnic 
School of Architecture 
ABSTRACT 
niB paper expZorea the consequences, 
both in terms of human thought and 
oombinatorice, of quantification used 
in so many fields nowadays, incZuding 
BuiZding Vtiti8ation Studies, and 
argues in terms of compZexity and 
design thinking, that a radicaZ change 
is needed in the quantitative way we 
describe the environment. 
The One Armed Bandit works on the 
principle that you insert discrete 
units of money and get less out. You 
may get a short-term gain. But, in the 
end, you will lose. It repays, nor- 
mally, 75% of the money inserted. 
Some people claim they win. And they 
may. I am not aware of any study 
having been carried out on this. How- 
ever, from the point of view of the 
(thinnish) analogy I wish to pursue. 
this is not important. What is impor- 
tant is that we lose. There are 
individual short-term gains, but we, 
collectively, lose. It's a mug's 
game. 
Although we may gain in less obvious 
and measurable ways. 
I have no objection to measured studies 
of building performance, per se. But 
I do have a problem. The problem is 
that I teach design, and assessment of 
a building doesn't tell me much about 
what to do in designing. It tells me 
ý for instance) that a building will 
or does) not work (or. if I am lucky, 
work(s)), but it tells me little of 
significance about how I should do any- 
thing about it. 
Of course. with experience, I can make 
hunches with a better than average 
likelihood of improving things. But 
this is all rather hit-&-miss when 
compared to the apparent precision of 
the assessment. 
It is not that I don't have a token 
explanation of this phenomenon. This 
explanation lies in the traditional 
contrast of analysis and synthesis 
(deduction and induction, serial and 
holist thinking, right and left brain 
functioning). But having this explan- 
ation, while excusing me, does not 
help me do anything about it. And I 
am not sure there is not a better ce 
more relevant duality. 
So I should like to try to open up 
another possible way of looking at 
this problem, in case this produces 
a question that my help me act. But 
I doubt that I can answer this question, 
yet. 
We are obsessed by quantification and 
measurement, and not without reason. 
Indeed. the OU has several courses 
specially on the subject, So important 
does it appear to be. Measurement has 
led to a simple form of assessment of design ability, and to tremendous 
results in terms of Western technolog- 
ical development. And it Is easy to 
measure, for instance, a sound level. 
or a length. It is, however, hard to 
comprehend the experience of a specific 
decibel level_- to understand. I am 
sure many of us will remember the dif- 
ficulties we had in the Cubs and 
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Brownies. estimating length. And the 
figure, while it may tell re some of 
what I should do, still does not tell 
me how to do it. 
Traditionally, measurement and complex- 
ity are closely related. Whenever we 
have simple repetitive units, we may 
end up with rather a lot of them. 
When we have a lot of things to han- 
dle at once, we say we are confronted 
by a complex situation. It is harder 
to add 2222 to some number than to add 
2. Complexity, thus, becomes a con- 
cern. 
George Miller (1) has demonstrated 
that humans appear to be abli to han- 
dle about seven lumps of information 
at once, to keep them-"in mind". It 
is, of course, relatively easy to 
invoke situations in which we have 
more than seven things to cope with 
at once. Life is such a situation, or 
think of the complexity of walking, 
for instance. (2) 
Yet, we can live (walk). 
However, the creation of more than 
seven things to be handled at once is 
a simple result of the sort of factor- 
ising that our use of quantification 
produces. We package up our descript- 
ions into multiples of many small 
units - which we like to call variables. 
This makes them apparently easy to 
handle, but also leads to the complex- 
ity problem. In turn, we attempt to 
get over this complexity: by increasing 
our ability to cope with it (using 
computers, which can be very effective 
number handlers) and by finding shorter 
(simpler) ways of describing things. 
A lot of work has been done on both 
approaches, with remarkable results. 
Computers have become faster, bigger. 
Yet Lehmann(3) demonstrates that they 
can never be taken to be reliable. 
And specifying simpler ways of describ- 
ing and operating on our world is also 
dubious . Simplicity is as I have shown (4) related to notions of the unprovable 
Just as randomness Is. There is no 
certain measure of the simplest, as 
there is no absolute proof of the 
random. Hence, simpler is a relatively 
meaningless tem. 
Thus, our techniques for handling com- 
plexity are basically unsound. 
Yet humankind has for years dealt with, 
more-or-less successfully, what we now 
understand to be an amazingly complex 
environment. 
Which might prompt us to ask a question, 
having got ourselves to our present 
position, as to whether our current 
understanding of complexity and measure- 
ment is more related to the pragmatics 
of the descriptions we use than to the 
way In which we human beings actually 
think? 
Herbert Simon (5) has approached to the 
edge of this question. He ves an 
example of missionaries, be? nig pursued 
by cannibals reaching their boat. It 
is(quantifieý as) an 8 seater (for 
instance). But there are 9 mission- 
aries. Are they defeated by this? No! 
They find a way to fit the extra person 
in: they redefine the boat. I think of 
this as designing. 
The same concern has recently been 
applied in logics. If you have a 4- 
seater car, the number of travellers in 
that car is limited to between 0 (empty 
and 4 (full). However, we have all, 
perhaps, fitted 5 people Into a 4-seatei 
car (6). It is possible, but it is not 
probable. Quantification can thus lead 
to severe limitations In our conception, 
To paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein, (7) 
just because something has always hap 
pened (and how do we know that? ) does 
not mean it always will. 
Simon, however. gave us another insight 
(8). In chessboard reconstruction 
experiments, he showed that master 
players could more accurately recon- 
struct more complex board arrangements 
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from a short examination than could 
beginners. This should not be suppri- 
sing, but it needs some accounting for. 
Simon's account was that masters under- 
stood patterns of relations between 
pieces, while beginners didn't: so 
masters could think of several pieces 
related, as one conceptual unit, while 
beginners think of the individual 
pieces by themselves. He called these 
units of perceptive thought "Chunks". 
Masters have richer (bigger/fuller/ 
more complex)chunks than beginners, but 
the number we all have is roughly the 
same. 
Here we begin, in another way, to think 
about complexity. Some people's chunks 
are "larger" than others, and since we 
can each, apparently, handle the same 
number of chunks, it follows that as 
skill increases, the complexity of what 
we can handle will also increase. This 
is a straightforward, quantitative 
argument. 
But it is profoundly limited. No matter 
how skilful we become, the complexity we 
can handle will be trivial in comparison 
to the complexity measured, in this 
manner, of the universe. Even in the- 
oretical extremis, as in Bremmerman's 
limit to computability (9), the uni- 
verse quickly takes over, ' 
through 
combinatorial explosion: A computer 
of the mass and life of the earth, 
working at the speed of light could 
not yet have chosen with absolute cer- 
tainty the best combination of 5 
building materials. 
And humans do not think like computers. 
We, for instance, discard information. 
If we did not, we would be completely 
unable to act. And, if we are a little 
open-minded, and consider chunks and 
complexity, we may see another possible 
difference. 
There appear to be two possible notions 
of complexity. Complexity of the trad- 
itional kind already introduced (which 
I shall call a-complexity), which is 
based on the factorising and adding of 
fixed variables, and another kind, 0- 
complexity, of which chunks are am 
example, and which I shall now 
elaborate. 
Chunks appear to have a-complexity. 
and indeed can be measured in this way. 
In this manner, we can soon define 
problems that are too complex for 
humans. But chunks are also 'packages' 
of information, and such packages are 
things in their own right. The same 
package may contain more or less things 
but it is still the same package, and 
you don't know what it contains unless 
it was you who put the bits In or it 
is you who unpacks it. (Compare the 
example of walking). 
This is a-complexity. $-complexity 
is scaleless. Whereas measures in 
complexity make use of a pre-defined 
standard, O-complexity re-defines 
itself. 
Two examples may help elucidate this 
difference. Firstly, conSider how to 
multiply large numbers. A computer 
will do it exactly (within its range) 
and fast. If we do it exactly, we are 
slow (with a few remarkable individual 
exceptions). But often we use another 
technique: we round numbers in order 
to get an answer in terms of orders 
magnitude (which lets us check the com- 
puter calculation). We modify our 
numbers so we can operate quickly. For 
instance 
954 x 731 x 43 -? 
On the computer (i. e. in longhand) 
- a-complexity. 
9S4 
x731 
954 
2862 
6678 
697374 
x43 
2092122 
2789496 
29987082 
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For order of magnitude - B-complexity: 
954 - 1000 - 10 
3 
731 750 of 1000) -x 10 
3 
43 50 of 100) -x 10 
2 
bdd exponents 10 
3+3+2 
. 108 
multiply IxIaI 
result, a bit less than Ix 10 
8 
a 3.75 x 107 
=3x TO 
7 
or 30,000.000 
Notice that the second method can be 
done fast in the head, while the first 
can't. 
I timed myself doing the sums. The 
first method, on a calculator, took 10 
sec. Doing it by hand took 95 sec. 
But doing the second, in my head, took 
only 15 sec. I consider the calculator 
to bein this case, a reasonable equi- 
valent to a computer. Clearly the 10 
seconds includes my inept button pres- 
sin I suppose the full calculation 
wou? d* have taken about Im sec on a 
micro. But the computer would have to 
be programmed (which takes time), and 
a program for the second method is not 
that simple. 
I also timed the participants at the 
conference. On calculators their 
average tire was 12.0 sec. By hand, 
they took 90.5 sec, Using the second 
method required 16.5 sec. See the 
Appendix. 
Secondly, consider a room you know well. 
You know and recognise the room, but 
you could probably not list everything 
in it, though you might notice when 
something was moved. Nevertheless, it 
remains the same room (even when re- 
decorated), and even when a new crack 
is spotted ( is it new of Just newly 
perceived? ). (10) 
So we see re-definition at work in both 
0-complexity examples. The use of 
complexity, includes, in part such 
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ideas as lateral thinking, but is more 
powerful and less arbitrary than that. 
I can think of the whole of London but 
I can also think of my front door key- 
hole there! 
$-complexity is constant, while a- 
complexity may either increase or 
decrease. But just as we think in 
chunks - and a more or less fixed 
number of them (Miller's seven)- we 
need to think about problems in a way 
that reflects this. And, at the moment, 
we hardly- bother with such a way, 
obsessed as we are by quantification. 
Even in talk about $-complexity we tend 
to refer back, eternally, to a- com- 
plexity. 
Yet B-complexity seems more human, 
more closely related to thinking, and 
to design. The constant re-definition 
of the packages of o-complexity is very 
similar to the act of design, in which 
activity we are constantly addin? in 
and subtracting ideas and focuss ng on 
different aspects. Ideas are incor- 
porated and discarded within a whole. 
Levels are set up by us where they can 
be fitted in above or below the one 
one is working on, as necessary. 
This is in -sharp counterdistinction to 
a-complexity, with its (pseudo) absolute 
units and relationships (after all I 
someone defined them), where the com- 
binational explosion rapidly makes for 
a-complexity far beyond human capabil- 
ities. In e-complexity, re-definition 
of the packages leads to a constant 
complexity, in which, however, we my 
unwrap or enfold ever more a-complex- 
ityjs)It is very much a gestalt (wholes/ 
par , and the problem is the same: our methods are all to do with an 
complexity approach. 
This is the problem that I referred to, 
and to which I don't have any answer. 
But it seems to me to be central. We 
need to know how we think, and to des- 
cribe that process in a manner that is 
sympathetic to it, rather than contra- 
dicting it, and which is supportive of 
design. We need to examine how we think 
to produce that knowledge, but not by 
using techniques that, themselves, make 
certain sorts of thinking necessary. or 
which lead to particular interpretations 
as we do so often now, and as the 
Research Councils demand we do. 
The problem is: how do you study s- 
complexity not in terms of, nor forcing 
it to revert to a-complexity? And 
what is the relationship between a- and 
0-cowplexity? 
Working with Mike Robinson. I hope to 
explore this. (11) 
But where does this leave us, in build- 
ing assessment? 
I have asserted that the s-complexity 
process is similar to the design pro- 
cess. Indeed, I would argue that the 
poverty of our classical understandings 
of design can probably be-attributed 
to our Insistence on using ei-complex- 
ity as a way of approaching the study. 
But Building Utilisation Studies are 
carried out using a-complexity app- 
roaches, with the familiar problem of 
the vast complexity of information 
produced and the difficulty of using 
such information in designing. 
If the purpose of Building Utilisation 
Studies is to assist in the improve- 
ment of buildings, it has a question 
to resolve: is It possible to use this 
information to make a good building 
through a-complexity approach and pres- 
entation? Although that may not be 
what Building Utillsation Studies are 
about. 
If a-complexity is not thought to be 
a useful way of describing for design, 
however, the information needs to be 
either re-jigged, if that is possible 
or re-made, in terms of $-complexity. 
I believe, -for a number of psycholo- 
gical and numerical reasons, the 
answer lies in re-jigging for a a- 
complexity approach. This means a 
change in approach and method needs to 
be explored, just as do the true 
natures of, and contrasts and relations between *-complexity and a-complexity. 
A number of people working in Building 
Utilisation Studies and assessment 
have already started. I have tried 
only to explain the change that is 
needed, and why that is so. For me, 
the a-complexity approach is like a 
one armed bandit. It packages every- 
thing up. and while it may occasion- 
ally produce a jackpot, the partition into units and numbers leads, in the 
long run, to impoverishment. It is 
the *pro lem" of pure science ( 2). 
but, even more, it is the problem of 
the pseudo-sciences that forgot their 
purpose and are obsessed by quanti- 
fication as justification and 
legitimation: that pseudo-science 
is, indeed. a one-armed bandit, and like the punters, in assessment and 
Building Utilisation, we are hooked, 
always hoping for the big one. 
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONAIRE DISTRIBUTED AT CONFERENCE 
Name .............. *0* Occupation..................... so. 
Please carry out the following calculations, in the order given, and time 
yourself doing them. Any written work should be carried out on this sheet. 
a) 954 x 731 x 43 
Secs: 
b) 954 x 731 x 43 
Secs: 
C) 954 x731 x 43 
(approx/order of magnitude) 
(Ta) 
(exact. not on a calculator) 
(Tb) 
(calculator) 
Secs: (Tc) 
d) Do your answers to (b) and (c) agree? yes/no 
If nowhich do you believe? (b)/(C) 
e) How accurate is your answer to jaý in comparison to b% from TaJ/JTbJJ 
c% 
Jfrom JTa 
/ Te 
Summary of Data (including author's) Ta Ta b/C Subject Ta Tb Tc error TU error T-c agreement 
1 52 110 10 in Sig in Sig N 
25 120 no ans 9%*9%Y 
3 10 90 is 9%*9%Y 
4 15 120 30 in Sig 6%N 
6 15 90 13 6%6%N 
6 20 70 5 11 % 11 %Y 
7 15 60 57%7%N 
8 10 60 10 (information too confusingf N 
98 90 10 18 % 17 %N 
10 is 95 10 in Sig in Sig Y 
Mean 16.5 90.5 12.0 7.2 % 6.5 % 
SD 11.4 19.8 4.0 
Notes 
27 forms were issued and 10 returned 
"insignificanto errors are taken as less than 1%, and are counted as 0 in 
calculating the mean. 
* Extra 0 added in to calculation by accident, disregarded In these calculations 
+ Alternative answers given to calculation Ta 
All who did not get an agreement between the answers in calculations 6) and c) 
believed their calculators rather than their own calculations. In all cases they 
were "correct" in their belief. What dominance, the machine! 
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NOTES 
(1) Miller's paper "The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus Two" (Psychological. 
Review, 63 no 2.1956, also found in Psychology and Communication, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1967) starts off -For some time now, I have'-Fe-en Tugged by 
a number*. He uses a wide range of examples to show how humans tend to 
associate things in sevens (or, rather, in a range of from five to nine). 
What is important is not the value of thIs number, but rather that there 
is such a number. 
(2) Some years ago, I analysed the act of walking into a series - and I agree 
this analysis is somewhat arbitrary - of physical actions to be completed 
in taking'a step (Glanville "The Concept of an Object and the Object of 
a Concept (1978), presented at 4 EMCSR, Linz). My description went: 
TO WALK 
1. Stand upright with the weight on both feet 
2. Lean forward, to lose your balance 
3. Raise one foot off the ground 
4. Place raised foot on the ground in front of you, to regain balance 
S. Push with back foot 
6, Lift back foot off ground 
7, Do you want to stop? If so go to 11, if not continue 
a. Move back foot past line of body 
9. Place (former) back foot on the ground in front of you 
10. Go to 5 
11. Move back foot into line of body 
12. Place (former) back foot on the ground below you and in line with 
the other foot. 
My argument, from this, was that, what with keeping balance, unlevel floors, direction, obstacles to be avoided, etc. there was far too much to keep in mind. according to Miller's Magical Number Seven, for us to learn to walk by simply coordinating thoughts. And that is without considering problems of physical strength. Looking at babies falling over, and their incredible expressions of concentration, uerely brings this out. So I asserted that, in learning to walk we gradually compose in more and more of the actions as an ever expanding composite thought (concept) that becomes, eventually, that we refer to as walking. This description was accepted as accurate by the only non-crippled adult I have met who had to learn to walk: a student who had lost this skill following a motor accident. 
In a lecture given at the AA in February 1983, Lehmann demonstrated that the complexity of many current computer programs is such that they are impossible for humans to understand. beyond the bounds of reasonable logical certainty, and not even analysable in terms of machine failure. See also remarks later in this paper on complexity. 
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(4) This is a matter of provability. For a mathematician, a random number Is 
one that cannot be described in a simpler way (ie, there is no pattern in 
it) - see Chaitin, G, "Randomness and Mathematical Proof, Scientific 
American, May 1975. But you cannot prove that. because you have not yet 
found a simpler description, there is not one, any more than you can prove 
that because, let us assume, no one has found the Loch Ness Monster, there 
isn't one. In "Occam's Adventures in the Black Box" (Glanville, in Lasker, 
(Ed)" AUlied Systems and CZbernetics" Vol 11, (1981, Pergamon Oxford), I 
argued that the same holds for the concept of "simpler% itseli, since its 
degree of being simpler must depend upon an unprovable simplest. 
(S) The Cannibals and Missionaries example is taken from Simon's "Models of 
Discover4, and other ToRics in the Mathematical Sciences" ((1971) , Nosto STudies in the Philosophy ot 5cience, b4). In this booW Simon, recognising 
that complexity is a widely used by scarcely examined concept, undertakes 
one of the first, but few serious analyses of it. 
(6) This notion was first put into mathematical expression by Zadeh (the father 
of fuzzy set theory) in an invited lecture to the Fourth European Meeting 
on Cybernetics and Systems Research, Linz, 1978.1 do not know how much 
further he has carried his work. 
(7) This assertion comes from the "Tractatus Lo2ico Phil osoýhi cus*WfWi ttgenstei n, 
2nd Ed, 1966, Routledge and Kegan Fault London). ana with it, ttgenstein 
banishes the whole inductivist argument of Mills about the truth of 
scientific knowledge. I suspect that this remark was much in Wittgenstein's 
mind when he wrote, in the introduction, that he thought he had solved all 
problems of philosophy. 
(8) Simon's chess experiments (with Newell) are renowned in the areas of 
artificial Intelligence and Cognitive studies. Perhaps the best general 
statement of his views can be found in "The Sciences of the Artificial* 
(Simon, 1968, MIT Press, Cambridge). 
(9) Bremmerman ("Complexity and Transcomputability" in Duncan, R and Weston- 
Smith, M, (Eds) "The Enc clopedia of Ignorancen (1977), Pergamon Oxford) 
has argued that, because in a digital computer we must have two distinct 
values, there must be a maximum theoretical computing rate. based on the 
certain transmission of a minimum unit of energy (ie photon). From that 
limit, Beer "Brain of the Firm" (1972), Allen Lane. London) has shown that 90 the computing power of th th-as-Solid-Computer, over its lifetime, is 10 
bits. Alexander ("Notes on the Synthe5As of Form", 1964, Harvard University 
Press) demonstrated that there were lu-- possible combinations of chemical 
elements to make building materials. In my "A Cybernetic View of Education 
a nd a View of Cybernetic Education" (Glanville, Cybernetic. forthcoming), I 
elaborate and extend these arguments to show that it Is thus theoretically 
imp28slble to c8mput5Othe best combination of 5 possible Wilding materials 
(10 1010 10 
(10) This is exactly what is entailed in Piaget's dynamic unit of concept building 
- object conservation - see. for instance "The Child's Conception f RealityO (1955, Basic Books, New York). The Child (a_nT we acults, too) learn to 
construct concepts with many different perceptions (eg-Mummy Such con- 
served objects can continue to grow, just as our room is stilmi-our room, even 
when we incorporate the crack. 
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(11) Robinson and I are putting together a proposal to the U. S. Army Research 
Institute, to explore a- and 0- complexity in terms of team decision makin 
between men and machines. This paper forms part of that proposal. We wil? 
hope to provide some answer to the question posed about a- and $- complexity, 
and their measurement. If we do find an answer, it will have profound 
effects on the method of Building Utilisation Studies vis a vis Design. 
(12) 1 have argued (Glanville "Why Design Research" in Jacques, R and Powell J 
(1981) Tesign; Science: Method. ", Westbury House, Guildford) that Science is 
a branch of Design, and not (cf Oxford Conference. Ulm etc) vice versa. 
Scientific experiments are designed, and so is knowledge. 
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Unpublished Manuscript. 
MOTIVATION 
Ranulph Glanville 
Portsmouth Polytechnic 
School of Architecture 
King Henry 1 St., 
Portsmouth, Hants. 
1982 
WTIVATION 
Outline 
This document presents a reflexive teaching technique used with 
architecture students in which (aspects of) their perception of space and 
means of representing it were used to generate the design of an exhibition. 
The reasons for using it are explained and justified, and its form is laid 
bare so that other potential uses can be identified. 
In 1979 & 80 1 taught with Annetta Pedretti a course at the Archi- 
tectural Association School of Architecture in London punningly called 
MOTIF 8. This was a design project intended to exploit each student's way 
of perceiving and representing architectural space, using an interior site 
(Inigo Jones' St. Paul's Church, Covent Carden, 1979) and an exterior site 
(Bedford Square, 1980) as a source to design an exhibition displaying each 
student's perception and representation as the exhibit (the project was 
intentionally extremely reflexive). While there were significant differences 
in the project on each run, these are not important here. This document is 
an account of an experimental teaching technique and some of its uses. 
In order to explain the project I must first go into a little back- 
ground psychology. Although a lot of work has been done in Environnental 
Psychology (e. g. Canter & Lee, 1974. ) little of it has been concerned with 
e ither how designers (architects) perceive or design space. But my research 
(Glanville 1976) shows that, whereas the environmental 'psychologist isolates 
variables in the environment, when we perceive a space we do so ubolistic&lly 
and not in terms of such parts: and when we design we explore through a sort of 
private conversation with pencil and paper (amongst other things). Much of 
design, at 1ýast in architecture, cannot .I believe, be thought of in ter-. ns 
of the tightest fitting together of all the isolated variables and functions, 
as would for instance be done using normal problem-solving techniques. 
All this is germane when it comes to teaching architecture. The act of 
design is a private conversationg starting without much and wandering one is 
not quite sure where. This makes both the setting and the teaching of 
projects rather hard - the teacher is, in many ways, more ignor&nt even thnn 
2. 
0 
the student, surely an unusual phenomenon to our Western Mind! The process 
of this conversation (into which the teacher may enter, with care) is one 
students are rarely prepared for in their previous education and which 
requires much critical self-reflection, becoming aware, through this con- 
versation, of one's thought processes and means of exploring them through 
their expression. Hence one gains the control to amplify one's skill 
(attempts to teach architecture by rote strengthen this point in that they 
have failed with all but the most talented whom it appears cannot be stopped 
anyway. ) Truly, practice makes perfect! 
It was specifically to these processes of perception and representation 
that we were directing ourselves in the two MTIF 8 projects. Could we make 
them more explicit for the students to examine and learn from them? 
I had already carried out an experiment in what I called "Controlled 
Viewing". I allowed students to view a room for various periods of time 
from two seconds to 15 minutes, and then asked them to draw the room from 
memory. The group then made an exhibition of the drawings and assessed how 
long a viewing_ each drawing represented. While there were many uncontrollable 
variables, the expected result that viewing times would be apparent from the 
drawings did not hold up. This was hinted at in a previous experiment,, the 
'Blindfold Survey", in which blindfolded students tried to visualise and draw 
a room they had been in, with no success. But when, later, allowed to view 
it their instant response was "Gosh" (both in Glanville 19TT). And another 
point of interest in the "Controlled Viewing" drawings was that ofteng when 
uncertain of a detail, the students would invent "wrong" ones of their own. 
It occurred to me that there was potential in this, around which I 
structured a design project. If students drew a space without much present 
visual information, they made assumptions about some aspects of that space 
that would be proved "wrong" when compared to drawings made within that 
space. These "wrong" assumptions could express certain personal spatial 
motifs (hence the title of the project), the results of years of spatial 
perception. And, indeed$ these differences did exist in all cases - even 
those of the most talented students. 
3. 
But, as well, it was possible to ask the students to reflect on how 
they were drawing - the tactics they used to represent these spaces. For 
instance, did they "set up" the room, and then draw all the windows followed 
by all the reveals and all the glazing, or did they draw each window complete, 
one at a time? The self-conscious reflection on how they drew could perhaps 
illustrate a way in which they explored space through drawing. 
We got each student to try to record or reconstruct their tacticso We 
could not do this very scientifically since we had no means of recording 
this (although I do hope to do an exact research project on this eventually), 
but we did collect their own accounts which, because they were intentionally 
personal, are not statistically analysable but nevertheless interested us. 
The students could record some, at least, of how they had drawn. And they 
found they could recognise in their records and their drawings something about 
how they explored space. 
The question was how could we use this material in order to design a new 
space, =plifying each student's skill? How could the students use this 
understanding to motivate (ah, yes) for a design? 
The argument I have proposed is that the "tactics" that the students 
recognised in their drawings are ways of exploring the representation of 
spatial understandings. But I have also argued (Glanville 1982a) that archi- 
tectural designers act through drawing - that a drawing is not really a 
representation of an idea or concept but rather ideas and drawings interact, 
allowing the designer to develop his design through alternating internalis- 
ation and externalisation: a conversation with himself. Thusq a drawing is 
not a record of a fixed external reality but is the exploration of perceptions 
and the creation of new realities: Recreation is Creation (or as von Foerster 
1981 said "Representation should be called Preseatation. ý'). Mus the tactics 
are vays of exploring and creating space. 
How can such tactics be overtly used as a Means of design? For what 
sort of function might they provide a purpose -a brief? And what about the 
personal spatial motifs and their integration? My problem was to set a 
project for the students to answer that answered these questions. 
The solution we arrived at, 'which I believe to be one solution but by 
1l. 
by no means necessarily the only one, was to ask the students to design a 
processional exhibition that displayed how they had understood the original 
space. This was intended to show, to visitors to the exhibition, just how 
the original space could be seen - though, of course, it could be seen as 
could the exhibition by any viewer other than the designer (and, possibly, 
his teacher or another participant in the project) in an entirely different 
and possibly generatively novel manner. Thus, the exhibition was to be of a 
way of seeing (cf Berger 1972) a space: the tactics of the drawings were to 
provide a pathway for exploring the space, the motifs, the individual 
perceptions of personal spatial elements that were first explored and then 
re-designed to form the exhibition material as expressing the individual 
personal and growing understanding of space. The whole to be a new revealing 
experiencet designed from the designer's experience(s) of the original space. 
This is, of course, reflexive in the extreme (about which I shall talk in a 
momentp and which I consider to be essential to the processes I am involved 
in describing). In other words, the designer's brief was to show howq from 
his learning to experience a space, others could so learn, too. The building, 
made up from the language (van Schaik & Glanville 1982) of personal motifs 
was to display the tactics of the drawings as a set of path(s) the visitor 
could follow through the building. 
And what were the motifs? These were determined by looking at the 
controlled viewing and on site drawings and comparing them to find the "errors" 
in the controlled viewing draying. These were taken to be the personal spatial 
motifst the personal associations and inventions of the student when he was not 
sure what he had seen but needed to draw something. 
So there we have it: the exhibition hall, with a (set of) path(s) 
through it that reveal a process of exploring space, made of and filled with 
the designer's personal motifs taken from the "errors" in the controlled 
viewing drawing. (Now you see why I put "errors" and "wrong" in inverted 
co=as. )- 
But it is, of course, a design itself, the product of a design process, 
uhich as I have argued (e. g. Glanville 1980) is itself t generally. a Process of 
discovery and surprise, often meandering way off its original courses and quite 
rightly so. So we have not only a reflexive process, but one in which the 
understanding of this reflexive process is applied to itself in order to create 
I 
5. 
something new (see Glanville 1982b). In this Way, the workshop experiment 
cannot be scientifically evaluated (although I have argued (Glanvi3-le 1981) 
that science should be seen as a special case of designs rather than design 
ever being expected to be scientific). This does not worry me at all: if 
they learnt a little (which they are better qualified to judge than I)q if 
they enjoyed themselves, if they designed something decent or even awful 
but from which they could learn (no matter how far their design varied from 
the original intention), then we succeeded. After all, the purpose behind 
the whole project was educationg and design tends to "take off" with a life 
of its own. 
There must be, I imagine . many other conditions - educational and 
other - in which such a doubly reflexive method could be used, for instance, 
participation designs the imaging of a community, or any form of self-help. 
But this I leave to others to decide, although I should be very glad to hear 
of further uses and developments. 
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Appendix 
I append some photographic prints of one of the designs that was 
developed in this project, and the post-rationalised source material. The 
o riginal drawings were in colour. 
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"Motif 8. " 
From: 
"Projects Review 1978 - 9", Architectural Association School of 
Architecture, London, 1979. 
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Wofif 8 X. " 
L 
From: 
"Projects Review 1979 - 80", Architectural Association School of 
Architecture, London, 1980. 
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